Abstract
What should our theorizing about social justice aim at? Many political philosophers think that a crucial goal is to identify a perfectly just society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect justice. Sen calls this the “comparative approach” to the theory of justice. He urges its adoption on the basis of a sustained critique of the former approach, which he calls “transcendental.” In this paper I pursue two tasks, one critical and the other constructive. First, I argue that Sen’s account of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches is not convincing, and second, I suggest what I take to be a broader and more plausible account of comparative assessments of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice (including, for example, ideal theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues of political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation.
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Notes
Sen (2009). Parenthetical page numbers in the paper refer to this book.
The reference to “only” is confusing here, as it seems to invite the possibility of a theory that focuses on identifying perfectly just outcomes and also comparisons among immediately feasible alternatives. But in the rest of his discussion Sen ignores this possibility, taking the contrast to be dilemmatic. Sen does mention in passing (pp. 16–17) the possibility of a “conglomerate” theory that includes both TA and CA exercises, but dismisses it on the grounds that (a) the two components are logically independent and (b) proponents of TA have not in fact pursued a conglomerate view. However, my discussion in sections III and IV suggests that there is a plausible view of the interaction between the tasks of TA and CA.
However, I will draw on the shared commitment to pluralism. For an important recent example of an approach to justice that might qualify as “transcendental” in Sen’s sense, but that is pluralist about grounds of justice and calls for a focus on people’s ethos and actions beyond institutional structures, see Cohen (2008).
Sen says that in later works Rawls is more amenable to comparative judgments. But A Theory of Justice is in fact suffused with arguments based on a comparative framework. Here are some examples. First, the final court of appeal in the justification of a theory of justice is the test of “reflective equilibrium,” which is eminently comparative and open-ended (Rawls 1999a, pp. 43, 396). Second, we saw that the selection of the two principles of justice as fairness in the original position is explicitly comparative and seen as incomplete, fallibilistic, and open-ended (pp. 105–109, 509). Third, the treatment of issues of nonideal theory explicitly calls for comparative judgments assuming that we “aim for the least injustice that conditions allow” (pp. 213, see 215–218). Fourth, principles of justice are seen as amenable to different institutional implementations in different contexts, and the choice of appropriate institutions depends on “the comparison of possible alternatives” in the relevant context (pp. 246–249, at 248). Fifth, alternative conceptions of justice are assessed in part on their comparative merits in leading to stable social arrangements (pp. 346, 398, 441). Sixth, comparative assessments are seen as crucial in people’s development of rational life-plans (pp. 359, 370, 375).
Some underlying ideas (e.g. the idea of people as free and equal persons) can sometimes be of direct relevance when some principles articulating them (e.g. a principle of equal distribution of some specific goods) are not immediately applicable. In what follows, when I talk about principles’ relevance the reader should also consider the indirect and direct relevance of ideas.
For illuminating discussion see Swift (2008, pp. 372–378). Swift also challenges Sen’s view. He claims, and I agree, that “the considerations that philosophers adduce to explain what it is about their ‘ideal’ that makes it such are likely also to be relevant to … comparative evaluation” of “less-than-ideal options” (p. 372).
For a development of the ideas of the historical expansion of people’s political capabilities emphasizing the importance of a transitional standpoint and dynamic duties see Gilabert (2009) and (2011). A transitional standpoint is the standpoint taken by political agents in the process of changing central features of the institutional and cultural environment in which they act. Such agents envisage trajectories of reform involving dynamic duties. These duties are peculiar in that they are not merely focused on what is to be done within certain circumstances, but also on changing certain circumstances so that new things can be done. The importance of dynamic considerations for identifying a synergic rather than competitive relation between ideal theory and nonideal theory is also helpfully explored by Simmons (2010).
Illustrations of this pattern in real politics abound. Consider the common choice by some political parties to dramatically limit their ideological agenda in order to gain short-term electoral appeal, thereby hampering their ability to pursue deeper reforms in the face of a conformist political culture they have helped to entrench rather than challenge. British Labor Party’s recent advocacy of a “Third Way” might be a good example.
I talk about the “pursuit” rather than the “achievement” of the task of TA because the five points mentioned do not require the complete achievement of TA’s goals for the recognition of the significance of steps taken towards their approximation.
See footnote 5.
Thus the real issue is not whether we should do nonideal theory instead of ideal theory, but how to do both in an integrated way. See Gilabert (2008). For the “substitution” view I oppose, see, in addition to Sen’s book, Farrely (2007). Other accounts emphasizing synergy include Goodin (1995), Simmons (2010), Stemplowska (2008), Swift (2008), and Valentini (2009).
The reflective equilibrium is “deliberative” rather than “descriptive” because the task is not merely to realize what we have been thinking, but to determine what to think, about the relevant issues. See Scanlon (2003). It is “deliberative” in the further sense of including intersubjective besides introspective reasoning.
For an illustration of these points in debates about socialist reforms see Gilabert (2011) and the comprehensive exploration in Wright (2010). It is important to note, however, (i) that epistemic limitations may affect every option available, and (ii) that the value of certain potential outcomes grounds dynamic duties to further serious scientific research and normative reflection that could reduce uncertainty (consider, for example, research and reflection regarding welfare states in Europe, and, increasingly, the avoidance of global environmental catastrophe).
For an illuminating discussion of this criticism on the part of Rawls and some Rawlsians, see Robeyns (2009).
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Acknowledgements
For helpful comments, I thank the referees for ETMP, Simon Caney, Matthias Fritsch, Joseph Heath, Holly Lawford-Smith, Adam Swift, and audiences at colloquia of the Canadian Philosophical Association, the Human Development and Capability Association, and the Oxford University Centre for the Study of Social Justice. My research has been supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Gilabert, P. Comparative Assessments of Justice, Political Feasibility, and Ideal Theory. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 39–56 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9279-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9279-6