Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-t5pn6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T09:23:17.523Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: COMPARING JUDGEMENTS IN TROLLEY PROBLEMS INVOLVING ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL HARMS, INJURY AND DEATH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2013

Natalie Gold ,
Briony D. Pulford  and
Andrew M. Colman
Natalie Gold
Affiliation:
Kings College, London, UKnatalie.gold@rocketmail.com
Briony D. Pulford
Affiliation:
University of Leicester, UK
Andrew M. Colman
Affiliation:
University of Leicester, UK
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 29 , Issue 2: Experiments in economics and philosophy , July 2013 , pp. 213 - 233
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Andreoni, J., Brown, P. M. and Vesterlund, L.. 2002. What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 40: 1–24.Google Scholar
Andreoni, J. and Miller, J.. 2002. Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica 70: 737–753.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K.. 1995. Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10: 122–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, G. and Ockenfels, A.. 2000. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 90: 166–193.Google Scholar
Cushman, F., Young, L. and Hauser, M.. 2006. The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science 17: 1082–1089.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K.. 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–868.Google Scholar
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K.. 2006. The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism: experimental evidence. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier.Google Scholar
Foot, P. 1967. The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review 5: 5–15.Google Scholar
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D.. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science 293 (5537): 2105–2108.Google Scholar
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D.. 2004. The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron 44: 389–400.Google Scholar
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. W. and Cohen, J. D.. 2008. Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition 107: 1144–1154.Google Scholar
Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E. and Cohen, J. D.. 2009. Pushing moral buttons: the interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111: 364–371.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.. 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47: 263–292.Google Scholar
Kamm, F. M. 1985. Equal treatment and equal chances. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 177–194.Google Scholar
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M. and Damasio, A.. 2007. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements. Nature 446: 908–911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mikhail, J. 2007. Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11: 143–152.Google Scholar
Mikhail, J. 2011. Elements of Moral Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Moore, A. B., Clark, B. A. and Kane, M. J.. 2008. Who shalt not kill? Individual differences in working memory capacity, executive control, and moral judgment. Psychological Science 19: 549–557.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, S. and Mallon, R.. 2006. Moral dilemmas and moral rules. Cognition 100: 530–542.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
O'Hara, R., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. and Sinnott-Armstrong, N. A.. 2010. Wording effects in moral judgments. Judgment and Decision Making 5: 547–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Petrinovich, L., O'Neill, P. and Jorgensen, M. J.. 1993. An empirical study of moral intuitions: toward an evolutionary ethics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64: 467–478.Google Scholar
Rai, T. and Fiske, A.. 2011. Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. Psychological Review 118: 57–75.Google Scholar
Quinn, W. S. 1989 a. Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of doing and allowing. The Philosophical Review 98: 287–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quinn, W. S. 1989 b. Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of double effect. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334–351.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Mallon, R., McCoy, T. and Hull, J. G.. 2008. Intention, temporal order, and moral judgments. Mind and Language 23: 90–106.Google Scholar
Thomson, J. J. 1985. The trolley problem. Yale Law Journal 94: 1395–1415.Google Scholar
Unger, P. 1996. Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusions of Innocence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Utikal, V. and Fischbacher, U. 2009. On the attribution of externalities. TWI Research Paper Series 46, Thurgau Institute of Economics.Google Scholar
Waldmann, M. R. and Dieterich, J. H.. 2007. Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb. Psychological Science 18: 247–253.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Gold et al. supplementary material

Supplementary material

Download Gold et al. supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 96.3 KB