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The primacy of the virtuous

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My work on this project was supported through the generosity of the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame and the Ford Foundation's Postdoctoral Fellowship Program.

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Garcia, J.L.A. The primacy of the virtuous. Philosophia 20, 69–91 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02382585

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