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Law and Science: The Autonomy and Limits of Culpability as a Cornerstone to the Ascription of Liability (or the Subject of Criminal Law: Three Maxims, a Problem and a Glimpse into the Future)

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Abstract

In recent years, the advancements made in the field of neuroscience have been echoed in criminal law, reigniting the discussion on culpability from the viewpoint of if it actually exists, considering the echoes of determinism on the re-found non-existence of free will. This discussion has triggered, once again, the issue of the boundaries and inter-relations between (criminal) law and science, namely on whether normative or legal concepts and categories should acknowledge scientific breakthroughs. Bringing forth the theme of the limits of the law, this discussion is able to provide insight, with reference to a specific problem, as to whether there are plausible legal answers in the context of the ascription of liability if the subject of law ceases to be a responsible—and thus free—person. Taking into consideration evolution both of science and criminal law dogmatic, we aim to argue that in the particular case of culpability, the desired autonomy of law has its limitations, and that without such limitations the ascription of liability would not have a correct answer. For this argument we will firstly approach the meaning of culpability as a milestone of subjective responsibility in criminal law, so that we can then analyse some arguments made regarding the impact of neuroscience on the maintenance of a concept of culpability with the meaning given above, so that lastly we can proceed to the rebuttal of the overarching impact of (neuro) science on the law and advocate the autonomy of culpability within the necessary limits imposed by the needs of a plausible legal answer.

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Notes

  1. This was fairly different in the Middle Ages; in fact, there are reports of criminal trials of animals, which were, too, convicted for their “crimes”. See [10: 566 ff.].

  2. A criminal act represents the connection between human conduct and the violation of a criminally protected legal interest. The expression “human conduct” encompasses the need for volition, but such conduct can be active (action) or passive (omission).

  3. Differently, Cesare Lombroso, in his L’Uomo Delinquente (1876), believed there to be a “natural offender”, based on the physical traits of each person.

  4. This is particularly relevant in the consideration of other problems, such as the mistake of fact and the vis absoluta as to the act as an action liberae.

  5. In this regard, particularly relevant [12: 216]. This leads to the fact that negligent conduct – actio libera in causa – is not considered to be as reproachable as intentional conduct – actio libera in se, and is, then, deemed as an “exceptional” source of responsibility in criminal law, only being foreseen in offenses regarding some legal interests (life, for example).

  6. However, considering criminal offence provisions as text, it can also be said that “A text is not simply a communicational apparatus. It is a device which questions the previous signifying systems, often renews them, and sometimes destroys them” [4: 25].

  7. Under Searle, “Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world” [30: 1].

  8. See United States v. Semrau (2010).

  9. We refer to the primary function of legal rules; there are, however, legal definitions, a.s.o., which do not carry said functions.

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  1. University of Coimbra Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR), Coimbra, Portugal

    Inês Fernandes Godinho

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Godinho, I.F. Law and Science: The Autonomy and Limits of Culpability as a Cornerstone to the Ascription of Liability (or the Subject of Criminal Law: Three Maxims, a Problem and a Glimpse into the Future). Int J Semiot Law 35, 297–308 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09804-8

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