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A New Solution to Moore's Paradox

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Abstract

Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency'' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary.It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lenseof an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA

    Anthony S. Gillies

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  1. Anthony S. Gillies
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Gillies, A.S. A New Solution to Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 105, 237–250 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010361708803

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