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Métaphysique et éthique de la reproduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 May 2017

LYNDA GAUDEMARD
LYNDA GAUDEMARD*
Affiliation:
Aix-Marseille Université
*
*<lynda@benovsky.com>
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Abstract

In this article, I examine the standard assumption that ethical disagreements on abortion and human embryonic stem cells research are grounded on metaphysical claims that underlie these ethical issues. Contrary to what some philosophers have claimed, I argue that, although the bioethical positions about the human embryo’s moral status are partly grounded on metaphysical claims, incorporating metaphysical arguments in the debates about the ethics of reproduction will not resolve this issue.

Dans cet article, j’examine la thèse classique selon laquelle les désaccords au sujet de l’avortement et de la recherche sur les cellules souches embryonnaires relèvent d’un désaccord plus fondamental relatif à des théories métaphysiques qui fondent ces positions éthiques. Je montrerai que si les positions au sujet du statut moral de l’embryon sont en partie motivées par des conceptions métaphysiques, introduire des arguments métaphysiques dans les débats relatifs à l’éthique de la reproduction ne permet pas de résoudre ce problème.

Keywords

métaphysiqueéthique de la reproductionbioéthiqueembryonpotentialitéidentité personnelleavortement
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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