Abstract
Many philosophers and scientists rightly take hallucinations to be phenomena that challenge in a most pressing way our theories of perception and cognition, and epistemology in general. However, very few challenge the received views on the hallucinatory experience and even fewer critically delve into the subject with both breadth and depth. There are all kinds of problems concerning hallucinations—including conceptual, methodological, and empirical issues—that call for a multilevel analysis and an interdisciplinary approach which in turn provide the detail and scope that the subject demands. In this paper, I present and briefly discuss four interrelated problems: (1) definitions, (2) dependence on perception, (3) two views on hallucinations, and (4) methodology. Neglect or underestimation of these problems, among other things, continue to prevent a proper understanding of the concept and the corresponding experience, giving rise to misconceptions and even plain myths on the subject. Hallucinations do occur; but in order to productively investigate them (for whatever end), we first need to get clear on the concept and develop a suitable epistemological framework for their analysis.
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Notes
In literature, think of W. Shakespeare’s Macbeth (Act II, Scene I) or L. Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1960). In ordinary (French) language we have, for instance, the popular expression ‘J’hallucine’ to convey disbelief, surprise, outrage or shock.
For the newcomer, these arguments are generally wielded to argue for some type of indirect theory of perception or to advance some form of philosophical skepticism.
Cf. Luis Eduardo Prado de Oliveira: Freud y Schreber http://www.pradodeoliveira.com/sp/Sfys.html, and Schreber’s autobiography (1975).
Lanteri-Laura (1994: 24).
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition.
American Pyschological Association, cited in Assad & Shapiro (1986: 1088).
Gregory (1987).
What prevents me from saying that the standard view is plainly useless is the fictional or fantastic sense of the concept (See section “Two different senses/views on hallucinations”).
This should be understood in the sense Dretske speaks of when distinguishing simple seeing from epistemic seeing (2000).
For the sake of clarity, this ‘on-line’ connection can be understood in terms of Dretske’s informational link that causally connects the perceiving organism to the physical world (1983).
In (González 2010), I distinguish three fundamental and inter-dependent levels of perception: the functional, the experiential and the symbolic. Of these, the functional level is ultimately the one responsible for the organism’s survival.
In which case, we would no longer be able to justify perceptual beliefs by appealing to the corresponding (perceptual) experience. For instance, we would not be justified in sincerely saying “there is a cup on the table” by appealing to our visual experience of a cup on the table.
In order to keep the discussion well focused, I will ignore in this section the conceptual links that exist or can exist between cases of hallucination, illusion, delusion and apparition, and will concentrate mostly on the phenomenal aspect of hallucinations (as opposed to their conceptual or emotional aspects, for instance). Within this aspect, emphasis will again be given to the visual modality.
‘Essential’ in the metaphysical, constitutive sense, as when we say that pains are, by definition, conscious (or experiential).
Psychologism was a popular doctrine in the nineteenth century that, in a nutshell, advocated that self-observation was the ultimate method for obtaining and evaluating knowledge, including that relating to mathematics and logic.
There are other approaches in philosophy that are more or less in tune with this line. Cf., for instance, Petitot et al’s naturalized phenomenology (1999). Alternative approaches should not be ruled out: e.g., Dennett’s heterophenomenology, (1991: IV) and, perhaps, the Churchlands’ neurophilosophy (see, for instance, 1992).
Unless proven otherwise (through data and a methodology yet to come).
By ‘hallucinogenic experience’, I understand an experience that results from the intake of a hallucinogen, whether hallucinations occur or not; by ‘hallucinatory experience’ I understand an experience that is characterized by the hallucinations it presents, whether they are caused by a hallucinogen or not. In some situations both locutions will be, of course, interchangeable.
I mean, as rich and reliable sources as they can get!
A term of Duit’s coinage roughly meaning: “that induces or enhances lucidity”.
Regarding these differences, see (González 2004).
There is empirical support for identifying dreaming with hallucinating: “In dreaming, we hallucinate without actually seeing because neuromodulators like norepinephrine are not available, a situation akin to mescaline psychosis” (Hobson 2001: 289).
This overlap or coexistence between perception and visions does not presuppose nor entail their phenomenal or conceptual identification, the visionary episodes being distinguishable form the perceptual ones (because of their being of different quality or etiology, for example, or because they belong to two different ontological categories: one visual, one eidetic, for example).
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Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Jesús Vega, Jérôme Dokic, Alexandre Lehmann, Manuel Villaescusa, Benny Shanon, José Luis Díaz, Sébastien Baud, Nancy Midol, Jean Petitot, Kevin O’Regan, Nelly Arenas, Centro Nagual, Conacyt (proyecto 090710/2009), the Graduate students of the Cognitive Science program at UAEM (Cuernavaca), and the reviewers, for their useful comments and support in the writing of this work.
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González, J.C. On pink elephants, floating daggers, and other philosophical myths. Phenom Cogn Sci 9, 193–211 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9164-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9164-0