Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

New foundations for epistemic change*

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Alchourrón, C., P. Gärdenfors, and D. Makinson: 1985, ‘On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Functions for Contraction and Revision’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Asher, N. and M. Morreau: 1991, ‘Commonsense Entailment: A modal Theory of Nonmonotonic Reasoning’, in Proceedings International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-91), Sydney.

  • Austin, J. L.: 1962, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford University Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boutilier, C.: 1994, ‘Unifying Default Reasoning and Belief Revision in a Modal Framework’, Artificial Intelligence 68, 33–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boutilier, C.: 1996, ‘Iterated Revision and Minimal Revision of Conditional beliefs’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(3), 262–305.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darwiche, A. and J. Pearl: 1997, ‘On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision’, Artificial Intelligence 89, 1–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, N. and J. Y. Halpern: 1997, ‘Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part I: Foundations’, Artificial Intelligence 95(2), 257–316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, N. and J. Y. Halpern: 1999a, ‘Belief Revision: A Critique’, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8(4), 401–420.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, N. and J. Y. Halpern: 1999b, ‘Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revision and Update’, Journal of AI Research 10, 117–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuhrmann, A.: 1989, ‘Reflective Modalities and Theory Change’, Synthese 81, 115–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuhrmann, A.: 1991, ‘Theory Contraction through Base Contraction’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 20, 175–203.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuhrmann, A.: 1997, An Essay on Contraction, CSLI Press, Stanford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P.: 1988, Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P.: 1992, ‘The Dynamics of Belief Systems: Foundations vs. Coherence Theories’, in C. Bicchieri and M. L. dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. and D. Makinson: 1991, ‘Relations between the Logic of Theory Change and Nonmonotonic Logic’, in A. Fuhrmann and M. Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. and D. Makinson: 1994, ‘Nonomonotonic Inference Based on Expectations’, Artificial Intelligence 65, 197–245.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillies, A. S.: 2001a, ‘Foundationalist Belief Revision in Update Semantics’, in R. van Rooy and M. Stokhof (eds.), Proceedings of the Thirteenth Amsterdam Colloquium, ILLC, Amsterdam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillies, A. S.: 2001b, Rational Belief Change, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy: The University of Arizona.

  • Grove, A.: 1988, ‘Two Modellings for Theory Change’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 17, 157–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson, S. O.: 1989, ‘New Operators for Theory Change’, Theoria 55, 114–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson, S. O.: 1998, A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson, S. O. and E. J. Olsson: 1999, ‘Providing Foundations for Coherentism’, Erkenntnis 51, 243–265.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G.: 1984, ‘Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision’, Noûs 18(1), 39–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katsuno, H. and A. O. Mendelzon: 1991b, ‘Propositional Knowledge Base Revision and Minimal Change’, Artificial Intelligence 52, 263–294.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krause, S., D. Lehman, and M. Magidor: 1990, ‘Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Preferential Models and Cumulative Logics’, Artificial Intelligence 44, 167–204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi, I.: 1984, ‘Serious Possibility’, in Decisions and Revisions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi, I.: 1988, ‘Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test’, Synthese 76, 49–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1996, ‘Elusive Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4), 549–567.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCarthy, J.: 1980, ‘Circumscription – A Form of Non-monotonic Reasoning’, Artificial Intelligence 13, 27–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. L.: 1995, Cognitive Carpentry, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. L.: 1997, ‘Reasoning about Change and Persistence: A Solution to the Frame Problem’, Noûs 31(2), 143–169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. L. and J. Cruz: 1999, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edn, Rowman and Littlefield, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. L. and A. S. Gillies: 2000, ‘Belief Revision and Epistemology’, Synthese 122, 69–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prakken, H. and G. Vreeswijk: 2000, ‘Logics for Defeasible Argumentation’, in D. Gabbay (ed.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edn, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O.: 1937, ‘New Foundations for Mathematical Logic’, American Mathematical Monthly 44(2), 70–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reiter, R.: 1980, ‘A Logic for Default Reasoning’, Artificial Intelligence 13, 81–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rott, H.: 1998, ‘“Just Because”: Taking Belief Bases Seriously’, Research report/Preprint, ILLC: University of Amsterdam.

  • Rott, H.: 2000, ‘Two Dogmas of Belief Revision’, Journal of Philosophy 97(9), 503–522.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E.: 1980, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, 3–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spohn,W.: 1988, ‘Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States’, in W. L. Harper and B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics II, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

  • Spohn, W.: 2002, ‘A Brief Comparison of Pollock's Defeasible Reasoning and Ranking Functions’, Synthese 131(1), 39–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tichy, P.: 1976, ‘A Counterexample to the Stalnaker–Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals’, Philosophical Studies 29, 271–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Veltman, F.: 1985, Logics for Conditionals, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam.

  • Veltman, F.: 1996, ‘Defaults in Update Semantics’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25, 221–261.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, 78712, U.S.A.

    Anthony S. Gillies

Authors
  1. Anthony S. Gillies
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gillies, A.S. New foundations for epistemic change* . Synthese 138, 1–48 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000012202.66263.b2

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000012202.66263.b2

Keywords

Search

Navigation