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Representation and Reality in Humans, Other Living Organisms and Intelligent Machines pp 235–245Cite as

The Relevance of Language for the Problem of Representation

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Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 28))

Abstract

This chapter deals with the relationship between representation and language, which becomes more relevant if we do not intend the process of forming internal representations of reality but rather the representative function of language. Starting from some Fregean ideas, we present the notion of representation theorized by Searle. According to Searle, a belief is a “representation” (not in the sense of having an “idea”) that has a propositional content and a psychological mode: the propositional content or intentional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects and the psychological mode determines the direction of fit of the propositional content. We draw attention to some very interesting ideas proposed by Brandom in response to the challenge of Searle to AI, as they propose formal aspects of representation that rely on the use of ordinary language while avoiding the psychological order of explanation.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the referees for fruitful criticisms and suggestions, and the participants at the AISB Convention 2014 and the UNILOG 2015 World Congress for thoughtful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Lateran University, Vatican City, Italy

    Raffaela Giovagnoli

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  1. Raffaela Giovagnoli
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Correspondence to Raffaela Giovagnoli .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Gothenburg, Sweden

    Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic

  2. Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City, Italy

    Raffaela Giovagnoli

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Giovagnoli, R. (2017). The Relevance of Language for the Problem of Representation. In: Dodig-Crnkovic, G., Giovagnoli, R. (eds) Representation and Reality in Humans, Other Living Organisms and Intelligent Machines. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43784-2_11

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-43782-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-43784-2

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