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Naturalising Austin

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Abstract

In this paper I will try to defend a quasi-naturalistic interpretation of J.L. Austin’s work. I will rely on P. Kitcher’s 1992 paper “The Naturalists Return” to compile four general criteria by which a philosopher can be called a naturalist. Then I will turn to Austin’s work and examine whether he meets these criteria. I will try to claim that versions of such naturalistic elements can be found in his work.

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Notes

  1. See for example Rothenberg 2006; De Gaynesford 2009.

  2. See for example: Putnam 2001.

  3. See Butler 1997.

  4. See for example: DePaul and Ramsey 1998; Bishop and Trout 2005; Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Knobe and Nichols 2008a; Hacker 2009; Jackson 1998; Stroud 2000.

  5. Thereafter SS.

  6. For the sake of economy of language I will thereafter call them analytics (just like Kitcher does).

  7. Analytic philosophy has never been a uniform tradition. However, many identify it as a sui generis conceptual investigation of some short (Rorty 1967; Hacker 2008, 2009; Jackson 1982, 1998; Cohen 1986; Dummett 1993; Stroud 2000). Others, especially today, identify it with naturalism (Kim 2003; Leiter 2004). All endeavours to strictly define analytic philosophy however have serious flows, as Glock (2008) shows. Glock rather tries to analyse the term in terms of family resemblances (overlapping similarities in method, style and doctrines) and historical-genetic analyses (a sequence of individuals and schools).

  8. See: Churchland 1986 and Bishop and Trout 2005; Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Knobe and Nichols 2008b.

  9. See for example Churchland 1986 and Bishop and Trout 2005.

  10. See for example Alexander and Weinberg 2007 and Knobe and Nichols 2008a.

  11. See Rorty 1967; also Stroud 1984; Cohen 1986; Hacker 1996; Stroll 2000; Hanfling 2000; Soames 2003; Glock 2008.

  12. B. Stroud argues the same (1984, pp. 38–82). Yet Stroud does not read Austin solely as a linguistic analyst. Austin rather provides practical (everyday life) reasons against scepticism.

  13. See Rorty 1967; Hacker 1996; Stroll 2000; Hanfling 2000; Soames 2003.

  14. Kitcher for example has criticised the argument from evolution as used in sociology and philosophy. See Kitcher 1987 and 1992, pp. 91–92.

  15. See SS, pp. 33–43 (for an analysis of real), pp. 62–77 (appears/seems), pp. 125–127 (vague).

  16. See “The Meaning of a Word” in Austin’s Philosophical Papers (thereafter PP), pp. 55–75.

  17. See also J. Duran 2002. Duran derives an anti-foundationalist argument out of Austin’s comments in SS.

  18. See for example his paper “The Meaning of a Word” in PP, pp. 55–74.

  19. See for example Hacker 1996, pp. 193–195 and passim.

  20. This is I think what Hanfling (2000, p. 204) implies, when he tries to justify this quote.

  21. This is, for example, how Hacker (1996, pp. 212–213) goes around Quine’s criticism of the analytic–synthetic distinction.

  22. Graham (1977, pp. 36–46) first emphasised that Austin uses a linguistic version of the argument from evolution. In 1981 Graham (1981, pp. 144–145) confronts Furberg (1979, pp. 465–473), who denies that Austin’s arguments are Darwinistic.

  23. See for example Millikan 1984; Dennett 1991; Kornblith 2002. For “A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism”, see Rosenberg 1996. Needless to say, there is still huge debate on the (many different) philosophical uses and versions of the evolutionary argument. See for example Buller 2005.

  24. Both aims are suggested in “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto” (Knobe and Nichols 2008b). For examples of (1) see Nichols et al. 2003; Weinberg et al. 2001. For examples of (2) see some recent papers on the free will debate: Nahmias 2006; Nichols and Knobe 2007; Nahmias et al. 2008.

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Correspondence to Renia Gasparatou.

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Gasparatou, R. Naturalising Austin. Acta Anal 28, 329–343 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0173-1

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