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Problems with Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

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Abstract

Two of the probabilistic measures of coherence discussed in this paper take probabilistic dependence into account and so depend on prior probabilities in a fundamental way. An example is given which suggests that this prior-dependence can lead to potential problems. Another coherence measure is shown to be independent of prior probabilities in a clearly defined sense and consequently is able to avoid such problems. The issue of prior-dependence is linked to the fact that the first two measures can be understood as measures of coherence as striking agreement, while the third measure represents coherence as agreement. Thus, prior (in)dependence can be used to distinguish different conceptions of coherence.

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Correspondence to David H. Glass.

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Glass, D.H. Problems with Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63, 375–385 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-4000-6

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