Abstract
Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard.
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Notes
Philosophers have often proceeded on the assumption that phenomenological description should have what Horgan and Timmons helpfully call “methodological priority” in moral theorizing (Horgan and Timmons 2005, p. 56 and p. 71). In this paper, I discuss how moral phenomenology was used by Cudworth, Clarke, Hutcheson, Butler, and Kierkegaard. Phenomenology was used in similarly methodologically prior ways by various twentieth century philosophers, such as: Mandelbaum (1969), who used moral phenomenology to argue against teleological normative theories; Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990), who used phenomenology to try to adjudicate between Kohlberg and Gilligan’s disputes over the nature of moral development; and Dancy (1986), who used an “argument from phenomenology” to try to advance a realist conception of value.
As Bernard Gert has said, “Many philosophers...define morality as that code of conduct which a person takes to be overriding. It is significant that such philosophers almost never discuss religion, for religion is just as plausibly regarded as providing a code of conduct that a person takes to be overriding or most important” (Gert 1998, p. 10).
Here are some examples of Clarke’s fundamental moral principles: “[I]n Mens dealing and conversing one with another; ‘tis undeniably more Fit, absolutely and in the Nature of the thing itself, that all Men should endeavour to promote the universal good and welfare of All; than that all Men should be continually contriving the ruin and destruction of All. ‘Tis evidently more Fit, even before all positive Bargains and Compacts, that Men should deal one with another according to the known Rules of Justice and Equity; than that every Man for his own present Advantage, should without scruple disappoint the most reasonable and equitable Expectations of his Neighbours, and cheat and defraud, or spoil by violence, all others without restraint. Lastly, ‘tis without dispute more Fit and reasonable in itself, that I should preserve the Life of an innocent Man, that happens at any time to be in my Power; or deliver him from any imminent danger, tho’ I have never made any promise so to do; than that I should suffer him to perish, or take away his Life, without any reason or provocation at all” (Clarke 1738, p. 609).
For fuller discussion of Cudworth’s use of the analogy between morals and geometry, see Gill (2004).
Things may look even worse for a universal, robust phenomenology if we bring Kierkegaard back into the mix. For Kierkegaard, it seems to me, would deny that the word of God that is experienced as normatively authoritative “fits” the situation at all. Kierkegaard’s telling of the story of Abraham implies that faith might demand we do something that contradicts what seems to us to be fitting.
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Gill, M.B. Variability and moral phenomenology. Phenom Cogn Sci 7, 99–113 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9069-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9069-8