Abstract
Taking seriously the arguments of Earman, Roberts and Smith that ceteris paribus laws have no semantics and cannot be tested, I suggest that ceteris paribus claims have a kind of formal pragmatics, and that at least some of them can be verified or refuted in the limit.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Kelly, K. T.: 1995, The Logic of Reliable Inquiry, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kelly, K.: 1998, ‘Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia’ Erkenntnis 50, 11–58.
Kelly, K. T. and C. Glymour: 1992, ‘Inductive Inference from Theory Laden Data’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 21, 391–444.
Kelly, K., C. Juhl, and C. Glymour: 1994, ‘Reliability, Realism, and Relativism’ in P. Clark (ed.), Reading Putnam, Blackwell, London, pp. 98–161.
Kitcher, P.: 1990, ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’ Journal of Philosophy 87, 5–22.
Kitcher, P.: 1995, Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Glymour, C. A Semantics and Methodology for Ceteris Paribus Hypotheses. Erkenntnis 57, 395–405 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021538530673
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021538530673