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Shiffer’s Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism

Smiljana Gartner

Sažetak

If the classical argument from skepticism is true, then we cannot claim that we know something and this also affects our ordinary claims about life, nature and us. DeRose proposes the New Contextualist Solution. Shiffer argues against DeRose’s explanation about the strength of the epistemic position. He also finds contextualist’s claim that in knowledge sentences without indexical terms the skeptical paradox arises, problematic. In this paper, I am trying to argue that we should look at examples in which the same object, different persons and different standards of knowing are involved. In that case it is hard to agree either with Shiffer’s or with DeRose’s solutions.

Ključne riječi

knowledge; skepticism; attributors contextualism; epistemic standards; new contextualist solution; indexical and non-indexical terms

Hrčak ID:

5919

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/5919

Datum izdavanja:

3.7.2006.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: francuski njemački

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