Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

What Climate Policy Can a Utilitarian Justify?

  • Articles
  • Published:
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This essay sketches out what a utilitarian should support when considering global warming along with what measures can be recommended to political leaders for utilitarian reasons. If we estimate the utility of the great advantages that any ambitious climate policy might create in the name of poverty reduction in the present, I will show how a decision can be made in favor of a vigorous climate policy based on such estimates. My argument is independent of the truth of the claims of climate sceptics. Until now, the debate has neglected the double effects of a vigorous climate policy that not only avoids risks of damages but also creates utility. In conclusion, three strategies of a climate policy legitimized by utilitarianism will be introduced: (1) Utilitarianism favors global emissions trading in comparison with a global CO2 tax. (2) Utilitarianism calls for this trade to be introduced while, at the same time, investments in renewable energies should be increased. (3) Furthermore, utilitarianism favors a policy that aims to slow down the rate of population growth.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I defend “humane utilitarianism” (Gesang 2005, 2003) but for this paper a version of standard act-utilitarianism will do the job. In (Gesang 2005) I defend, why I choose utilitarianism. A further discussion of this issue would lead us away from the focus of this paper.

  2. Individual activities are also important but I will not regard them to focus my topic.

  3. Cf. Page (2006), Gardiner (2004).

  4. In this regard, Singer’s thesis that all of these ethical categories lead to the same measures is questionable: Singer (2002, 41) and more recently in: Singer (2006, 419).

  5. Meyer and Roser (2007).

  6. Solomon et al. (2007).

  7. Pachauri and Reisinger (2007, 76).

  8. Cox et al. (2000).

  9. Lynas (2008, 252). This danger is stressed by Hansen (2009, 276). First empirical evidences: Connor (2008).

  10. Friedlingstein et al. (2006, 3337).

  11. Dakos et al. (2008, 14308).

  12. Lynas (2008, 250).

  13. Hansen et al. (2007, 2306).

  14. That seems to be very difficult of course, but we will see in the next section that there is an easy move to manage this roughly.

  15. Also cf. Garvey (2008, Ch. 3).

  16. Parfit (1987, 357).

  17. Parfit (1987, 482). Also Attfield (2003, 109–115), Ng (2011, 112). Discounting related to money makes sense when interest is earned, but this mechanism is absent with utility.

  18. That does not mean that population growth must take place, rather only that the size of the population remains at several billion individuals.

  19. Ng (2005, 249), (2011, 112ff).

  20. Ng calls for a probability of less than 0.01%. Ng (2011, 113).

  21. Muller and MacDonald (2000).

  22. Tol (2009, 37).

  23. International Risk Governance Council (2009).

  24. Humans will probably manage to raise the temperature by three degrees themselves whereas the feedback mechanisms would threaten to add one or two additional degrees. This is supported by the IPCC Reports: Pachauri and Reisinger (2007, 50); see also: Friedlingstein et al. (2006, 3337).

  25. Tol (2009, 37).

  26. This is implied by J. Hansen et al., as the authors write: “According to our estimates, we must be close to such a point (a tipping point that could even lead to a worst case scenario B.G.).” (Hansen et al. 2007, 2306).Their assumptions primarily focus on the question whether this point has already been reached or if it will be reached soon. This second scenario is abandoned, however, but it gives information on how close we are to this expected point. Hansen et al. base their argument on comparisons with earlier periods of the earth. The proposition that feedback mechanisms with over 50% probability will occur if we continue our BAU is a much weaker proposition than the one just cited.

  27. Cf. Tol (2009).

  28. Ng proposes an interesting route: “Catastrophe reduction has a huge effect on expected utility because it increases the survival probabilities (…) indefinitely into the future” (Ng 2011, 122). I do not wish to expand too much on this route, however it does at least depend on the probability of occurrence of catastrophes which eliminate the entire human race and on the utility effects in the long term. My idea should show a utility independent of precarious problems due to the probability of occurrence and one that would be created in the near future if not in the present.

  29. Singer (1993).

  30. Evidence for this tendency: emissions trading transfers money, and causes transaction costs while increasing the amount of happiness due to a diminishing marginal utility. Renewable energies prove to be expensive; however they soon become a means of saving, cf. data in the last paragraph.

  31. Clark et al. 2008.

  32. Cf. Gesang 2003, 22–26.

  33. By noteworthy I mean any measure that leads to a prevention of CO2, which is causally influential on a global scale.

  34. Meinshausen et al. (2009).

  35. One could also use a comparative expression such as “the more, the better” to describe these two obligations. Where it is stated below that measure x corresponds to UD (2) or (3), what is meant is often a comparative in the sense of “better than alternative measure a-n.”

  36. Of course one has to clarify the modalities so that the money really helps the poor and not corrupt regimes. But that is a practical question and there are ideas how they can be solved: Müller (2009).

  37. Cf. Ekardt et al. (2010, 80f).

  38. Cf. Müller (2009).

  39. Cf. Stern (2009, Ch. 6) and Weinmann (2009, 162–166, 183f).

  40. German Aerospace Center (2006). In Gesang (2011), I discuss the reasons why we should not depend on emissions trading alone rather, at the same time, expand renewable energies.

  41. Norcross (1997, 159f)., and (1998). Cf. Ng (1989, 242ff).

  42. Hansen (2009, IX), Lynas (2008, 226–233).

  43. If these ideas are true, one must modify the principle of diminishing marginal utility, for we would of course still be maximizing utility by distributing goods and commodities from the rich to the poor, but it would not be the poorest but rather those who have access to these basic goods who would generate the greatest utility from goods. There is, however, a lack of empirical findings for these hypotheses.

  44. By this I mean real and feasible alternatives, not invented constructions in other possible worlds.

References

  • Attfield, R. (2003). Environmental ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. E., Frijters, P., et al. (2008). Relative income, happiness and utility: An explanation for the easterlin paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(1), 95–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Connor, S. (2008). Exclusive: The methane time bomb. Blog article. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/exclusive-the-methane-time-bomb-938932.html. Accessed December 29, 2011.

  • Cox, P. M., Bettset, R. A., et al. (2000). Acceleration of global warming due to carbon-cycle feedbacks in a coupled climate model. Nature, 408, 184–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dakos, V., Scheffer, M., et al. (2008). Slowing down as an early warning signal for abrupt climate change. PNAS, 105(38), 14308–14312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ekardt, F., Heitmann, C., et al. (2010). Soziale Gerechtigkeit in der Klimapolitik. Hans Böckler Stiftung, (249 ed.), Düsseldorf.

  • Friedlingstein, P., Cox, P., et al. (2006). Climate—carbon cycle feedback analysis: Results from the C4MIP model intercomparison. Journal of Climate, 19(14), 3337–3353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gardiner, S. M. (2004). Ethics and global climate change. Ethics, 114(3), 555–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garvey, J. (2008). The ethics of climate change, right and wrong in a warming world. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • German Aerospace Center (DLR) (2006). Trans—Mediterranean interconnection for concentrating solar power. Study report http://www.dlr.de/tt/Portaldata/41/Resources/dokumente/institut/system/projects/TRANS-CSP_Full_Report_Final.pdf. Accessed November 20, 2010.

  • Gesang, B. (2003). Eine Verteidigung des Utilitarismus. Stuttgart: Reclam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gesang, B. (2005). Utilitarianism with a human face. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 39, 169–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gesang, B. (2011). Klimaethik. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, J. (2009). Storms of my grandchildren. New York: Bloomsbury.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, J., et al. (2007). Dangerous human-made interference with climate: A giss modelE study. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 7(11), 2287–2313.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • International Risk Governance Council (2009). Geoengineering. http://www.irgc.org/geoengineering. Accessed October 10, 2009.

  • Lynas, M. (2008). Six degrees: Our future on a hotter planet. London: Harpercollins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meinshausen, M., Meinshausen, N., et al. (2009). Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2°C. Nature, 458(7242), 1158–1162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meyer, L. H., & Roser, D. (2007). Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit—Die Bedeutung von zukünftigen Klimaschäden für die heutige Klimapolitik. Bern: Bundesamt für Umwelt BAFU.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, O. (2009). Mikro-Zertifikate. Für Gerechtigkeit unter Luftverschmutzern. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 95(2), 167–198.

    Google Scholar 

  • Muller, R. A., & MacDonald, G. J. (2000). Ice Ages and Astronomical Causes. Berlin: Springer.

  • Ng, Y. (1989). What should we do about future generations? Economics and Philosophy, 5(2), 235–253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ng, Y. (2005). Intergenerational impartiality: Replacing discounting by probability weighting. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 18(3), 237–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ng, Y. (2011). Consumption tradeoff vs. catastrophes avoidance: Implications of some recent results in happiness studies on the economics of climate change. Climatic Change, 105(1), 109–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Norcross, A. (1997). Comparing harms: Headaches and human lives. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 26(2), 135–167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Norcross, A. (1998). Great harms from small benefits grow: How death can be outweighed by headaches. Analysis, 58(2), 152–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pachauri, R. K., & Reisinger, A. (Eds.). (2007). Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Genf: IPCC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Page, E. (2006). Climate change, justice and future generations. Cheltenham: Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, D. (1987). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (1993). Practical ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (2002). One world. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (2006). Ethics and climate change: A commentary on MacCracken, Toman and Gardiner. Environmental Values, 15(3), 415–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, S., Qin, D., et al. (Eds.). (2007). Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern, N. (2009). The global deal: Climate change and the creation of a new era of progress and prosperity. New York: Public Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tol, R. S. (2009). The economic effects of climate change. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(2), 29–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J. (2009). Die Klimapolitik Katastrophe. Marburg: Metropolis.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this paper for their helpful comments! Further I want to thank Bryan Scheler for his comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrstuhl für Philosophie mit Schwerpunkt Wirtschaftsethik, Universität Mannheim, Schloss, 68131, Mannheim, Germany

    Bernward Gesang

Authors
  1. Bernward Gesang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bernward Gesang.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gesang, B. What Climate Policy Can a Utilitarian Justify?. J Agric Environ Ethics 26, 377–392 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-012-9380-4

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-012-9380-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation