Abstract
Philip Pettit has argued that universalizability entails consequentialism. I criticise the argument for relying on a question-begging reading of the impartiality of universalization. A revised form of the argument can be constructed by relying on preference-satisfaction rationality, rather than on impartiality. But this revised argument succumbs to an ambiguity in the notion of a preference (or desire). I compare the revised argument to an earlier argument of Pettit’s for consequentialism that appealed to the theoretical virtue of simplicity, and I raise questions about the force of appeal to notions like simplicity and rationality in moral argument.
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Gleeson, A. Pettit on Consequentialism and Universalizability. Theor Med Bioeth 26, 261–275 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-005-3983-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-005-3983-y