Summary
This is a sequel to my paper, “Searching for a (Post)Foundational Approach to Philosophy of Science”, which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal [Ginev 2001, Journal for General Philosophy of science 32, 27–37]. In the present paper I continue to scrutinize the possibility of a strong hermeneutics of scientific research. My aim is to defend the position of cognitive existentialism that combines the advocacy of science’s cognitive specificity and the rejection of any form of essentialism. A special attention will be paid to the notion of the thematizing project of scientific research.
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Ginev, D. A (Post)Foundational Approach to the Philosophy of Science: Part II. J Gen Philos Sci 38, 57–74 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-9016-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-9016-3