

Nietzsche and the Politics of Difference

Edited by
Andrea Rehberg and Ashley Woodward

DE GRUYTER

George W. Shea, IV
**Nietzsche, Foucault and the Politics of the
Ascetic Ideal**

Abstract: While traces of a post-metaphysical political theory are to be found throughout his *oeuvre*, Nietzsche himself never explicitly elaborates any such comprehensive theory. Yet, this chapter argues, it is possible to discern a politics beyond *ressentiment* and the ascetic ideal, which must be both experimental and pluralist. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault thinks the political as a play of force relations immanent to a concrete strategic field, and thus as a multiplicity of power relations existing in agonistic tension rather than as a duality in antagonistic opposition. This makes him one of the most significant inheritors of the Nietzschean challenge to overcome the politics of *ressentiment* and to think instead a politics of affirmation that makes difference constitutive of the political.

1 Introduction

Nietzsche's place within political theory is still a highly contested one. Scholars grappling with Nietzsche as a political thinker have developed a myriad of "Nietzsches": as apolitical (Brobjer 1998 and Kaufmann 2013), as sceptic (Shaw 2010), as perfectionist (Conway 1997), as aristocrat (Detwiler 1990; Appel 1999), as liberal (Connolly 1991), as agonist (Hatab 1995), etc. In this chapter, I will refrain from engaging in these debates or offering to name definitively Nietzsche's "political doctrine". Instead, I prefer to take seriously the question that motivates this collection of essays – namely, how might we understand Nietzsche as offering – or better yet, how might we mobilise Nietzsche to think – a "politics of difference"? I regard as central to this task an appreciation of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics. As a post-metaphysical thinker, Nietzsche directly challenges the tenability of the metaphysical faith in the value of truth and all that it assumes. To sound out such idols is, as Nietzsche rightly recognises, to up-end the rational order that has governed western culture since at least Plato, though, we might ask, to what end? What are the ramifications of such a critique? There is, undoubtedly, more to Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics than could possibly be said about it in the span of a short chapter. Nevertheless, I want to focus here on what I regard to be the pluralistic dimensions of such a critique and their implications for developing a politics of difference. While clues and traces of a politics of difference can be found throughout Nietzsche's

oeuvre, it is generally agreed that Nietzsche himself never elaborates an explicit political theory. Thus, I will suggest that if our aim is to distil a politics of difference from Nietzsche's thought, the work of Michel Foucault serves as one exemplary model for how we might go about conceiving such a politics. While there is much excellent scholarship already exploring significant connections between Nietzsche and Foucault¹ – for instance, focusing on the will to know, genealogy as a critical and transformative practice, freedom and self-fashioning, and the intersecting of truth, power, and the subject within history – I will advance a reading of Foucault's work in light of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal. By framing Foucault's work in light of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal, a connection which has gone underappreciated in the literature, I will specifically call attention to the import of Foucault's overt characterisation of genealogy as a "method" in contradistinction to metaphysical philosophy. On this basis, I will argue that Foucault's work can be read as a considered theorisation of the political implications of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, offering what might be regarded as a 'politics of affirmation' – in contrast to that of a 'politics of *ressentiment*' – one that makes possible a post-foundationalist political activism. In this light, I will further argue that Foucault's politics of affirmation brings into relief the contours of a politics of difference germinal in Nietzsche. In spelling out these implications, I will draw primarily on Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality* as well as on Foucault's later works.

2 Nietzsche: Diagnosing the Politics of the Ascetic Ideal

That Nietzsche's *Genealogy* is a nuanced and complicated text is, obviously, an understatement as it not only runs several different arguments simultaneously, but those different arguments additionally cut across and reinforce one another in often subterranean and significant ways. For this reason, the *Genealogy* is an extremely rich text and there is much to be made, and has been made, of its various themes. Nonetheless, despite the complicated staging of characters and motifs that Nietzsche sets out, the rhetorical tenor of the text crescendos in the third and final essay when Nietzsche introduces the ascetic ideal and begins to exam-

¹ See, e.g., Thiele (1990); Ansell-Pearson (1991); Mahon (1992); McWhorter (1992); Owen (1998); Shapiro (2003); Milchman and Rosenberg (2007); Lightbody (2010a and 2010b); Westfall and Rosenberg (2018); and Tuana and Scott (2020).

ine
pre
tic
a se
ic c

of p
ses
Her
wha
Mor
and
has
fait

ifica
gark
mat
tenti

On th
of the
full b
I
Philo
faith
not,
make

2 Niet
and di
truths
tained

ine its meaning.² And yet, with this introduction, several questions immediately present themselves to us. Why the ascetic ideal at all? Why the hurried and frantic sense surrounding Nietzsche's inquiry? And, perhaps most significantly, why a sense of danger such that the ascetic ideal stands as the final and most dramatic of Nietzsche's motifs?

Near the close of the *Genealogy*, as Nietzsche begins to elaborate the stakes of philosophers having worn the mask of the ascetic priest for so long, he discloses to us what an inquiry into the meaning of the ascetic ideal entails for him. Here, he tells us, 'I do not want to bring to light what the ideal did; rather simply what it ... indicates, what lies hidden behind, beneath and within it' (GoM III, 23). More specifically, for Nietzsche, this involves bringing to light its aim, its purpose and its goal. We are told that this goal, the crowning jewel of the ascetic ideal, has been determined by the unconditional will to truth and the metaphysical faith in the value as such of truth (GoM III, 24).

For Nietzsche, this faith on the part of metaphysicians is tantamount to a deification of truth. Thus, whether in its priestly, philosophical, or even scientific garb, the ascetic ideal aims at the divine, and, in aiming at the divine, it ultimately aims at the transcendent. On this precise point, Nietzsche draws our attention in the *Genealogy* to a passage from *The Gay Science*, noting:

The truthful man, in that daring and final sense which faith in science presupposes, *thus affirms another world* from the one of life, nature and history; and inasmuch as he affirms this 'other world', must he not therefore deny its opposite, this world, *our world*, in doing so? ... Our faith in science is still based on a *metaphysical faith*, – even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take *our fire* from the blaze set alight by a faith thousands of years old, that faith of the Christians, which was also Plato's faith, that God is truth, that truth is *divine*. (GoM III, 24)

On the one hand, this clearly represents the culmination of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal as life-denying; but, on the other hand, it also draws out the full implications of Nietzsche's critique of the logic of the metaphysicians' faith.

In the opening section of *Beyond Good and Evil*, "On the Prejudices of the Philosophers", Nietzsche states in no uncertain terms that 'The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is *the faith in antithetical values*' (BGE 2). This is not, however, a banal faith in mere oppositions. Rather, Nietzsche wants to make clear to us that the unquestioned metaphysical faith in the value of

² Nietzsche's own account of the *Genealogy* in *Ecce Homo* remarks upon its distinctive tempo and drama: 'Gradually an increasing disquiet; isolated flashes of lightning; very unpleasant truths becoming audible as a dull rumbling in the distance – until at last a *tempo feroce* is attained in which everything surges forward with tremendous tension' (EH Books: GoM).

truth is the very impetus from which an entire metaphysico-ontological structure has emerged. As Nietzsche notes a few sections later, "To explain how a philosopher's most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to ask oneself first: what morality does this (does *he* –) aim at?" (BGE 6).

In the case of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche is not merely critiquing Plato or the Stoics, or some other particular philosopher, but is instead bringing to light an assumed metaphysico-ontological structure that underpins the entire western philosophical tradition as a result of the value invested in a particular conception of truth. Thus, we find that because metaphysicians value truth, the intransient is therefore privileged over the transient; and, consequently, being over becoming, identity over difference, the one over the many, reason over the senses, the immaterial over the material, and the unhistorical over the historical. All of this culminates in the assumption of a metaphysical subject that can extricate itself from the contaminations of this world and attain the purity of another. This is further manifested even in the moralisation at the heart of substance ontologies that privilege unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality and being as the true and the good in contrast to change, mutation and becoming, which are regarded as signs of 'appearance' that lead us astray (TI Reason. All of this is, for Nietzsche, symptomatic of an equation that has been assumed from the outset by the metaphysical faith in the value of truth: Being = Truth = Reason = Highest Value = God = The One and Only Rightful Authority (TI Reason; GoM III, 24).

It is, however, the moment when Nietzsche draws our attention to the dangers that lurk within the metaphysicians' faith that we begin to understand the hurried and frantic sense surrounding his analyses. Nietzsche's inquiry into the meaning of the ascetic ideal reveals the insidious way in which it functions both to arrest the circulation of other systems of interpretation and to mask itself as an interpretation. As Nietzsche notes:

The ascetic ideal has a *goal*, – this being so general that all the interests of human existence appear petty and narrow when measured against it; it inexorably interprets epochs, races, and human beings, all with reference to this one goal, it permits of no other interpretation, no other goal, and rejects, denies, affirms, and confirms with reference only to *its* interpretation (– and was there ever a system of interpretation more fully thought through?); it does not subject itself to any power, in fact, it believes in its superiority over any power, in its unconditional *superiority of rank* over any other power, – it believes there is nothing on earth of any power that does not first have to receive its meaning, a right to exist, a value from it, as a tool to *its* work, as a way and means to *its* goal, to *one* goal. (GoM III, 23)

This follow
describes it

[Presents
human c
Nietzsche
flecting a

Thus, withir
the one and
ers (appears
than already
will to truth
other than it
it is the one
What Nie
nealogy, is th
being the pr
radiant gaze
the ascetic ic
the pinnacle
tempts to do t
cording to the
from power –
from power w
theless as the
are to confor
to absolve itse
treated as me
that is, its law
e's estimation,
the value of tr
ascetic ideal is
other systems t
tological struct
technique of p
Nietzsche's
lished by the r
twofold operati
side/outside of

This follows directly from the very nature of metaphysical truth. As David Owen describes it in his own analysis of the *Genealogy*, the ascetic ideal:

[Presents] itself as objectively valid, that is, as the only possible way of conceptualizing human existence. It is this in-built denial of its own perspectival character that, on Nietzsche's account, explains how we have come to be wholly captivated by the way of reflecting and evaluating human existence expressed in the ascetic ideal. (Owen 2007, p. 123)

Thus, within the order of metaphysics, it comes to be the case that since there is the one and only truth that stands above the fray of false claimants and imposters (appearance), since it itself stands in accord with itself for no other reason than already being itself (reality), the system of interpretation installed by the will to truth must of necessity deny all other interpretations, goals and orders other than itself – in other words, according to its own system of interpretation, it is the one and only order because it is, that is, Being = Truth.

What Nietzsche uncovers in all of this, and what is made manifest in the *Genealogy*, is that the unconditional will to truth is inherently political. Far from being the product of an innocent 'contemplation without interest' or 'the pure radiant gaze of the sage' (GoM III, 6; BGE 2), the will to truth at the heart of the ascetic ideal aims to enthrone itself as the highest authority and thus as the pinnacle of power with no other power or authority standing above it. It attempts to do this through its very structuring of the system of interpretations. According to the laws of a system of its own design, it presents itself as divorced from power – conceived of as corruption and bias – and thereby uncouples itself from power while simultaneously standing above power, yet functioning nonetheless as the pinnacle of power insofar as all other systems of interpretation are to conform to its law. Thus, it manages both to rule with an iron fist and to absolve itself entirely of ruling. In this way, its proclamations are not to be treated as mere edicts since they are purportedly expressions of Being itself – that is, its laws are not its laws, they are rather reality itself (though, in Nietzsche's estimation, a reality constructed on the basis of the metaphysicians' faith in the value of truth). Consequently, the system of interpretation inaugurated by the ascetic ideal is to be regarded as the one and only system and there are to be no other systems than it. Ultimately, as Nietzsche aims to show, the metaphysico-ontological structure installed by the metaphysical faith in the value of truth is a technique of power if not 'the ultimate sanction of power' (GoM III, 1).

Nietzsche's analysis further reveals that the system of interpretation established by the metaphysical conception of truth functions along the lines of a twofold operation of power. On the one hand, it divides by constructing an inside/outside of its domain – reality/appearance, true/untrue, legitimate/illegiti-

mate, and thus proper power (justice) and abuse of power (corruption). On the other hand, it works to coalesce divergences and differences by governing the entirety of its domain as the one and only rightful domain into which everything is to be assimilated. Thus, through this twofold operation of division and coalescence, the will to truth sanctions the eradication of that which is untrue and other than itself while simultaneously bringing that which remains entirely under its control. In this way, nestled within the will to truth is the totalitarian, autocratic and homogenising will to the one. Everything is to succumb to its law with the intent that, ultimately, there will be no remainder, that nothing will remain “untamed” in a wilderness outside. Lawrence Hatab, in a slightly different context, similarly notes this homogenising tendency at work in the ascetic ideal:

For Nietzsche, *any* development of culture out of natural conditions and any innovation will require a dynamic discomfort, resistance, and overcoming, that is, a contest with some Other. Nietzsche asks us not only to acknowledge this dynamic but also to be wary of its dangers, which are indicated in traditional constructs and their *polarization* of a conflicted field into the oppositions of good and evil, truth and error. The ascetic ideal in the end represents the desire to escape the difficulty of incorporating the Other (*as other*) into one's field of operation. Affirmation, for Nietzsche, is anything but comfortable and pleasant; it means taking on the difficulty of *contending [with] the Other without wanting to annul it*. (Hatab 2008, pp. 109–110)

In other words, the ascetic ideal cannot abide the existence of that which is other than it. Thus, it interprets *everything* in light of its *one* goal, excluding all others.

And yet, once again, we must ask: why the ascetic ideal? Why the unconditional will to truth that it harbours? How does a system of interpretation so hostile to anything outside of, and other than, itself emerge? Nietzsche provides an account of this emergence in the first essay of the *Genealogy* via his analysis of the slave revolt in morality. More specifically, in sections 13 and 14 of the first essay, Nietzsche sheds light on what he calls the ‘fabrication of ideals’ and tells the tale of the birds of prey and the little lambs. In this scenario, we have two separate systems of valuation – one in which the birds of prey enjoy eating the lambs and another in which the lambs resent being carried off and eaten by the birds of prey. According to Nietzsche's own estimation of this situation, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that there are these separate systems of valuation. This situation radically alters, however, when *ressentiment*, born from the resentment that the lambs hold against the birds of prey and in conjunction with a powerlessness and inability to do anything about their situation, grows creative. The lambs want revenge but cannot take it. And, in the very specific differential generated between these two systems, Nietzsche locates the transformation of the desire for revenge into the desire for justice. The distinctly

i
t
“
s
t
t
e
o
la
t
t
t
tr
pl
te
th

es
ck
W
id
co
rec
ist

Witi
foot
peal

interesting moment in this transformation, to which Nietzsche draws our attention, is the moment when the lambs move from demanding “lamb justice” to “true justice”. They demand “justice as such” – a justice that is one and the same for all, a justice that transcends the two separate systems and binds them together. This is a justice, founded on a metaphysical conception of truth that not only aims to link the two previously distinct systems of valuation together in a permanent way, but also aims to cause the one to tilt and slide into the other, bringing it about that the former is subsumed into and reorganised by the latter. Ultimately, what Nietzsche’s excavation of the ascetic ideal uncovers is that the will to truth, as a form of politics, functions as a technique of power that operates through division and coalescence to subsume that which is other than it into and under it. In this way, metaphysical truth, posited as univocal transcendence, functions strategically and tactically to capture a field of multiplicities in order to arrest the play of their differences; and it is precisely this technique of power, born from the will to truth – which is a will to the one – that embodies a politics of *ressentiment*.

Having elaborated the operations of this technique of power, Nietzsche raises the question of a counter-ideal, asking, ‘Where is the counterpart to this *closed system* of will, goal, and interpretation?’ (GoM III, 23, emphasis added). With Nietzsche having focused so intently on the priestly mask of the ascetic ideal, one might be tempted to hold up modern science and atheism as providing counter-ideals. However, Nietzsche dismisses science as the ascetic ideal’s ‘*most recent and noble manifestation*’ (GoM, III, 23). As for atheists, sceptics and nihilists, Nietzsche derisively retorts:

These ‘no’-sayers and outsiders of today, those who are absolute in one thing, their demand for intellectual rigour, these hard, strict, abstinent, heroic minds who make up the glory of our time, all these pale atheists, Antichrists, immoralists, nihilists, these sceptics, ephectics, *hectics* of the mind (they are one and all the latter in a certain sense), these last idealists of knowledge in whom, alone, intellectual conscience dwells and is embodied these days, – they believe they are all as liberated as possible from the ascetic ideal, these ‘free, very free spirits’: and yet, I will tell them what they themselves cannot see – because they are standing too close to themselves – this ideal is quite simply *their* ideal as well, they themselves represent it nowadays, and perhaps no-one else: they themselves are its most intellectual product, its most advanced front-line troops and scouts, its most insidious product, delicate and elusive form of seduction: – if I am able at all to solve riddles, I wish to claim to do so with this pronouncement! ... These are very far from being *free* spirits: *because they still believe in truth*. (GoM III, 24)

With these words, Nietzsche aims to place our thinking on an entirely different footing. Any particular ideal that aspires to displace the ascetic ideal via an appeal of the sort that it alone has finally arrived at the truth – in the same way

that science claimed to have deposed religion and philosophy – is, simply, just another variant in the long line of successors operating in accord with the ascetic ideal. As Hatab again insightfully notes, ‘It seems that the *antimetaphysical* posture here would sustain the binary thinking that constitutes a metaphysical faith (while *contending* with metaphysics would be a different story)’ (Hatab 2008, p. 113). Of importance here is the realisation that any attempt to refute the ascetic ideal by means of an appeal to a metaphysical truth only replicates the ascetic ideal in the end – and this is most especially the case for those anti-metaphysical positions that take aim to refute metaphysics.³ Thus, Nietzsche’s question is all the more pressing. Where is the counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal? Who or what, in Hatab’s words, can ‘contend’ with metaphysics?

Within the *Genealogy* itself, Nietzsche is far from forthcoming in terms of a clear and explicit answer. In section 25 of the third essay, Nietzsche briefly remarks that ‘art’ is ‘much more opposed to the ascetic ideal than science is’ (GoM III, 25), and in section 27, he quickly notes that the ascetic ideal has ‘only one type of enemy and *injurer*: these are the comedians of this ideal – because they arouse mistrust’ (GoM III, 27). However, in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche explicitly names Zarathustra as a counter-ideal, as the ascetic ideal’s “competitor” (EH Books, GoM). This latter remark helps shed light on Nietzsche’s allusions to Zarathustra at the end of the second essay and at the beginning of the third essay in the *Genealogy*. These cryptic allusions on Nietzsche’s part open up an immense field of interpretative possibilities, and much has been made of them in Nietzsche scholarship.⁴ However, exploring these possibilities is beyond the scope of this chapter since my aim here is not so much to elucidate specifically what the counter-ideal must mean within Nietzsche’s own work, as it is to explore more generally what it might mean to take Nietzsche’s critique of the ascetic ideal seriously and to understand its implications for mobilising a politics of difference. Thus, instead of exploring these overtly intra- and inter-textual questions within Nietzsche’s oeuvre, I will examine what I regard to be the structural implications of rejecting the ascetic ideal that must be assumed by any conception of a counter-ideal.

First, it is quite obvious that whatever might stand as a counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal would have to be other than the ascetic ideal. Thus, if the ascetic

³ Because of this very danger – the danger of remaining yoked to the ascetic ideal and the metaphysicians’ faith – which Nietzsche so eloquently and precisely identifies, I elsewhere argue that we ought to read Nietzsche’s own work as carefully and explicitly operating outside the bounds of metaphysics, and thus as ‘post-metaphysical’. See Shea (2016).

⁴ See Conway (1997); Conway (2008); Hatab (2008); Hicks and Rosenberg (2008); and Marsden (2009).

ideal tends towards one that excludes all others while also drawing everything into it, then a counter-ideal would have to be a multiplicity that could maintain itself in a dynamic tension without reintroducing the one.⁵ Second, if the ascetic ideal tends towards identity, then a counter-ideal would tend towards difference. Both of these points entail that there is no one alternative to the ascetic ideal, but instead a plurality of alternatives. It is in the context of trying to render the contours of these alternatives explicit that I will argue that Foucault's work serves as one way to conceptualise a political ontology that affirms these multiplicities and differences.

3 Foucault: From a Politics of Ressentiment to a Politics of Affirmation

When read in the context of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal, Foucault's work on discourse, power, critique and resistance stands as an exemplary model of a post-metaphysical politics of difference committed to mobilising Nietzschean insights. The depth of this commitment is exemplified in the opening of his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, where Foucault states explicitly one of the major methodological decisions that orients his historical inquiries:

Historicism starts from the universal and, as it were, puts it through the grinder of history. My problem is exactly the opposite. I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that consists in saying: Let's suppose that universals do not exist... So what I would like to deploy here is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of history we can do. (Foucault 2010, p. 3)

I begin with this quote in order to highlight what I consider to be one of the most significant and often overlooked features of Foucault's work – namely, that the fundamental principles that guide and orient his investigations are not the result of an insight into the ultimate nature of things, that is, metaphysics, but are instead the result of careful and considered methodological decisions. The nature of these methodological decisions receives its most sustained treatment in Fou-

⁵ I regard Luce Irigaray's account of female sexuality in distinction to a masculine phallogocentricism, in *This Sex Which Is Not One*, as providing an eloquent articulation of just such an alternative: 'within herself, she is already two – but not divisible into one(s) – that caress each other' (Irigaray 1985, p. 24).

cault's essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault 1997b), where he contrasts the methodological commitments of genealogy to those of metaphysical history. On Foucault's account, the metaphysical approach assumes the existence of self-identical and immobile structures that lie beneath history. These original identities, once unearthed, function as an origin, as the site of primordial truths that would provide a suprahistorical perspective from which to survey history as a singular and closed totality. In this way, the origin would provide a singular understanding of history as the result of either a cosmological cause – something like Platonism or monotheism – or as the progressive realisation of a teleological aim – something like Hegel or Marx.

Alternatively, according to Foucault, the genealogist has no *'faith in metaphysics'* and therefore 'refuses the certainty of absolutes (Foucault 1997b, pp. 371 and 379). For this reason, rather than start with the assumption that its objects of inquiry are self-identical and unified entities that remain the same through change, the genealogist instead approaches history as a network of fabricated assemblages, ruptures and multiple beginnings brought about through a play of forces and dominations. Thus, the genealogist neither feigns disinterested observation nor pursues ideal metaphysical absolutes, but rather affirms the very perspective from which she constructs historical formations from discontinuous and fragmented elements.⁶ What this means, then, is that, methodologically, the genealogist divests herself of the task of washing away historical contingency so as to reveal a primordial truth that would in some way return us to the privileged position of a metaphysical origin – 'the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return' (Foucault 1997b, p. 386). This also means that the genealogist is not engaged in the inverse task of disclosing the fundamentally contingent nature of history so as to "unmask" purported metaphysical absolutes as illusory since this would, in essence, be the very same task as metaphysical history – that is, contingency would stand as an inverted metaphysical origin that would eternally de-centre and fracture history rather than congeal and totalise it. For these reasons, the genealogist renounces any and all claims to origins – whether those are absolutes or contingencies, which is to say that from the outset, as a method, genealogy is avowedly post-metaphysical and post-foundational.

While Foucault makes no explicit statements in regard to the ascetic ideal, we can nonetheless see that his account of genealogy as a method departs

⁶ Thus, Foucault does not claim to engage in genealogy from "nowhere". Genealogy is precisely a method that is always already underway from somewhere, from a vested interpretative perspective or position. For this reason, at the end of the essay, Foucault describes the historical sense under the direction of genealogy as parodic, dissociative and sacrificial.

from the ascetic ideal's metaphysical commitments. First, by characterising genealogy as a method, Foucault evades the indictment Nietzsche brought against science and atheism – namely, that they still possess a metaphysical faith in truth. Thus, Foucault's use of contingency as a methodological starting point functions to 'contend' with metaphysics (in Hatab's words), rather than sustain it. Second, Foucault's understanding of his work as guided by method thereby explicitly situates it as one amongst many, and thus as affirming difference and multiplicity from the outset, which disables both the functioning and the effects of the technique of power named above. On Foucault's account, genealogy makes no claim to be the one and only true philosophical practice, denouncing all others as false or aberrant. Lastly, by affirming the positionality of the genealogical inquirer, Foucault additionally rejects the decontextualised and otherworldly epistemic subject of metaphysics. For these reasons, genealogy as a method is always underway as a hypothetical, provisional, experimental and dialogical form of inquiry – in contrast to metaphysics.

In May of 1978, several months before the 1979 lectures at the Collège de France, in a talk given to the French Society of Paris entitled "What is Critique?", Foucault similarly expands upon the specifically methodological dimension of his work. There, he claims that the theme with which his historical-philosophical work is concerned is the relationship between truth, power and the subject (Foucault 2007, p. 57). More specifically, Foucault tells us that his historical-philosophical inquiries are an examination of what he calls 'eventualization' (Foucault 2007, p. 59), which he defines as an investigation into 'the relationships between structures of rationality that articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation that are linked to it' (Foucault 2007, p. 56). According to Foucault:

What we are trying to find out is what are the links, what are the connections that can be identified between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge, what is the interplay of relay and support developed between them, such that a given element of knowledge takes on effects of power in a given system where it is allocated to a true, probable, uncertain or false element, such that a procedure of coercion acquires the very form and justifications of a rational, calculated, technically efficient element, etc. (Foucault 2007, p. 59)

In pursuit of these aims, Foucault is explicit about the methodological decisions that enable these inquiries, decisions that openly eschew the search for metaphysical origins in favour of constructing historical assemblages. First, inquiries into eventualizations suspend the traditional philosophical questions concerning both the validity of the systems of knowledge under consideration and the legitimacy of the practices in question. As Foucault notes, 'We are not attempting to find out what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific

or ideological, or legitimate or abusive' (Foucault 2007, p. 59). Second, the very terms of the investigations, 'knowledge' and 'power', serve as an analytic grid for investigation: '[These] two terms have only a methodological function. It is not a matter of identifying general principles of reality through them, but of somehow pinpointing the analytical front, the type of element that must be pertinent for the analysis' (Foucault 2007, p. 60). Thus, as analytical terms, *savoir* and *pouvoir* refer, respectively, to the procedures and effects of *connaissance* at work in a given historical domain, and to the mechanisms that induce behaviours and discourses.⁷

Foucault calls this circular relation in which truth is linked with a system of power that produces and sustains it, and to effects of power that it induces and extends, a 'regime of truth' (Foucault 1997c, p. 132). Of particular importance for Foucault are the mechanisms of normalisation and subjectification at work in these regimes. Foucault famously surveys – via analyses of madness, medicine, knowledge, delinquency and sexuality – the ways in which regimes of truth fashion normal and abnormal subjects while simultaneously producing practices that not only divide and partition them, but also individuate, measure, compare and correct them.⁸ For example, within the education system, "experts" – who are themselves constituted by acting in accordance with the correct methods for attaining knowledge – make claims about the nature of human beings and the ways they learn (knowledge); and, based on this knowledge, determine the appropriate methods of instruction (power). To determine the efficaciousness of the implemented methods of instruction, tests are administered to determine student comprehension (knowledge), whose results are then used to correct and adjust the methods of instruction (power). These pedagogical practices (power) legitimated in sources of correct knowledge (knowledge) have the further effect of sorting students (power) into the categories of proficient and deficient, or normal and abnormal, which are based on standardised tests that establish the statistical norm for comprehension of all students (knowledge) and identify deficient students for targeted means of correction – normalisation (power). According to Foucault:

This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word 'subject': sub-

⁷ Colin Koopman and Tomas Matza (2013) highlight the significance of method and analytic in Foucault.

⁸ This relation finds its most systematic treatment in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*.

ject to someone else
science or self-knowledge
makes subject to.

It is here, in his analyses
rules according to which
of power attached to
identifying in specific
Nietzsche identifies
ideal, that is, the truth
for instance, the discipline
to all learning – construction
– while sir
to its principles – the
only rightful domain.
forward Nietzsche's
Central to these
its most elaborate treatment
tells us:

By power, I do not mean
subservience of the individual
subjugation which, in my
have in mind a general
whose effects, through
1978, p. 92)

Rather:

⁹ We might better see this in
all equally being made into
tion.

¹⁰ In his inaugural lecture
precursor in analysing the
only one truth appears before
universality. In contrast, with
with its vocation of exclusion
tempted to remould this will
undertakes to justify the taboos
Bataille, must now stand as (p.
p. 220).

ject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault 1997d, p. 331)

It is here, in his analyses of these regimes of truth – that is, in ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’ (Foucault 1997c, p. 132) – that we find Foucault identifying in specific historical discourses the very technique of power that Nietzsche identifies in the system of interpretation installed by the ascetic ideal, that is, the twofold operation of power: division and coalescence. Thus, for instance, the discourse of pedagogy lays claim to the instruction “proper” to all learning – constructing the inside/outside of legitimate/illegitimate instruction – while simultaneously organising all pedagogy internally according to its principles – that is, governing the entirety of its domain as the one and only rightful domain.⁹ In this way, we can read Foucault as specifically carrying forward Nietzsche’s analysis of the politics of truth.¹⁰

Central to these analyses is Foucault’s conception of power, which receives its most elaborate treatment in *The History of Sexuality, vol. 1*. There, Foucault tells us:

By power, I do not mean ‘Power’ as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. (Foucault 1978, p. 92)

Rather:

⁹ We might better see this in the way in which educators, students and administrators alike are all equally being made into “subjects of assessment” within the contemporary milieu of education.

¹⁰ In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, Foucault explicitly names Nietzsche as his precursor in analysing the manifestations of desire and power at work in true discourse: ‘Thus, only one truth appears before our eyes: wealth, fertility and sweet strength in all its insidious universality. In contrast, we are unaware of the prodigious machinery of the will to truth, with its vocation of exclusion. All those who, at one moment or another in our history, have attempted to remould this will to truth and to turn it against truth at that very point where truth undertakes to justify the taboo, and to define madness; all those, from Nietzsche to Artaud and Bataille, must now stand as (probably haughty) signposts for all our future work’ (Foucault 1972, p. 220).

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Foucault 1978, pp. 92–93)

On this account, the power relations that serve as an analytic grid for Foucault's investigations are local, ubiquitous and unstable. This means that instead of locating the locus of power in the centralised point of a sovereign and its associated bureaucracies, Foucault will examine the networks of power relations formed between economies, doctors' offices, courtrooms, Child Protective Services, schools, workplaces and families, as well as the everyday practices between social groups and individuals. Thus, rather than confining his analyses of power relations to the great binary divide of rulers and ruled, which would form a pyramidal structure of the application of power from the top down, Foucault instead focuses on power relations as de-centred, multiple, multi-layered, mobile and reverberating networks of social interactions – that is, 'power comes from below' (Foucault 1978, p. 94). Foucault's description of power relations in his essay "The Subject and Power" attests to the complex and vast field of analysis that interests him:

[Power] operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions. (Foucault 1997d, p. 341)

Such an analytic of power relations allows Foucault to examine and make intelligible the widest possible array of social interactions and practices without reducing them to a single grid or conception of intelligibility – and, by doing so, it allows him to evade the singular and totalising tendency of the ascetic ideal in the direction of a univocal and global system of interpretation.

Despite the ubiquitous presence of power relations, which might appear to reduce power to a homogeneous and undifferentiated medium, Foucault maintains that 'Where there is power, there is resistance' (Foucault 1978, p. 95). However, Foucault's conception of resistance is quite specific to his analytic of power relations. From the outset, as mentioned above, Foucault rejects a centralised

locus of power either in terms of a mutual power, taking as the focus of power relations an 'antagonistic great war' of confrontational social ideologies and devices. For this reason, much reinforcement and weakening of power relations, but resistances.

Moreover, mobile, they are Foucault notes

When one is when one is broadest sense, only or collective conduct, see p. 342)

11 Foucault is quoted as saying that knowledge is produced through power relations, and that knowledge is useful because it is useful in power relations with that does not pres-

locus of power that would exist in contrast to its 'other', an 'other' conceived of either in terms of an 'all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled' (Foucault 1978, p. 94), that is, those with power and those without, or in terms of a mutually exclusive and confrontational opposition between knowledge and power, that is, knowledge as positioned outside power but nonetheless serving as the foundation of its legitimate application.¹¹ In this way, for Foucault, power relations stand in an 'agonistic' relation to one another rather than in an 'antagonistic' relation (Foucault 1997d, p. 342). In other words, there is no "great war" of binary power relations arranged in a mutually exclusive and confrontational opposition to one another. Rather, for Foucault, the network of the social is composed of a multiplicity of power relations pursuing their own strategies and deploying their own tactics, and all without direction from a centre. For this reason, power relations, through interaction and play, can just as much reinforce, extend and strengthen one another as they can reverse, deplete and weaken one another. Thus, since there is neither a centre to power relations nor an outside of power relations, there is no privileged locus of refusal to power relations, but only the open play of multiple power relations and a multiplicity of resistances.

Moreover, since power relations are, on Foucault's account, both fluid and mobile, they can also be conceived of in terms of freedom and domination. As Foucault notes:

When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of others, when one characterizes these actions as the government of men by other men – in the broadest sense of the term – one includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are 'free'. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available. (Foucault 1997d, p. 342)

¹¹ Foucault is quite explicit on this point: 'Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations' (Foucault 1995, p. 27).

For Foucault, freedom exists as an intrinsic feature of his analytic of power relations. Since power relations are inherently unstable, they are therefore capable of intensification and extension as well as de-escalation and reversal. Thus, freedom ultimately speaks to the element of modification in any relation of power. However, when the capacity for modification is absent, a state of domination exists:

The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. (Foucault 1997a, p. 283)

On Foucault's account, then, freedom is not an arrangement or condition without power relations – as there is no “outside” of power relations – but is instead the inherently fluid dynamic of power relations themselves. Similarly, domination is not the unauthorised and illegitimate imposition of power on a just and innocent state of freedom, but rather is a particularly static ensemble of power relations. Thus, while the ascetic ideal installs a singular metaphysico-ontological interpretation of a mutually exclusive and antagonistic dichotomy between being either free from power relations or subject to them – a relation that is itself supposed to be arranged in light of a principle or truth that transcends them – Foucault alternatively constructs an analytic grid in which a multiplicity of power relations take form immanently to the dynamic that unfolds between them. In this way, through the construction of an analytic grid that understands power relations as operating immanently to a strategic field, Foucault manages to deploy a method that functions otherwise than that of the ascetic ideal, since his method puts out of play the metaphysicians' faith in antithetical values. It does this, first, by refusing the dichotomy of an inside/outside of power and, second, by refusing any appeal to an element that is simultaneously supposed to transcend and organise the system to which it is related.

Lastly, when it comes to conceptualising a resistance to, and reversal of, the effects of normalisation and subjectification in light of the aforementioned methodological commitments, Foucault further tells us:

Thus you see that the question is no longer through what error, illusion, oversight, or illegitimacy has knowledge come to induce effects of domination.... The question instead would be: how can the indivisibility of knowledge and power in the context of interactions and multiple strategies induce both singularities, fixed according to their conditions of ac-

ceptability
locations v
nothing m
istic of [the
knowledge
tegitic field,
be governe

Here, Foucault
panying techn
differences. A
with metaphy:
vocabulary or den
the end, abern
Foucault offer
to, and affirm
and its politics
tion of critique
deem intolerant
side:

I will say that
tion truth on
will be *the a*
essentially in
in a word, th

In evading the
and groups' ref
tance is not the
– but rather the
ger abide.

4 Conclus

My account here
outside the bour
aphysics or as po
I hope merely to
Nietzsche and F

ceptability, and a field of possibilities, of openings, indecisions, reversals and possible dislocations which make them fragile, temporary, and which turn these effects into events, nothing more, nothing less than events? In what way can the effects of coercion characteristic of [these regimes of truth] not be dissipated by a return to the legitimate destination of knowledge and by a reflection on the transcendental or semi-transcendental that fixes knowledge, but how can they instead be reversed or released from within a concrete strategic field, this concrete strategic field that induced them, starting with the decision not to be governed? (Foucault 2007, p. 66)

Here, Foucault refuses the politics of *ressentiment* and thereby refuses its accompanying technique of power, which seeks both to escape and arrest the play of differences. According to the politics of *ressentiment*, only those in accord with metaphysical truth have the legitimate right to political speech as either advocacy or denunciation since all speech and action uncoupled from truth is, in the end, aberrant, corrupt and unjust, according to metaphysics. Alternatively, Foucault offers a conception of political resistance that operates immanently to, and affirms, differences. Thus, carrying the disavowal of the ascetic ideal and its politics of *ressentiment* to its logical conclusion, Foucault offers a conception of critique that empowers political actors to decry those arrangements they deem intolerable and to do so precisely without the certainty of truth on their side:

I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. [Critique] will be *the art of voluntary insubordination*, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we would call, in a word, the politics of truth. (Foucault 2007, p. 47, emphasis added)

In evading the metaphysical impulse, Foucault locates critique in individuals' and groups' refusal to be governed. In this way, the impetus for political resistance is not the possession of truth – a strategy and tactic born from *ressentiment* – but rather the refusal to remain subject to social practices that one can no longer abide.

4 Conclusion

My account here of the ways in which we can read Foucault's work as operating outside the bounds of the ascetic ideal, and thus as either contending with metaphysics or as post-metaphysical, is by no means meant to be exhaustive. Rather, I hope merely to have shown some of the ways in which we can mobilise both Nietzsche and Foucault to sketch the contours of a politics of difference. More

specifically, while Nietzsche arguably has no explicit politics of difference, his critique of the ascetic ideal and the politics of truth it inaugurates provide many of the necessary clues for how we might go about thinking their alternative. Furthermore, when we read Foucault's work in light of Nietzsche's critique, we find that Foucault offers what may be regarded as a politics of affirmation in contrast to a politics of *ressentiment*.

On this account, there are several distinguishing features that mark Foucault's work as offering a politics of affirmation, one that brings into relief a germinal politics of difference present in Nietzsche's work. First, in contrast to the ascetic ideal, which is driven by the metaphysicians' faith in the value of truth, Foucault is explicit that his work avoids appeals to origins and primordial truths. For this reason, the analytic grid and terms that constitute his work are not to be regarded as postulating theories of reality, but are instead to be understood as hypothetical, provisional and experimental principles for guiding inquiry. Thus, Foucault's own account of his work is as a method. Likewise, there are intimations in Nietzsche's own work that he understands the difference between the traditional metaphysical approach to philosophy and his own historical approach as methodological, as operating upon different ontological considerations, which is most apparent in *Human, All Too Human* (1, 12). Similarly, in the Preface to the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche even more clearly characterises his genealogical approach to history as a method (GoM Preface, 7–8). Fundamental to this notion of method on the part of both Nietzsche and Foucault is a self-reflexive awareness that their work is not to be regarded as advancing metaphysical absolutes but instead is to be regarded otherwise than as metaphysical philosophy. Nietzsche himself states unabashedly in the first chapter of *Beyond Good and Evil* that his reading of existence as will to power is 'only an interpretation' (BGE 22), which explicitly counters a metaphysical reading of his work and establishes an implicit move away from the politics of *ressentiment* and towards a politics of difference.

Second, Foucault's genealogical analyses of historically-specific discourses in the human sciences identify in concretised historical form the two-fold operations of power – division and coalescence – at work in the system of interpretation installed by the ascetic ideal and driven by the unconditional will to truth identified by Nietzsche. More precisely, like Nietzsche, Foucault's genealogical analyses draw attention to the normalising and subjectivating effects of a technique of power that aims to construct the inside/outside of its domain, and to absorb and reorganise that which is foreign to it according to its own laws. By drawing our attention to this technique of power and its concretised historical forms, both Nietzsche and Foucault draw our attention to the totalitarian, autocratic and homogenising mechanisms at work in the unconditional will to truth

and the a
politics o
play of di

Third,
tion of po
that runs
cetic idea
Nietzsche,
tion precis
plicities ar
system of i
constituted
ic singulari
and not its
differences.

Lastly,
ception of c
the play of
ressentiment
tion and val
causes one
politics of a
bind and fix
that find the
and resist th
ference. This
cilitates dest
ment of scie
since they sti
tion of a form
is all the mor
erates otherw
ressentiment an
of critique ecl
metaphysical
self otherwise

and the ascetic ideal, which is always a will to the one. Thus, to take leave of the politics of *ressentiment* is, of necessity, to affirm multiplicities and release the play of differences that the ascetic ideal precisely aims to arrest.

Third, and following from the previous point, Foucault employs a conception of power relations as a multiplicity of forces immanent to a strategic field that runs precisely counter to the opaque operations of power at work in the ascetic ideal and its technique of power. Reading Foucault backwards into Nietzsche, one might say that the ascetic ideal and its technique of power function precisely to produce a state of domination, one in which the play of multiplicities and difference is frozen by the ascetic ideal's move towards one, closed system of interpretation. Thus, Foucault's political ontology is, from the outset, constituted by an open, dynamic play of differences rather than by a closed, static singularity. In this vein, Nietzsche's call for a counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal, and not its destruction, is itself an affirmation of multiplicities and the play of differences.

Lastly, bringing all of the above features together, Foucault advances a conception of critique as voluntary insubordination that uniquely manages to affirm the play of these differences rather than arresting them. Whereas a politics of *ressentiment* aims to dissolve the tension between separate systems of interpretation and valuation by drawing the two together under a transcendent term that causes one system to be absorbed into and reorganised by the other, Foucault's politics of affirmation eschews a transcendent term that would permanently bind and fix them. Instead, his politics of affirmation empowers those subjects that find their position within a regime of truth untenable to call into question and resist that very structure, thereby affirming and even intensifying their difference. This is a politics that resists the impulse to subjugation and instead facilitates desubjugation. When read against the backdrop of Nietzsche's indictment of science and atheism as the latest manifestations of the ascetic ideal, since they still hold firm to the unconditional value of truth, Foucault's elaboration of a form of critique that renounces this very appeal to a foundational truth is all the more impressive. Thus, Foucault offers a conception of critique that operates otherwise than the technique of power at the heart of the politics of *ressentiment* and the ascetic ideal. In this case, we find that Foucault's conception of critique echoes Nietzsche's own delicate position in relation to the tyranny of metaphysical philosophy and the ascetic ideal, which is that of positioning oneself otherwise than metaphysics so as to contend with it rather than either re-

maining tethered to it, or worse, replicating it – the latter being quite possibly the greatest danger that any politics of difference faces, as Nietzsche indicated.¹²

Bibliography

- Ansell-Pearson, Keith (1991): "The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche: Power, the Subject, and Political Theory". In: *Nietzsche-Studien* 20. No. 1, pp. 267–283.
- Brobjer, Thomas (1998): "The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsche's Writing". In: *Nietzsche-Studien* 27. No. 1, pp. 300–318.
- Connolly, William (1991): *Political Theory and Modernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Conway, Daniel (1997): *Nietzsche and the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Conway, Daniel (2008): *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals: A Reader's Guide*. New York: Continuum.
- Detwiler, Bruce: (1990): *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1972): "The Discourse on Language". In: *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 215–237. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, Michel (1978): *The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Random House.
- Foucault, Michel (1995): *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, Michel (1997a): "The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom". In: *Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984, vol. I: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, pp. 281–301 Edited by Paul Rabinow and translated by Robert Hurley et al. New York: The New Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1997b): "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History". In: *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, vol. II: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, pp. 369–391. Edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley et al. New York: The New Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1997c): "Truth and Power". In: *Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984, vol. III: Power*, pp. 111–133. Edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley et al. New York: The New Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1997d): "The Subject and Power". In: *Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984, vol. III: Power*, pp. 326–348. Edited by James D. Faubion and translated by Robert Hurley et al. New York: The New Press.
- Foucault, Michel (2007): "What is Critique?" In: *The Politics of Truth*, pp. 41–81. Translated by Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Foucault, Michel (2010): *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*. Translated by Graham Burchell. London, New York: Palgrave.
- Hatab, Lawrence J. (1995): *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics*. Chicago: Open Court.
- Hatab, Lawrence J. (2008): "How Does the Ascetic Ideal Function in Nietzsche's Genealogy?" In: *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 35/36, pp. 106–123.

¹² I take this to be the thrust of Nietzsche's critique of science and atheism in GoM III, 24.

- Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg (Eds.) (2008): *Reading Nietzsche at the Margins*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
- Irigaray, Luce (1985): *This Sex Which Is Not One*. Translated by Catherine Porter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Koopman, Colin, and Tomas Matza (2013): "Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian Inquiry". In: *Critical Inquiry* 39. No. 4, pp. 817–840.
- Lightbody, Brian (2010a): *Philosophical Genealogy – Vol. 1: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Lightbody, Brian (2010b): *Philosophical Genealogy – Vol. 2: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Mahon, Michael (1992): *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Marsden, Jill (2009): "Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism". In: Keith Ansell-Pearson (Ed.): *A Companion to Nietzsche*, pp. 22–38 Malden: Blackwell.
- McWhorter, Ladelle (1992): "Asceticism/Askēsis: Foucault's Thinking Historical Subjectivity". In: Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott and P. Holley Roberts (Eds.): *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*, pp. 243–254 Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Milchman, Alan, and Alan Rosenberg (2007): "The Aesthetic and Ascetic Dimensions of an Ethics of Self-Fashioning: Nietzsche and Foucault". In: *Parrhesia* 11. No. 2, pp. 44–65.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (2003a): *Beyond Good and Evil*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (2003b): *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (2004): *Ecce Homo*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (2017a): *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and translated by Carol Diethel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (2017b): *Human, All Too Human*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Owen, David (1998): *Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason*. London: Routledge.
- Owen, David (2007): *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Shapiro, Gary (2003): *Archaeologies of Vision: Nietzsche and Foucault on Seeing and Saying*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shaw, Tamsin (2010): *Nietzsche's Political Skepticism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Shea, IV, George W. (2016): "Nietzsche and Habermas on *Wille zur Macht*: From a Metaphysical to a Post-Metaphysical Interpretation of Life". In: *Nietzsche als Kritiker und Denker der Transformation*, pp. 134–144. Edited by Helmut Heit and Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Tuana, Nancy, and Charles E. Scott (2020): *Beyond Philosophy: Nietzsche, Foucault, Anzaldúa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Westfall, Joseph, and Alan Rosenberg (Eds.) (2018): *Foucault and Nietzsche: A Critical Encounter*. London, New York: Bloomsbury.

quite possibly
be indicated.¹²

f Nietzsche:
, pp. 267–283.
g". In:

uide. New York:

hicago:

Knowledge,

ated by Robert

ted by Alan

of Freedom".

ity and Truth,

il. New York:

of Foucault,

edited by James

s.

cault

translated by

iel Foucault

translated by

1. Translated

nce,

in

; Genealogy?"

in GoM III, 24.