Rights and Demands: A Foundational InquiryRights are often invoked in contemporary moral and political debates, yet the nature of rights is contested. Rights and Demands provides the first full-length treatment of a central class of rights: demand-rights. To have such a right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action of another person. How are such rights possible? Everyday agreements are generally acknowledged to be sources of demand-rights, but what is it about an agreement that accounts for this? The central thesis of this book is that joint commitment is a ground of demand-rights, and that it may be the only ground. In developing this thesis Margaret Gilbert argues in detail for joint commitment accounts of both agreements and promises. The final chapter explains the relevance of its argument to our understanding of human rights. Engaging where appropriate with contemporary rights theory, Gilbert provides an accessible route into this area for those previously unfamiliar with it. |
Contents
Rights in the Conversation of Humanity | 1 |
A Problem Posed | 13 |
The Problem Solved | 99 |
DemandRights Morality and Law | 233 |
| 349 | |
| 361 | |
| 368 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accept according action addressee agreements allow appeal appropriate argue argument assume assumption central chapter claim clear conception concerned conformity consider considerations constituted context course discussion duty earlier effect equal equivalent example existence explain express fact focus follows further Gilbert give given ground Hart human rights idea important individual instance institutional intention interest interpretation intuitive involve issue joint commitment jointly justified kind least legal system liberty matter means mind moral demand-rights moral principle moral requirement moral rights nature normative noted object obligation one's owing particular parties performance person population position possible practice present problem promise promisor promissory obligation proposal question reason refer relation relevant respect rules Scanlon seems sense simply situation social someone speaking standing to demand sufficient suggests Suppose theorists theory things understand understood wrong