The Transcendental TurnSebastian Gardner, Matthew Grist Kant's influence on the history of philosophy is vast and protean. The transcendental turn denotes one of its most important forms, defined by the notion that Kant's deepest insight should not be identified with any specific epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but rather concerns the fundamental standpoint and terms of reference of philosophical enquiry. To take the transcendental turn is not to endorse any of Kant's specific teachings, but to accept that the Copernican revolution announced in the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason sets philosophy on a new footing and constitutes the proper starting point of philosophical reflection. The aim of this volume is to map the historical trajectory of transcendental philosophy and the major forms that it has taken. The contributions, from leading contemporary scholars, focus on the question of what the transcendental turn consists in--its motivation, justification, and implications; and the limitations and problems which it arguably confronts--with reference to the relevant major figures in modern philosophy, including Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein. Central themes and topics discussed include the distinction of realism from idealism, the relation of transcendental to absolute idealism, the question of how transcendental conclusions stand in relation to (and whether they can be made compatible with) naturalism, the application of transcendental thought to foundational issues in ethics, and the problematic relation of phenomenology to transcendental enquiry. |
Contents
The Transcendental Turn | 1 |
The Nature and Significance of Kants Transcendental Turn | 20 |
2 On Reconciling the Transcendental Turn with Kants Idealism | 35 |
3 Kant Naturalism and the Reach of Practical Reason | 56 |
Kantian QuestionsFichtean Answers | 74 |
On the AntiSkeptical
Strategies in Fichtes Presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre 1794 to 18012 | 96 |
6 Fichtes Transcendental Ethics | 135 |
The Transcendental
and the Metaphysical Hegel | 159 |
10 Husserl and the Transcendental | 228 |
Making Meaning
Thematic | 244 |
12 Heidegger on Unconcealment and Correctness | 264 |
13 Transcendental versus Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being and Time | 278 |
14 MerleauPontys Transcendental Theory of Perception | 294 |
Bernard Williamss Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Transcendental Idealist | 324 |
16 Stoic Transcendentalism and the Doctrine of Oikeiosis | 342 |
| 369 | |
8 Is Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument? | 173 |
9 Transcendental Aspects Ontological Commitments
and Naturalistic Elements in Nietzsches Thought | 195 |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute activity Aenesidemus appears argues assertion assumption attempt causal claim cognition conceived concept concerning constitution critical Critique Dasein determinate distinction empirical Empiricism entities error theory existence experience explain fact Fichte Fichte’s fundamental German Idealism ground Hegel Heidegger Heidegger’s hermeneutic Hierocles Houlgate human Husserl idealist interpretation intersubjectivity intuition judgement Kant Kant’s transcendental Kantian knowing knowledge logical means merely Merleau-Ponty metaphysical method moral law naturalist nature neo-Kantian Nietzsche Nietzsche’s normative notion objective thought oikeiosis one’s ontological ordinary consciousness perception Phenomenology philosophy of mind position possibility practical pre-objective precisely presupposes presupposition principle priori problem proposition psychological Pure Reason question realism reality reflection regard relation representations scendental self-consciousness Seneca sense sense-certainty simply skeptical specific Stoic structure synthetic thesis things tion transcendence transcendental argument transcendental conditions transcendental idealism transcendental idealist transcendental philosophy transcendental realism transcendental turn truth understanding Williams’s Wissenschaftslehre Wittgenstein