

How Quotations Refer

MARIO GÓMEZ-TORRENTE

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, México DF 04510, Mexico

mariogt@unam.mx

A remarkable feature of most recent theories of quotation is that they view even purely referential (or pure) uses of quotations as having eccentric or just plainly anomalous linguistic properties. The motivation for the postulation of these properties can in all cases be traced to a well-known observation by Donald Davidson. Davidson observed that quotations, unlike typical names, must somehow get interpreted in a general way that exploits the salient pre-referential relation between a quotation and the expression between its quotes, rather than via individual naming stipulations that need not exploit any such relation. A number of theories of quotation as an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon emerge when some alleged implications of Davidson's observation are combined with some by now widely accepted objections to early descriptivist/demonstrative theories (including Davidson's own). On Herman Cappelen's and Ernie Lepore's "minimal theory,"¹ the Davidsonian observation requires quotations to be semantically structured; together with the objections to early descriptivist/demonstrative theories, this leads to the idea that quotations can be neither semantically unstructured terms nor descriptions, and must instead be strange structured but non-quantificational noun phrases, whose exact compositional structure Cappelen & Lepore leave undescribed. On Stefano Predelli's strongly modified version of Davidson's theory,² the Davidsonian observation implies that quotations must be demonstrative phrases; but the objections to early demonstrative theories then require that a (pure) quotation must be an anomalous demonstrative phrase, in fact one of a kind that invalidates the standard way of making the distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative phrases. On Paul Saka's and Corey Washington's deflationist theories,³ the Davidsonian observation is thought to be incompatible with the

¹ Cappelen & Lepore, *Language Turned On Itself* (New York: Oxford, 2007).

² Predelli, "The Demonstrative Theory of Quotation," *Linguistics and Philosophy*, XXXI (2008): 555-72.

³ Saka, "Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction," *Mind*, CVII (1998): 113-35, "Quotational Constructions," in P. De Brabanter, ed., *Hybrid Quotations* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2005), pp. 187-

possibility that quotations acquire semantic referents by linguistic conventions, and this leads to the surprising requirement that every expression, including every expression that on standard syntactic assumptions belongs to a grammatical category other than that of noun phrases, must have uses in which it works syntactically as a noun phrase. If any of these theories is correct, the linguistic explanation of quotation requires the postulation of eccentric or anomalous facts concerning the ways in which noun phrases contribute to truth conditions, the nature and function of demonstratives, or general syntactic theory. By contrast, the less recent—by now perhaps “classical”—theories of quotation, including the theory that quotations are proper names and early descriptivist theories, sought to assimilate pure quotations, syntactically and semantically, to run-of-the-mill noun phrases of some kind, even if they did so in ways that Davidson showed to be clearly objectionable.

In this paper I want to argue, however, that the friends of the classical need not fall into despair. I will argue, in particular, that the Davidsonian observation has no implication that quotations cannot get semantic referents by linguistic conventions, or that they must be demonstrative phrases, or that they must be semantically structured. In fact I will indicate, both by means of general considerations and by appeal to a number of examples of classes of terms in natural language, that there is no inconsistency in supposing that the terms in a certain class get semantic referents by linguistic conventions, are semantically unstructured and context-insensitive, and yet get their referents fixed wholesale with the help of a general rule that exploits a pre-referential relation between terms and intended referents. A theory on which quotation is postulated to be an instance of this combination, like the theory to be proposed below, is then an attractive alternative to recent theories. For, besides not being affected by objections to classical theories, it does not require the postulation of eccentric or anomalous facts underlying the syntax and semantics of quotation. The upshot will be that the proper linguistic explanation of quotation does not require so much a departure from classical assumptions as an awareness that these assumptions can be instantiated in more ways than was classically (or recently) realized.

A substantial part of my discussion will be devoted to making it clear that the Davidsonian observation, as well as some related new observations by Cappelen & Lepore,

212, and “The Demonstrative and Identity Theories of Quotation,” *Journal of Philosophy*, CIII, 2006: 452-71; Washington, “The Identity Theory of Quotation,” *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXXIX, 1992: 582-605.

do not imply in any way that quotations must be semantically structured. I take this to be of significant independent interest for the theory of reference quite generally. The Davidsonian observation plausibly implies that some general procedure serves to interpret all quotations. Cappelen & Lepore take the observation to imply the stronger claim that a certain lexical construction must also somehow give their semantic structure. While they are wrong to do so, their mistake is perhaps understandable. For while it is in general accepted that the lexical material that helps fix the reference of a term or terms need not codify their semantic structure, the full range of ways in which this dissociation can take place has not been widely appreciated. It is generally accepted, e.g., that a typical proper name can get its reference fixed with the help of a description that is nevertheless not synonymous with it. And it is also widely believed that the utterances of a given pure indexical get their referents fixed via a rule (the Kaplanian character of the indexical), from which one can extract a system of reference-fixing descriptions which are nevertheless not synonymous with those utterances. But it has not been frequently observed that the dissociation also takes place in some cases where the relevant lexical material consists of a general rule that helps fix the referents of a class of context-insensitive terms. Furthermore, it seems not to have been observed that it is perfectly possible that these general rules exploit pre-referential relations between the terms whose referents are being fixed and those referents. Just as in the cases of typical proper names and of pure indexicals, these general mechanisms for wholesale reference-fixing can clearly be consistently coupled with an independent convention that the terms whose reference is thus fixed are to be used as semantically unstructured (one analogous to the unstructuredness convention that David Kaplan postulated as forming an essential part of the semantics of pure indexicals). I take these observations to provide the key to a proper understanding of the semantics of quotation.

In section I I will very briefly recall classical theories of quotation and their problems, and I will provide an only somewhat less brief critical exposition of recent deflationist, *sui generis* demonstrative and “minimal” theories, and of their implications concerning quotation as an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon. In section II I will state my theory and give a preliminary defense of it. I will briefly point out how this theory is not affected by the problems of classical theories, thus being in this respect on a par vis-à-vis the recent

theories described in section I. Furthermore, I will make it clear how the theory does not postulate eccentric or anomalous facts concerning the ways in which noun phrases contribute to truth conditions, nor concerning general syntax or the semantics of demonstratives. The final section III completes the defense of the theory begun in section II, as it is devoted to showing that arguments that the Davidsonian observation prevents quotations from getting semantic referents via linguistic conventions, or requires them to be structured or equivalent with demonstrative phrases, are mistaken. I will first point out that semantic unstructuredness, non-demonstrativeness, and conventional wholesale reference-fixing exploiting pre-referential term-referent relations are uncontroversially combined in some naturally occurring classes of terms, such as traditional Spanish proper names and numerical street names. And I will note how attention to these cases and to certain general considerations shows by itself what is wrong with the Cappelen & Lepore arguments against the unstructuredness of quotations, with Davidson's fundamental consideration for demonstrativeness in quotation, and with the deflationist arguments that quotations cannot acquire semantic referents via linguistic conventions.

I. CLASSICAL THEORIES, RECENT THEORIES, AND THEIR PROBLEMS

The most influential classical theory of pure quotation was the theory that pure quotations are proper names, traditionally associated with Tarski and Quine.⁴ This theory was widely rejected on the basis of two related Davidsonian objections. We will later see that these objections work only against a theory on which quotations are like typical proper names in all semantically significant respects, including matters of reference-fixing, but not against the weaker claim that they are semantically unstructured expressions. However, it is

⁴ Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages", in Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp. 152–278; Willard V. Quine, *Mathematical Logic* (Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1940). I join several recent writers (including Cappelen & Lepore, *Language Turned on Itself*, p. 101) in thinking that this attribution is at best questionable. I think that Tarski and Quine merely thought that quotations are semantically unstructured, and really held no detailed views concerning the question of how their reference gets fixed (see my "Quotation Revisited," *Philosophical Studies*, CII (2001): 123-53). But the stronger view that they are like typical proper names in all semantic respects, including matters of reference-fixing, was at any rate read into their theories by many people, such as Davidson, so it was at least in this sense a classical view.

important to see that the objections do convincingly refute the idea that quotations are simply typical proper names. The first objection was that if quotations were typical proper names, a language in which every quotation had been replaced by a typical proper name unrelated to the quoted expression would be a language where “nothing would have been lost,” and this is clearly wrong. The users of such a language would have to gain knowledge of the reference of each expression-referring name through individual acts of learning, and clearly nothing like this happens with quotations: one learns the reference of quotations in some general way that exploits the “relatedness” of quotation and quoted expression. This is strictly speaking the Davidsonian observation mentioned in the introduction above. The second objection was that if quotations were typical proper names, then the only way to give their denotations within a recursive theory of truth would be by means of a separate basis clause for each quotation in the theory of denotation; since there are infinitely many quotations, the appropriate theory could not be finitely storable, but plausibly such theories should exist for natural language.

Another classical theory was that pure quotations abbreviate context-insensitive descriptions of the form of ‘the expression formed by a_1 concatenated with a_2 concatenated with . . . concatenated with a_n ,’ where in place of ‘ a_1 ,’ ‘ a_2 ,’ etc., go names from a finite set of names of basic subexpressions with the help of which every quotable expression is supposed to be constructible; this is associated especially with Peter Geach.⁵ This context-insensitive description theory is vulnerable to another objection by Davidson: there would seem to be no finite set of basic subexpressions with the help of which every quotable expression can be constructed by concatenation, unless we have some very restrictive idea of what is “quotable.” In fact Geach does seem to think that only concatenations of words are quotable material, but then the obvious objection to the theory is that it is based on an unduly restrictive idea of what is quotable.

The implication of the classical name theory that quotations are associated with individual acts of interpretation and learning led to the proposal of a number of theories,

⁵ Geach, *Mental Acts* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971). It is sometimes also associated with Tarski and Quine, but this attribution is definitely wrong. They did use such descriptions for certain logico-mathematical purposes, but never claimed that they could be used as analyses of natural language quotations.

especially connected also with Davidson, according to which the quotation marks in a quotation abbreviate a description or a complex demonstrative phrase containing some familiar demonstrative or other, that in particular uses can be used together with a demonstration of the quoted token, or of the space it occupies, etc. Examples of such phrases or phrase forms include ‘the expression a token of which is *here*,’ ‘the expression with the shape *here* pictured,’⁶ ‘the expression which shares with *this* all the features R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n ’⁷ (I will not go into what these features are), and ‘*this* X,’ where in place of ‘X’ goes some common noun supplied by context.⁸ For Davidson and several of the authors of these theories, there was a powerful consideration in favor of the idea that descriptiveness and demonstrativeness are essential to quotation. The Davidsonian observation required that the referring parts in quotations get their referents fixed wholesale with the help of a mechanism that exploits the salient pre-referential relation between quotations and quoted expressions, which Davidson took to be the relation of “picturing.” Wholesale reference-fixing was thought to require in turn that the referring parts in quotations be semantically structured (unlike proper names), and semantic structure plausibly amounts here to descriptive structure. But on the other hand, the “picturing” as such in quotations is intuitively not a relation of linguistic description. So “picturing” must be accomplished by a “semantically inert” part of the quotation, and it must be the remainder of the quotation that is a description. However, there must be a connection between this description and the quoted expression, as required by the idea that the reference of the referring part of a quotation gets fixed exploiting the relation of “picturing.” Since this connection cannot be that the description linguistically describes the quoted expression either in a purely “qualitative” way or by containing names for it or for its parts (as in the context-insensitive description theory), it was thought to be that the description contains a demonstrative that

⁶ Davidson, “Quotation,” in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (New York: Oxford, 1984), pp. 79-92.

⁷ Jonathan Bennett, “Quotation,” *Noûs*, XXII (1988): 399-418.

⁸ Manuel García-Carpintero, “Ostensive Signs: against the Identity Theory of Quotation,” *Journal of Philosophy*, XCI, 1994: 253-64, and “The *Deferred Ostension* Theory of Quotation,” *Noûs*, XXXVIII (2004): 674-92.

must be coupled with a demonstration of a token of the quoted expression, or of the space it occupies, etc.⁹

Classical Davidsonian theories are clearly not vulnerable to the specific Davidsonian objections to the name theory or the context-insensitive description theory, but they are open to several other forceful objections: (i) the demonstrative phrases of Davidsonian analyses can in principle refer in some contexts to things that quotations (or quotation marks) as a matter of conventional principle cannot refer to in any context;¹⁰ hence (ii) it is not guaranteed purely by a Davidsonian theory that apparently context-independent disquotational truisms such as (D) are true:

(D) ‘ “Socrates” ’ refers to ‘Socrates’;

rather, whether (D) is true on a Davidsonian theory will at best depend on the context, on what the referents of certain standard demonstrative phrases are;¹¹ (iii) even worse, the truth of (D) is not even compatible with the referring part of a quotation being the quotation marks: on any view, (D) says that ‘ “Socrates” ’ is a referring expression whose reference is ‘Socrates’; but if the quotes did the referring, then ‘ “Socrates” ’, as it appears in ‘ “Socrates” ’, does not refer at all, let alone to ‘Socrates.’¹²

Recent theories are motivated by a realization of these or other related difficulties facing early Davidsonian theories, and by the rejection of the name theory on the basis of the Davidsonian observation. These recent views include those of Washington, Saka, Cappelen & Lepore, Predelli, and others.

Washington and Saka take as a root of the evils of the name theory its problematic implication that each quotation, being a typical proper name, must be an expression that acquires its semantic referent via a linguistic convention. Call an expression that gets its semantic referent via a linguistic convention a *referentially original* expression. For these authors, if the referring parts in quotations get their semantic referents (Washington) or their capabilities for pragmatic reference (Saka) determined in some general way, they must

⁹ This is the essence of the concluding considerations in Davidson’s “Quotation,” p. 90.

¹⁰ See my “Quotation Revisited” and Cappelen & Lepore, *Language Turned on Itself*, pp. 117ff.

¹¹ See Cappelen & Lepore, *Language Turned on Itself*, pp. 120ff.

¹² See my “Quotation Revisited”.

not be referentially original terms. The main argument for that conclusion in Washington is this: referentially original terms have their standard semantic values, or standard semantic referents, determined by stipulation, and stipulations are not general. Since the (quotational) semantic referents of the referring parts of quotations must be fixed in a general way, those referring parts are not referentially original terms.¹³ In Saka the idea is that referentially original terms have their capabilities for pragmatic reference determined in part by the semantic conventions that play a role in assigning semantic reference to the terms. But no semantic conventions play any role in determining the set of items that can be pragmatically referred to by a speaker with uses of a quoted expression. This set can be characterized by the general non-conventional principle that its members are the items related to the quoted expression in some pre-referential way appropriately salient in context. Since the potential speaker referents of the (speaker-)referring parts of quotations are determined merely by this general principle, those parts are not referentially original terms.¹⁴ As these authors view the phenomenon of reference in quotation (to the extent that it takes place) as not involving (standard) semantic referents, we may call them (quotational) *deflationists*.

Washington and Saka propose that the (relevant) referring part in a quotation is the quoted expression viewed as a lexically preexisting item. In Washington the quoted expression semantically refers to itself, though not by being its own standard semantic value, but in virtue of being its own non-standard quotational semantic value, dictated to exist by a general non-conventional principle about language (similar to the alleged non-conventional law dictating that each meaningful expression must have, besides its standard semantic reference, also an indirect reference or Fregean sense). In Saka the quoted expression is the bearer of a range of potential speaker referents related to the expression in

¹³ As Washington puts it: “The connection [between an expression and its standard semantic value] is determined by stipulation. Stipulations are not general. Since a stipulation may or may not have been carried out, a basic expression may or may not have a standard semantic value. What is commonly called the ‘lexicon’ of a language consists of those basic expressions which have standard semantic values” (“The Identity Theory of Quotation,” p. 588).

¹⁴ I take this to be the main thrust of Saka’s considerations around pp. 126-7 of his “Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction.”

some pre-referential ways that can be made salient in different contexts.¹⁵ Washington and Saka emphasize that a quoted expression does not get its (quotational) reference or its (quotational) referential capabilities determined in the way typical names do, or in the way descriptions (whether demonstrative or not) do. Rather, it gets its reference or its referential capabilities in some other, general way. In Washington's case, this is provided by the non-conventional "identity principle," that an expression refers to itself (in the quotational use). In Saka's case, this is the non-conventional rule that a speaker will manage to refer with a quoted expression to anything related to it in a way that is appropriately salient in context. Note that quotational deflationists accept that quoted expressions are not demonstratives, that their theories presumably have no place for a structure determining compositionally the semantic value of a quoted expression, and that they postulate that the referents or the referential capabilities in quotations are given by general principles; but these general principles do not introduce referentially original terms.

It is clear that Washington and Saka are not open to the above objections against the name and classical Davidsonian theories. However, they postulate (and seem forced to do so) an anomalous fact underlying the syntax of quotation. *'thinks' is an ugly expression* and *'geodesically you beneath' appears twice* are intuitively grammatical sentences; *thinks is an ugly expression* and *geodesically you beneath appears twice* are not. Intuitively, quotations are noun phrases that can work as grammatical subjects (just as the name theory had it), but not every quotable expression is a noun phrase that can work as a grammatical subject. However, on Washington's and Saka's view, *thinks is an ugly expression* and *geodesically you beneath appears twice* must be grammatically in order.¹⁶ The reason is

¹⁵ In these authors the quotation marks are not constituents of the (relevant) referring part of the quotation and are a mere auxiliary device indicating quotational use of the quoted expression (though in Saka's case the full quotation can be said to obtain referential capabilities in a derivative way from the preexisting referential capabilities of the quoted expression).

¹⁶ As criticized in my "Quotation Revisited" and by Cappelen & Lepore in *Language Turned on Itself*, p. 96. Another broadly deflationist option is to hold John Searle's view, on which inscriptions containing quoted material (whether self-standing or inside quotes) are really ungrammatical, but speakers nevertheless intend to use the quoted material to refer to itself, and succeed in communicating this intention. (See Searle, *Speech Acts*, New York: Cambridge, 1969.) However, on this version of quotational deflationism *'thinks' is an ugly expression* and *'geodesically you beneath' appears twice*, and in fact all sentences containing

that they are committed to the thesis that every expression, including expressions that syntactic theory assigns to categories other than that of noun phrases and expressions that syntactic theory classifies as not belonging to any syntactic category, has a preexisting use on which it is a noun phrase with a semantic reference or at least a range of capabilities for pragmatic reference. But if quotational use of expressions requires the truth of this thesis, then it constitutes an anomaly not accounted for in standard syntactic theory.¹⁷ This suggests that a theory that did not postulate such an anomaly would be preferable, *ceteris paribus*.¹⁸

Predelli seeks to preserve the virtues of Davidsonian theories, and specifically their power to escape the implication of the name theory that different quotations must be interpreted and learned via unrelated acts of stipulation. He presents a demonstrative theory that, like classical Davidsonian theories, is not vulnerable to Davidson's objections against the name theory, but which is otherwise highly revisionist, as it is tailor-made to cope with objections (i)-(iii) above. On this theory, the referring part in a quotation is, as in the name

quotations, must be ungrammatical, as neither their quoted expressions nor the quotation-marks (nor the quotations) can be noun phrases according to the theory. An obvious objection to Searle's view is that this kind of explanation is undesirable if there is an alternative theory that does not entail the ungrammaticality of inscriptions containing quotations, which in general seem intuitively grammatically correct. Washington and Saka would certainly agree.

¹⁷ Saka, in "The Demonstrative and Identity Theories of Quotation," pp. 466-7, explains ungrammaticality judgments in the cases above as coming from misunderstood intuitions of stylistic infelicity. This might conceivably be so, but the fact that standard syntactic theory would require modification if Saka's grammaticality intuitions are to be respected tells heavily against his explanation, while it is in harmony with standard ungrammaticality intuitions. Note that a vast number of the examples given in the linguistics literature as uncontroversial examples of intuitively ungrammatical sentences would have grammatical (if sometimes contrived) readings according to deflationists. (Take e.g. many of the initial motivating examples in the introductory text by Adrian Akmajian, Richard A. Demers, Ann K. Farmer and Robert M. Harnish, *Linguistics*, 5th edn. (Cambridge MA: MIT, 2001): *Dog the horse the bit* (p. 151: track 'the horse the bit'!); *You saw I* (p. 171: you saw 'I!'); etc.) As far as I can tell, Saka does not address this worry.

¹⁸ A further—to my mind decisive—objection to a deflationist "identity" theory like Washington's (which was probably also Frege's view of quotation in "On Sense and Reference") is that, like classical Davidsonian theories, it also implies that sentences like (D) are false: if the quoted expression did the referring, then ' "Socrates" ', as it appears in ' " "Socrates" ' ' (the apparent subject of (D)), must refer to itself, not to 'Socrates' (as noted in my "Quotation Revisited").

theory, the whole quotation, which always refers (in virtue of the mechanism about to be described) to the quoted expression. This move diverts objection (iii). Furthermore, the quotation does not abbreviate a familiar demonstrative noun phrase: every full quotation is a demonstrative phrase that is not equivalent to any demonstrative phrase from non-quotational parts of natural language. Rather, quotations are odd demonstrative phrases that come together with an associated general convention (not forming part of their Kaplanian character) to the effect that only the expression inside the quotation marks can be demonstrated by the demonstration accompanying the full quotation. This diverts objections (i) and (ii). Note that Predelli's theory is at least in principle compatible with the idea that quotations are semantically unstructured,¹⁹ and that he postulates that the quotational referents are fixed wholesale via a general convention (which includes the mentioned restriction on the *demonstrata* of quotations) by means of which quotations are introduced as referentially original terms; but on the theory quotations are of course demonstrative phrases.

Predelli's theory again requires quotation to constitute an anomaly, in this case a glitch in the usual way of drawing the distinction between indexical and non-indexical phrases, and thus the distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative phrases. As the standard distinction is made, e.g. in Kaplan's classic text on demonstratives, an indexical is an expression different utterances of which can as a matter of conventional principle have different contents as a function of aspects of context;²⁰ and a demonstrative is an indexical the content of an utterance of which is a function of contextual demonstrations. In fact, all uncontroversially recognized demonstratives and demonstrative phrases of natural language are indexicals in Kaplan's sense, susceptible of referring contextually to different objects, as far as their associated semantic conventions go. Moreover, it would appear that a primary function of indexicals and in particular demonstratives and demonstrative phrases, which also provides a substantial part of the

¹⁹ As far as I can tell, Predelli is silent about whether he would embrace Davidson's argument for descriptiveness plus demonstrativeness above. I am uncertain as to whether he would prefer a view of quotations as unstructured demonstratives or as structured demonstrative phrases.

²⁰ See e.g.: "it is characteristic of sentences containing demonstratives—or, for that matter, any indexical—that they may express different propositions in different contexts" (Kaplan, "Demonstratives," in J. Almog, H. Wettstein and J. Perry, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (New York: Oxford, 1989), pp. 481-563, at p. 513).

explanation for their existence, is precisely to provide a means of referring on occasion to things for which a context-insensitive designator is lacking or occasionally cumbersome to use. Expressions able to fulfill this role must in principle be able to refer to different things as a function of context.²¹ However, on Predelli’s theory every expression gives rise to a distinct demonstrative phrase (its quotation) that as a matter of semantic convention can only be used to demonstrate and refer to the expression itself. Objections (i)-(iii) thus lead Predelli to redraw the distinction between indexical and non-indexical expressions, and then to postulate that quotations must be anomalous demonstratives from the point of view of the standard distinction, with properties that one would rather expect of context-insensitive designators. This suggests that a theory on which quotations were not demonstratives or indexicals, but plain context-insensitive designators, would be preferable to Predelli’s theory, *ceteris paribus*.

Cappelen & Lepore concede that the difficulties of demonstrative theories (a version of which used to be their own view) are insurmountable, and they also think that the non-standard nature of the syntactic theory required by the deflationist accounts seriously disqualifies them. However, they seek to stay faithful to the Davidsonian spirit at least in the rejection of the idea that quotations could possibly be unstructured terms. On the Cappelen & Lepore theory, pure, direct, indirect and so-called “mixed”²² uses of quotation are all hypothesized to be fully accounted for by the general “minimal” principle that *a quotation quotes the item inside its quotation marks*.²³ Although Cappelen & Lepore are

²¹ If complex demonstratives are indexicals in Kaplan’s sense, and yet have descriptive semantic structure, some of them may have a single content in all contexts; perhaps ‘that prime number between 5 and 11’ is an example. However, in that circumstance even ‘that prime number between 5 and 11’ would in principle be susceptible of referring to different objects: as far as its associated purely semantic conventions go, it may refer to different things in different contexts, even if the arithmetic facts make this impossible.

²² Mixed uses are those in which, at least *prima facie*, the quoted expression is in some sense both referred to and used with its standard meaning, as in *Ford said that thinking “is the hardest work” there is*. The exact theoretical description of these uses is just as controversial as that of pure uses. More on mixed uses below.

²³ Or, as they put it, the principle that the schema

‘ “e” ’ quotes ‘e’

yields a truth for all suitable replacements for ‘e’ (the “quotable items”). But they make it clear that they take this to be essentially the same as the non-schematic principle not using quotation marks that I just stated in the main text, and essentially the same as similar principles in the earlier literature (including the

largely inexplicit about the principles governing in turn the notion of “quoting” featured in the minimal principle, the principle is said to imply that the semantic value contributed by a quotation to the truth conditions of sentences in which it appears is an individual object. (The semantic value of a quotation for Cappelen & Lepore is the item it quotes, which need not be an expression, but which in common cases will be the expression between quotes.²⁴) However, “quotations are *not unstructured*,”²⁵ as shown by several objections closely related to Davidson’s objections to the stronger name theory.²⁶ Thus they argue (“objection 2”) that a quotation cannot be unstructured because it is non-conventionally “proximate” to its quoted expression: a quotation stands in a salient non-conventional relation to its quoted expression (more exactly, its “quotable item”), one that can moreover be used to get information from a quotation concerning its quoted expression. And they argue (“objection 3”) that if a quotation had no semantic structure, there would be no rule for interpreting it. They also argue (“objection 1”) that the relationship between a quotation and the thing *x* that it quotes cannot be the relationship between a semantically unstructured expression and what it refers to, because any semantically unstructured expression could have been used to refer to *x*, but no quotation other than the one quoting *x* could have been used to quote *x*.²⁷

But although Cappelen & Lepore thus deny that quotations are unstructured, they also deny that the way quotations contribute to truth conditions, i.e. the application of the minimal principle, is effected via any implicit equivalence between a quotation and some quantificational phrase. They assume (correctly, in my view) that any quantifier having a chance of being equivalent to a quotation ought to be a description containing a

“Interiority” principle of my “Quotation Revisited” and of section II below); see Cappelen & Lepore, *Language Turned on Itself*, p. 124.

²⁴ For criticism of the view that a quotation can semantically refer to things other than expressions, see my “What Quotations Refer To,” in E. Brendel, J. Meibauer and M. Steinbach, eds., *Understanding Quotation*, (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2011), pp. 139-60.

²⁵ *Language Turned on Itself*, p. 103.

²⁶ Cappelen & Lepore explicitly accept that the name theory is stronger than the claim that quotations are unstructured (at least on the assumption that names are unstructured).

²⁷ These objections all appear on pp. 101 to 103 of *Language Turned on Itself*. Cappelen & Lepore also object (“objection 4,” p. 103) that quotations cannot be semantically unstructured noun phrases because in mixed quotation they are sometimes phrases of other syntactical kinds (as in *Ford said that thinking “is the hardest work” there is*). See below, note 31, for exposition, and note 53, for criticism of this objection.

demonstrative, and they (again correctly, I think) take such a possibility to have been discredited by objections such as (i)-(iii) above. Cappelen & Lepore conclude that quotations must be structured but non-quantificational noun phrases. In summary, on Cappelen & Lepore's theory, quotations are context-insensitive, referentially original terms that get their referents fixed wholesale via a conventional general rule, but they must then be semantically structured.

Just as deflationist theories avoided the Davidsonian objections to the name theory by appealing to general principles featuring a general notion of expression, Cappelen & Lepore's theory clearly avoids those objections by appealing to a general semantic principle featuring a general notion of "quotable item"; and the theory is also obviously invulnerable to the problems that plagued classical Davidsonian theories. However, it generates the worry that it postulates an eccentricity (and in fact a mystery) at the heart of the theory of reference. There are no standardly recognized examples of structured non-quantificational noun phrases, and in this situation one would expect Cappelen & Lepore to provide a detailed "constructive" description of the peculiar non-quantificational semantic structure of quotations.²⁸ But instead their presentation creates a suspicion that structured non-quantificational noun phrases might be ad hoc eccentricities forced on them by fallacies in their "non-constructive" arguments for structuredness. Cappelen & Lepore do not describe either the general compositional process that is supposed to operate in quotation or the particular kind of sequences of semantic values that this process is supposed to operate on

²⁸ The Cappelen & Lepore theory goes against a conjecture put forward and forcefully defended by Stephen Neale, that every noun phrase in natural language is either a (semantically unstructured) "referring" term or a (structured) restricted quantifier. (See Neale, "Term Limits," *Philosophical Perspectives*, VII (1993): 89-124 and "Term Limits Revisited," *Philosophical Perspectives*, XXII (2008): 375-442; however, Neale seems inclined toward the idea, rejected both by Cappelen & Lepore and by me, that quotations are descriptions of some sort; see "Term Limits", p. 104, on the ' "Achilles killed Hector" ' example and surrounding text, and also "Term Limits Revisited", p. 382.) This conjecture is of course highly controversial, and the fact that the Cappelen & Lepore theory goes against it is not by itself proof of the eccentric nature of their proposal. However, it is worth noting that the controversy surrounding Neale's conjecture concerns primarily the question whether there are structured "referring" terms, not whether there are structured but non-quantificational noun phrases. The existence of such phrases appears definitely more unlikely (and their postulation more eccentric) than the existence of structured "referring" terms.

as arguments, thus leaving the way in which the minimal principle is supposed to reveal the specific semantic structure of quotations totally opaque.²⁹ Cappelen & Lepore seem perfectly content with having established “non-constructively” that quotations must somehow be structured (in virtue of their Davidson-inspired arguments) and that they cannot be quantificational noun phrases (in virtue of considerations similar to (i)-(iii) above). But they give no “constructive” proof that quotations are structured, much as this would seem especially needed given the visibly eccentric nature of their proposal.

Note that I am not denying that Cappelen & Lepore’s “minimal principle” says what the referents of quotations are; we might for the sake of argument grant that it does. The problem is that the truth of the principle by itself as a rule that describes what the semantic values of quotations are is compatible with all kinds of views about their semantic structure or lack thereof, and if it suggests any view of quotations as structured, it is one of quotations as certain demonstrative descriptions, specifically utterances of ‘the item inside these quotation marks,’ or similar. However, by contrast with the opaque eccentricity of the Cappelen & Lepore view, on the view that it is a semantically unstructured singular term, a quotation is simply an atomic unit whose semantic value is not determined compositionally at the level of semantic structure, and on the view that it (or its quotation marks) abbreviates a particular description (as in the early Davidsonian theories), the quotation obtains its semantic value through a familiar process of composition of the semantic values of its syntactic parts. Neither idea is particularly mysterious. While Cappelen & Lepore welcome the eccentric nature of their proposal in this respect, and portray it as “a semantic theory for quotation that celebrates its unique nature,”³⁰ all this again suggests that a theory on which quotations were either semantically unstructured singular terms or quantificational phrases would be preferable, *ceteris paribus*.³¹

²⁹ Cappelen & Lepore’s only explicit application for the minimal principle to the semantics of pure quotation is in the derivation of Tarskian truth biconditionals for sentences containing quotations. In their derivation they assume that quotations are assigned certain semantic values by the principle (*Language Turned on Itself*, p. 131). But again they are completely silent about the alleged compositional process internal to quotations that determines those values.

³⁰ *Language Turned on Itself*, p. 123.

³¹ Besides postulating semantic eccentricities, Cappelen & Lepore’s theory joins the deflationist theories in the postulation of anomalies at the syntax/semantics interface. As noted in the text, along with other authors

II. HOW QUOTATIONS REFER

Davidson's fundamental observation made it clear that quotations are not typical names, and in particular that they do not get their referents fixed in the way typical names get their referents fixed. Typical names, such as 'Aristotle,' 'Phosphorus' or 'Boston,' presumably get their referents fixed via individual acts of baptism, accomplished with the help of acts of ostensive or descriptive stipulation that do not exploit pre-referential relations between the names and their eventual referents. The question of the semantic structure of typical names is of course more controversial, but the idea that they are semantically unstructured expressions is now widely thought to be perfectly consistent with the just mentioned picture of the fixing of their reference with the help of initial descriptive or demonstrative stipulations, and has been gaining substantial ground over structuredness (descriptivist) views in the last forty years or so. By contrast, quotations obviously do not get their referents fixed via individual acts of baptism of any sort.

Unfortunately, while the Davidsonian observation is clearly correct, I think it is safe to say that it has led Davidson and many recent authors to conclude wrongly that quotations must also be different from typical names in a number of other ways. It has led Davidson and authors in the Davidsonian tradition to the idea that quotations or parts thereof must be context-sensitive terms, that get their referents fixed in the way demonstratives get their

in the quotation literature, such as Davidson (in "Quotation") and François Recanati (in "Open Quotation," *Mind*, CX (2001): 637-87), they have sought Procrustean semantically unified accounts of all kinds of uses of quotation marks (though unlike Recanati, they do not seek to fit "scare" quotation marks in the bed also). This leads them to postulate that all quotations get their semantic values by application of instances of the minimal principle, and thus that these values are always of the nature of the values of noun phrases (they are always, in fact, "quotable items"). But mixed quotations cannot always be noun phrases, as witnessed by *Ford said that thinking "is the hardest work" there is*. This in turn leads Cappelen & Lepore to postulate, in effect, that quotations belong to as many standard syntactic categories as their corresponding quoted expressions, but also share an abstract non-standard syntactic category whose semantic values are "quotable items." Like deflationist theories did, this requires a non-standard addendum to syntactic theory. Saka ("Does "'Quotation' " Quote "Quotation"?," in *Protosociology Reviews* for 2009, <http://www.protosociology.de/Reviews/ProtoSociology-R-Saka-Cappelen.pdf>) offers a critique of more specific technical difficulties of Cappelen & Lepore's syntactic proposal. See below, note 53, for further criticism, and for discussion of a related set of issues.

contextual referents fixed. It has led deflationist theorists to the idea that quotations cannot really be referentially original terms, and that the expressions of a language all have a certain use as noun phrases. And it has led Cappelen & Lepore to the idea that quotations must somehow be terms that are semantically structured in a mysterious way. The theory I will state in this section rejects all these implications, and proposes that quotations can be understood as being much closer to typical names than has usually been thought ever since Davidson presented his critique of the name theory.

As there are many analogies between the present theory and the most widely accepted semantic theory of pure indexicals, it will be useful to recall this theory briefly. As plausibly argued by Kaplan, 'I' has as a part of the rules governing its conventional use a certain implicit general rule, its "character":

(‘I’-rule) An utterance of ‘I’ refers to its utterer.³²

The ‘I’-rule is a universally quantified statement that does not mention particular utterances—in particular, the pronoun ‘its’ that appears in it is arguably just a bound variable in deep structure. Nevertheless, it appears to play an essential role in fixing the referents of all particular utterances of ‘I’ in the idiolects of all competent users of ‘I.’ How does it do this? One way in which this can plausibly happen is in virtue of the fact that, merely on the basis of broad linguistic knowledge, such a competent user could in principle and after sufficient reflection associate, with each utterance of ‘I’ he gets acquainted with, one or more particular (utterances of) reference-fixing descriptions for that utterance of ‘I’ which are intuitively extractable from the ‘I’-rule. For example, such a competent user, when shown the utterance of ‘I’ in the first sentence of the second paragraph of this section, could in principle and after sufficient reflection associate with that utterance (an utterance of) the description ‘its utterer’ (where ‘its’ is a demonstrative pronoun), or (an utterance of) the description ‘the utterer of this,’ which taken together with a demonstration of that utterance of ‘I’ fix the referent of that utterance. All these descriptive associations follow

³² See Kaplan, "Demonstratives," p. 505. As in all cases where a convention is merely implicit, different explicitations of the convention at work may be recognized as appropriate by different speakers (or even by a single speaker) when they consider the question in a sufficiently reflective way. Strictly speaking, the thesis put forward by Kaplan is probably that the ‘I’-rule is a good representative explicitation.

from the universal quantification constituting the ‘I’-rule, and all of them fix me as the referent of the relevant utterance of ‘I.’

However, as also argued by Kaplan, ‘I’ is intuitively not semantically equivalent with any of these descriptions. This is indicated by the fact that while ‘I’ is intuitively rigid, ‘the utterer of this,’ say, is not. In this sense, there is no implication from the fact that the contextual referents of ‘I’ are fixed by the ‘I’-rule to the thesis that ‘I’ must be semantically structured. The stronger thesis that ‘I’ is simply semantically unstructured also receives firm support from this consideration, and Kaplan and others reasonably go on to embrace it. Specifically, Kaplan proposes that the semantics of ‘I’ is essentially given by the ‘I’-rule and an additional convention of unstructuredness.³³

On the present theory, analogously, quotations get their referents³⁴ fixed via an implicit general convention similar or identical to the following principle, which I have elsewhere called “the interiority principle”:

(Interiority) A quotation refers to the expression within its quotation marks.

Interiority exploits the fact that quotations are morphologically complex, consisting of the left quotation mark, the quoted expression and the right quotation mark (in that order), and assigns a referent to a quotation as a function of the identity of one of its morphological components, the quoted expression, hence exploiting the salient pre-referential relation between a quotation and its intended referent. Note however that, unlike in the case of the ‘I’-rule, Interiority does not provide a method for assigning a reference to an utterance of a quotation as a function of an aspect of its context; Interiority assigns a reference to each

³³ See “Demonstratives,” p. 520. Kaplan speaks of a convention of “direct reference.” I use the terminology of “unstructuredness” in order to dissociate the issue of lack of semantic structure from the issue of the singularity of thought contents that is also linked to Kaplan’s terminology in the literature—an issue on which I have no desire to make any pronouncements here.

³⁴ I assume without further argument that full quotations are the bearers of quotational reference, unlike identity theorists (such as Washington and probably Frege) and the classical Davidsonian theorists, who as we saw took the quoted expression and the quotation marks, respectively, to be the reference bearers in quotations. One key reason why only the full quotation can be the bearer of reference is that this is the only possibility compatible with the truth of sentences like (D). (See above, objection (iii) to Davidsonian theories, and note 18.)

quotation type, independently of any sensitivity to contextual factors. Also, being as it is a general convention, it is available to all users of quotation who are aware of it (whether implicitly or explicitly), and establishes quotations as referentially original expressions.

Purely on the basis of broadly linguistic knowledge, a competent user could, in principle and after sufficient reflection, associate with each quotation he gets acquainted with one or more particular (utterances of) reference-fixing descriptions for that quotation which are intuitively extractable from Interiority. For example, such a competent user, when shown an utterance of ‘ “Socrates” ’, could in principle and after sufficient reflection associate with that utterance (an utterance of) the description ‘the expression within its quotation marks’ or (an utterance of) the description ‘the expression within the quotation marks of this,’ which taken together with a demonstration of (the token of) ‘ “Socrates” ’ fix the referent of that quotation. All these descriptive associations follow from the universal quantification constituting Interiority, and all of them fix ‘Socrates’ as the referent of ‘ “Socrates” ’.

But this does not mean that a quotation must be equivalent with any of the corresponding descriptions. Just as the fact that the referents of utterances of ‘I’ are plausibly fixed by descriptions following from the general ‘I’-rule does not imply that these utterances are equivalent with corresponding descriptions provided by the rule, the fact that the referents of quotations are plausibly fixed by descriptions following from the general Interiority rule does not imply that a quotation should have the semantic structure of some particular equivalent description provided by the rule, or that it should be semantically structured in some other way. Furthermore, as we will see in section III, there are also other cases where the terms in a large or even infinite class get their referents fixed with the help of a wholesale procedure, and the corresponding rules provide ways of associating each term with one or more co-referential descriptions. But the rules and descriptions plausibly work only at the reference-fixing level, and the terms in the class otherwise function under a convention of unstructuredness. On the present theory, quotation is a case of this kind. The presumable convention of unstructuredness in the case of quotations is an implicit agreement that Interiority merely helps fix their reference, without providing a description or other locution semantically equivalent with a quotation.

Just like (utterances of) ‘I,’ quotations are fairly uncontroversially intuitively rigid singular terms: if I say *The object that is ‘Socrates’ is such that it could not have existed and failed to be ‘Socrates’ (and no other object could have been ‘Socrates’)*, what I say is intuitively true.³⁵ Since unstructuredness implies rigidity, this is once more one “abductive” point in favor of the unstructuredness hypothesis. (Note, on the other hand, that descriptions such as the Davidsonian ‘the expression a token of which is here’ (taken together with a demonstration of the space occupied by a token of the relevant quotation), are not rigid—at least as intuitively understood.) But some of the reference-fixing descriptions that we can naturally extract from the Interiority rule are rigid, unlike most of the descriptions that we can naturally extract from the ‘I’-rule. Think of ‘the expression within the quotation marks of this,’ taken together with a demonstration of (a token of) ‘“Socrates”’. Just as ‘“Socrates”’ intuitively designates the same object (i.e., ‘Socrates’) in all counterfactual circumstances, ‘the expression within the quotation marks of this’ (I am pointing to a token of ‘“Socrates”’) also presumably designates that very same object in all counterfactual circumstances. So, unlike in the case of the descriptions naturally extractable from the ‘I’-rule, there is no argument from rigidity to the non-equivalence between quotations and the descriptions naturally extractable from Interiority. Still, rigidity is often taken to be best explained by unstructuredness, at least in cases where there is a conspicuous absence of quantificational structure in the surface syntax. Quotations clearly provide one case of this kind.³⁶ More decisively, the idea that quotations are not quantificational structures at some hidden level is further bolstered by the arguments against quotational descriptivism from section I. These showed fairly conclusively that quotations could not abbreviate standard demonstrative descriptions, such as the

³⁵ This is what Scott Soames (in *Beyond Rigidity* (New York: Oxford, 2002)) calls the “linguistic test” for rigidity of noun phrases. All other standard tests would deliver the same verdict.

³⁶ Further evidence for unstructuredness is provided by the classical observation, especially associated with so-called “name” theorists like Tarski and Quine, that quotations pass the “quantifying into” test for unstructuredness: intuitively, one cannot quantify into those of their morphological parts which are noun phrases: *Something is such that ‘Donald that thing’ is the name of a great philosopher* makes no intuitive sense. To be sure, this does not refute every sophisticated objection to the thesis that quotations are unstructured *tout court*, as they might codify semantic structure that is hidden at the morphological surface level. But it nevertheless shows that their morphological structure is no guide to their semantic structure.

demonstrative descriptions extractable in a natural way from Interiority—the only descriptions having any chance of giving the semantic structure of quotations, both by Cappelen & Lepore’s lights and by mine.

Let me now review how the present theory eludes the problems of classical theories, and is thus in this respect on a par vis-à-vis the recent theories described in section I. First there were Davidson’s objections to the theory that quotations are like typical proper names in all semantical respects, which served as inspiration for Cappelen & Lepore’s objections to the weaker thesis of unstructuredness. The present theory eludes the first Davidsonian objection because it rejects the idea that a quotation is a typical proper name essentially unrelated to the thing it refers to. Quotations get their referents fixed via the Interiority rule, a convention that explicitly exploits the fact that a quotation is essentially related to the thing it refers to: a quotation—the convention stipulates—refers to the thing inside its quotes. Furthermore, knowledge of Interiority (whether explicit or implicit) is knowledge of a general rule applying to all quotations, and thus provides a user of quotation with all she needs to use competently all quotations (or at least all quotations of humanly graspable length and width).

Turning to the second Davidsonian objection, the present theory postulates that though semantically unstructured, quotations do not lack morphological structure; they are composed of the quotation marks and the quoted expression, and their reference is fixed by a process that exploits this structure in a general way. With a modest apparatus including a name for the left-hand quotation mark, another for the right-hand quotation mark, the term ‘expression’ and a term for the function of concatenation, a clause giving the denotation of quotations could mirror the reference-fixing Interiority rule and be stated as follows: the denotation of an expression that is the concatenation of the left-hand quotation mark with an expression *e* with the right-hand quotation mark is the expression *e*.³⁷

³⁷ Mark Richard has actually proposed such a way of giving a definition of denotation (and later satisfaction and truth) for languages containing quotations (see his “Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity,” *Linguistics and Philosophy*, IX (1986): 383-403, at pp. 398f.). Strictly speaking, things are not quite this simple, for some quotations are morphologically ambiguous (an observation by Michael Ernst reported by George Boolos in “Quotational Ambiguity,” in P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio, eds., *On Quine* (New York: Cambridge, 1995), pp. 283-96): ‘*a*’ concatenated with ‘*b*’ is ambiguous between a reading on which it is a description designating the expression ‘*ab*’ and contains two bona fide quotations, and a reading on which it *is* a bona

Davidson's objection to the "context-insensitive description" theory is also inapplicable to the present theory. The objection was that there would seem to be no finite set of basic subexpressions with the help of which every quotable expression can be constructed by concatenation. But the present theory does not postulate the existence of such a set of basic subexpressions. Our presumable implicit grasp of the Interiority rule requires that we have an understanding of the general notion of an expression that appears in its formulation,³⁸ but it does not require the idea that all expressions can be constructed by concatenation from a set of basic subexpressions.

The present theory also avoids the problems of classical Davidsonian demonstrative theories. Since the theory postulates that quotations get their referents fixed with the help of a rule that does not appeal to context dependencies at all, it is not liable to the objection that quotational reference varies with context. Furthermore, the theory is compatible with, and in fact guarantees by itself, the idea that truisms such as (D) are true: the theory has it that a quotation is a singular term that refers to its quoted expression; therefore, according to the theory ' "Socrates" ' refers to the expression inside its quotation marks, which is none other than 'Socrates.'

These considerations indicate how the present theory is on a par vis-à-vis the recent theories described in section I, at least as far as the objections to classical theories are concerned. This lays the ground for a series of analogous arguments for the theory based on the non-eccentric and non-anomalous nature of the properties it postulates for quotations; for the theory, unlike those recent theories, makes do with essentially classical assumptions.

To begin with, unlike deflationist theories, the present theory does not postulate any anomalous fact underlying the syntax of quotation. It presupposes that quotations are noun

fide quotation referring to the odd expression *a* concatenated with *b*. So the denotation clause for quotations ought strictly speaking be specified to apply to bona fide (occurrences of) quotations, leaving it to a theory of quotational morphology and syntax to describe the ambiguities of quotations (and possibly to pragmatics to explain when (an occurrence of) a quotation is being used as a bona fide quotation and when it is used as something else). Similarly, strictly speaking Interiority ought to be stated as something like *A bona fide (occurrence of a) quotation refers to the expression within its quotation marks*. (Note that these facts do not show that (an occurrence of) a quotation is context-sensitive any more than the ambiguity of *Visiting relatives can be boring* shows that this sentence exhibits context-sensitivity.)

³⁸ See the next note.

phrases created according to a certain morphological rule that did not pre-exist in non-quotational language, the rule that leads from an expression to its quotation.³⁹ But it has no implications concerning the possibility that expressions not formed according to the relevant morphological rule can work as noun phrases. Thus the present theory respects the intuition that quotations are noun phrases that can work as grammatical subjects, and that not every quotable expression is a noun phrase that can work as a grammatical subject. The present account implies, modulo usual syntactic theory, that *'thinks'* is an ugly expression and *'geodesically you beneath'* appears twice are grammatically correct sentences, and is compatible with the intuition that *thinks is an ugly expression* and *geodesically you beneath appears twice* are not. Thus the account does not require a supplement to current syntactic theory, and is therefore preferable to deflationist theories at least as compared against objections to classical theories.

³⁹ Arguably this morphological rule does not go against any essential tenet of syntactic theory. Paul Postal ("The Openness of Natural Languages," in his *Skeptical Linguistic Essays* (New York: Oxford, 2004), pp. 173-201) points out that the rule of quotation formation does go against the usual assumption that the set of grammatical expressions of a language (at any given time) must be recursively generable from a *finite vocabulary*. But I doubt that this is an essential tenet of syntactic theory rather than an artifact of standard formalizations. What is closer to an essential tenet of syntactic theory is that the set of grammatical expressions (at a given time) must be generable by a finite number of rules, or perhaps even that that set must be intuitively decidable or at least effectively listable, presumably in a sense that must be reducible to or reconstructible in terms of the purely arithmetical concepts of recursiveness or recursive enumerability. Clearly the rule of quotation formation by itself does not violate this idea. It all depends on whether the notion of an *expression* (or at least that of a quotable expression) is intuitively decidable or at least effectively listable. My own view is that the notion of an expression is indeed intuitively (and quite trivially) decidable, and even that it can be reconstructed in such a way that the notion of recursiveness (trivially) applies to the reconstructed notion. For example, I think it is likely that any intuitively quotable expression can be viewed as a filling (with black) of some sufficiently large but finite grid of (white) cells or pixels. The set of fillings of such finite grids is clearly countably infinite. If we code each filling by a natural number in a one-to-one way, then the set of codes of fillings is (trivially) recursive (it is just the set of all natural numbers); many subsets of the set of fillings, by contrast, are undecidable (such as the set of fillings that look just like valid formulas of first-order logic), just as many subsets of the set of natural numbers are not recursive. (Postal also says that it is unclear that every expression, in the sense of 'expression' relevant in quotation, can be generated by some recursive algorithm for graphic generation, but I myself think, on the contrary, that this is just overwhelmingly likely.)

The basic objection to Predelli's theory was also that it postulates anomalous properties for quotations, specifically the property of being demonstratives, and thus indexicals, that as a matter of convention can only be used to refer to a single object each—their quoted expressions. As noted above, this is a property that, under the standard way of making the distinction between indexical and non-indexical expressions, would rather pertain to context-insensitive designators. On the present theory, quotations are not demonstratives or indexicals, but plain context-insensitive designators, and this makes it preferable to Predelli's theory, at least as compared against the objections to classical theories.

Finally, the present theory is also preferable to the Cappelen & Lepore theory in that it does not postulate eccentric and potentially sui generis facts concerning the ways in which some noun phrases contribute to truth conditions, while having a similar power of evading classical objections. The theory, in particular, does not require quotations to be noun phrases with an undescribed non-quantificational semantic structure; on the present account, quotations are simply semantically unstructured singular terms, on a par in this respect with names and pure indexicals.

The preceding considerations go a long way, I think, toward showing how the theory I have presented is preferable to recent and classical alternatives. But in the current theoretical environment, the defense of the theory will not be complete before we argue in some detail that it carries no inconsistency with the Davidsonian observation. I think that it is fairly clear even at this stage that there is no such inconsistency, and also that a presentation of the theory to an ideally unprejudiced reader would not generate any impression that there is. However, in the current theoretical environment such a presentation must also show that ideas that the Davidsonian observation requires structuredness, equivalence with demonstrative phrases, or the impossibility that quotations be referentially original terms, are mistaken. In the next section I will first (subsection III.1) argue for the consistency of the present theory with the Davidsonian observation in a constructive way, pointing out that the combination of semantic unstructuredness, non-demonstrativeness, referential originality and wholesale reference-fixing exploiting pre-referential relations between terms and intended referents is exemplified in other cases in natural language besides the quotation case; and in the second place (subsection III.2) I will

point at what is specifically wrong with the several Davidson-inspired arguments described in section I.

III. WHAT DAVIDSON'S OBSERVATION DOES NOT IMPLY

III.1. Arguing by examples. It may be useful to remember first that semantic unstructuredness, non-demonstrativeness, referential originality and wholesale reference-fixing are widely thought to form a consistent combination, indeed an actualized one. On a widely accepted view, natural language has some referentially original, unstructured context-sensitive terms which are not demonstratives and nevertheless get their contextual referents fixed via general conventional rules. Pure indexicals like 'I' are widely believed to be examples of this combination. The arguments for unstructuredness are essentially the ones rehearsed above. As regards non-demonstrativeness, Kaplan's rigidity considerations plausibly show that 'I' is not semantically equivalent with a demonstrative description that is naturally extractable from the 'I'-rule; and the idea that 'I' *is* (or is equivalent with) a demonstrative (simple or complex) runs into problems not unlike the problems of early demonstrative theories of quotation: as far as its associated semantic conventions go, any standard demonstrative can in principle refer in some contexts to things different from the utterer of those contexts. Finally, 'I' or its utterances are evidently referentially original terms, at least if we accept the overwhelmingly plausible and widely embraced view that the 'I'-rule codifies an implicit convention.

If we restrict our attention to pure indexicals, one can still legitimately complain that wholesale reference-fixing has not been shown to be consistently combinable with unstructuredness and referential originality *in the absence of context-sensitivity*. But I think that, once one bears clearly in mind the distinction between fixing the reference of a term and giving its semantic structure, it is unclear that the complaint can be the basis for a substantive inconsistency objection. Provided that a certain rule has been given that plays the essential role in fixing the referents of the terms in a certain class, what is to prevent the reference fixer from additionally convening that the terms are to be used as unstructured, and in particular as not equivalent with any description extractable from the rule? Nothing, it would seem. And it would also seem that one can create artificial examples without

difficulty. In fact, Kaplan's 'Dthat(α)' terms⁴⁰ form an artificial class of referentially original terms which are context-insensitive (at least if instances of ' α ' are restricted to context-insensitive descriptions) and unstructured by explicit convention. To take another example, suppose I give new names to all the natural numbers by means of the following rule:

(LexNumb) A finite sequence of letters of the English alphabet refers to the natural number that corresponds to it when one enumerates such sequences by the natural lexicographic enumeration.⁴¹

And suppose I further stipulate that a finite sequence of letters $l_1l_2\dots l_n$ on this usage is to be used as an unstructured tag for its referent, in particular as not equivalent with the description of the form 'the natural number that corresponds to " $l_1l_2\dots l_n$ " when one enumerates finite sequences of letters by the natural lexicographic enumeration.' These sequences would of course be referentially original terms and clearly no context-sensitivity would be involved in the fixing of their reference. Where could the inconsistency of this procedure possibly lie?⁴²

This shows, I think, that wholesale reference-fixing is consistently combinable with unstructuredness in the absence of context-sensitivity (and hence of demonstrativeness) and in the presence of referential originality. It is just a short way to making it equally plausible that semantic unstructuredness, non-demonstrativeness, referential originality and wholesale reference-fixing *exploiting pre-referential term-referent relations* are consistently combinable. Note first that one could perfectly well use the following

⁴⁰ See e.g. "Demonstratives," pp. 521-2.

⁴¹ That is, the enumeration where first come all the letters in the usual alphabetical order, then all the two-letter sequences in the lexicographic ordering, then the three-letter sequences in the lexicographic ordering, etc.

⁴² The decimal Arabic numerals are naturally occurring terms that are also widely thought to be unstructured, at least by "Millian" or "direct reference" theorists. See e.g. Richard, "Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity" and "Articulated Terms," *Philosophical Perspectives*, VII (1993): 207-30; or Soames, "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content," in his *Philosophical Papers Volume II. The Philosophical Significance of Language* (Princeton NJ: Princeton, 2009), pp. 33-71, at p. 50. Of course decimal Arabic numerals must get their reference fixed in some wholesale way, and there is little doubt that they are context-insensitive, referentially original additions to the "lexicon."

reference-fixing stipulation for a single proper name: let ‘0’ be a proper name of the first man, if any, who wrote that very symbol (taken together with a demonstration of the symbol ‘0’). Surely ‘0’ is unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original if proper names in general are unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original, despite the fact that its reference has been fixed with the help of a (demonstrative) description that mentions a pre-referential relation between the symbol and its intended referent.⁴³ It is hard to see how using a wholesale version of this procedure could turn the newly introduced terms into structured terms, or into demonstratives, or into non-referentially original terms.

A fairly simple and convincing illustration of just such a procedure is provided by numerical street names, as employed in some cities. A common method is to assign to the

⁴³ Some theorists would think that a person who introduces ‘0’ by means of the stipulation *Let ‘0’ be a proper name of the first man, if any, who wrote that very symbol* (taken together with a demonstration of the symbol ‘0’) does not actually introduce a genuine name just in virtue of making the stipulation and of there being a single satisfier of the reference-fixing description, as they think there is a pretty demanding kind of epistemic acquaintance between stipulator and intended referent required for a term to be a genuine name in the idiolect of the stipulator. Thus Soames (in his *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth-Century. Volume 2: The Age of Meaning* (Princeton NJ: Princeton, 2003), at pp. 403ff.), reacting to Saul Kripke’s classic example of ‘Neptune’ as introduced by Leverrier to refer to *the planet, if any, causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus*. On other theorists’ views, the requirements are far less demanding; see e.g. Robin Jeshion, “Singular Thought: Acquaintance, Semantic Instrumentalism, and Cognitivism,” in Jeshion, ed., *New Essays on Singular Thought* (New York: Oxford, 2010), pp. 105-40.

For present purposes it is enough to note that, even if the first kind of theorists are right, the (attributive) stipulation *Let ‘0’ be a proper name of the first man, if any, who wrote that very symbol* plays an essential role in reference-fixing in cases where ‘0’ *does become* an “epistemically irreproachable” name in the idiolect of some speaker as a consequence of the stipulation (e.g. because the reference-fixer does become independently acquainted with the relevant man and knows that he was the first to write ‘0,’ or because someone else to whom the name is transmitted is acquainted with the man and knows that he was the first to write ‘0,’ etc.). The important point is that, at least in these cases if not in others, ‘0’ will be an unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original term—if proper names like ‘Neptune’ in the idiolect of Leverrier at a time after seeing Neptune through the telescope, or in the idiolect of someone down the transmission line from Leverrier, are unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original—despite the fact that the reference of ‘0’ has been fixed with essential help from a (demonstrative) description that mentions a pre-referential relation between the symbol and its intended referent.

streets parallel to a certain line the number that corresponds to them when they are counted from a certain point and in a certain direction. This gives rise to a conventional rule analogous to the 'I'-rule or to LexNumb in abstract relevant respects (suppose 'p' and 'd' are names of a particular point and a particular direction):

(Numerical Street Names) A numeral *n* refers, if at all, to the *n*th street in the ordering of the parallel streets that begin at point *p* in direction *d*.

This rule is generally available to the city's population and interested outsiders, and gives a way of assigning a name to all the streets that begin at point *p* in direction *d*, without appealing to context. It exploits a certain pre-referential relation between the introduced terms and their intended referents, namely the fact that a numeral *n* already stands for a number that gives the place in the ordering of the streets for the street that *n* ends up naming.⁴⁴ A competent user could in principle associate with each numeral *n* one or more particular reference-fixing descriptions for the numeral which are extractable from the rule, e.g. one of the form of 'The *n*th street in the ordering of the parallel streets that begin at point *p* in direction *d*.' However, people familiar with these numerical street names can and do use the names introduced into their idiolects as rigid designators, while the corresponding descriptions clearly are not rigid. If asked whether *There is a little street between 32 and 33* would have been true in a possible circumstance in which someone opens a little street between the streets we know as 32 and 33, I will say it would have been true. Plausibly, this sounds true to my ears because Numerical Street Names is not used by me as giving the semantic structure of the numerical street names, but merely as fixing their reference.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Of course that the numeral stands for its number is a referential fact. But it is a fact previous to the establishment of any referential relation between the numeral and the *street* it comes to stand for, and thus a pre-referential fact in the sense relevant to our discussion.

⁴⁵ Again it might be argued that the numerical street names that become genuine names that enter a language or a speaker's idiolect do not enter that language or idiolect just in virtue of the conventional adoption of Numerical Street Names and of there being single satisfiers of the relevant reference-fixing descriptions. This might again be supported by the idea that the acquisition of a real name requires some demanding kind of acquaintance of the speaker with the referent (see note 43 above). But again there is no relevant argument here against the idea that the street names that do enter the language are unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original. Note for example that there is no plausibility in a similar argument

To be sure, it might be argued that the semantic structure of the numerical street names is given by some rule other than Numerical Street Names, one from which one can naturally extract a different type of rigid descriptions—just as it might be argued that the rule giving the semantic structure of the indexical ‘I’ is not really the rule postulated by Kaplan, but some other rule that naturally assigns to every token of ‘I’ a rigid description. I do not intend to argue against such views here, but only to point out that while rules such as Numerical Street Names or the ‘I’-rule do successfully fix the referents of the corresponding classes of terms in a wholesale way, the descriptions they give rise to are not intuitively equivalent with the terms, despite being the obvious candidates to give their semantic structure. The stronger idea that these terms are simply semantically unstructured appears then eminently reasonable too, and no detailed attempt to defend it from sophisticated objections and alternatives will be made here. For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to note that a reasonable consequence of our remarks is that that stronger idea can be controversial only to the same extent that the Kaplanian thesis that pure indexicals are semantically unstructured is controversial in view of Kaplan’s arguments—and this may not be a great extent.

for the case of the referents of utterances of ‘I,’ even if we grant that an utterance of ‘I’ is meaningful *only if* its utterer is acquainted with herself (and is not, say, mentally disturbed) and realizes that she is referring to herself with the utterance. Felicitous utterances of ‘I’ are presumably unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original, even if only utterances of ‘I’ made by people who are acquainted with themselves and intend to refer to themselves with them do get a referent. The important point is that the referents of the street names that do enter the language are fixed wholesale via a procedure that essentially involves a general rule mentioning a pre-referential relation between names and intended referents, and yet these names are unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original. Similarly for quotations.

A difference between the street names case and the quotation case lies of course in that the prevalent view is one of expressions (and of their quotations) as abstract objects of whose necessary existence we are convinced in some a priori way at the same time that we make (or implicitly recognize) stipulations such as Interiority. However, this is arguably an accident of no semantic import. Surely someone who thinks of expressions as contingent existents (e.g. as sets of existing tokens) can consistently think of quotations as unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original. (Similar remarks hold for a “strict finitist” about numbers and decimal Arabic numerals.) And someone who has a weird view that he knows a priori that a certain city will necessarily eventually get an n th street (for each n) is not thereby forced to think of street names as structured, demonstrative or non-referentially original.

Other examples of the combination of semantic unstructuredness, non-demonstrativeness, referential originality and wholesale reference-fixing exploiting pre-referential term-referent relations, are provided by some naming practices that fully determine the proper names of the individuals of certain populations on the basis of general conventions. While the custom of leaving the choice of a forename to the parents is the most extended across cultures, in some of them the choice is highly restricted, and in a few it is completely fixed in advance by general rules. (The choice of surname or surnames, on the other hand, is almost always fully fixed in advance by general conventions.) One fully regulated naming practice of this kind was once generally followed in Spain and Hispanic America, and it is still followed by some populations of speakers of Spanish. The practice is to give to a child a proper name composed of a first name identical with the name of the (first) saint or angel for the child's birthday in the calendar of Catholic saints and angels, followed by a last name composed of the first surname of the father and the first surname of the mother, in that order.⁴⁶ This gives rise to this conventional rule:

(Old Spanish Names) The result of joining a forename to a first surname to a second surname refers, if at all, to the person born on the feast day of the saint with that forename to the couple in which the father has as first last name the first surname and the mother has as first last name the second surname.

⁴⁶ There are many other examples. Among the Gengbe (Mina) of Southern Togo, there is a fixed forename for each of the children of a woman, as a function of the order in which they are born (see Adrienne Lehrer, "Proper Names: Semantic Aspects," in K. Brown, ed., *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, 2nd edn., vol. 11 (Amsterdam: Elsevier-Pergamon, 2006), pp. 141-45); together with the surname, which is inherited from the father, this fully determines the proper name of an individual. (A similar practice was followed by some ancient Roman and Chinese families, though the practice was not universal in these cultures.) The Akan people of Ghana give fixed forenames to their children as a function of the day of the week in which they are born (see L. A. Boadi, "How to Derive *araba* and *abena* from a Common Underlying Representation: Some Comments on Historical Methodology," *Anthropological Linguistics*, XXVI (1984): 435-44). Among the Sotho-Tswana of South Africa, the first son of a couple gets the forename of the father's father, the first daughter the forename of the father's mother, the second son the forename of the mother's father, and in general every baby gets the forename of a determinate relative as a function of the order in which it is born (see Robert K. Herbert, "Personal Names as Social Protest: the Status of African Political Names," *Names*, XLVII (1999): 109-24). However, all these names are presumably rigid and unstructured.

On the basis of the rule every child from a population where it is followed gets a name in a way that partially makes use of name morphology, specifically of the possibility of correlating in a systematic way the Spanish names with saints' names (as ordered in the Catholic calendar) and parents' last names.⁴⁷ The rule exploits a certain pre-referential relation between the introduced names and their intended referents, namely the fact that a forename N_0 in a name $N_0 N_1 N_2$ is the forename of a saint whose feast day is the day when the intended referent is born.⁴⁸ The rule is generally available to the speakers of Spanish from a population where the practice is followed, and is also familiar to many speakers from other populations, even nowadays.⁴⁹

Note that, in the same way as a typical morphologically simple name type, an old Spanish name type might be shared by several people (specifically by children born on the same day to couples with the same first surnames). But this is no indication that context supplementation or semantic structure are involved in the determination of the referents of (tokens of) old Spanish names. The corresponding fact is generally not considered a relevant indicator of context-sensitivity or semantic structure in the case of typical names.

⁴⁷ As stated, the rule does not assign names to twins, triplets, etc. born on the same day, and does not assign different names to children born from the same couple on the same day of different years. But it could be easily supplemented to do this in a principled way (and perhaps people have actually followed these supplementary principles): the twin born first gets as first name the day's first saint's name, the twin born second gets as first name the second saint's name, and analogously for triplets, etc. A child born on the same day as her (his) older sister (brother) gets as first name the day's second saint's name, etc. Appropriate supplements could also be used (and probably have been used) with children of an unknown father or mother.

⁴⁸ Of course that a forename is the name of a certain saint is a referential fact; but it is a fact previous to the establishment of any referential relation between the forename and the *newborn* for whom it comes to be the forename, and thus a pre-referential fact in the sense relevant to our discussion.

⁴⁹ Once more, it can be readily conceded that only some of the name types of the form $N_0 N_1 N_2$ get referents under this rule and/or become genuine names that enter a language or an idiolect. Once more the important point is that the referents of the old Spanish names that do enter a language or an idiolect are fixed via a procedure that essentially involves a wholesale rule mentioning a pre-referential relation between names and referents, and yet the names are plausibly unstructured, non-demonstrative and referentially original. Note again that someone who has a weird view that he knows a priori that every old Spanish name will necessarily eventually get a (single) bearer, is not intuitively using a procedure semantically different from the one used by people abiding by the Old Spanish Names convention.

That several objects share a certain typical name type is in all likelihood a mere semantic accident, not something determined by the semantic structure of the name and contextual supplementation, either in the way of pure indexicals or in the way of demonstratives (pace some “deictic” theories of proper names on which the fact is taken to indicate that names have the semantic structure of some complex demonstrative phrases). The same can be said of old Spanish names.

A speaker of Spanish familiar with the Old Spanish Names rule can in principle associate with each known old Spanish name $N_0 N_1 N_2$ in use in the language one or more particular reference-fixing descriptions extractable from the rule, e.g. one of the form of (the Spanish version of) ‘The person born on the feast day of Saint N_0 to the N_1 - N_2 family.’ However, these old Spanish names are fairly uncontroversially like typical morphologically simple names in key semantic respects bearing on the question of their semantic structure. For example, they are clearly intuitively rigid singular terms for any (normal and sufficiently reflective) speaker of Spanish, whether he is familiar with the rule or not. This shows that, say, ‘Miguel López Rodríguez’ is not equivalent with the description ‘The person born on the feast day of Saint Michael to the López-Rodríguez family,’ even in the idiolect of a speaker of Spanish who knows that the person in question was named using the Old Spanish Names rule. For ‘Miguel López Rodríguez’ intuitively designates the same object even in counterfactual circumstances in which that description designates some other person or no person, for example circumstances in which the custom of assigning feast days to saints never develops. The rigidity of ‘Miguel López Rodríguez’ also indicates, more generally, that the Old Spanish Names rule, though it plays an essential role in fixing the semantic referents of all old Spanish names that do intuitively have a referent, does not codify the semantic structure of these names.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Another observation disconnects the morphological structure of old Spanish names from their semantic structure. Intuitively, one cannot quantify into the morphological parts of old Spanish names that are themselves noun phrases: it makes no intuitive sense to say *Some object is such that Miguel that object Rodríguez is a nice person* (or, if we assume there are legitimate intuitions about “first-order English,” it makes no intuitive sense to say *There is an x such that Miguel x Rodríguez is a nice person*). To be sure, this does not refute every sophisticated objection to the thesis that old Spanish names are unstructured *tout court*, as they might codify semantic structure that is hidden at the morphological surface level. But it nevertheless shows that their morphological structure is no guide to their semantic structure.

III.2. Rejecting inconsistency objections. The examples we have considered put us in a good position to appreciate what is wrong with the Cappelen & Lepore arguments against the unstructuredness of quotations, with Davidson’s fundamental consideration for demonstrativeness in quotation, and with the deflationist arguments for the thesis that quotations cannot be referentially original terms.

Cappelen & Lepore’s “objection 2” was that a quotation cannot be unstructured because it is non-conventionally “proximate” to its quoted expression, as it stands in a non-conventional relation to it that can be used to get information about it. On the basis of our preceding discussion we can easily see that this is arguably irrelevant to the matter of semantic structure. An old Spanish name like ‘Miguel López Rodríguez’ is also in a non-conventional relation to its referent,⁵¹ and in virtue of this it can provide information concerning the person talked about by means of it, information that will be obvious to any person who knows that it is an old Spanish name and what the convention for fixing the reference of old Spanish names is (namely, the information that the referent is the person born on the feast day of Saint Michael to the López-Rodríguez family). But evidently this does not mean that ‘Miguel López Rodríguez’ is semantically structured. A numerical street name like ‘32’ is also non-conventionally related to its referent,⁵² and in virtue of this it can provide information concerning the street talked about by means of it, information that will be available to users of numerical street names who are familiar with the Numerical Street Names rule (namely, the information that the referent is, or at some point was or was thought to be, the 32nd street in the ordering of the parallel streets that begin at point p in direction d). But numerical street names are plausibly unstructured devices. Similarly, it could be argued, a quotation is certainly non-conventionally related to its referent, and in virtue of the existence of this relation it can provide information concerning

⁵¹ Namely, the non-conventional relation *x is a name where the forename is that of a saint whose feast day is the day when y is born*. (Of course it is conventional that a saint gets a certain name and a certain feast day, but these conventions are previous to and independent from the fact that a certain person is born on that day, so the fact that a name and a person stand in that relation is non-conventional.)

⁵² Namely, by the non-conventional relation *x stands for a number that gives the place in the ordering of the streets for the street y*. (Of course it is conventional that a numeral names a certain number, but this convention is previous to and independent from the fact that a certain street occupies the corresponding place in the series of streets, so the fact that numeral and street stand in that relation is non-conventional.)

its referent, information that will be evident to a speaker who knows that it is a quotation, and what the convention for fixing the reference of quotations is. In fact, as I proposed, this knowledge even allows such a speaker to associate with a given quotation descriptions such as ‘the expression enclosed within the quotation marks of this’ (taken together with a demonstration of a token of the quotation), that will provide the speaker with rich identificatory information concerning the referent of the quotation. But all this is compatible with the quotation itself being semantically unstructured.

Cappelen & Lepore’s “objection 3” was that if a quotation had no semantic structure, there would be no rule for interpreting it. Again the comparison with the cases of old Spanish names, numerical street names, pure indexicals, etc. indicates how this is a non sequitur. In these cases there exist appropriate rules that serve to interpret those terms (in the sense that they play the essential role in assigning them the extensional interpretations that Cappelen & Lepore have in mind). But this is compatible with the terms being unstructured, because the relevant rules arguably work only at the reference-fixing level, not at the level of semantic structure. Similarly, in quotation the relevant rule may well provide (and on the theory above, it does provide) an interpreting rule that works merely at the reference-fixing level, leaving the semantic structure of quotations as an independent matter.

Cappelen & Lepore’s “objection 1” was perhaps their most novel objection to the unstructuredness thesis. It was that the relationship between a quotation and the thing x that it quotes cannot be the relationship between a semantically unstructured expression and what it refers to, because any semantically unstructured expression could have been used to refer to x , but no quotation other than the one quoting x could have been used to quote x . A brief reflection on our examples completely dissolves this objection, however. Quite generally, if a class of terms get their referents fixed with the help of a general rule, and in such a way that two different terms in the class never get the same referent, then it will be true that if t is a term of the class that refers to an object o , then no term in the class other than t can refer to o , given that t is the term determined as the name of o by the rule, and that the rule has been conventionally adopted. The ‘can’ is of course a deontic modal, as in Cappelen & Lepore’s objection. For example, no old Spanish name other than ‘Miguel López Rodríguez’ could have been used to refer to Miguel López Rodríguez, given that he

was born on the feast day of Saint Michael to the López-Rodríguez family and that the general Old Spanish Names rule had been instituted. No numerical street name other than ‘32’ could have been used to refer to street 32, given that this street occupies the 32nd place in the relevant ordering and that the Numerical Street Names rule had been instituted. The case of quotations may well be similar (and on the theory above, it is): it is quite true that no quotation other than ‘ “Socrates” ’ could have been used to refer to ‘Socrates,’ but this is merely because once the reference-fixing rule for quotation has been adopted, the reference of a quotation other than ‘ “Socrates” ’ will not be ‘Socrates.’ Thus no implication that the intuition of deontic modality is grounded in the structuredness of quotations is warranted. Note that the objection arguably presupposes that the only way in which unstructured singular terms could get their referents fixed is the way typical names get their referents fixed, that is, via individual unrelated reference-fixing stipulations. If this was the only way in which an unstructured term could get its reference fixed, then Cappelen & Lepore’s objection would be correct. But clearly the idea of unstructuredness is compatible with other ways in which unstructured expressions could get their referents fixed, and in particular with wholesale reference-fixing by a general rule that assigns only one term in the class to each relevant object.⁵³

⁵³ Cappelen & Lepore’s “objection 4” was that quotations cannot be semantically unstructured noun phrases because in mixed quotation noun phrases are sometimes not substitutable for them *salva congruitate*. I find this objection perplexing, for if it were correct it could also be used to argue that quotations are not noun phrases, period, while Cappelen & Lepore are clearly committed to taking them as noun phrases (at least in cases of pure quotation), and in fact adopt their *sui generis* syntactic postulates in order to guarantee this. In any case, my own view is that mixed quotation is a phenomenon substantially different from the phenomenon of pure quotation, and consequently that objections based on mixed quotation are irrelevant to the syntax and semantics of pure quotation. In pure quotation and mixed quotation two different meanings or acceptations of the quotation marks seem to me to be manifestly involved. Pure quotation is arguably governed by the Interiority and semantic unstructuredness conventions above and by their presupposed morphologico-syntactic postulate that pure quotations are singular terms. Mixed quotation, on the other hand, is arguably governed by the convention that one can put an expression within quotation marks, without therefore creating a singular term, simply to indicate conventionally that the quoted expression is an appropriate version of an expression uttered by some agent or agents who are appropriately relevant. (Or by some similar convention; see my “Remarks on Impure Quotation”, in *Hybrid Quotations, op. cit.*, pp. 129-51, and for broadly related views Predelli, “Scare Quotes and their Relation to other Semantic Issues,”

Davidson's argument that wholesale reference-fixing exploiting the pre-referential relation between a quotation and its referent requires equivalence with demonstrative phrases was in essence this: wholesale reference-fixing in quotation required that quotational referring parts be semantically structured, and in fact descriptions; but these descriptions ought to exploit the fact that quoted expressions "picture" their referents; given that this cannot plausibly consist in the description containing typical names or non-demonstrative descriptions of the quoted expression, it must consist in its containing a demonstrative for the quoted expression (or the space it occupies, etc.). We can now see that there are at least two things that are wrong with this argument. First, wholesale reference-fixing does not imply structuredness, as shown by the cases of pure indexicals, numerical street names, traditional Spanish names, and others. And moreover, wholesale reference-fixing exploiting pre-referential relations between terms and intended referents does not imply structuredness either, as shown by the cases of numerical street names, traditional Spanish names, and others. As repeatedly emphasized in the preceding, the dissociation between matters of reference-fixing and matters of semantic structure cannot plausibly be thought to be a phenomenon limited to typical names. Second, and perhaps more important, even if the referring parts of quotations turned out to be descriptions of some sort, Davidson's inference that they must contain a demonstrative phrase would be unwarranted. This inference is based on the tacit assumption that the only ways in which

Linguistics and Philosophy, XXVI (2003): 1-28; Bart Geurts & Emar Maier, "Quotation in Context," in *Hybrid Quotations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-28; and Christopher Potts, "The Dimensions of Quotation," in C. Barker and P. Jacobson, eds., *Direct Compositionality* (New York: Oxford, 2007), pp. 405-31.) This conventional indication of mixed quotation marks is absent in (many) uses of pure quotation marks (as in *Nobody uttered 'Socrates'*). Note that this view is not an instance of what Kripke criticizes as the "lazy man's approach to philosophy" (see his "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, II (1977): 255-76). The "lazy man" objection is only plausible when it is clear that we can explain apparent differences in the uses of an expression by supposing that it has a single semantics and syntax and by appealing to general and independently plausible pragmatic principles. But in pure and mixed quotation there is no such clear explanation, and instead it is exceedingly plausible to think that there are different conventional semantic and syntactic principles involved. Attempts to fit the different uses of quotation into a single semantic and syntactic Procrustean bed seem to me patently strained. On this set of issues, and for an account of what all types of quotation *do* have in common, see again my "Remarks on Impure Quotation."

one could refer to the quoted expression (or the space it occupies, etc.) would be with a typical name, a non-demonstrative description, or a demonstrative phrase. But this assumption is wrong; one could also refer to the quoted expression with a non-typical (but still unstructured and non-demonstrative) name, one for which, and for the likes of which, reference has been fixed with the help of a wholesale stipulation, as in the cases of numerical street names and old Spanish names.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ There might seem to be a difference between the cases of numerical street names and old Spanish names, on the one hand, and quotations on the other, that is relevant to the issue of demonstrativeness. The relevant pre-referential relation between a quotation and its referent is one that appears to make it immediately possible for a user of a quotation to demonstrate its referent, while the relevant pre-referential relations between numerical street names and old Spanish names and their referents are not such that they make it immediately possible for a user of such names to demonstrate those referents. A Davidsonian thought might then be that this apparent fact makes it compulsory that these potential demonstrations are exploited in quotation, and that quotations must be demonstrative phrases. But this Davidsonian thought would again be a non sequitur. This is especially clear from the fact that a typical name can arguably be in a salient pre-referential relation with its referent, that would appear to make it immediately possible for a user of the name to demonstrate this referent, at least to the same extent that this happens in quotation, and yet a typical name is fairly uncontroversially not a demonstrative phrase. One could perfectly well use the following reference-fixing stipulation for a single proper name: let 'Smith' be a proper name of this expression (taken together with a demonstration of the expression 'mith'). Surely 'Smith' is non-demonstrative if proper names in general are non-demonstrative, despite the fact that it is in a salient pre-referential relation with its referent, that makes it immediately possible for a user of the name to demonstrate this referent, at least to the same extent that this happens in quotation. It is hard to see how using a wholesale version of this procedure could turn the newly introduced terms into demonstratives. It may be worth noting also that the salient pre-referential relation between a quotation and its quoted expression does not really make it immediately possible for a user of a quotation to demonstrate the quoted expression. In fact, what a user of a quotation can immediately demonstrate is a token of the quoted expression, or the space the quotation or the quoted expression occupies, etc. The quoted expression itself can only be described with the help of a demonstration of a token of it or, if it can be demonstrated at all, it can be demonstrated only in a deferred way, much as the owner of a vandalized car can be demonstrated by someone who points to the car while saying *He's gonna get mad*. Pure indexicals are not really different from quotations in this respect. A user of an utterance of 'I' can describe the referent of that utterance with the help of a demonstration of it, as in 'the utterer of this' said pointing to that utterance (and on Kaplan's view, it is by means of such descriptions that the referents of utterances of 'I' are fixed); and he can also demonstrate that referent in a deferred way, as in 'this utterer,' again said pointing to the utterance of 'I.' But on the widely accepted view, pure indexicals like 'I' are not thereby demonstrative phrases.

Finally, let us turn to deflationist arguments that the Davidsonian observation implies that quotations cannot be referentially original terms. Washington's argument was that since referentially original terms have their standard semantic values determined by stipulation, and the (quotational) semantic referents of the referring parts of quotations must be fixed in a general way, but stipulations are not general, those referring parts are not referentially original terms. We can now see that what is clearly wrong in this argument is the assumption that the standard semantic values of expressions, if fixed by means of stipulations, can only be fixed in an individual way. There *are* general stipulations fixing standard semantic values for classes of singular terms, such as the stipulation fixing the referents of the numerical names for the streets in a particular city, or the stipulation fixing the referents of old Spanish names. General reference-fixing rules are clearly not restricted to the alleged non-conventional principle dictating the supposed quotational semantic value of each expression (or the alleged non-conventional principle dictating the supposed indirect reference or Fregean sense of each meaningful expression).

Saka's argument was that since the items that can be intuitively pragmatically referred to by a speaker with uses of a quoted expression are characterized by the general principle that they are the items merely pre-referentially related to the quoted expression in some contextually salient way, the referring parts in quotations are not referentially original terms. This is again wrong, as it is clear by now that the fact that capabilities for pragmatic reference can be characterized by pre-referential connections does not prevent the establishment of semantic referential conventions set up by exploiting those capabilities. It is quite true that this would seem impossible in the case of typical names having no salient pre-referential connection to what turn out to be their referents. But think again of the symbol '0.' '0' does have a non-conventional range of potential pragmatically feasible referents—essentially anything that is pre-referentially related to '0,' in a way that is salient in the appropriate context. In particular, in this range we find the man who first used '0' as

On the other hand, it seems likely to me that a genuine difference between numerical street names and old Spanish names, on the one hand, and quotations on the other, is that while the typical reference-fixing descriptions in the former case are not demonstrative, the typical reference-fixing descriptions in the quotation case may be essentially demonstrative. If this is correct, it is nevertheless probably not a distinguishing feature of quotations. Pure indexicals like 'I' and (in my view, which I cannot explain here) decimal Arabic numerals are probably also instances of this phenomenon.

a symbol, as there are contexts in which it is salient that we are thinking of the introducers of symbols. If two people are thinking of introducers of symbols, then, before any convention has been set up by anyone, they can begin to refer to the man who first used '0' by means of '0,' and make themselves perfectly understood (which would have been impossible with typical names pre-referentially unrelated to their referents). But surely '0' would enter the language as a referentially original name of the man who first used '0' *once a semantic convention were put in place* to this effect. This would be especially clear as '0' could then begin to get used also in contexts in which the connection between it and its referent was not salient. It is hard to see how using a wholesale version of this procedure could turn the newly introduced terms into non-referentially original terms.

Think of the case of numerical street names. Presumably, before streets are given numerical names, numerals already have conventional referents, the corresponding numbers. In virtue of this, the numerals get a range of potential pragmatically feasible referents—essentially any things ordered in a discrete sequence with a first element, and in particular the streets of a certain city that are parallel to a certain line when they are counted from a certain point and in a certain direction. If two people are looking at a street map and it is salient to them that the streets can be counted from a certain point and in a certain direction, then, before any convention has been set up by anyone, they can begin to refer to the streets by the numerals corresponding to the numbers they occupy in the sequence, and make themselves perfectly understood (which would have been impossible with typical names pre-referentially unrelated to their referents). But surely numerical street names enter the language as referentially original terms once a semantic convention has been put in place to that effect. The same can be said for traditional Spanish names. The forename of a saint or angel has a range of non-conventional, potential pragmatically feasible referents—essentially anything that is pre-referentially related to that forename in a way that is salient in context, and in particular a man born on the feast day of that saint or angel. Suppose that two speakers are looking at a list of babies of whom they only have the birth dates, and that it is salient to them that the dates correspond to certain saints' names (perhaps because they are Catholic nuns who know the calendar of saints by heart). Then, before any convention has been set up by anyone, they can begin to refer to the babies by the names corresponding to the days on which they were born, and make themselves perfectly understood (which

would have been impossible with non-Christian names pre-referentially unrelated to their referents, or with Christian names not related in a salient way). But surely traditional Spanish names enter the language as referentially original terms once the appropriate semantic convention has been put in place.

This concludes my vindication of the theory that quotations are unstructured, context-insensitive, referentially original devices that get their referents fixed by a conventional wholesale reference-fixing rule. To the extent that this theory assimilates quotations to proper names and other presumably unstructured expressions, its formulation and acceptance may have been prevented by the well-learned lessons of the traditional objections to classical theories, and especially Davidson's objections to the name theory. But I hope that the preceding discussion will convince some that while quotations are obviously not typical proper names, they are not so different from them as most of the post-Davidsonian literature suggests. I believe that only an appreciation of the ways in which they relate to proper names and other unstructured expressions can give us a proper understanding of the place the phenomenon of quotation occupies in the linguistic landscape.