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First-Order Frege Theory is Undecidable

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Abstract

The system whose only predicate is identity, whose only nonlogical vocabulary is the abstraction operator, and whose axioms are all first-order instances of Frege's Axiom V is shown to be undecidable.

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REFERENCES

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Emerson Hall 208, Cambridge, MA, 02138, U.S.A

    Warren Goldfarb

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  1. Warren Goldfarb
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Goldfarb, W. First-Order Frege Theory is Undecidable. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30, 613–616 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013362627445

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013362627445

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