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On the Metaphysics of Probabilistic Causation: Lessons from Social Epidemiology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Bruce Glymour
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Abstract

I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populations can cause the behavior of members of the populations. Such emergent population-level causation is metaphysically impossible on the orthodoxy.

Type
Laws and Causation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1413 - 1423
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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