Hume Studies

Peter Fosl's new monograph investigates Hume's skepticism in light of two traditions going back to ancient times: Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism. The book offers an intricate history of both traditions and culminates in a bold reading of Hume's skepticism. Against a trend which sees Hume's naturalism overcoming his skepticism, Fosl argues that Hume is "a truly radical and coherent sceptic" (332). Moreover, Hume is a "hybrid sceptic" (2, 171), gracefully combining elements of both the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptical traditions. Numerous scholars have sought antecedents to Hume's skepticism in the Pyrrhonian Sextus Empiricus or the broadly Academic Cicero. What distinguishes Fosl's investigation is, first, its treating both traditions together and at length, and, second, its portrayal of Hume as "a deeply Pyrrhonian thinker" (172)—one who is not only profitably compared to Sextus, but who likely understood, favorably regarded, and self-consciously adapted Pyrrhonian thought (2–4, 79–80, 153ff). Fosl supports this iconoclastic reading with extensive historical research. But, due to a failure to answer central questions about the consistency of Hume's philosophy with the Pyrrhonists', the book leaves its bold reading underexplained and undersupported.

Hume's Scepticism contains an Introduction and two Parts. I highly recommend the Introduction as a resource for any readers who want a brief yet comprehensive overview of the progression of Anglophone interpretation of Hume's skepticism (4–13). Parts I and II offer an "Empirical Case" and "Conceptual Case," respectively, for Fosl's reading.

Part I's Empirical Case traces the Pyrrhonian and Academic traditions from their ancient roots through their subsequent transmissions and transformations, and offers "evidence culled from Hume's published and unpublished work, his private letters and his circumstances" (2). What results is a serviceable history of skepticism with a "special focus on the dimensions of the sceptical traditions that illuminate Hume's philosophical texts" (209–10). Trimming extraneous details would have helped the "special focus" emerge more fully. Moreover, since close readings of Hume are postponed until the Conceptual Case in Part II, Part I's most explicit discussions of Hume often amount to a mere "chronicling [of] similarities between Hume's texts and those of the Pyrrhonian (and Academic) traditions" (153). Scholars of Hume's skepticism and sources may, with patience, mine food for thought here. But readers short on time can skip most of Part I without great loss. Enough context to profitably read Part II is provided by the discussions of the Academics and dogmatism (28–34), of the Pyrrhonist's assent (85–87, 94–96), method (92–94), and aim (107–108), and of Bayle and Huet (60–67, 140–50). Fosl's discussions of the latter two figures, which build on work by José Maia Neto, Dario Perinetti, and John P. Wright, are highlights, if not entirely new. [End Page 171]

Part I concludes by beginning to address a difficulty for Fosl's reading: the idea that Hume admired Pyrrhonism, or even understood it, is hard to square with Hume's explicit remarks. Hume famously declares that "Pyrrhonian" doubt has no "constant influence on the mind," and objects that "all human life must perish" from inactivity, "were [Pyrrhonian] principles universally and steadily to prevail" (EHU 12.23; SBN 159–60). This objection was already familiar to the ancient skeptics and Sextus has a nuanced reply. According to Sextus, Pyrrhonian skeptics are able to act on life's necessities despite their general suspension of judgment because they continue to passively "acquiesce" or "assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances" (Outlines of Scepticism, ed. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.13 cf. 19, 193; hereafter "PH"). In particular, they assent "in accordance with everyday observances," which are "fourfold, and . . . consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feeling, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise" (PH 1.23, 24). In denying that Pyrrhonists held "beliefs" (dogmata), Sextus means...