Abstract
A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. (Cf. Göcke (2013) for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term “God” in philosophical and theological discourse and for an analysis of the logical form of arguments for and against the existence of God.) A recent example of this type of argument against the existence of God is based on the assumption that there are random processes or chancy states of affairs in the actual world that contradict God being absolute sovereign over his creation: Chancy states of affairs are said to entail a denial of divine providence or omniscience. (For instance, Smith (1993, p. 195) argues that “classical Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism due to the unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity.”) More often than not, however, this apparent conflict is formulated only intuitively and lacks sufficient conceptual clarification of the crucial terms involved. As a consequence, it is seldom clear where the conflict really lies. In what follows, I first provide a brief analysis of chance and randomness before I turn to cosmological and evolutionary arguments against the existence of God that in some way or other are based on chance and randomness. I end by way of comparing three popular conceptions of God as regards their ability to deal with God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. Neither classical theism, nor open theism, nor indeed process panentheism has difficulties in accounting for God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness.
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Notes
At first it might seem that “randomness” and “chance” are straightforwardly conceptually related insofar as something is random if and only if it happens by chance. Futuyma (2005, p. 225), for instance, seems to presuppose the synonymy of both terms: “scientists use chance, or randomness, to mean that when physical causes can result in any of several outcomes, we cannot predict what the outcome will be in any particular case.” Cf. also Bartholemew (2008, p. 140), “it is only at this final stage that chance enters. The selection appears to be entirely at random. That is, there is nothing that we could possibly observe which would help us to predict the outcome.” The putative synonymy of chance and randomness blurs important epistemological and ontological distinctions that should be kept apart in order to avoid confusion. For further analysis of the distinction between chance and randomness, see (Eagle 2015).
As Eagle (2011a, p. 339) says, this understanding of chance is what “we normally interpret as physical or empirical probabilities, such as: (a) The probability that a fair coin lands heads when tossed is one-half. (b) The probability that this uranium-238 atom will decay in the next 4.468 billion years is one-half.” Cf. also Giere (2011, p. 501) says, “it is the single case that is fundamental for understanding what physical probabilities are.”
According to Schaffer (2007, p. 123), “chance is connected to such further notions as credency, possibility, futurity, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. To characterize the role of chance is to trace such connections.” However, it seems to me that Schaffer’s way to characterize chance should be divided into a characterisation of elements connected to chance and elements connected to randomness.
As Earman (1986, p. 13) states, “the world w ∈ W (the set of physically possible worlds) is […] deterministic just in case for any w′ ∈ W, if w and w′ agree at any time, then they agree for all times.” Cf. also Schaffer (2007, p. 115): “Determinism: A world w is deterministic iff: for all times t in we, the total occurent history of w supervenes on the occurent state of w at t together with the laws of w.”
As Papineau (2002, p. 17) says, “All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories. […] A stricter version [of causal closure] would say that the chances of physical effects are always fully fixed by their prior physical histories.” Cf. also Plantinga (2011, pp. 92–93): “[In quantum mechanics,] we don’t get a prediction of a unique configuration for the system at t, but only a distribution of probabilities across many possible outcomes.” Cf. Papineau (2000) for a justification of the validity of the principle of causal closure. See Göcke (2008) and Lowe (2008) for a critical discussion of the plausibility of causal closure. Although the assumption that the world is causally closed is controversial as a metaphysical assumption and not an implication of science itself, I assume for the sake of this paper that it is true that the actual world is causally closed.
Here is another argument according to which the existence of maximal chance is problematic: “Indeed, it is impossible in the nature of the case to establish beyond question that any event is an absolutely chance occurrence. For to show beyond all possible doubt that at a given happening (e.g. the decomposition of an atom) is spontaneous and without determining circumstances, it would be necessary to show that there is nothing whatever upon which its occurrence depends. But this would be tantamount to showing that no satisfactory theory could ever be devised to explain what present theories already explain, and in addition account for the allegedly spontaneous event. However, though any amount of evidence might be produced to show that the given event’s occurrence does not depend on a specified set of factors, the possibility would not thereby excluded that other factors may eventually be found in which to determine the event’s occurrence, and that in consequence a theory might yet be constructed which will do what our present theories fail to do” (Nagel 1961, pp. 332–333).
Cf., for instance, Eagle (2011a, p. 3): “The mathematical notion of an algebra makes the notion of a collection of possible outcomes rigorous. With it in hand, we can now say what it is that probabilities attach to. They attach to each member of an algebra of outcomes, so that for every member of the algebra, there will be an associated probability. As probabilities are numerical, probability is a function: a mapping that, for each member of some algebra, yields a number—which is the probability of that event or proposition.”
This is the ‘Basic Chance Principle’ according to which the following holds: “In general, if the chance of A is positive, there must be a possible future in which A is true. Let us say that any such possible future grounds the positive chance of A. But what kinds of worlds can have futures that ground the fact that there is a positive chance of A in the actual world? Not just any old worlds […T]he positive present chance of A in this world must be grounded by the future course of events in some A-world sharing the history of our world and in which the present chance of A has the same value as it has in our world” (Bigelow et al. 1993, p. 459).
According to Giere (2011, p. 498), “probability is becoming ever more important in all areas of science. Yet although there is widespread agreement concerning the mathematical development of probability theory, there are still fundamental disputes as to what further interpretation (or interpretations) of probability are needed both for a clear understanding of scientific inquiry and for sound scientific practice.”
As Ismael (1996, p. 83) argues, “the most natural way of classifying accounts of chance, or as it is often called in this context ‘objective probability’, is according to whether they recognize an analytic connection between chance and frequency.”
Here is Russell’s classic idea of finite actual frequentism, “Let B be any finite class, and A any other class. We want to define the chance that a member of B chosen at random will be a member of A, e.g. that the first person you meet in the street will be called Smith. We define this probability as the number of B’s that are A’s divided by the total number of B’s” (Russell 1948, p. 368).
Cf. Hájek (2011a, p. 412): “Frequentism has laudable empiricist motivations, and frequentists have typically had an eye on scientific applications of probability[…]. But hypothetical [and modal] frequentism make[…] two modifications of that account that ought to make an empiricist uneasy: its invocation of a limit, and of a counterfactual. Regarding the limit, any finite sequence—which is, after all, all we ever see—puts no constraint whatsoever on the limiting relative frequency of some attribute. Limiting relative frequencies are unobservable in a strong sense: improving our measuring instruments or our eyesight as much as we like would not help us ascertain them.”
Cf. also Hájek (2011b, p. 400): “It is the coin’s probability of landing heads that gives rise to its statistics, rather than the other way round.”
Cf. Hájek (2011b, pp. 398–399): “We think that various events straightforwardly have unconditional probabilities, and indeed we even have theories that tell us what some of these probabilities are. But it seems that frequentism delivers only conditional probabilities—or in any case, relativized probabilities. […] Suppose I am interested in my probability of dying by age 60. What I want is an unconditional probability. I can placed in various reference classes: the set of all living things; the set of all human; the set of all males, the set of all non-smoking males who exercise occasionally, the set of all philosophers; the set of all Wood Allen fans…Each of these reference classes will have its own associated relative frequency for death by age 60. But I’m not interest in my probability of death qua philosopher, say. To repeat, I want an unconditional probability.”
As Lewis (1986, p. 90) says, “[w]e have think that a coin about to be tossed has a certain chance of falling heads, or that a radioactive atom has a certain chance of decaying within the year, quite regardless of what anyone may believe about it and quite regardless of whether there are any other similar coins or atoms. As philosophers we may well find the concept of objective chance troublesome, but that is no excuse to deny its existence, its legitimacy, or its indispensability. If we can’t understand it, so much the worse for us.”
According to Miller (1996, p. 139) “[t]he propensity interpretation of probability is inescapably metaphysical, not only because many propensities are postulated that are not open to empirical evaluation.” Popper (1990, p. 17) agrees: “But in many kinds of events […] the propensities cannot be measured because the relevant situation changes and cannot be repeated. This would hold, for example, for the different propensities of some of our evolutionary predecessors to give rise to chimpanzees and to ourselves. Propensities of this kind are, of course, not measurable, since the situation cannot be repeated. It is unique. Nevertheless, there is noting to prevent us from supposing such propensities exist, and from estimating them speculatively.” Against the metaphysical interpretation of the propensity theory, Gillies (2000, p. 824) argues as follows: “The main problem with […] views on propensity of Popper and Miller is that they appear to change the propensity theory from a scientific to a metaphysical theory.” However, since metaphysics is not as such in contradiction to science, and since every scientific theory is yet already embedded in a metaphysical context, it is no good reason to argue against the adequacy of the propensity theory of probability that it is metaphysical.
Gillies (2000, p. 822): “Propensity theories […] can […] be classified into (i) long-run propensity theories, and (ii) single case propensity theories. A long run propensity theory is one in which propensities are associated with repeatable conditions, and are regarded as propensities to produce in a long series of repetitions of these conditions frequencies which are approximately equal to probabilities. A single-case propensity theory is one in which propensities are regarded as propensities to produce a particular result on a specific occasion.”
As Popper (2011, p. 495) says, “thus the estimate of the measure of a possibility—that is, the estimate of the probability attached to it—has always a predictive function, while we should hardly predict an event upon being told no more than that this event is possible. In others words, we do not assume that a possibility as such has any tendency to realise itself; but we do interpret probability measures, or ‘weights’ attributed to the possibility, as measuring its disposition, or tendency, or propensity to realise itself; and in physics (or in betting) we are interested in such measures […] We therefore cannot get round the fact that we treat measures of possibilities as dispositions or tendencies or propensities.”
According to Popper, “like all dispositional properties, propensities exhibit a certain similarity to Aristotelian potentialities. But there is an important difference: they cannot, as Aristotle thought, be inherent in the individual things. They are not properties inherent in the die, or in the penny, but in something a little more abstract, even though physically real” (Popper 2011, p. 496). I have to confess that I fail to see the argument here. Popper merely asserts that they cannot be inherent in the particular in question. From a systematic point of view, however, it is the best explanation and in accordance with the present ontology of possible worlds if we assume that the propensities are inherent in the particulars in question.
More technically: suppose that f is the future and h the history of w and suppose that h’ is the history of h and h the future of h’. The objective probability for S to obtain in f can be different depending on whether we take into account h or h’.
According to van Inwagen, the obtaining of a state of affairs is a matter of chance if and only if “the event or state of affairs is without purpose or significance; it is not part of anyone’s plan; it serves no one’s end; and it might very well not have been” (Van Inwagen 1995, p. 50). However, this definition mixes up ontology and epistemology. If a state of affairs obtains and is no part of anyone’s plan, then it still might be necessary or determined to obtain. To say that it might not have obtained on the other hand, is too little a demand on something of which we suppose that it happens as a matter of chance.
According to Eagle (2005, p. 750), “the views about randomness in which philosophers currently acquiesce are fundamentally mistaken about the nature of the concept.” Furthermore, according to Howson and Urbach (1993, p. 324), “it seems highly doubtful that there is anything like a unique notion of randomness there to be explicated.”
These are the assumption the members of a community would agree upon if they had an ideal discourse concerning their assumptions. For our purpose, in the context of science, we can think of a shared research paradigm that constitutes the shared belief system.
As Eagle (2005, p. 766) argues, “prediction is an activity that arose primarily in the context of agency, where having reasonable expectations about the future is essential for rational action. Creatures who were not goal directed would have no use for predictions.”
What about laws of nature? Is science not concerned to discover laws of nature? Although the term “laws of nature” is often deployed in the discussion, it is not clear what precisely a law of nature is supposed to be. Cf. Göcke (2015) for an analysis of laws of nature in terms of the dispositional behaviour of fundamental natural entities.
As Eagle (2005, p. 769) states: “The agent P who wishes to make the prediction has some epistemic and computational capabilities.” Eagle (2005, p. 770): “As such, it is accepted theory and current evidence that are to be taken as basic; these fix some prediction functions as reasonable for the agents who believe those theories and have observed that evidence.”
Eagle (2005, p. 769) provides the following definition of what a prediction is: “A prediction function CP,T(M, t) takes as input the current state M of a system described by a theory T as discerned by a predictor P, and an elapsed time parameter, and yields a temporally indexed probability distribution Prt over the space of possible states of the system. A prediction is a specific use of some prediction function by some predictor on some initial state and elapsed time, who then adopts Prt as his posterior credence function (conditional on the evidence and the theory)”.
This is, for instance, also explicit in Lewis’ ‘Best System Account’: “Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, better systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative than others. These virtues compete: An uninformative system can be very simple, an unsystematized compendium of miscellaneous information can be very informative. The best system is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between the simplicity and strength. How good a balance that is will depend on how kind nature is. A regularity is a law IFF it is a (contingent) theorem of the best system” (Lewis 1994, p. 478).
I assume that divine omniscience, roughly, entails that God knows everything that is possible to be known for the creator of the universe. I assume furthermore assume that “divine providence is God’s care, provision, foresight and direction of the universe in such a way that the universe as a whole and individual creatures within it fulfil God’s purposes” (Hasker 1998, p. 797).
Cf. Davies (1981, p. 161): “anything can come out of a naked singularity—in the case of the big bang the universe came out. Its creation represents the instantaneous suspension of physical laws, the sudden, abrupt flash of lawlessness, that allowed something to come out of nothing.” Cf. also Hawking (1976, p. 2460): “A singularity is a place where the classical concepts of space and time break down as do all the known laws of physics because they are all formulated on a classical space–time background.”
Smith (1993, pp. 200–201) states the argument as follows: “(1) If God exists and there is an earliest state E of the universe, then God created E. (2) If God created E, then E is ensured either to contain animate creatures or to lead to a subsequent state of the universe that contains animate creatures. (3) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly benevolent. (4) An animate universe is better than an inanimate universe. (5) There is an earliest state of the universe and it is the Big Bang singularity. (6) The earliest state of the universe is inanimate since the singularity involves the life-hostile conditions of infinite temperature, infinite curvature, and infinite density. (7) The Big Bang singularity is inherently unpredictable and lawless and consequently there is no guarantee that it will emit a maximal configuration of particles that will evolve into an animate state of the universe. (A maximal configuration of particles is a complete state of the universe, the universe as a whole at one time.) (8) The earliest state of the universe is not ensured to lead to an animate state of the universe. (9) God could not have created the earliest state of the universe. (10) God does not exist.”
Cf. Leftow (1991, p. 251): “If God is timeless, God’s knowledge is not in the temporal past, present, or future of [the obtaining of S…]. If God’s knowledge is wholly outside time, it cannot have the sort of temporal relation to [the obtaining of states of affairs in the actual world] which would let it determine them… [Fn8:] If this is so, then in a sense, we cannot call God’s knowledge that [S obtains] foreknowledge, for God does not know this before [the obtaining of S]. Of course, as many have noted, it can be called foreknowledge quoad nos, insofar as God has knowledge of matter that for us are future.”
Cf. Russell (1998, p. 221): “God does not foresee our future from our present or foreknow our future by calculating the outcome from our present. Instead, God as eternal sees and knows the future in its own present time and determinate state. Such a view was given a highly nuanced formulation in classical theism, and it has been reshaped in important new ways during the twentieth century by a number of Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians. The basic point, however, is that God’s knowledge of what is for us the indeterminate future is God’s eternal knowledge of an event in what is its own present, determinate state.”
I assume that molinism here can be treated as a form of classical theism. Cf. Craig (1993, p. 219): “According to Molina, in addition to the contingency of the world that springs from God’s free action as the primary cause, there is a natural contingency that exists in the world either directly or as a result of indeterministic secondary causes or indirectly as the product of causal chains stemming from indeterministic secondary causes. Molina maintained that logically prior to God’s eternal decision to create the world, He possessed an exhaustive knowledge, not only of all metaphysically necessary states of affairs, but also of all conditional future contingents. These latter are conditional states of affairs indicating which naturally contingent effects would be produced, directly or indirectly, by indeterministic secondary causes, granted the obtaining of some condition that specifies a possible arrangement of secondary causes. By actualizing the state of affairs specified in the condition, God can ensure that the contingent state of affairs which would ensue does in fact ensue. In this way God can providentially govern a world containing indeterministic secondary causes without removing from that world its contingency.”
According to Griffin (2004, p. 36), “Panentheism is the content of a divine revelation that has been occurring in the cultural life of the West, primarily through religious, moral, scientific, and philosophical experience, roughly over the past two centuries. It is ‘postmodern’ in that it goes beyond, while incorporating the central truths of, the dominant worldviews of early and late modern periods in the West”.
According to this understanding of God, God has contingent as well as essential properties. In respect to divine omniscience, process panentheists specify their assumption as follows: “To say that God changes in this sense does not imply, however, that God’s character or essence changes. For example, God’s (concrete) knowledge changes because the creatures, with their power of self-determination, constantly do new, unpredictable things. But God always embodies the abstract attitude of omniscience, because God always knows what is knowable at any particular time” (Griffin 2014, p. 27).
Furthermore, “these higher-level enduring individuals are, by hypothesis, not simply complex arrangements of lower-level individuals. Rather, they involve higher-level energetic events, with their own unity of response to their environments. This emergence of higher-level units is possible because of internal relations. That is, because each event is internally constituted out of the things in its environment, a more complex environment can provide the basis for more complex events and thereby ‘compound individuals’, which are more complex enduring individuals compounded out of simpler ones” (Griffin 2014, p. 78).
I am grateful to the referees, Andrew Pinsent, Stephen Priest, Anna Sindermann, Christian Tapp, and Christian Weidemann. Research for this article was made possible through the grant Creation at Random? Indeterminism as a Challenge to Theism, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI (USA).
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Göcke, B.P. Did god know it? God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. Int J Philos Relig 78, 233–254 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9531-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9531-4