Skip to main content

The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification

Conscious experience, Higher-order Beliefs, and Reliable Processes

  • Book
  • © 2016

Overview

  • Presents a specific focus on perceptual justification
  • Takes a new approach to epistemological theories of perception
  • Clarifies ongoing debates in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Synthese Library (SYLI, volume 377)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (6 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book’s discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities as human perceivers are special. This allows it to combine many of our intuitions about the importance of conscious experience and higher-order belief with the controversial thesis that perceptual justification is fundamentally non-evidential in character.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Harmen Ghijsen

About the author

Harmen Ghijsen is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Philosophy at KU Leuven and a member of the Leuven Epistemology Group. His area of research is located at the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology and focuses on integrating epistemological theories with our actual cognitive architecture. He has published numerous articles related to this research, with perceptual justification as one of his favorite topics.


Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification

  • Book Subtitle: Conscious experience, Higher-order Beliefs, and Reliable Processes

  • Authors: Harmen Ghijsen

  • Series Title: Synthese Library

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30500-4

  • Publisher: Springer Cham

  • eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)

  • Copyright Information: Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-30498-4Published: 03 May 2016

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-319-80826-0Published: 27 May 2018

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-30500-4Published: 22 April 2016

  • Series ISSN: 0166-6991

  • Series E-ISSN: 2542-8292

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XIII, 165

  • Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Publish with us