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Appearances and the Metaphysics of Sensible Qualities: A Response to Ivanov

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Abstract

Siegel (The contents of visual experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) has argued that visual experience has content. Ivanov (Topoi 36:331–342, 2017) has convincingly shown that there is a confusion in Siegel’s argument between perception presenting property-instances and perception presenting properties as being instantiated. According to Ivanov, whether a revised version of Siegel’s argument succeeds depends on the metaphysics of sensible qualities. I argue that Ivanov’s argument rests on a mistake, and I conclude by suggesting how we might go about arguing for or against perceptual content.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Thomas Aeppli, Davood Bahjat Fumani, Philipp Blum, Donnchadh O’Conaill, Gianfranco Soldati and two referees for this journal.

Funding

Funding was provided by Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (Grant no. P1FRP1_148549).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Andrea Giananti

  2. Institute of Philosophy, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany

    Andrea Giananti

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  1. Andrea Giananti
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Correspondence to Andrea Giananti.

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Giananti, A. Appearances and the Metaphysics of Sensible Qualities: A Response to Ivanov. Topoi 39, 1011–1015 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09709-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09709-y

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