On Social Facts

Front Cover
Princeton University Press, Apr 12, 1992 - Philosophy - 521 pages

Are social groups real in any sense that is independent of the thoughts, actions, and beliefs of the individuals making up the group? Using methods of philosophy to examine such longstanding sociological questions, Margaret Gilbert gives a general characterization of the core phenomena at issue in the domain of human social life. After developing detailed analyses of a number of central everyday concepts of social phenomena--including shared action, a social convention, a group's belief, and a group itself--she proposes that the core social phenomena among human beings are "plural subject" phenomena. In her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of such thinkers as Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, and David Lewis. "Gilbert's book aims to ... exhibit some general and structural features of the conceptual scheme in terms of which we think about social groups, collective action, social convention, and shared belief.... [It] offers an important corrective to individualistic thinking in the social sciences...."--Michael Root, Philosophical Review "In this rich and rewarding work, Margaret Gilbert provides a novel and detailed account of our everyday concepts of social collectivity. In so doing she makes a seminal contribution to ... some vexed issues in the philosophy of social science.... [An] intellectually pioneering work."--John D. Greenwood, Social Epistemology

 

Contents

Introduction everyday concepts and social reality
1
3 Social science and everyday concepts
3
4 Weber on everyday collectivity concepts
6
5 The everyday concept of a collectivity
8
6 Methodology
10
7 The main themes
12
8 Overview of chapters
14
Social action and the subject matter of social science
22
some salient features of the rules discussion
243
some tests
254
4 The simple summative account
257
adding common knowledge
260
the group as cause
274
7 A nonsummative account of collective belief
288
VI Social convention
315
2 David Lewis on Convention
319

2 Webers account of social action
24
3 The question of collectivities
34
4 Further considerations on Webers concept
44
5 Conclusions
55
Action meaning and the social
58
2 The deep level of the discussion
64
3 Winch on rulefollowing
71
4 Kripkes Wittgenstein
100
5 The intentionalist programme
128
6 Group languages
132
Social groups a Simmelian view
146
2 On sharing in an action
154
3 We
167
4 Social groups
204
After Durkheim concerning collective belief
237
A flawless mechanism?
329
Lewiss conditions on convention
339
Lewis and the ought of convention
349
Conventions and Collectivities
355
7 Towards an account of social convention
367
8 Social convention
373
On social facts
408
2 The actions of participating individual men
417
3 Concerning individualism versus holism
427
4 A sketch of some further applications
436
5 On social facts
441
Notes
446
Bibliography
496
Index
505
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