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Semantics and truth relative to a world

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Abstract

This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California – Davis, Davis, CA, 95616, USA

    Michael Glanzberg

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  1. Michael Glanzberg
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Glanzberg, M. Semantics and truth relative to a world. Synthese 166, 281–307 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9285-3

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