

The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 3 (July 2002)

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. lii, 423.

This new translation is an extremely welcome addition to the continuing Cambridge Edition of Kant's works. English-speaking readers of the third Critique have long been hampered by the lack of an adequate translation of this important and difficult work. James Creed Meredith's much-reprinted translation¹ has charm and elegance, but it is often too loose to be useful for scholarly purposes. Moreover it does not include the first version of Kant's introduction, the so-called "First Introduction," which is now recognized as indispensable for an understanding of the work.² Werner Pluhar's more recent translation,³ which does include the First Introduction, is highly accurate when it confines itself to rendering Kant's German. However, it is often more of a reconstruction than a translation, containing so many interpretative interpolations that it is often difficult to separate out Kant's original text from the translator's contributions. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews have provided a translation (henceforth referred to as GM) that compares to or exceeds Pluhar's in its literal approach to the German, but that confines all interpretative material to footnotes and endnotes, so that the text itself, with all its unclarity and ambiguities, lies open to view. In addition, Guyer, as editor of the volume, has provided a great deal of valuable supplementary material. This includes an introduction with an outline of the work and details of the history of its composition and publication, and a wealth of endnotes offering clarifications of the text, background information, and, most strikingly, many references to related passages in Kant's voluminous writings, particularly in connection with Kant's earlier writings related to aesthetics. The edition also records differences among the first three editions of the work, and—of particular interest—erasures from and additions to Kant's manuscript of the First Introduction. Although the introduction and endnotes reflect interpretative views that are sometimes disputable (in ways that, for the most part, lie beyond the scope of this review), this supplementary material makes the present edition into a valuable resource even for those able to read the text in German.

There is much to admire in GM's handling of the challenges presented by the German text. The problem of how to translate the central terms *Zweck* and *Zweckmäßigkeit* (in Meredith, 'end' and 'finality'; in Pluhar 'purpose' and 'purposiveness') is dealt with in Solomonic fashion by using 'end' for *Zweck* and 'purposiveness' for *Zweckmäßigkeit*. This has the advantage of preserving a connection with the term *Zweck* as it is normally translated in the ethical writings, while avoiding the misleading neologism 'finality' and retaining a link with much of the recent secondary literature on the third Critique, most of which

BOOK REVIEWS

tends to prefer 'purpose' and its cognates. Guyer and Matthews are resourceful in finding English equivalents for the multifarious German terms based on the stem '-stimmen' (*Einstimmung*, *Zustimmung*, *Zusammenstimmung*, etc.) that appear throughout the discussion of Kant's aesthetics. They make what is, to my mind, the correct decision in translating *Vorstellung* as 'representation' rather than Pluhar's 'presentation', and *beurteilen* (which, as they note, is simply the transitive form of *urteilen*) as 'judge' in contrast to Meredith's 'estimate'. By and large, the reader is well served by the translation's almost word-to-word faithfulness to the German text, although sometimes the translators seem positively to avoid elegant or idiomatic formulations, even where these can be achieved without any sacrifice of accuracy. For example, their practice of always translating *man* as 'one', as opposed to using 'we' or the passive voice, gives Kant's prose a stiffness that is not present in the original. And sometimes, more seriously, the word-to-word approach can make the original text harder to decipher, as when the translation of a gendered pronoun by its nongendered English equivalent leads to ambiguity about which word it refers back to. However, in aiming for maximum literalness, even at the expense of readability, GM is clearly erring in the right direction.

Now for the inevitable complaints. Some of GM's decisions about individual terms struck me as less than happy. 'Satisfaction' has too much the flavor of a need having been met or a desire fulfilled to be a good fit for *Wohlgefallen*, which Kant uses to refer to pleasure in general, including the disinterested pleasure of taste. My own preference here would be for Pluhar's more neutral 'liking'. 'Power of judgment', while in no way misleading, seems over-elaborate as a translation for *Urteilkraft*, and leads in a couple of passages to the awkward 'capacity of the power of judgment' (First Introduction, 20:215, 20:244).⁴ Because in most cases the context rules out any ambiguity, I see no reason in this case not to stay with the traditional 'judgment', which has the further advantage of according with the Cambridge Edition's usual practice of using English terms that are based on Kant's Latin equivalents.⁵ Turning now to the Critique of Teleological Judgment, I had reservations about the rendering of *erzeugen* in most cases as 'generate', rather than 'produce' as in both Meredith and Pluhar. The term 'generate' strikes me as somewhat too specific for some of the contexts in which *erzeugen* occurs; in addition, its adoption leads to an inappropriate translation of *Erzeugung* as 'generation' where what Kant clearly has in mind is 'production' in the sense of product or thing produced.⁶ It makes more sense to me to reserve 'generate' and 'generation' for the terms *zeugen* and *Zeugung*, rather than to use them, as GM does, for cognates of *zeugen* and *erzeugen* alike.⁷

Ideally, a scholarly translation of a philosophical text will aim at a one-to-one correspondence between philosophically significant terms in the two languages, and, where this is not feasible, will make clear to the reader where the divergences lie. GM is, in many instances, exemplary in this respect. For exam-

BOOK REVIEWS

ple, while it appropriately departs from one-to-one correspondence by using 'judge' for both *urteilen* and *beurteilen*, every occurrence of *beurteilen* is flagged. And, in many other cases where divergences are not indicated on a passage by passage basis, these divergences are often indicated in a general way in the glossaries or in the introduction (where, for example, Guyer makes a case for using 'object', without marking any differentiation, for both *Objekt* and *Gegenstand*).⁸ However, GM sometimes departs from this standard in ways that decrease the transparency of the translation. For example, 'comprehend' and its cognates are sometimes used, without indication, for both *begreifen* and *zusammenfassen* and their cognates; 'lawful' for both *gesetzlich* and *gesetzmäßig*; 'transcendent' for both *überschwenglich* and *transzendent*; 'natural science' for both *Naturwissenschaft* and *Naturkunde*; 'generate' (as noted above) for both *zeugen* and *erzeugen*; and 'produce' not only for *bewirken* and *wirken*, as indicated in the English-German glossary, but also for *hervorbringen*, *erzeugen* and *angeben*.⁹ None of these terms, with the exception of 'produce', is listed in the English-German glossary, although 'comprehension' is listed as corresponding to *Zusammenfassung*, and 'generation', which is in fact used to render both *Erzeugung* and *Zeugung*, as corresponding only to *Erzeugung*; *gesetzmäßig* is listed in the German-English glossary as corresponding only to 'lawlike' even though it is in fact translated throughout, as far as I could see, by 'lawful'. I am not claiming that all the distinctions mentioned here are philosophically important. But ideally the reader should be alerted to them so that she can decide for herself.

There are also some unmarked departures in the other direction. Most of these (for example, 'research' and 'investigation' for *Nachforschung*, 'think' and 'conceive' for *denken*) are of minor importance, but one example that did strike me as troubling concerns the frequently used verb *sollen*. On one page of the translation (114, corresponding to 5:229–30) this term appears three times, in a similar context each time. Pluhar, in my view correctly, translates *sollen* as 'ought' throughout; but GM renders it successively as 'ought', 'supposed to', and 'should', thus obscuring the connection registered by Kant's repeated use of the same verb.

This leads me to a substantive philosophical issue regarding the translation: its approach to Kant's normative language. It is a central feature of Kant's aesthetic theory that, in making a judgment of beauty, we claim that everyone ought to [*sollen*] agree with our judgment. The judgment of taste demands [*verlangen*, *fordern*] and expects [*erwarten*] agreement from others; in addition, Kant describes the claim it makes using the verbs *ansinnen* and *zumuten*, so that, for example, the judgment of taste "*sinnt jedermann Beistimmung an*" (5:237), and the corresponding feeling of pleasure "*muten wir jedem andern im Geschmacksurteile als notwendig zu*" (5:218). In translating the passages that lay out this aspect of Kant's view, GM consistently renders the relevant terms in a way that minimizes their normative force. In particular, *ansinnen* is rendered as 'ascribe' (where Pluhar has 'require' and Meredith has 'impute'), *zumuten* as 'expect'

BOOK REVIEWS

(where Pluhar has ‘require’ and Meredith has both ‘require’ and ‘insist’) and *sollen* as ‘should’ (where both Pluhar and Meredith have the more unambiguously normative ‘ought’).¹⁰ The translation thus suggests, in a way that the original does not, that the claim to universal agreement is factual rather than normative: more specifically, that it is a prediction that others *will* agree with our judgment (at least under appropriate circumstances), rather than a strong normative claim that they *ought* to agree with it. This is in fact Guyer’s view, but it is a controversial one, and the translation’s choice of terms might encourage the reader to give it more credence than the original text warrants.¹¹

Any translation will include slips and other inaccuracies, but I found rather more of them than might be hoped for in an edition that will undoubtedly be regarded as authoritative. In the Preface, where Kant introduces the project of the *Critique of Judgment* by asking “whether judgment ... has a priori principles of its own, whether these are constitutive or regulative ... and whether it [judgment] gives the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure” [*ob nun die Urteilskraft ... für sich Principien a priori habe ... ob diese constitutiv oder bloß regulativ sind ... und ob sie dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust ... a priori die Regel gebe*] (5:168), GM mistakenly reads ‘dem Gefühle’ as though it were in the nominative and overlooks the immediately preceding ‘sie’, so that the latter part of the question becomes ‘whether the feeling of pleasure and displeasure ... gives the rule a priori’. Another apparent oversight with potentially misleading consequences is in the Dialectic of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, where, in the course of discussing various systems for explaining the purposiveness of nature, Kant contrasts the system of “casuality” [*Kasualität*] associated with Epicurus and Democritus with Spinoza’s system of “fatality” [*Fatalität*]. Here the term *Kasualität*, which appears twice, both times in boldface, is rendered each time as ‘causality’ rather than ‘casuality’ (5:391).¹² I also found some misplaced pronoun references, one of them being at 5:228, where the ‘sie’ in “*jener Einhelligkeit im Spiele der Gemütskräfte ... sofern sie nur empfunden werden kann*” is translated as ‘they’ and thus made to refer back to the powers of the mind [*Gemütskräfte*] instead of to their unison [*Einhelligkeit*], as is mandated by the singular verb form *kann*, in addition to being suggested by the context.

Further errors appear in an important passage where Kant explains the reason why we are not satisfied, in the study of nature [*Naturkunde*], with an explanation of natural products in terms of purposes: it is because, he says, “*wir ... in derselben die Naturerzeugung bloß unserem Vermögen, sie zu beurteilen ... und nicht den Dingen selbst ... angemessen zu beurteilen verlangen*” (5:408). GM translates this as follows: “we are here required to judge the generation of nature as is appropriate for our faculty for judging them ... and not according to the things themselves.” The references of ‘here’ [*in derselben*] and ‘them’ [*sie*] in GM’s translation of the passage are unclear, but the former appears to refer back to the study of nature, and the latter to refer forward to the “things themselves”; if this is so, then both references are incorrect, since *derselben* refers to expla-

BOOK REVIEWS

nation in terms of purposes, and *sie* is a singular pronoun referring to *Naturerzeugung*. More importantly, *wir...verlangen* should be rendered as ‘we demand’, rather than, as GM has it, ‘we are required’. GM’s translation seems to me to mistake the overall sense of the passage, which is about the minimal nature of the demands we impose on ourselves when we seek to explain natural things in terms of purposes, not about the requirements placed on us by the study of nature (or, as GM renders *Naturkunde*, of natural science). As Pluhar’s translation puts it, the point is that “all we demand in such an explanation is that natural production be judged in a way commensurate with our ability for judging such production ... rather than with the things themselves.”

A few other slips, while less serious, are worth noting because of their potential to confuse the unwary reader. At 5:272 and again at 5:365 Kant explicitly distinguishes *Bewunderung* (translated by GM as ‘admiration’) and *Verwunderung* (‘astonishment’); but GM’s rendering of *bewundernswürdig* at 5:382 as ‘astonishing’ rather than ‘admirable’ turns the distinction around. And a later occurrence of *bewunderungswürdig* at 5:418, which should again be ‘admirable’, is translated as ‘remarkable’. Readers might also be confused by ‘mechanisms’ (plural) in place of ‘mechanism’ (singular) at 5:387 and at 5:398; by ‘subjective’ for ‘subject’ at 5:190; and by ‘quality’ for ‘quantity’ in the chapter heading at 5:211.¹³

Other departures from the German might have been motivated by interpretative considerations, but would still have been better avoided, or at least flagged in footnotes. The passage in the First Introduction where Kant says that judgment reveals itself as a faculty with its own principle “only in taste, and indeed [*und zwar*] that concerning objects of nature” (20:244) has been viewed as problematic because it seems to deny that taste concerning objects of art is relevant to an examination of judgment. GM neatly, but inaccurately, disposes of the problem by translating *und zwar* as ‘and especially’ so that judgments about natural objects are still privileged, but not to the extent of excluding those about art, as the correct meaning of *und zwar* seems to require.¹⁴ Another apparent emendation occurs in an important passage of the Introduction where Kant says that even though empirical laws of nature “may indeed be contingent according to the insight of *our* understanding [*zwar ... nach unserer Verstandeseinsicht zufällig sein mögen*]” they must still, if they are to be called laws, be regarded as necessary (5:180). GM translates ‘*zufällig sein mögen*’ as ‘may seem to be contingent’ (my emphasis), which perhaps makes better philosophical sense, but which does not correspond to what Kant actually says.¹⁵

In spite of the difficulties I have noted, GM is, in important respects, a significant advance on its predecessors. It is unquestionably a great improvement on Meredith, especially for readers with a scholarly interest in the text. And it is also in many respects an improvement on Pluhar, although here there is more to say in Pluhar’s favor: in particular, Pluhar seems to me to have the edge over GM when it comes to accuracy and reliability, and in addition, Pluhar is

BOOK REVIEWS

more generous than GM in providing the original German word or phrase where the translation might be controversial or where a query about the original German might be anticipated. On the other hand, GM has the important advantage of presenting a text that is unencumbered with interpretative interpolations, so that (except for a few cases like those noted in the preceding paragraph) it leaves the task of interpretation where it properly belongs, that is, with the reader. Moreover, lapses aside, GM is more literal and remains closer to the structure of the text than Pluhar, and while Pluhar's notes are often useful, the editorial material in GM is far more systematic and comprehensive. For these reasons, I find GM to be preferable, although many of its readers will continue to find Pluhar invaluable as a trustworthy second opinion on the translation of crucial passages.

HANNAH GINSBORG

University of California, Berkeley

Notes

I am grateful to Randall Amano, Janet Broughton, Katharina Kaiser, Jay Wallace and Daniel Warren for helpful comments and discussion.

¹ *The Critique of Judgment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). This volume contains translations of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment that were first published in 1911 and 1928 respectively.

² The text of the First Introduction has also been published separately in a mostly satisfactory translation by James Haden (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

³ *Critique of Judgment* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).

⁴ References to the *Critique of Judgment* and the First Introduction are given in the text and cite volume and page number of the *Akademie* edition (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1902–). The relevant page numbers are given in the margins both of GM (which also gives the volume numbers) and of the other translations mentioned in this review. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are given in the usual way by citing page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) editions. References to other works of Kant are given by volume and page number of the *Akademie* edition.

⁵ For mention of this practice, see the editor's introduction, xlix. As Pluhar points out in a footnote to 5:167, Kant offers *iudicium* as the Latin equivalent to *Urteilkraft* in the *Anthropology*, 7:199.

⁶ Here I have in mind the occurrences of *Naturverzeugung* at 5:413, line 21, where Kant goes on to refer to the *Naturverzeugung* as 'this product' [*diese Produkt*] and of *Erzeugung* at 5:413, line 37, where the term is again coupled with the term *Produkt*.

⁷ I mention here some further decisions that struck me as questionable. (1) *Erden* is rendered as 'soils' in a context ("*Erden, Luft, Wasser*") where *Erde* seems to invoke the eighteenth-century scientific notion of 'earth' as a kind of substance with certain chemical properties (5:425). This choice is especially puzzling given that *Erden* is given its traditional rendering as 'earths' in the Cambridge edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for which Guyer is co-translator; see for example A646/B674, A653/B681 and A657/B685. (2) *Zum Behuf* is translated at 5:186 and 5:193 as 'in behalf of', but the more appropriate translation seems to me to be 'for the sake of', which GM uses in most other contexts. (3) In a passage referring to reflective judgment's goal of discovering "an accordance and hierarchy of species and genera under them" [*eine Einhelligkeit und Stufenordnung von Arten und Gattungen unter ihnen*] (20:213), *Einhelligkeit* is rendered as 'consensus'. This seems odd given that it refers not to an accordance or agreement holding among judging subjects (as the term 'consensus' suggests), but rather to the agreement of species with genera. To complicate matters, *ihnen*, which I take to be a plural dative pronoun, is ren-

BOOK REVIEWS

dered incorrectly as 'it' rather than 'them', so that reflective judgment's goal is characterized as "consensus and a hierarchical order of species and genera under it." Perhaps this represents an emendation intended to save Kant from the obviously mistaken view that genera are subordinate to species, but it is not clear that the resulting text is preferable.

⁸ See the editor's introduction, xviii.

⁹ GM's use of 'produce' for *angeben* strikes me as questionable, even apart from the issue of consistency. The passage I have in mind, from the Analytic of the Beautiful, says that the judgment of beauty is regarded as an example of a universal rule "*die man nicht angeben kann*" (5:237), that is, a rule "which we are unable to state" (Pluhar) or which is "incapable of formulation" (Meredith). GM's reading of this as a rule "which one cannot produce" seems to me to obscure the sense of this important passage.

¹⁰ Pluhar discusses the sense of *ansinnen* and *zumuten*, and explains his decision to translate both terms as 'require', in a footnote to 5:214.

¹¹ The potentially misleading effect of the translation is reinforced by the outline of the text given in the editor's introduction, which adopts the "factual" view, but without any indication that it is controversial (xxvi, xxix, xxxii–xxxiii).

¹² Since completing this review, I have been informed that this error is not due to the translators but was introduced by the publisher's proofreader; it has been corrected in the paperback edition.

¹³ The last two errors have been corrected in the paperback edition.

¹⁴ The translation I give here, which is based on James Haden's, is not ideal; the '*und zwar*' locution in '*der Geschmack, und zwar in Ansehung der Gegenstände der Natur*' is probably best rendered by a formulation like Pluhar's: 'it is only in taste, and in taste concerning objects of nature'. I use the somewhat less apt 'and indeed' to bring out the contrast with GM's 'and especially'.

¹⁵ Two further examples: (1) At 5:238 Kant describes the process of perceptual cognition as one in which "*ein gegebener Gegenstand ... die Einbildungskraft zur Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen, diese aber den Verstand zur Einheit derselben in Begriffen in Tätigkeit bringt.*" GM reads *derselben* as referring back to *des Mannigfaltigen* and translates *Einheit* ('unity') as 'unification', so the last clause reads "imagination brings the understanding into activity for the unification of the manifold into concepts." But in addition to doubts one might have about the nonliteral translation of *Einheit*, the feminine *derselben* indicates that the reference is to *Zusammensetzung*, that is, to the *composition* of the manifold. GM may here be following the text of the *Akademie* edition, which (following Vorländer) replaces *derselben* with *desselben*. However, the reasons for this emendation are not clear, and given that Kant refers again to the "unity of the composition of the manifold" at 5:287, the original seems preferable. (2) At 20:225, Kant says that the determining ground of an aesthetic judgment of reflection "*kann ... nur im Gefühle der Lust gegeben werden, so doch, daß das ästhetische Urteil immer ein Reflexionsurteil ist.*" GM understands this as saying that the determining ground "can only be given in the feeling of pleasure, so that the aesthetic judgment is *always* a judgment of reflection," whereas I read it as saying that the determining ground "can only be given in the feeling of pleasure, *yet in such a way that* the aesthetic judgment is *still* a judgment of reflection" (my emphasis throughout). GM's rendering here is close to the translation given by Guyer in his *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 115. I discuss that translation, and the interpretative issue it raises, in "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 72 (1991), 295 n.10.