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How lucky can you get?

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Abstract

In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim (1) that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, (2) that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and (3) that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, 1427 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY, 40506-0027, USA

    Sanford Goldberg

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  1. Sanford Goldberg
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Correspondence to Sanford Goldberg.

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Goldberg, S. How lucky can you get?. Synthese 158, 315–327 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9042-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9042-z

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