Abstract
Matthew Liao’s edited collection Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality covers a wide range of issues in moral psychology. The collection should be of interest to philosophers, psychologist, and neuroscientists alike, particularly those interested in the relation between these disciplines. I give an overview of the content and major themes of the volume and draw some important lessons about the connection between moral neuroscience and normative ethics. In particular, I argue that moving beyond some of the dichotomies implicit in some of the debates advanced in the book makes the neuroscience of moral judgment much more useful in advancing normative ethics.
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For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Claudia Passos-Ferreira and Zoe Drayson.
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Gonzalez-Cabrera, I. Moving beyond dichotomies: Liao, S. Matthew (ed.), Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality, Oxford University Press, 2016. Biol Philos 32, 1035–1046 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9590-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9590-2