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A Semantics and Methodology for Ceteris Paribus Hypotheses

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Abstract

Taking seriously the arguments of Earman, Roberts and Smith that ceteris paribus laws have no semantics and cannot be tested, I suggest that ceteris paribus claims have a kind of formal pragmatics, and that at least some of them can be verified or refuted in the limit.

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Glymour, C. A Semantics and Methodology for Ceteris Paribus Hypotheses. Erkenntnis 57, 395–405 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021538530673

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021538530673

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