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Is there a neutral metalanguage?

  • S.I.: Pluralistic Perspectives on Logic
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Abstract

Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that (i) the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to reconcile with the theories of meaning for logical constants, and (ii) the second version collapses mathematically, if rival logics, as object languages, are treated with charity in the metalanguage. I substantiate (ii) by proving a collapse theorem that generalizes familiar results. Thus, the existence of a neutral metalanguage cannot be taken for granted, and meaning-invariant logical pluralism might turn out to be dubious.

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Notes

  1. I use the terms “metalanguage” and “metalanguage logic” interchangeably in this paper for the sake of simplicity, unless stated otherwise. Hence, by “metalanguage” I also mean the logic that comes with it.

  2. Some philosophers (e.g., Beall and Restall 2006, p. 91) don’t consider non-transitive and non-reflexive systems to be logics at all, on the grounds that their consequence relations have nothing to do with preservation.

  3. What’s important in this version, is that neutrality is achieved by appealing to a unifying framework, rather than by a mere collection of inferences. It is less important whether such a framework involves metalinguistic resources such as quantifiers over sets. Hence, a “neutral metalanguage” can be, e.g., first order logic, if proven neutral.

  4. It is commonly accepted that Quine’s meaning-variance thesis objects to any kind of logical pluralism, as it implies that debates in logic cannot even be expressed. Yet, an anonymous reviewer suggested that, presumably, one could also see Quine as a kind of meaning variant pluralist. I will not make a stand on this issue.

  5. It is worth pointing out that Quine does not want to make logic impossible to revise, nor does he want to argue that there cannot be any rivalry in logic. Indeed, different logics are put to use in the exact sciences as a matter of fact. It’s only that there is no way to make sure that no shifts of meaning happen when one logician talks to her opponents in such a debate (see Priest 2006, ch. 10 for a detailed discussion). I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.

  6. To be more precise, there are cases where meaning is conferred molecularly, but not \({ atomically}\), strictly speaking. For example, in a system where \(\lnot A\) is \({ defined}\) as \(A\rightarrow \perp \), any disagreement about negation would stem from, and depend on, a corresponding disagreement, either about the conditional or about absurdity. Hence, there is no way of having a meaningful dispute only about negation. Needless to say, this doesn’t rule out a scenario where the conditional is itself disputable, and meaningfully so. (By the way, negation isn’t unique in this regard: there are other examples like, e.g., the biconditional and exclusive disjunction.)

    There might also be cases where two constants are interdefinable, such that meaning is conferred on both somewhat non-molecularly. I take it that if there are such cases, then meaningful disputes are still possible \({ insofar}\ as\) the meaning of a given constant doesn’t depend on the entire system as a whole. In any case, unlike strict atomism, molecularism is flexible enough to accommodate this kind of meaning interdependence.

  7. This idea isn’t restricted to connectives or constants that are truth functional; possible-worlds semantics can also be looked upon as specifying the meanings of logical constants in terms of their contributions to making propositions true (or false, or something else), even if one has to take into account the distribution of truth values in all possible worlds (or states) in order to specify such contributions.

  8. For detailed discussion of this point, see Priest (2006, pp. 204–206), Hjortland (2013, pp. 363–365).

  9. This point is made in more detail in Weber et al. (2016). Dummett (1978, pp. 238–239) makes a similar point: that one cannot convey the meaning of the intuitionistic apparatus to classicists, based on its disputable notion of truth. Thus, he goes on to explain the intuitionistic notions of truth and meaning in terms of the agreed upon notion of mathematical proof. To use our terminology, Dummett moves from the representational conception of meaning to the inferential one, because he views truth as theory-laden.

  10. See Dicher (2016b, pp. 738–739) for a detailed discussion of this point, as well as my discussion below.

  11. Restall (2014) disagrees with this point. A more detailed criticism of his position can be found in Dicher (2016b).

  12. An anonymous reviewer objected to this claim, arguing that context-sensitivity doesn’t necessarily imply such holism: it may be the case that the operational rules of a given connective determine its meaning on their own, and it’s just that whether they successfully do this is measured in relation to other (operational as well as structural) rules. Suppose that a connective \(\#\) is conservative (\(=\hbox {definable}\)) in two distinct contexts and undefinable (\(=\hbox {non conservative}\)) in a third, also distinct from each of the first two. This would not mean that \(\#\) has one meaning in the first and another in the second. It would just mean that \(\#\) has no meaning in the third.

    However, as Dicher (2016b, pp. 734–737) argues, the operational rules themselves are not quite the same in different contexts. For instance, the additive and multiplicative rules for disjunction (which are discussed below) turn out to be identical in some contexts and different in others. Thus, then the rules do confer different meanings in different contexts. Indeed, Dicher introduces later on in his paper some criteria for identifying rules across contexts, but his suggestion (which is discussed below) relies on a local version of conservativeness, which is not at stake at this moment.

  13. To be exact, given our assumption that the consequence relation is transitive, the two negations cannot be combined in a conservative way. See Cerro et al. (2013) for more detail.

  14. I will show later, in regard to the metalinguistic version, that a similar problem arises even if no connective is unique.

  15. See Hjortlang (2012) for a detailed discussion of this point.

  16. There are several versions of these rules, but they are all along the lines of:

    $$\begin{aligned} Cut:\ \frac{\varGamma ,A\Rightarrow ,\varDelta \ \ \varGamma \Rightarrow A,\varDelta }{\varGamma \Rightarrow \varDelta }\ Id:\ A\Rightarrow A \end{aligned}$$

    Needless to say, one has to make up one’s mind on the version that fits best with the context of deducibility at hand. In any case, I must say I am somewhat reluctant to waive global conservativeness: if we give up this requirement, then a connective can be meaningful even where it forms a non-conservative (let alone inconsistent) extension with respect to a given system. Dicher is well-aware of this, acknowledging that a connective can be meaningful even if it cannot be used in a given system: “[T]here is\(\ldots \) a gap between a connective being endowed with a coherent meaning and it being usable in a determinate logical system.” Yet, he adds: “This is not something that should worry us. It is just another illustration of the truism that whether a connective is usable \({ hic}\ et\ { nunc}\) depends on more than just its defining rules” (Dicher 2016b, p. 749).

    \({ But}\), recall the inferential theory in the background of this story. The basic insight of the inferential theory is that the meaning of an expression is to be given in terms of its \({ use}\). Hence, a distinction between a connective being endowed with a \({ coherent}\ { meaning}\), on the one hand, and it being \({ usable}\) in a given system, on the other, is problematic by the very standards of inferentialism. By these standards, in cases where some connective is usable in one system and unusable in another, it should be conceived of as meaningful in the first, and meaningless in the second. Ultimately, the inferential theory is a theory of \({ use}\), and so, according to this theory, an expression unusable in a given context should not be considered meaningful in it. Yet, I cannot establish this point within the scope of the present discussion, and so I leave it to the judgment of the reader. See also Dicher (2016a).

  17. To be precise, Dicher distinguishes between \({ intrinsic}\) structural properties, which are induced by the connective rules, and \({ extrinsic}\) properties, which are in charge of the connective’s interaction with other connectives. What’s important for our purposes is only the former, i.e., structural properties that “belong” to the rules themselves, so to speak.

  18. In addition, by restricting the left-hand side (analogously), we get dual-intuitionistic negation, but I shall not discuss this here.

  19. To be precise, his conclusion is that “negation, via its operational rules, determines the structural properties which make swaps possible—that is, the structural property of having an empty slot and the structural property of having (at least) two formula occurrences on the same side” (Dicher 2016b, pp. 743–744)

  20. This claim may strike one as counterintuitive, as the two are really similar. In fact, if Weakening and Contraction hold:

    $$\begin{aligned} WL:\ \frac{\varGamma \Rightarrow \varDelta }{\varGamma ,A\Rightarrow \varDelta ,},\ \ \ WR:\ \frac{\varGamma \Rightarrow \varDelta }{\varGamma ,\Rightarrow A,\varDelta },\ \ \ CL:\ \frac{\varGamma ,A,A\Rightarrow \varDelta }{\varGamma ,A\Rightarrow \varDelta ,},\ \ \ CR:\ \frac{\varGamma \Rightarrow A,A,\varDelta }{\varGamma ,\Rightarrow A,\varDelta } \end{aligned}$$

    and the context at hand permits more than one formula on each side of the turnstile, the two connectives can be proven to be identical, and the same goes for multiplicative and additive conjunctions. (In addition, it is rather obvious that the issue is much broader than these examples.) In a more recent paper (Dicher 2018), Dicher approaches this particular issue in more detail, using a different criterion of definability, according to which the two connectives do share meaning. But that is exactly my point: not every criterion can be used in every case, and so the business of deciding between logics is intertwined with choices of criteria of meaning.

  21. In this regard, the metalinguistic version is similar to Hjortalnd’s intra-theoretic pluralism (Hjortland 2013). The latter is a kind of pluralism that aims to combine more than one consequence relation in a \({ single}\) logical theory. Recall, for example, the operational rules for negation that are mentioned above, and that restricting contexts in various ways yields different consequence relations. The result is a single proof system with different definitions for “derivation” . Since all of these consequence relations live in one system, one may claim, there are no shifts of meaning; in a way, the meanings of logical constants are fixed via their use within the agreed upon (minimal) collection of inferences—those inferences that meet all mentioned restrictions.

    However, the issue I wish to explore here is quite different: whether such a combining system can be proven neutral for debates in logic. For the latter purpose, it is not enough to show that certain systems combine more than one consequence relation. What is at stake is rather whether one can \({ neutrally}\) discuss different logics with the resources provided by such a system. I address this issue at length in the following pages.

  22. The following is a somewhat restricted version of the deduction theorem, but it is all that’s required, as we assume compactness.

  23. This is clearly the case with classical, intuitionistic, and relevance logics, but such implications can also be introduced into paraconsistent logics (Hewitt 2008). For the general question of having deduction theorems in propositional logics, see Pigozzi (2001). As the scope of this work is propositional logics, I disregard the problem with free logics.

  24. By “rival logics” I mean that there exist \(\alpha \in \mathcal {L},\varGamma \subseteq \mathcal {L}\) such that \(\varGamma \vdash _{L_{1}}\alpha ,\varGamma \nvdash _{L_{2}}\alpha \).

  25. This assumption isn’t necessary for the results that follow.

  26. If \(\alpha ,\beta \) do involve implications, the translation is more complex, and we want to have: \(\tau _{2}(\alpha )\rightarrow _{2}\tau _{2}(\beta )\vdash \tau _{1} (\alpha )\rightarrow _{1}\tau _{1}(\beta )\) and not the converse. Following the Davidsonean methodology, this is the best we can do to make a comprehensive comparison between the two logics: it allows us to compare straightforwardly the introduction and elimination rules for the connectives (regarding both logics), etc.

  27. To that end, the metalanguage should have a conjunction that obeys the conjunction introduction and elimination rules. I haven’t mentioned this assumption explicitly, because it is quite natural to assume. This method moreover requires that both \(L_{i}\)’s be compact, as I’ve already said. I could have, alternatively, just stipulated that \(L'\) obeys rules of each rival logic (it doesn’t matter for the results that follow), but this would obfuscate the roles that the implications play in representing consequence relations.

  28. It is worth noticing that: (i) those implications obey MP in the corresponding object languages, since they admit corresponding deduction theorems in these languages, and (ii) these implications \(do\;not\) admit the conditional introduction rules (in the metalanguage), which would bring about a collapse immediately. It is also worth noticing that in the case of implication-saturated axiomatizations with deduction theorems, MP should suffice as a unique rule of inference.

  29. I leave open the question whether \(L'\) should have as an axiom \(\vdash \alpha \rightarrow _{i}\alpha \), or whether this stipulation should somehow be derivable. In any case, recall our assumption that the consequence relations of both logics are reflexive and transitive.

  30. Lattice-based semantics (which is a kind algebraic semantics, see Rasiowa 1974) is used here only as a ladder, to use Wittgenstein’s metaphor. It may not be the natural semantics for the metalanguage, for several reasons. Nevertheless, the completeness theorem implies that there is a \({ syntactic}\) collapse, regardless of what the natural semantics is. Theorem 2 shows, in other words, that you cannot properly represent rival logics (indeed, at the level of syntax) within one meta-framework.

  31. Take for example the case of intuitionistic logic vs. the system R of relevance logic. Intuitionistic logic has explosion, but R has double negation elimination, so there is no “weaker” logic.

  32. One could also endorse Hjortland’s intra-theoretic pluralism which is mentioned in footnote 22.

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Correspondence to Rea Golan.

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Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This work was supported by a Rothschild Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Pittsburgh, and an Edelstein Fellowship at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I wish to thank Carl Posy and Robert Brandom for their influence on this work. The paper also benefited from fruitful discussions with David Kashtan, Aviv Keren, and Gil Sagi. My thanks also to the participants of the LOGICA 2016 conference, where I presented the main ideas that are discussed below. Finally, I want to thank to anonymous referees for this journal, for their helpful comments.

Appendix

Appendix

As the logics at issue are reflexive, transitive, and compact, and admit deduction theorems, we can use lattice-based semantics to give a general account of their semantics. I follow mainly Rasiowa’s notion of \({ implicative}\;{ algebras}\) (Rasiowa 1974) with slight differences. Recall that we are concerned here with a language \(\mathcal {L}\) whose expressions are generated by some set of connectives over a countable set of atoms to be designated by At. Axioms and rules of inference for each logic (over \(\mathcal {L}\)) are defined in the usual way.

Definition 1

A \({ lattice}\) is a partial order \(\langle A,\le \rangle \) such that for all \(a,b\in A\) there exist \(a\vee b,a\wedge b\in A\) with:

  1. 1.

    \(a\wedge b\le a,b\) and if \(c\le a,b\) then \(a\wedge b\le c\).

  2. 2.

    \(a,b\le a\vee b\) and if \(a,b\le c\) then \(a\vee b\le c\).

A lattice is \({ bounded}\) if there are \(0,1\in A\) such that \(0\le a\le 1\) for all \(a\in A\).

For semantics, we have to define \({ implication}\,{ lattices}\):

Definition 2

An \({ implication}\,{ lattice}\) is a tuple \(M=\langle A,\le ,Tr \rangle \) where:

  1. 1.

    \(\langle A,\le \rangle \) is a bounded lattice.

  2. 2.

    For each n-ary logical constant, \(*\in \mathcal {L}\), there is a corresponding n-ary operation \(*':A^{n}\rightarrow A\).

  3. 3.

    In particular, \(\wedge ,\vee ,\bot ,\top \) stand for conjunction, disjunction, bottom, and top respectively.

  4. 4.

    \(Tr\subseteq A\) is a filter with respect to \(\le \), \(\top \in Tr\). We call Tr a \({ truth}\,{ filter}\).

Definition 3

Let L be some logic over \(\mathcal {L}\), and \(M=\langle A,\le ,Tr \rangle \) be an implication lattice. A functor \(F:\mathcal {L}\rightarrow A\) is a \({ semantic}\ { functor}\) for L if the following conditions are met:

  1. 1.

    For each n-ary logical connective, \(*\in \mathcal {L}\), and \(\alpha _{1},\ldots ,\alpha _{n}\in \mathcal {L}\): \(F(*(\alpha _{1},\ldots ,\alpha _{n}))=*'(F(\alpha _{1}),\ldots ,F(\alpha _{n}))\).

  2. 2.

    For each conditional, \(\alpha \rightarrow \beta \): \(F(\alpha \rightarrow \beta )\in Tr\) iff \(F(\alpha )\le F(\beta )\). The interpretation of implications is thus constrained by the lattice partial order, though this restriction isn’t unique:—we might have various implications meeting this condition. Under this restriction each implication respects the consequence relation, so that deduction theorems can hold, as required.

The points of A are regarded as truth values. We say that M satisfies \(\alpha \) (\(M\vDash \alpha \)) if \(F(\alpha )\in Tr\).

Lemma 1

Let \(F:\mathcal {L}\rightarrow A\) be a semantic functor and \(\sigma :At\rightarrow At\) some permutation on the atomic propositions. We define by induction for any \(\alpha \in \mathcal {L}\ \sigma (\alpha )\)—the translation function generated by \(\sigma \) in the obvious way. Then \(F_{\sigma }=F\circ \sigma :\mathcal {L}\rightarrow A\) is a semantic functor as well.

The proof of Lemma 1 results trivially from the formality of logic. Hence a lattice is a model for some logic independently of some specific semantic functor. Note that not every lattice is a model for every logic. Soundness and completeness theorems may specify for each logic its class of models in terms of corresponding algebraic properties.

Definition 4

A logic is said to be \({ sound}\) if \(\varGamma \vdash \alpha \) implies \(\varGamma \models \alpha \), i.e., for each lattice M and semantic functor, \(F:L\rightarrow M\): \(F(\varGamma )\subseteq Tr\) implies \(F(\alpha )\in Tr\). A logic is called \({ complete}\) if \(\varGamma \vdash \alpha \) entails \(\varGamma \models \alpha \).

Let \(L_{1},L_{2}\) be two \({ rival}\,{ logics}\), i.e., there are \(\varGamma \subseteq \mathcal {L},\alpha \in \mathcal {L}\) s.t. \(\varGamma \vdash _{L_{1}}\alpha ,\varGamma \nvdash _{L_{2}}\alpha \). We define the unifying metalanguage \(\mathcal {L}'\) and the corresponding logic \(L'\) as explained in Sect. 5. We define models for \(\mathcal {L}'\) in the usual way.

Lemma 2

Let \(C_{i}\) be the class of models for \(L_{i}\) (\(i=1,2\)); then M is a model for \(L'\) iff \(M\in C_{1}\cap C_{2}\).

Proof

(\(\Leftarrow \)) Assume \(M\in C_{1}\cap C_{2}\). Then, there are two semantic functors for these logics: \(F_{i}:\mathcal {L}\rightarrow A\). Define \(F:\mathcal {L}'\rightarrow A\) as follows. Without loss of generality (following Lemma 1) we assume that \(F_{1}\upharpoonleft At=F_{2}\upharpoonleft At\). By definition, for each logical constant \(*\) except for implication: \(F(*(\alpha _{1},\ldots ,\alpha _{n}))=*' (F(\alpha _{1}),\ldots ,F(\alpha _{n}))\) is well-defined. In the same way, for each implication \(F(\alpha \rightarrow _{i}\beta )\) is well defined in terms of the operator \(\rightarrow _{i}'\), since \(M\in C_{i}\) (recall Definition 3). By induction, it is trivial to prove that all the rules of inferences and axioms for both logics are represented successfully in this way, for they are preserved by the original \(F_{i}\)’s, and each \(\rightarrow _{i}\) represents the corresponding consequence relation. (\(\Rightarrow \)) Assume \(F:\mathcal {L}\text {'}\rightarrow A\) is a semantic functor. For each i define: \(F_{i}:\mathcal {L}\rightarrow A\) by \(F_{i}(\alpha )=F(\tau _{i}(\alpha ))\) where \(\tau _{i}\) is the translation function defined in Sect. 5. The rest of the proof is trivial. \(\square \)

Corollary 1

Soundness If \(\varGamma \vdash \alpha \) then \(\varGamma \models \alpha \).

Proof

By induction on the derivation of \(\alpha \) from \(\varGamma \). Each step is either a premise (true by definition), or an axiom or rule of inference representing \(L_{1}\), preserved because \(M\in C_{1}\), or an axiom or rule of inference representing \(L_{2}\), preserved because \(M\in C_{2}\), as Lemma 2 shows. \(\square \)

Definition 5

For technical reasons, we define a hierarchy of \({ incomplete}\) languages (namely, sets of propositions not necessarily closed under the connectives) such that: \({\mathcal {L}'} = \bigcup \nolimits _{{n \in \mathbb {N}}} {{\mathcal {L}}_{n} } \). Let \(\mathcal {\mathcal {L}}_{1} =(\mathcal {L}\backslash \{\rightarrow \})\cup \{\rightarrow _{1}\}\), and define \(\mathcal {L}_{2n+1}\) (\(\mathcal {L}_{2n}\)) by induction: \(\alpha \in \mathcal {L}_{2n+1}\ (\mathcal {L}_{2n})\) iff:

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \in \mathcal {L}_{2n}\;(\mathcal {L}_{2n-1})\;or\;\alpha =\beta \rightarrow _{1}\gamma \;(\alpha =\beta \rightarrow _{2}\gamma )\;where\;\beta , \gamma \in \mathcal {L}_{2n+1}\;(\mathcal {L}_{2n}) \end{aligned}$$

Let i(n) denote the index of the implication symbol (i.e., 1 or 2) added during this enrichment process at the level \(\mathcal {L}_{n}\). That is, \(i(n)={\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1 &{} n\;is\;{ odd}\\ 2 &{} n\;is\;{ even} \end{array}\right. }\)

Before proving completeness, let me just explain what this hierarchy is good for. To prove completeness, we construct a saturated set which induces a lattice, and then show that this lattice is indeed a model for both logics, relying on the completeness theorems of both \(L_{1},L_{2}\). In particular, we show by induction that up to the level of \(\mathcal {L}_{n}\) we have a Tarski–Lindenbaum lattice for \(L_{i(n)}\). Thus, for the entire language we have a model for \(L'\). This will become clear while reading through the proof.

Theorem 1

Completeness: If \(\varGamma \models \alpha \) then \(\varGamma \vdash \alpha \).

Proof

Assume \(\varGamma \nvdash \alpha \). We first construct a saturated set \(\varGamma ^{+}\supseteq \varGamma \) s.t. \(\varGamma ^{+}\nvdash \alpha \). Let \(\varphi _{1}\) be an enumeration of \(\mathcal {L}_{1}\) and \(\varphi _{n+1}:\mathbb {N\rightarrow }\mathcal {L}_{n+1}\backslash \mathcal {L}_{n}\), an enumeration of \(\mathcal {L}_{n+1}\backslash \mathcal {L}_{n}\). Then enumerate \(\mathcal {L}'\) with \(\varphi :\omega \times \omega \rightarrow \mathcal {L}'\) given by \(\varphi (n,m)=\varphi _{n}(m)\). Now, we construct \(\varGamma ^{+}\) by induction:

$$\begin{aligned} \varGamma _{1,0}= & {} \varGamma \cap \mathcal {L}_{1}\\ \varGamma _{n,m+1}= & {} {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \varGamma _{n,m}\cup \varphi (n,m)\} &{} if\;\varGamma _{n,m}\cup \{\varphi (n,m)\}\nvdash \alpha \\ \varGamma _{n,m} &{} { otherwise} \end{array}\right. }\\ \varGamma _{n}^{+}= & {} \bigcup _{m<\omega }\varGamma _{n,m}\\ \varGamma _{n+1,0}= & {} \varGamma _{n}^{+}\cup (\varGamma \cap \mathcal {L}_{n+1})\\ \varGamma ^{+}= & {} \bigcup _{n<\omega }\varGamma _{n,0} \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to verify that \(\varGamma ^{+}\) is closed under the consequence relation and that \(\varGamma ^{+}\nvdash \alpha \).

Now define \(\delta \le \gamma \) if \(\varGamma ^{+},\delta \vdash \gamma \), and \(\delta \sim \gamma \) if \(\delta \le \gamma \) and \(\gamma \le \delta \). \(\sim \) is then an equivalence relation. Define \(A_{M}=\nicefrac {\mathcal {L}'}{\sim }\), so that \(\langle A_{M},\le \rangle \) is a bounded lattice, since for all \(\delta \in \mathcal {L}'\): \([\bot ]\le [\delta ]\le [\top ]\). Define \(Tr=\nicefrac {\varGamma ^{+}}{\sim }\). Tr is by definition a truth filter, and so \(M=\langle A_{M},\le ,Tr \rangle \) is an implication lattice. Define now: \(F(\delta )=[\delta ]\). All we have to show is that \(F:\mathcal {L}'\rightarrow A_{M}\) is a semantic functor for \(L'\). If so, we get \(Th(M)=\varGamma ^{+}\) by definition, and \(M\nvDash \alpha \) as a result. In particular, we have to show that M is a Tarski–Lindenbaum lattice for both logics (see Font et al. 2003, pp. 22–24). If so, we get:

  1. (1)

    For each n-ary operator \(*\) : \(F(*(\delta _{1},\ldots ,\delta _{n}))=*'(F(\delta _{1}),\ldots ,F(\delta _{n}))\), where \(*\) is the operator defined for semantic functors \(F:\mathcal {L}'\rightarrow A_{M}\), where \(M\in C_{1}\cap C_{2}\).

  2. (2)

    For each implication: \(F(\delta \rightarrow _{i}\gamma )\in Tr\) iff \(F(\delta )\le F(\gamma )\).

  3. (3)

    F satisfies all the axioms and the rules of inference.

The proof rests on the completeness of both \(L_{1},L_{2}\). We first define for all \(n\in \mathbb {N}\) a projection translation function \(\eta _{n}:\mathcal {L}_{n}\rightarrow \mathcal {L}\cup \{p_{n}^{k}\}_{k\in \mathbb {N}}\), where \(\{p_{n}^{k}\}_{k\in \mathbb {N}}\) are countably many new atoms. \(\eta _{1}\) is the identity function. \(\eta _{n+1}\) is defined by induction:

$$\begin{aligned} \eta _{n+1}(\delta )={\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \delta &{} if\ \delta \in At\\ \eta _{n+1}(\beta )*\eta _{n+1}(\gamma ) &{} if\ \delta =\beta *\gamma ,\ where*\ne \rightarrow _{1},\rightarrow _{2}\\ p_{n+1}^{k} &{} if\ \delta =\beta \rightarrow _{i(n)}\gamma ,\ where\ p_{n+1}^{k}\,wasn't\,added\,yet\\ \eta _{n+1}(\beta )\rightarrow \eta _{n+1}(\gamma ) &{} if\ \delta =\beta \rightarrow _{i(n+1)}\gamma \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$

All \(\eta _{n}\)’s are by definition bijective. I now argue that \(\eta _{n}(\varGamma _{n}^{+})\) is closed under the consequence relation of \(L_{i(n)}\). Assume \(\eta _{n}(\varGamma _{n}^{+})\vdash _{L_{i(n)}} \delta \); we are about to show by induction on the length of this proof that \(\delta \in \eta _{n}(\varGamma _{n}^{+})\). For length=1, if \(\delta \) is not an axiom then immediately \(\delta \in \eta _{n}(\varGamma _{n}^{+})\). If it is an axiom of \(L_{i(n)}\), then \(\eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta )\) is an axiom of \(L'\) whose principal operator is not \(\rightarrow _{i(n+1)}\). Thus, \(\eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta )\in \mathcal {L}_{n}\). By the construction, \(\eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta )\in \varGamma _{n}^{+}\), so \(\delta \in \eta _{n}(\varGamma _{n}^{+})\). For length>1, suppose that \(\delta \) is derived from \(\delta _{1},\ldots ,\delta _{k}\) in \(L_{i(n)}\). By the induction hypothesis, \(\delta _{1},\ldots ,\delta _{k}\in \eta _{n} (\varGamma _{n}^{+})\). Thus, \(\eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta _{1}),\ldots , \eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta _{k})\in \varGamma _{n}^{+}\). By the conjunction introduction-rule of \(L'\): \(\varGamma _{n}^{+}\vdash {\bigwedge \nolimits _{1\le j\le k}}\eta ^{-1}(\delta _{j})\). The above mentioned derivation in \(L_{i(n)}\) is by the construction represented in \(L'\), with \(\varGamma _{n}^{+}\vdash {\bigwedge \nolimits {1\le j\le k}}\eta ^{-1}(\delta _{j})\rightarrow _{i(n)}\eta ^{-1}(\delta )\). By MP: \(\varGamma _{n}^{+}\vdash \eta ^{-1}(\delta )\). Hence, by the construction: \(\eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta )\in \varGamma _{n}^{+}\). Therefore, \(\delta \in \eta _{n}^{-1}(\varGamma _{n}^{+})\).

Define now: \(F_{n}:\mathcal {L}\cup \{p_{n}^{k}\}_{k\in \mathbb {N}}\rightarrow A_{M}\) by \(F_{n}(\delta )=F(\eta _{n}^{-1}(\delta ))\). It is easy to verify that due to the soundness and completeness of \(L_{i(n)}\), together with the representational properties of \(L'\), \(F_{n}\) is a well defined semantic functor for \(L_{i(n)}\), and \(F_{n}(\mathcal {L}\cup \{p_{n}^{k}\}_{k\in \mathbb {N}})\subseteq A_{M}\) forms a Tarski–Lindenbaum lattice for \(L_{i(n)}\). In conclusion: \(M\in C_{i(n)}\), because \(A_{M}\supseteq F_{n}(\mathcal {L}\cup \{p_{n}^{k}\}_{k\in \mathbb {N}})\).

The last result is true for all \(n\in \mathbb {N}\). Moreover, \(F_{n}(\mathcal {L}\cup \{p_{n}^{k}\}_{k\in \mathbb {N}})=F(\mathcal {L}_{n})\), and hence \(F(\mathcal {L}_{n})\in C_{i(n)}\). By definition \(F(\mathcal {L}_{n})\subseteq F(\mathcal {L}_{n+1})\) (because \(\mathcal {L}_{n}\subseteq \mathcal {L}_{n+1}\)), and \(F(\mathcal {L}_{n+1})\in C_{i(n+1)}\). To sum up, for all \(n\in \mathbb {N}\cup \{0\}\):

$$\begin{aligned} F(\mathcal {L}_{2n+1})\in & {} C_{1}\\ F(\mathcal {L}_{2n})\in & {} C_{2} \\ F(\mathcal {L}_{n})\subseteq & {} F(\mathcal {L}_{n+1}) \end{aligned}$$

These three results give us:

$$\begin{aligned} \underset{n\in \mathbb {N}}{\bigcup F(\mathcal {L}_{2n}})= & {} F\left( \underset{n\in \mathbb {N}}{\bigcup \mathcal {L}_{2n}}\right) =\underset{n\in \mathbb {N}}{F\left( \bigcup \mathcal {L}_{n}\right) }=A_{M} =\underset{n\in \mathbb {N}}{F\left( \bigcup \mathcal {L}_{n}\right) }\\= & {} \underset{n\in \mathbb {N}}{F\left( \bigcup \mathcal {L}_{2n+1}\right) } =\underset{n\in \mathbb {N}}{\bigcup F(\mathcal {L}_{2n+1}}) \end{aligned}$$

But \({\bigcup F(\mathcal {L}_{2n+1}})_{n\in \mathbb {N}},{\bigcup F(\mathcal {L}_{2n}})_{n\in \mathbb {N}}\) form implication lattices that belong to \(C_{1},C_{2}\), respectively. So \(M\in C_{1}\cap C_{2}\), and F forms a Tarski–Lindenbaum lattice for both logics. Thus, M is a model for \(L'\) such that \(M\nvDash \alpha \). \(\square \)

Theorem 2

(collapse): Let \(L_{1},L_{2}\) be two rival logics, and L’ the unifying system. Assume without loss of generality that for some \(\alpha ,\beta \in \mathcal {L}\): \(\alpha \vdash _{L_{1}}\beta ,\alpha \nvdash _{L_{2}}\beta \). The representational roles of the implications collapse: \(\vdash \tau _{1}(\alpha )\rightarrow _{1}\tau _{1}(\beta )\) entails \(\vdash \tau _{2}(\alpha )\rightarrow _{2}\tau _{2}(\beta )\).

Proof

We first assume that \(\alpha ,\beta \) do not involve implications, so that: \(\tau _{i}(\alpha )=\alpha ,\tau _{i}(\beta )=\beta \), and show that \(\alpha \vdash _{L_{1}}\beta \) entails \(\vdash \alpha \rightarrow _{2}\beta \) (this by itself shows that the representational roles of the implications collapse). Assume then that \(\alpha \vdash _{L_{1}}\beta \) where \(\alpha ,\beta \) do not involve implications. Therefore, \(\vdash \alpha \rightarrow _{1}\beta \) as \(L'\) represents \(L_{1}\) (this direction is straight forward, as stated in Sect. 5). Hence, for all \(M=\langle A_{M}, \le ,Tr \rangle \) such that \(M\in C_{1}\cap C_{2}\) and semantic functor: \(F:\mathcal {L}':\rightarrow A_{M}\): \(F(\alpha \rightarrow _{1}\beta )\in Tr\). By definition, for all these models: \(F(\alpha )\le F(\beta )\). But then: \(F(\alpha \rightarrow _{2}\beta )\in Tr\). That is, for all \(M\in C_{1}\cap C_{2}\) and \(F:\mathcal {L}'\rightarrow A_{M}\): \(M\models \alpha \rightarrow _{2}\beta \). By the completeness of \(L'\) we get: \(\vdash \alpha \rightarrow _{2}\beta \) even though \(\alpha \nvdash _{L_{2}}\beta \). The proof for \(\alpha ,\beta \) that do involve implications is done by induction on the number of implications in \(\alpha \) and \(\beta \). Since I’ve already shown that the representational roles collapse, it is left to the reader. \(\square \)

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Golan, R. Is there a neutral metalanguage?. Synthese 198 (Suppl 20), 4831–4858 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02078-5

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