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Does mentality entail consciousness?

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  1. Syracuse University, 13244, Syracuse, New York, U.S.A

    Rocco J. Gennaro

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Gennaro, R.J. Does mentality entail consciousness?. Philosophia 24, 331–358 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379962

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