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The Conception of Synthetic Entities from a Personalist Perspective

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Abstract

Synthetic biology opens up the possibility of producing new entities not found in nature, whose classification as organisms or machines has been debated. In this paper we are focusing on the delimitation of the moral value of synthetic products, in order to establish the ethically right way to behave towards them. In order to do so, we use personalism as our ethical framework. First, we examine how we can distinguish between organisms and machines. Next, we discuss whether the products of synthetic biology can be considered organisms at all and assess what their moral value is and how should we behave towards them. Finally, we discuss the hypothetical case of synthetic humans.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Life Sciences, Universidad Católica de Valencia San Vicente Mártir, 46001, Valencia, Spain

    Lucía Gómez-Tatay, José Miguel Hernández-Andreu & Justo Aznar

  2. Grupo de Medicina Molecular y Mitocondrial, Departamento de Ciencias Médicas Básicas, Facultad de Medicina y Odontología, Universidad Católica de Valencia San Vicente Mártir, 46001, Valencia, Spain

    Lucía Gómez-Tatay & José Miguel Hernández-Andreu

  3. Escuela de Doctorado, Universidad Católica de Valencia San Vicente Mártir, 46001, Valencia, Spain

    Lucía Gómez-Tatay

Authors
  1. Lucía Gómez-Tatay
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  2. José Miguel Hernández-Andreu
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  3. Justo Aznar
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Correspondence to Justo Aznar.

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Gómez-Tatay, L., Hernández-Andreu, J.M. & Aznar, J. The Conception of Synthetic Entities from a Personalist Perspective. Sci Eng Ethics 25, 97–111 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-9994-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-9994-z

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