Abstract
On the grounds that there are no mereological composites, mereological nihilists deny that ordinary objects (such as tables and chairs) exist. Even if nihilism is true, however, I argue that tables and chairs exist anyway: for I deny that ordinary objects are (identical to) the mereological sums the nihilist rejects. Instead, I argue, ordinary objects have a different nature; they are arrangements, not composites. My argument runs as follows. First, I defend realism about ordinary objects by showing that there is something that plays the role of ordinary objects in perception and discourse, and that ordinary objects are (identical to) whatever plays this role. Next, I argue that it is arrangements that play this role. It follows that ordinary objects exist- even if mereological nihilism is true.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Many of these traditional views have modern variants. For a modern version of the bundle theory, see Paul (2006). For a modern take on Aristotelian hylemorphism, see Fine (2003, 2008) and Koslicki (2008). Others advocate newer conceptions. For objects as spacetime nodes, see Schaffer (2009). For discussion of objects as structural relations, see Chakravartty (2003). For objects as conventional constructions, see Sidelle (2010, inter alia). In brief, many candidates for the nature of objects exist, and each requires argument. That being said, I will neither defend nor criticize these particular theories (space forbids a thorough examination); rather, I mention them to establish precedent and a position in conceptual space.
Just as Quine (1948) slid between the name ‘Pegasus’ and the predicate ‘pegasizes’, the analogous move can be made here, mutatis mutandis.
I assume—uncontroversially, I hope—that an instance of e.g., roundness is numerically distinct from the object which is round. Thus, more generally, an instance of a property being spatiotemporally located is distinct from the property-possessor being spatiotemporally located.
Regarding the persistence conditions of arrangements in general, I do not here offer any general theory. For the most part, though, the sortal-governance of persistence conditions can be employed; the sorts of changes a tablewise arrangement can undergo are the very same changes a table might undergo, for example.
Potential energy and gravitational force are perhaps more familiar examples of something’s causal powers depending on its (spatial) relations to other entities.
Cf. Elder (2007), who runs a similar (though more complex) argument against nihilism based on the implausibility of referring to entities—atoms—too small to be perceived.
Put another way: because mereology is supposed to be ontologically neutral—i.e., it is not supposed to matter whether something is composed out of e.g., properties or objects or abstracta—then whether we are talking of composite arrangements or more standard understood composites should not matter here.
It should be noted that Merricks argues for the existence of people on the grounds that they are not causally redundant.
This presentation largely follows Lewis (1993: 64).
For Lewis (1993), supervaluationism is a way to recover in conversational contexts the (super) truth of ‘there is at most one cloud here’. Metaphysically, though, this is no solution, as it remains true (just not supertrue) that there are many clouds.
Paul considers this a kind of bundle theory, but with the familiar mereological notion of fusion replacing the more traditional (and perhaps more obscure) notions of compresence or bundling.
Paul’s view need not be right to work here; instead, what is important is showing that the power of an extant view can be harnessed to do work for the objects-as-arrangements thesis.
References
Armstrong, D. (2004). Truth and truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
Bennett, K. (2004). Spatiotemporal coincidence and the grounding problem. Philosophical Studies, 118(3), 339–371.
Campbell, K. (1981). The metaphysic of abstract particulars. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6(1), 477–488.
Cameron, R. (2008). Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble. Philosophical Studies, 140(1), 1–18.
Cameron, R. (2010). How to have a radically minimal ontology. Philosophical Studies, 151, 249–264.
Chakravartty, A. (2003). The structuralist conception of objects. Philosophy of Science, 70, 867–878.
Dorr, C. (2005). What we disagree about when we disagree about ontology, In Kalderon, M. (ed.): Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford Press: 234–286.
Elder, C. (2007). On the phenomenon of ‘dogwise arrangement’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1), 132–155.
Fine, K. (2003). The non-identity of a material thing and its matter. Mind, 112, 195–234.
Fine, K. (2008). Coincidence and form. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Xxxii, 101–118.
Hirsch, E. (2002). Quantifier variance and realism. Philosophical Issues, 12, 51–73.
Kim, J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 1–26.
Kim, J. (1993). In Heil & Mele (Eds.), The non-reductivist’s troubles with mental causation. Oxford: Clarendon.
Koslicki, K. (2008). The structure of objects. Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1993). In Bacon (Ed.), Many, but almost one, in ontology, causality and mind: Essays in honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McGrath, M. (2008). Conciliatory metaontology and the vindication of common sense. Noûs, 42(3), 482–508.
Merricks, T. (2001). Objects and persons. Oxford Press.
Paul, L. A. (2006). Coincidence as overlap. Noûs, 40(4), 623–659.
Paul, L. A. (2010). The puzzles of material constitution. Philosophy Compass, 5, 579–590.
Quine, W. V. O. (1948). On what there is. Review of Metaphysics, 2(5), 21–36. Reprinted in (1980): From A Logical Point of View, 1–19. Harvard University Press, 2nd edition.
Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Ontology and ideology. Philosophical Studies, 2, 11–15.
Rosen, G. and Dorr, C. (2002). Composition as a fiction. In Gale, R. (ed.): The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Blackwell Press: 151–174.
Schaffer, J. (2009). Spacetime the one substance. Philosophical Studies, 145, 131–148.
Sidelle, A. (2010). Modality and objects. Philosophical Quarterly, 60(238), 109–125.
Unger, P. (1980). The problem of the many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 411–467.
Van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material beings. Cornell University Press.
Wasserman, R. (2012). Material constitution. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/material-constitution/>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Cathy Sutton, Matt McGrath, Dan Korman, Tommy Kivatinos, Ben Abelson, and an audience at NYU’s Metaphysics Bootcamp for helpful discussion.
Ethical Statement
This manuscript complies with the ethical responsibilities outlined in the ‘Instructions for Authors’ portion of your website. In particular, this manuscript has not been submitted to more than one journal for simultaneous consideration, it has not been previously published in whole or in part, and it contains no plagiarism or unacknowledged sources. In addition, this work is free from any conflicts of interest (or appearances thereof).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Goldwater, J.P.B. “No Composition, No Problem: Ordinary Objects as Arrangements”. Philosophia 43, 367–379 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9593-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9593-7