Abstract
This essay sketches out what a utilitarian should support when considering global warming along with what measures can be recommended to political leaders for utilitarian reasons. If we estimate the utility of the great advantages that any ambitious climate policy might create in the name of poverty reduction in the present, I will show how a decision can be made in favor of a vigorous climate policy based on such estimates. My argument is independent of the truth of the claims of climate sceptics. Until now, the debate has neglected the double effects of a vigorous climate policy that not only avoids risks of damages but also creates utility. In conclusion, three strategies of a climate policy legitimized by utilitarianism will be introduced: (1) Utilitarianism favors global emissions trading in comparison with a global CO2 tax. (2) Utilitarianism calls for this trade to be introduced while, at the same time, investments in renewable energies should be increased. (3) Furthermore, utilitarianism favors a policy that aims to slow down the rate of population growth.
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Notes
Individual activities are also important but I will not regard them to focus my topic.
Meyer and Roser (2007).
Solomon et al. (2007).
Pachauri and Reisinger (2007, 76).
Cox et al. (2000).
Friedlingstein et al. (2006, 3337).
Dakos et al. (2008, 14308).
Lynas (2008, 250).
Hansen et al. (2007, 2306).
That seems to be very difficult of course, but we will see in the next section that there is an easy move to manage this roughly.
Also cf. Garvey (2008, Ch. 3).
Parfit (1987, 357).
That does not mean that population growth must take place, rather only that the size of the population remains at several billion individuals.
Ng calls for a probability of less than 0.01%. Ng (2011, 113).
Muller and MacDonald (2000).
Tol (2009, 37).
International Risk Governance Council (2009).
Tol (2009, 37).
This is implied by J. Hansen et al., as the authors write: “According to our estimates, we must be close to such a point (a tipping point that could even lead to a worst case scenario B.G.).” (Hansen et al. 2007, 2306).Their assumptions primarily focus on the question whether this point has already been reached or if it will be reached soon. This second scenario is abandoned, however, but it gives information on how close we are to this expected point. Hansen et al. base their argument on comparisons with earlier periods of the earth. The proposition that feedback mechanisms with over 50% probability will occur if we continue our BAU is a much weaker proposition than the one just cited.
Cf. Tol (2009).
Ng proposes an interesting route: “Catastrophe reduction has a huge effect on expected utility because it increases the survival probabilities (…) indefinitely into the future” (Ng 2011, 122). I do not wish to expand too much on this route, however it does at least depend on the probability of occurrence of catastrophes which eliminate the entire human race and on the utility effects in the long term. My idea should show a utility independent of precarious problems due to the probability of occurrence and one that would be created in the near future if not in the present.
Singer (1993).
Evidence for this tendency: emissions trading transfers money, and causes transaction costs while increasing the amount of happiness due to a diminishing marginal utility. Renewable energies prove to be expensive; however they soon become a means of saving, cf. data in the last paragraph.
Clark et al. 2008.
Cf. Gesang 2003, 22–26.
By noteworthy I mean any measure that leads to a prevention of CO2, which is causally influential on a global scale.
Meinshausen et al. (2009).
One could also use a comparative expression such as “the more, the better” to describe these two obligations. Where it is stated below that measure x corresponds to UD (2) or (3), what is meant is often a comparative in the sense of “better than alternative measure a-n.”
Of course one has to clarify the modalities so that the money really helps the poor and not corrupt regimes. But that is a practical question and there are ideas how they can be solved: Müller (2009).
Cf. Ekardt et al. (2010, 80f).
Cf. Müller (2009).
If these ideas are true, one must modify the principle of diminishing marginal utility, for we would of course still be maximizing utility by distributing goods and commodities from the rich to the poor, but it would not be the poorest but rather those who have access to these basic goods who would generate the greatest utility from goods. There is, however, a lack of empirical findings for these hypotheses.
By this I mean real and feasible alternatives, not invented constructions in other possible worlds.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this paper for their helpful comments! Further I want to thank Bryan Scheler for his comments.
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Gesang, B. What Climate Policy Can a Utilitarian Justify?. J Agric Environ Ethics 26, 377–392 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-012-9380-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-012-9380-4