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

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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Pygmalionism – even if it is lined with beautiful expectations and honest intentions – might also have its grotesque dimension. Let's take, for example, the Czech prince Colorado mentioned by Seth Benardete in his *Encounters and Reflections*, who boasted that for nine hundred years no one in his family gave birth to a non-male offspring, and who used to meet with beautiful boys whom he had encountered by chance on the street. He used to invest in their education, manners, garments; later on, he arranged their marriages. He never slept with any of them; he didn't look for their gratitude, fearing they might gain some advantage over him. He did all of this because of their outer beauty. This beauty all by itself inspired the prince Colorado to do what he did. Meeting the prince seemed to these young men – once they realized whom they had met and what for – the shortest and the most beautiful path to classical Greece, the same path that two centuries earlier had been taken by Johann Joachim Winckelmann and his young friends. Benardete recalls Goethe's testimony:

> Since the ancients, as we claim, were truly complete personalities in harmony with themselves and the world, they also had to experience the full scope of human relationships. They did not want to deny themselves the delight that results from the bond between people of similar temperament. Even in this respect there is a remarkable difference between ancient and modern times. The relationship to women, which in our time has become so tender and spiritual, scarcely rose above the level of physical need. The relationship of parent and child seems to have been somewhat more loving. But friendship among men was for them the only genuine relationship. (...). We react with astonishment when, with regard to two young men, we hear of passionate fulfillment of love's desire, the bliss of being inseparable, lifelong devotion, or the need to follow the other into death. (...) Winckelmann felt born for friendship of that kind. (...)
>
> Granted that a latter-day Greek in his intense need for friendship actually creates the objects of his affections, he would still gain only a one-sided, an emotional benefit from it and little from the external world, unless there emerged a different, yet related and similar need and a satisfactory object for this need. We are referring to the need for physical beauty and the incarnation of beauty itself. For the ultimate goal of evolving nature is the beautiful human being. (...) To be sure, nature only rarely succeeds in producing him because there are numerous obstacles to her plans, and even her omnipotence cannot linger long with perfection and lend permanence to the beauty

> she produces. We are justified in saying that a beautiful human being is beautiful only for one brief moment. At this point, art enters. (...). Those who saw the *Olympian Jupiter* were seized by such feelings, as we can gather from ancient descriptions, reports, and testimony. A god had become man in order to make man into a god. They saw supreme majesty and were inspired by supreme beauty.

Taking these young boys for a trip to classical Greece, the prince Colorado and Winckelmann both felt that, although old books and fragments of past greatness could share with these boys the beauty they contain, mere artifacts couldn't give them the warmth that only the closeness of another person can provide. And even though such presence always involves a risk – Winckelmann was murdered by his boyfriend, and history has forgotten the prince Colorado – it seems that just like bread, wine, and air, it is necessary for life.

Readers from outside Benardete's closest circle can only imagine who he really was as a human being. From his recollections we learn that good fortune granted him many friends. The books that he left behind – books that are, to a large extent, "esoteric," indeed often nigh illegible – are only a part of Benardete's didactic activity, of which we outsiders can have only a vague notion. "They are there for people who want to fly to strange places without buying a ticket and without being frisked by security guards" – as Harvey C. Mansfield, Benardete's friend, beautifully called them. To deepen one's knowledge of the man and gain a more profound insight into the manner in which he elaborated on some complex issues, it is worth taking a look at the transcripts of his lectures and seminars. One of them we publish in the present issue of *Kronos.* It is a great one! Begin reading with it!

Piotr Nowak
Deputy Editor in Chief

Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer

TRANSLATION OF *METAPHYSICS* Λ 6, 1071B6-20: THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF THE BEING OF MOVEMENT AS PURE TEMPORAL UNFOLDING (ENEPΓEIA)[1]

1071b6-7: ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν.

H: *»Die Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung ist so, daß Bewegungsein nicht selbst entstehen und vergehen kann. Bewegung war nämlich immer.« Bewegung ist ihrem Seinssinne nach so, daß sie immer war. (Eigentlicher Seinssinn von Bewegung: der der ersten kreisenden ständigen Bewegung des ersten Himmels.)*

> "The ontological character of movement is such that the Being of movement cannot itself emerge and pass away. Because movement always was." Movement, according to its ontological meaning, is such that it always was. (Proper ontological meaning of movement: that of the first circling constant movement of the first heaven.)

[1] Heidegger's translation (1922): GA 62, 102-4 (H); Gadamer's translation (1948): Aristoteles Metaphysik XII, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, 27 (G).

G: *Nun ist es aber unmöglich, daß die Bewegung entstünde, oder verginge (denn sie war immer) –*

> Now it is, however, impossible for movement to emerge or pass away (for it always was) –

1071b7-9: οὐδὲ χρόνον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου.

H: *»So ist es auch mit der Zeit; es gibt kein Vorher und Nachher, ohne daß die Zeit nicht schon war.«*

> "So, too, is this the case with time; there is no before and after without time not already having been."

G: *und ebenso die Zeit. Denn es ist nicht möglich, daß es das Frühere und Spätere gibt, wenn es keine Zeit gibt.*

> and likewise, time. For it is not possible for there to be an earlier and a later if there is no time.

1071b9-10: καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος.

H: *»Auch ist die Bewegung – ebenso wie die Zeit – sich in sich selbst nach ihrem Seinssinn zusammenhaltend. Demnach ist die Zeit entweder dasselbe wie Bewegung oder ein Wie in der Weise des Seins der Bewegung.«*

> "Also, movement – just like time – holds itself together in itself according to its ontological meaning. Therefore, time is either the same as movement or a how in the manner of Being of movement."

G: *Auch die Bewegung also ist so beständig anhaltend wie die Zeit. Denn diese ist entweder geradezu identisch mit ihr oder ein Etwas an der Bewegung.*

> Movement, too, is thus as constantly self-sustaining as time. For the latter is either downright identical with it or a something in the movement.

1071b10-11: κίνησις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ.

H: *»Sich in sich selbst – nach ihrem Seinssinn – zusammenhaltend ist nur die Bewegung als Fortgang von-zu, und zwar ein solcher Fortgang von-zu in der Weise des >Kreisens<.«*

> "Holding itself together in itself – according to its ontological meaning – movement is only as a progression from-to, and indeed, such a progression of from-to in the manner of a 'circling.'"

G: *Beständig anhaltende Bewegung kann es aber nur als Ortsbewegung geben und von dieser nur die Kreisbewegung.*

> There can be constantly self-sustaining movement, however, only as movement of place, and of this only circular movement.

1071b12-13: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις.

H: *»Aber Bewegung* ist *nicht, wenn es zwar ein Bewegendes und etwas Ausrichtendes gäbe, das aber nicht so wäre, daß es* ist *in der Weise des Bewegtheitseins.«*

> "But movement *is* not, if there were indeed something moving and something that directs,[2] which however, were not in such a way that it *is* in the manner of Being of movedness."

G: *Weiter aber: wenn ein Bewegen- oder Bewirken-Könnendes zwar existiert, aber nicht in Tätigkeit ist, dann braucht es keine Bewegung zu geben;*

> Further, however: if something that is able to move or bring about indeed exists but is not in activity, then there need be no movement;

1071b13-14: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν.

H: *»Denn was so ist, daß es bewegen, ausrichtend auf etwas zugehen* kann*, braucht ja nicht seinen Seinssinn in der Bewegtheit zu haben.«*

> "For that which is in such a way that it *can* move and go toward something in a directing manner need not, indeed, have its ontological meaning in movedness."

G: *denn es kann ja das, was nur die Möglichkeit dazu hat, auch nicht tätig sein.*

> for that which only has the possibility for it is indeed also able not to be active.

1071b14-15: οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη.

H: *»Es trägt aber auch nichts bei zur* Erhellung *des Notwendig-immer-seins von Bewegung, d. h. überhaupt des Seins von Bewegung, wenn wir die Weisen der Seinshaftigkeit als immer bestehend ansetzen – wie jene, die die >worauf< der bewegten Dinge als so etwas ansetzen.«*

> "Yet it also does not contribute anything to the *illumination* of the always-being-necessary of movement, i.e., in general of the Being of movement, if we posit the

[2] Translators' note: *Ausrichten* also has the sense of "adjusting," "bringing into line."

> ways of having Being as always persisting – as do those who posit the 'on the basis of which's of moved things as something like this."

G: *Es ist uns also nicht geholfen, selbst wenn wir ewiges Sein annehmen, wie die Vertreter der Annahme der Ideen*,

> It thus does not help us even if we assume eternal Being, as do the advocates of The assumption of the ideas,

1071b15-16: εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν.

H: *»Das hilft nichts, wenn in diesem Sein nicht selbst ist, an ihm selbst, so etwas wie das Kann,* Woraus*, Ausgang von Umschlagen zu sein.«*

> "It does not help if, in this Being, there is not itself, in itself, something like the can, the *from out of which*, the point of departure for the changeover."

G: *wenn nicht ein Ursprung des Wechselnkönnens darin ist.*

> if an origin for the ability to change is not located therein.

1071b16-17: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη.

H: *»Aber auch so etwas ist fürwahr nicht genügend [dem Sinn des Seins von Bewegung nicht entsprechendes Woher], noch leistet das eine andere, neben die besagten Worauf gesetzte Weise* solchen *Seins.«*

> "But neither, truly, is something like this sufficient [the wherefrom, not corresponding to the meaning of Being of movement], nor does a different manner of *such* Being, posited alongside the said 'on the basis of which's, achieve this."

G: *Dieses Sein der Ideen also ist nicht einmal ausreichend, noch auch irgend ein anderes Sein neben den Ideen*.

> This Being of the ideas is, therefore, not even sufficient, nor is any other Being alongside the ideas.

1071b17: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις.

H: *»Wenn das >woraus< nicht ist in der Weise der reinen Zeitigung, wird nie verständlich sein, was es heißt: Bewegung ist [*und zwar ewige reine Kreisbewegung*].«*

> "If the 'from out of which' is not in the manner of pure temporal unfolding,[3] it will never be possible to understand what this means: movement is [*and indeed eternal pure circular movement*]."

H: *[Andere, eingeklammerte Übersetzung:] »Wenn der Seinssinn nicht als solcher angesetzt wird, daß er sich explizieren läßt als z[u] v[erstehen] von der Zeitigung, wird es nie verständlich sein, was es heißt: es ist Bewegung.«*

> [Different translation in brackets:] "If the ontological meaning is not posited as such – that it can be explicated as to be understood from temporal unfolding – it will never be possible to understand what 'there is movement' means."

G: *Denn wenn es nicht tätig sein wird, wird es auch nicht Bewegung geben.*

> For, if it will not be active, there will also be no movement.

1071b17-18: ἔτι οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις:

H: *»Weiter. – Aber auch wenn das Woraus so wäre, die reine Zeitigung machte aber nicht gerade den Seinssinn der ἀρχή selbst aus, bliebe alles unverständlich.« Es* wäre *nicht – gegenständlich gesprochen -, das Seiende ist nur gehabt und da nach seinem Aussehen (Was es ist), sofern es in seiner echten >sachlich< genügenden Warumbeziehung steht.*

> "Further. – But even if the from-out-of-which were in this way but pure temporal unfolding did not constitute precisely the ontological meaning of the ἀρχή itself, everything would remain unintelligible." It *would* not *be* – spoken objectively –; that which *is* is only had and is there according to its look (What it is), insofar as it stands in its genuine, "factually" sufficient why-relation.

G: *Ferner: Auch dann nicht, wenn es zwar tätig sein wird, aber sein eigenes Sein Vermögen ist;*

> Further: Not even when it will indeed be active but its own Being is capacity;

1071b18-19: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι.

H: *»Auch so wäre noch keine ewige, ständig seiende und ständig* gleich *seiende Bewegung. Es kann das, was nur ist, so, daß es etwas ausrichten* kann*, in diesem Kann-sein auch* nicht *sein.«*

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[3] Translators' note: The verb *zeitigen* also has the sense of "ripening" and "bringing about." Earlier in the lecture course (GA 62: 42), Heidegger uses the German *Vollzug* ("carrying out," "enactment") as a synonym.

> "Even in this way there would still be no eternal, constantly existing and constantly *equally* existing movement. That which only is in such a way that it *can* direct something is also able, in this can-be, *not* to be."

G: *denn auch dann wird es keine ewige Bewegung geben können. Was der Möglichkeit nach ist, kann ja auch nicht sein.*

> for then, too, there will not be able to be eternal movement. That which is according to possibility is, after all, able not to be.

1071b19-20: δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.

H: *»Also muß es mit dem Sein der ewigen Bewegung für diese einen solchen Ausgang geben, dessen Seinshaftigkeit, Sinn des Seins, reine Zeitigung ist, ἐνέργεια.«*

> "Thus, with the Being of eternal movement, there must, for the latter, be a point of departure whose ontological character, meaning of Being, is pure temporal unfolding, ἐνέργεια."

G: *Es muß also ein solcher Ursprung sein, dessen Wesen Tätigkeit ist.*

> Thus, there must be such an origin whose essence is activity.

Translated by Josh Hayes and Ian Alexander Moore

Seth Benardete

ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS* LAMBDA

Editor's note: This text is a transcript of Seth Benardete'a fall 1973 lecture course on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (lecture 15) given at the New School in New York. It was first transcribed by Ronna Burger from tape recordings (no longer available) and then by William Wood with the aid of Alex Priou from Ronna Burger's partially illegible typescript (Seth Benardete papers, ser. 2, Course Materials and Transcripts, box 14). There are other untranscribed recordings of Benardete's lectures on Aristotle preserved at the New School archives, in particular, the 1984 lectures on *Metaphysics* and the 1993 lectures on *De Anima*, but none of them addresses Book Lambda of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

SB: Now, as you know, Lambda is preceded by a summary of, on the one hand, the problem of Zeta plus the *Physics*. So, in a rather happy way there is a separation between the consideration of natural beings and the consideration of poetic beings. So that [...] was very clever. Now, Lambda [...] parts. Chapters 1-5 deal with natural beings and chapters 6-10 deal with theology [...]. Now, the difference between the treatment of natural beings in these chapters as opposed to the preceding chapters is that he is here concerned with the relation among the various natural beings and that is what we would call [...]. And that leads necessarily to a consideration of that which [...] together [...]. Alright, now look at the way he begins. Would you read the beginning? Do we have our reader here?

Reader: [1069a18] "The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances."[1]

SB: Now, you notice, you see, that's interesting, that's where the change is because that had always been in the background because up to this point the ultimate principle of οὐσία was οὐσία. That οὐσία has its own principle, namely itself. And now he's asking, what are the principles of those principles. OK. Go on.

Reader: [1069a18] "For if the universe is of the nature of a whole [...]"

[1] The student is reading from the W. D. Ross translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. This translation is used throughout the text, except in one place where the student reads from the Richard Hope translation (see note 2). Benardete sometimes corrects the translation or translates freely from the Greek.

SB: Yeah, he makes a distinction between the universe as τὸ πᾶν as opposed to the whole. And so the universe is not quite correct because universe already suggests unity. It's the sum, the sum.

Reader: [1069a18] "For if the sum is of the nature of a whole [...]"

SB: No, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. "If the sum is as a certain kind of whole." I'll explain why that is important.

Reader: [1069a20] "[...] substance is its first part [...]."

SB: Don't use "substance."

Reader: οὐσία?

SB: Yeah, either say "οὐσία" or say "*being*."

Reader: [1069a20] "And if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also οὐσία is first and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity."

SB: OK. Now this in fact represents two extreme divisions rather than the positions which he himself says he won't incline to accept either one. He wants to say that no matter if you take it either as a series or as a kind of whole, then for the primary parts it's οὐσία. Now, it's clear that the first case, the extreme case would be, naturally, Parmenides. In the second case, that is, if it is serial, the series must be constituted by an οὐσία.

Now, [...] he says that it doesn't really mean what it seems to mean. What he says it really means not taking it in the literal sense is this, that the first assertion implies that the genus being is and the second, that there is no whole whatsoever in terms of being, that is, everything is unique. Now, we can immediately guess that Aristotle is going to say that the truth lies in the in-between, that it is both the whole and the series and each kind of being is a principle for the ontic spread of its own kind and that there are οὐσίαι which act as principles for these kinds of beings. If that is the case, as it seems to be the case, you can immediately see why it is not possible to assert that the sum is a whole in the strict sense because the beings that are acting as principles for the natural beings do not need the natural beings in order to be beings. It is an accident, even if you said it was a per se accident, it is still an accident of those higher beings that they be principles for natural beings. That would mean that there's necessarily a split between the sublunar sphere and the superlunar sphere, to put it in cosmological terms. And the reason for that, I think I mentioned before, is that, the lower you go on the scale of being, the less you need the higher beings and the highest beings do not need the lower beings. So, it's as though you had two pyramids that didn't quite fit with one another because they are going in two completely different directions. So, you have here in small Aristotle's remarks about Plato observing that the movement away from the principles are two different paths leading to this impossible little break, this little lacuna, which is precisely where the sublunar

sphere begins. That means that he will never be able to prove in a strict sense that the visible whole is eternal. That is by introducing beings which are not visible and will only act in a secondary capacity as principles for the visible whole he will not be able to prove what he wants to.

Now, read on what he says.

Reader: [1069a22] "At the same time, these latter are not even being in the full sense but are qualities and movements of it – or else even not – white and the not straight would be being; at least we say even these *are*, e.g., 'there is a not white.' Further, none of the categories other than substance can exist apart."

SB: OK. Now, look. So, the logical mark of an οὐσία, it seems to be the implication, seems to be the lack in implication about being if it is negated. This is a rather superficial view, but [in] other words, not at all [non-dog] does not imply anything, whereas non-white implies something within the category of color. If you look down, you see that it is not strictly true but look at 1069b5.

Reader: [1069b5] "[...] but the voice is not-white [...]."

SB: "But the voice, too, is not-white...", you have to put in "too," that is, not-white usually implies another color, it is possible to say about anything, any category, any class, that it isn't something else. And it is true that ordinarily speaking that you say that something is not a dog you usually think it means that it is an animal. One could make this distinction, though it's not really going to hold, that in the case of οὐσία, the negation of it does not stay within the kind. So, not-dog could mean plant. Whereas not-white does not mean six feet. But whether that is just because of the way we think or whether that is really necessary [...]. Now, the strict thing of course is, the strict way to make the distinction really hold, for Aristotle, is to say that there is no contrary for οὐσία but there is a contrary for everything else. Alright, make this observation. This remark explains why, as long as number is explained as being a number of things, nothing itself could then be a number. That is, if nothing is always or primarily contextual, we can ask, what is the sum of all contextual nothings is either one or it is two. As two, it is the context of all contexts, plus everything which is not identified, comes to two. Or it is simply one. Hence, you see, that is why zero cannot be a number for Aristotle. That is, when you immediately try to decontextualize zero, you will get a number.

Student: What about one?

SB: You take the contexts of all contexts, and that turns out to be one context because you take them one at a time. The not-white and then you go on but you don't get zero. Oh, yes, only if you could get zero would it in fact be a number.

Now, there is a further problem which we touched on before which immediately comes up in this remark that none of the others are separate which is absolutely crucial to this question of cosmology, and that's this: Are plants and trees, which seem to qualify

very strongly as being οὐσία in Aristotle's sense, are they separate? That is, it is true that a tree is not known by its roots or by the soil in which it stands, any more than any of the animals [...] is known by its environment. But the question could arise in what way do the conditions of the existence of plants and animals differ from the conditions of the existence of the qualities and quantities. That is, they look exactly the same. That is, no soil, no tree, no οὐσία, no white. So, Aristotle's certainly aware of that, as indicated by this remark in the *Physics* at 194b13, where he says that the sun and man generates man, which is what supposedly guarantees that it is οὐσία. Now, naturally speaking, the termination of a natural motion is taken as a rough criterion for the existence of an οὐσία. But in the case of natural οὐσία, termination [...] of its motion is in another, and that's why you get succeeding generations. And this immediately suggests that because he admits that the separation of ideas of the natural beings, but he is forced to allow for an ultimate separation, on a higher level, and whether that in fact gets out of the difficulty we shall have to see.

Now, the destruction, the [confusing] thing about an οὐσία in Aristotle's understanding is that it takes very little to destroy it, in the strict sense. And it is often destroyed prior to the destruction of everything else that belongs to the οὐσία. Right? So everything remains the same except for this one thing, namely, its being-at-work. Take the example of the racing car that turns over without any damage, or just turn it over and let it run with a man sitting inside so that he is in fact in third gear or whatever. That in fact is not an οὐσία. Everything else is exactly the same, nothing has changed. So the notion of destruction is very peculiar, you see.

Student: Doesn't that interfere with the potentiality of it? Don't you want to say that it is not actually an οὐσία?

SB: Yeah, that's it. It is not actually an οὐσία; it's potentially an οὐσία.

Student: Οὐσία includes the range of potentiality and actuality, right?

SB: Well, that's the problem. You'll see in a minute when we come to the question of whether you can have οὐσία which is only ἐνέργεια. Right? Which is what he wants to maintain because in fact he has always said that οὐσία is both, and he wants to distinguish why a mathematical theorem is not an οὐσία, because when it was not thought it entirely disappeared and has no potentiality at all. The potentiality was much less the potentiality of this racing car, which is closer to an οὐσία for that reason. It's a very tricky thing if he wanted to say why and what is the difference there. OK. Now, what this means is this. The possibility of instantaneous destruction of οὐσία, in the strict sense, of the natural οὐσία, means that the categorical predicates that constitute the ontic spread belong and do not belong to the focal ἕν, namely, the οὐσία, the focal ἕν is and is not the principle of the categorical predicates. Now, you can therefore raise this question: To what extent are the ultimate constituents of things only intelligible in light of their compounds? In other words, if you take this modern example, does one understand hydrogen if one does not understand water, and does one understand an electron or proton if one does not understand hydrogen? Now, the parallel to mathematics is: Does one understand a number if one does

not understand that it necessarily has a successor? Is that part of knowing what it is, the fact that it is true about it, or is it in fact completely independent of it?

Student: Is there a difference between asking that question and asking whether one knows what a thing is without knowing its effects?

SB: Well, it's parallel to that, it's parallel to that, that would be a modern way of putting it. You see, if you put it that way, you're inclined to say yes, of course, and that means, of course, that nothing can really be known because you would have to know [in infinite time], and he obviously does not want to say that, and the only way to get out of it is to make a distinction between per se accidents and accidents.

Student: Which he does?

SB: Well, you remember that he asks that question, remember that was one of the problems of Zeta, that is precisely this question, was first philosophy something that examines the per se accidents of the beings, or was there another, that is to say, second philosophy or physics, that does that. You see we have a puzzle: the physicist said the ultimate constituents of the universe are 103 known particles, and you don't have to know that there is such a thing as hydrocarbons. Chemistry is an examination of second-order phenomena and in no way belongs to the true science. That's puzzling: you say you mean to say that if in fact it never happens, that none of these things are ever compounded, is that true? Would they think that, given a long enough time, they will compound in a certain way on the basis of some kind of cosmology and therefore that seems to belong to it that that is part of the sciences, but you have to stop somewhere because you don't want to say that you have to know what a house is in order to understand earth, say. Earth is a first element.

Student: Well, that might not be natural. The combination that creates a house.

SB: Where the difficulty comes in is this, think of synthetic compounds like nylon. You begin with natural elements, and you put them together in a way that does not exist in nature. Right? Is the fact that nylon is possible part of the knowledge of this kind of thing? Or not? The question would be this: Do you have to know that this is possible without knowing in fact what is possible? Maybe you would have to make that distinction.

Student: Would you have to know the periodic table? To know how many elements you would have and what their relation is?

SB: Well, they would say yes, but then you would [...] but would they say that the elements that are created artificially you would have to know?

Student: Oh, well, that's something else.

SB: No, that would be the parallel line.

Student: That's συμβεβηκός.

SB: I don't know whether they would say that.

Student: That could be or couldn't be, whereas the basic elements in the periodic table would have to be ...

SB: Do they have to be?

Student: ... Relative to what man might synthesize.

SB: No, they don't have to be, though. Not for all time, they don't have to be.

Student: I mean, as far as we know, the science is based on it.

SB: No, but look, the point is that as far as the physics goes there is no necessity that they have a periodic table at all.

Student: Physics pure and simple ...

SB: Well, you start from the fact that [...] has neutrons in some sort of primordial mix.

Student: Although they probably would never discover it.

SB: Well, yeah, right. In other words, the question is whether the order of discovery is the order of being. You'll grant that none of this would be known unless it was men who were there who were constituted by chemicals in a certain way to examine these primordial elements out of which they came, but I think that a physicist would draw the line and say well, it's not necessary to know what man is to know what a neutron is.

Student: But if you carry it that high on the evolutionary scale ...

SB: Well, you see that it gets into a bind at this point because you introduce Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle. Then, of course, it is absolutely necessary to know man in order to know anything.

Student: Because the focal point is in the observer.

SB: Well, yeah, because you introduce the fact that the character of the physics is determined by the conjunction of the observed and the observer. So that is really a puzzle. But it is a good illustration of why physics can never be first science, from Aristotle's point of view, and why it is necessary to go back to first philosophy, for exactly this reason. Aristotle would agree that it is in a way an unreasonable demand to make of the physicist that he know what man is. But on the other hand, it means it is a partial science for that

reason. What makes it interesting is that if you say that the whole world, the fact that man is there in the first place, is a complete accident because all the elements are complete accidents so that only things which you are guaranteed are always, there are these things into which everything will collapse finally. It's a puzzle, about where one should stop in the examination of it.

Student: I was wondering if this question doesn't in some way stem from a kind of ambiguity in the concept of compounds and compounding. It seems there are basically two kinds of compounds: the sort of compound in which the compound is really a sort of summation of ingredients, a sum total of them; and the sort of compound where the result of compounding, a summation, is by some kind of synergetic process other than mere summation of them. The first kind of process is to some degree reversible, you can extract from the compound the constituents that you put into it. The second kind of compound is generally characterized as irreversible, or reversible only with great difficulty, and obscurely reversible even at that.

SB: But it's still reversible, though.

Student: Yeah, but it is difficult to say from the result of the compound if you haven't seen what has gone into it, what the actual ingredients are. In the first case, the mechanical compounding, you can by examination pretty well determine what went into it. You can reconstruct the history of the compound. In the second case, it is very very difficult to do so.

SB: But take the case of water, though. Now, water is known by the fact that it is H_2O. Now, it is very different from hydrogen and oxygen.

Student: Right, and it is easily reversible.

SB: Well, it's not so easy. I mean, it took a long time to do it ...

Student: Yeah, it took until the nineteenth century ...

SB: Well, so, the fact that its easiness is relative to the sophistication of your science ...

[tape turned]

Student: ... the artificial elements and some of the natural elements for that matter do irreversibly transform themselves, undergo a metamorphosis through radioactive decay. I don't know, I don't really know. Can that be reversed? Synthetically?

SB: Yeah, sure. You have to bombard it.

Student: This would not happen naturally.

SB: Well, that's the cosmological issue. Because if you say that it does not happen naturally, then you have an irreversible cosmological process that is unintelligible at both ends. But no one is willing to say, because there's a problem with time. A problem with time and infinity; it looms there. You know what I mean?

Student: Yeah.

SB: OK. Now, look at this interesting remark right after this at 1069a25.

Reader: (1069a26) "...for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. The thinkers of the present day tend to rank universals as substance (for genera are universals, and these they tend to describe as principles and substances, owing to the abstract nature of their inquiry)."

SB: Yeah, because they examine λογικός. So, he makes a distinction between in speech and in deed. Now, again, we can guess that Aristotle wishes to steer a course between the "in deed" of the ancients and the "in speech" of the moderns, and the link between the two is motion. That is specifically indicated in 1072a22, chapter 7.

Reader: [1072a20] "Since (1) this is a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it were not true, the world would have proceeded out of night and 'all things together' and out of non-being, these difficulties may be taken as solved. There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact."

SB: Not only in speech, but also in deed. Right? So motion is the link, how you steer a middle course between [speech and deed] and the reason for that is that, on the one hand, because it is *the* mark of all perceptible beings and, two, because it needs an unmoved mover, which necessarily can only be something which is only worked out in speech and also in terms of genera. OK. He now puts the issue very strongly. There are three pairs of opposites with which we have to deal. The first pair is motion, nonmotion. The second pair is perceptible and imperceptible. The third pair is corruptible and eternal. And what happens is that there are five possible combinations of these three pairs, and Aristotle allows there to be only three οὐσίαι, three kinds of οὐσίαι on the basis of their combination. So let's do it. We begin this way: we separate eternal from corruptible [writes on board], and we put in this unmoving, imperceptible; moving and perceptible. Right? Now, if E + P = M (if it's eternal and perceptible, it's moving). If E + I, it's unmoving. Now, EPU (eternal, perceptible, and unmoving) is out. And EIM (eternal, imperceptible, moving) is matter and is not οὐσία. Over here is C + P = M (corruptible, perceptible is moving), and then of course the question arises, there's one other possibility, namely, CMI (corruptible, moving, and imperceptible). Now, CMI would exist between EIM and CPM. Right? Now, CMI is in principle unknowable.

Student: Why?

SB: Well, it's interesting, very interesting, for understanding modern and ancient physics. The key importance of what is meant by πρὸς ἡμᾶς, that is, "things for us," clearly emerges from this consideration of the possibility of CMI because Aristotle is much less perturbed by the possibility of CMI than a modern physicist would be because of his λόγος discovery of EIM, that is, matter. And the reason for that, you see, is that perceptible for Aristotle, for us. Whereas the physicist replaces it with detectable. Now, when you replace perceptible with detectable, you can in fact be dealing with something like CMI because, namely, it shows up somehow, either as a track in a bubble chamber or some other way.

Student: And we don't want to call that perceptible?

SB: Well, Aristotle would say not. No, you see the whole point is that when you introduce this question of instruments which entirely change the character of what it means to be for us, you see. That is, from a physicist's point of view, this table is perceptible, or rather detectable, in the same way in which an electron is detectable because, [to] the eye of a bubble chamber, there's no difference really for them between the two. The perceptible world dissolves into these other things. Now, air is not seeable, but it is perceptible in its effects. So, one could say you have a dial reading and you have current going through a wire, so the voltmeter moves. And you say, well, that means that it is really perceptible in the same way. It's very curious, you see, that we take for granted that, that this adding on of the instrument to the eye just increases its capacity. It does not change in any way the character of the thing.

Student: Well, isn't that what Heisenberg was starting to deal with?

SB: Well, in fact, it turns out it does have an effect which led to very serious difficulties necessarily.

Student: But there is also good justification in not drawing the division between perceptible and detectable.

SB: Why?

Student: Well, why would you be able to say that the eye is not an instrument.

SB: Well, it is an instrument.

Student: Well, what would be the dividing line?

SB: Well, the question is this: it very much depends on an analysis of perception. Aristotle would say that one sees the house, say, as it is. Now, if you deny that, then no one would say that you see the electrons; you're only seeing a path that is an effect of a house. That is, an effect of the electron, not the electron itself. Right? But if you analyze this in such a way so that you deny that in fact we are seeing the house as it is, you're seeing the effect

of something. That's not taking an extreme Kantian view about it but sort of a middle view, which is what the physicist would take, [...] so you're seeing the effect of something which is there, which we call the house. But then you say that's pretty much like an electron. Eddy can have a very interesting footnote, by the way, in one of his crazy psychological books in which he waxes indignant because people thought that only when there was an optical observation of Pluto that it was discovered. That is historically true. But the calculations had been made beforehand. He says, well, look, the calculations of the effects of gravity absolutely indicated that there was something there which was of this kind. And that's it. [...] The interesting thing is that's what he was objecting to, that is, that this Aristotelian notion had persisted. It's very tenacious, it's very difficult to uproot, you see, because it seems to be so natural. Of course, it is only there when you actually see that it is. And it's very complicated because in fact one doesn't see its motion. That's also inference, so that the same thing would be true about any planet and therefore Aristotle [...]. It becomes very complicated. How do you know it is the same body? Between observations, it could pass out of existence and be replaced by something else unless you had continual observation, and even then you could not be sure. Now, let me go back a bit. The question that is really posed in Lambda is this. Although it is rather hidden. If the sum of the beings is not simply serial, what is the being of all beings? Now, no one would say, and certainly not Aristotle, that the order of the beings is a being. But there is nothing to preclude the possibility that the beings in order could be a being. Right? In other words, if the universe was made up, if the whole was made up of three beings B, A, C, and one could say that there is a being to BAC that is different from either B, A, or C, and so in fact that there may be four beings. Now, Aristotle allows for that possibility because he continually uses the formula when he is talking about what he means by οὐσία; he says, plants, animals, and their parts, their proper parts. So, why couldn't it be the case, in other words, that just as the hand is a being by itself, so man is in one sense a being by itself but in fact belongs to a whole which has another kind of being. Right? Now, if you take my example of BAC, if the order of pronunciation will correspond to the primacy of the three kinds of being which constitute it, that is, without B neither A nor C could be, but B could be without A or C. What you want to know is that, if it is not serial, that it is, it is not B = A + C, but in fact BAC [pronounced as a word, "bac"], then it must be something which is determined in some way by the initials. That somehow is Aristotle's notion, that is, that B corresponds to *nous*, and then A corresponds to the first mover, and C corresponds to the beings on the earth.

Student: And what about BAC [pronounced "bac"]?

SB: Well, the question is, what is bac? Bac is human, the cosmos. But what being does that have? Now Aristotle asks the question by implication, but he never answers it. He never says what that means. You see it's not identical, it's not identical at first, so that can go at the first and be without the others. But the others could not be without it, according to his analysis of the necessity of eternal motion being caused by an unmoved mover.

Student: If each thing has an aim or goal or τέλος that it only attains through οὐσία when it is fully actualized, when it is ἐνέργεια, then on the analogy of proper parts of a man's

body, his liver, his hands, one finger, whatever, then couldn't every object, no matter how significant in the universe, be considered a proper part of the universe as a whole? It would seem strange that each constituent would have a τέλος in some trivial, small way, and yet the whole assemblage, the sum total of the universe have no τέλος, that is, everything interacts with everything else for some purpose, and yet the assembly, the collection, the set, if you will, at first blush, has no τέλος, no goal at all, that would seem to be a rather defective design on the part of whoever made it all.

SB: Yeah.

Student: So it would seem that it is possible that the universe as a whole, it would seem not only possible, it would seem to be consistent, to view the universe as a whole, in toto, as a whole, as a being, and each part of it, from the motes of dust that [...] to anything else, the planet, the solar system, as a proper part.

SB: Well, the difficulty is this, that the only passage in all Aristotle which connects with proposals of universal teleology is in the *Politics* and therefore suspect as not being the ultimate view. And that is based, that total teleology is based on man being the primary. Even if it wasn't man, let's say there's some being in the universe for the sake of which everything else is ...

[defect]

Student: ... it seems very difficult to say that any being, any constituent member of the set, the entire set which is the universe, really fully achieves ἐνέργεια, achieves full actualization and reaches a goal, if it does it by reaching that goal somehow subserves some ultimate goal of the universe as a whole, because obviously when each thing, not all things reach their actuality at the same time, then it would seem that for the universe to reach a full actuality through full actualization or full ἐνέργεια, that everything would have to, by mutual interaction of the most subtle and complicated kind, [...] it would all have to achieve some kind of τέλος at some moment in time, otherwise the universe at any given moment is completely random, it'll never be anywhere with respect to its [...]

SB: That's right.

Student: It's just an arbitrary corruption, whatever you can conceive [...]

SB: No, it's not additive. [...] So, he must maintain that there is some possible middle ground which makes sense between the serial view, that it is completely random, and the holistic view, which was based on some kind of teleology. A teleological account of the universe does not solve the ontological problem of the being of the universe because then what you have is a series of parts which is contributing to another part, all of which parts are necessary, but since they are serving a part and not serving a whole, the whole itself does not cohere.

Student: Right. You can't ask why is the whole there. Well, you can ask it, but you won't get an answer. A very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

SB: Well, you see, the difficulty is this: the problem arises not only in the case of the universe. The same thing is true in the case of man, say. All his parts are supposed to serve one part – namely, mind, ultimately. What is the whole of all those parts? The answer is that it isn't a whole of all those parts. The answer is that it isn't a whole in the strict sense precisely because of this reason. There is a take off, as it were, from the τόδε τι into thinking itself, which has nothing to do with the individual.

Student: There is an answer that was given some of us when we were children, as I remember, the question of the catechism, why were you made. Why do your parts serve your mind, and why do you act as a total assembly?

SB: Yeah.

Student: To know God, to love Him, and to serve Him. It's influenced by Aristotle in some way.

SB: Yeah, surely. But then you can ask this question, which is of course the great theological mystery: What is the being of God in the universe? And the answer is in terms of divine love, which has to be put down as a mystery that you can never explain. The problem in the theological context, the difficulty about creation, is that there is this ultimate tension between will and reason, and in order to introduce creation you have to give primacy to will, and when you give primacy to will, you eliminate reason, and if you introduce reason as being primary, you get no will.

Student: Strictly speaking, I don't think it is possible to enter reason as primary in that sense because then the form any reasonable determination takes, that any determination of reason takes, whether it is reasonable or not, reasonable is in the broader sense, is purely arbitrary.

SB: Yeah.

Student: I mean, the thing that gives us one, the major aspect that provides us with our own intuitive sense of making sense to ourselves and to other people is that, before we open our mouths, no matter how wrong we may be or how irrelevant we may be, that we are obeying an impulse, a voluntary impulse, an act of will which is deeper than cognition, prior to cognition. I don't think you can start with reason; you have to start with will.

SB: Aristotle patently denies that. By the way, that's one of the big issues.

Student: He did deny that?

SB: Yeah, absolutely.

Student: You mean, you will to be reasonable in a reasonable way.

SB: Ultimately, yeah. That's peculiar, I think.

Student: The other way out of that problem, the easy way out, is to say that God is not separate from the universe, but the universe is God.

SB: Then he's not created. And then of course it turns out to be serial. I mean, once you introduce infinite attributes, you introduce serial.

Alright, now one other observation I want to make at 1069a29:

Reader: [1069a29] "[...] but the thinkers of old ranked particular things as substances, e.g. fire and earth, not what is common to both, body."

SB: Yeah, that's very important, by the way. The question I want to raise is this. He uses the word "particular things." I think we've had this expression before; the thing is taken severally. Now, this expression occurs both in the singular and in the plural. Now, as far as I know, this expression never occurs in the plural, and that would be a good question: What would be the difference between this and this? This is more comprehensive than this. Now the interesting thing is this, that when he says that they dealt with the things taken severally and he gives the example of fire, they certainly don't mean this fire and all fires together or all earth together. What kind of a thing is that?

Student: [...]

SB: Well, is all fire together a τόδε τι?

Student: No, because some of it always would be potential in relation to whatever fire was actual. So, you could never say that all fire was a τόδε τι.

Student: It's an element.

SB: Yeah, fire is one of the elements. Yeah.

Student: [...]

SB: Well, suppose there was a conservation of one particle. OK? Is that a τόδε τι? Is it? There's billions of them, but they never change in their number.

Is it a τόδε τι?

Student: [...]

SB: What? No, all of them. The ultimate constituent of the universe is *x* and this, being an ultimate constituent, everything dissolves into it, but it's only a compound and makes up everything else. [Say ... in water] That's what he means, that it doesn't change in quantity. Now, it gets separated from itself, clearly, this river and that river. It's very hard to see that you can talk about it as being a τόδε τι if you have two. Right?

Student: That's why Timaeus said it's just an adjective. [So, he described space as fiery.]

SB: Yeah, yeah. I guess that raises this problem. He says, by the way, in 1040b8-9, that fire and earth are heaps. So, you have to keep that in mind, so when he uses that expression "particulars," it means heaps, including τόδε τι, too, but not necessarily.

Student: What's "body" here?

SB: Well, σῶμα, σῶμα.

Student: But what about σῶμα, is that a heap, too?

SB: Well, you see the point is that σῶμα is ultimately going to be reduced to matter. That is because the mistake of the pre-Socratics was not to distinguish between matter and potentiality. That they are not co-extensive, so that not only is it important to understand the resolution of differences into one but also the differentiation out of one. That's how he argues now.

Student: The pre-Socratics thought they were doing that, right?

SB: Yeah, except you see that what he argues here is that, precisely because they did not see potentiality, they were not able to account for the differentiation. Because once everything had got together, it would never get out of being together. An Anaxagorean conglomerate would remain a conglomerate for ever and ever.

Student: But most of the systems tried to have some means of preventing that.

SB: Yeah, but they were always arbitrary, arbitrary additions to this basic stuff. And it always leads to contradictions. It's very simple. You say an Anaxagorean mind. Well, an Anaxagorean mind is always at work; things were never together. And if they were together, then mind was never at work and never could be at work. The problem which comes up and the thing which leads to this whole issue, the whole cosmological issue, is this. He says there are four kinds of change: generative change, qualitative change, alternative change, and locomotive change. And he wants to say that locomotion does not entail, of the three, anything that can exist by itself. And that it is primary. Now, two problems arise. Precisely because locomotion can be independent of generation, that means independent of nature kinds, there is need of a prime mover whose relation to the generated kinds is obscure. The obscurity comes from the fact that he makes an observation at 1070a21:

Reader: [1070a21] "The moving causes exist as things preceding the effects, but causes in the sense of definitions are simultaneous with their effects."

SB: Alright, that means, on the one hand, the εἰδή, the forms, the kinds, which are the οὐσίαι, and, on the other hand, efficient cause, which is prior, necessarily must be prior. Now, the question: Is there a necessary relation between the efficient cause and the eternal preservation of the kind? Because one can immediately imagine the following situation: To anticipate, suppose there was an un-moved mover, and you had a big batch of homogeneous stuff. Now, it was always acting as a cause on this stuff, and there would be something in it which began to move or was moving in accordance with it. This motion was rectilinear, that is, not circular, not closed; it was finite impulse because as a result of this motion the mix changed. So, as it died out, another thing in the universe took over from this constant cause of motion, and so on, and so on. So, there was always something moving, but it was never the same thing moving, so there would never be any real order, in Aristotle's sense, or there would be eternal motion. That possibility he cannot exclude, precisely because of the split between the two kinds of motion. Because the highest motion is simply this locomotion, which is act as the efficient cause for everything beneath it. But doesn't that act as the generative cause? It's not sufficient for the generative cause.

Student: There's no way to justify a necessary relationship so that the eternal motion you were describing would be at least a pattern?

SB: Yeah, right. It might turn out if you argued that, over a long period of time, there was a pattern. But, in any given point in time, you could not figure out what the pattern is.

Student: Well, that's ok.

SB: But he wants to say that that is not true. That's Plato's view, what I've presented.

Student: So that it is unknowable, the pattern?

SB: Yeah, the phenomenological pattern is unknowable for Plato, and therefore physics is impossible for that reason.

Student: But there is one?

SB: Yeah, I think he would argue that necessarily there must be one. I think there would be a contradiction if he said there wasn't one. But maybe not; maybe he is wrong about that. But you see that precisely in making the distinction between a kind of matter which receives one kind of motion and no other kind of motion, and other matters which receive all four kinds of motion, there is obviously a little break there which cannot fully be accounted for. The way he puts it is this – namely, that in order for there to be generation and corruption, it is necessary that you have an ecliptic – that is, that you need another motion in addition to the constant motions of the first universe so that in fact generation

is always necessarily eccentric to being. Otherwise, his problem, which he raised in Beta – namely, are the principles of corruptible and generated things the same as the principles of non-corruptible things. And the answer is no, precisely because of the ecliptic. But is the ecliptic caused by the first motion in the universe? No, clearly not. Right?

Student: No way.

SB: Well, how could it be? You see, it's an absolutely uniform motion.

Student: Well, how could he ever get the whole? How could there be a whole?

SB: You mean in his sense?

Student: Right. And there's no higher principle of those but motion?

SB: Yeah, well, you want the un-moved mover to comprehend both kinds, but that he will not allow.

Student: You've got to get something [λογικός].

SB: Right.

Student: And how does that square with the fact that locomotion is a species of change, for Aristotle that it would be under a broader genus. Even though as elementary motion it would be the simplest type.

Student: But that's just λογικός.

Student: And this is the only form of becoming that the planetary ...

SB: It's the only form of becoming in which there is no becoming.

Student: Yes, it's the only form of change they have, the planetary bodies. But motion is a species of change, of μεταβολή, so you would be contradicting yourself, flatly, there, if that's true.

SB: You mean, if change really meant something? He tried to get out of it by saying that locomotion is primary.

Student: Well, you couldn't have the species of a genus without having a genus, and the genus is change. And change embraces generation and destruction at the same level.

SB: Well, I think he has to introduce πρὸς ἕν here.

Student: But then there would be a question of contradiction.

SB: But he must say that locomotion is in relation to change, right? Or οὐσία is in relation to the categorical predicates. So the three other kinds of change are tagged onto this primary one the same way as quantity and quality are tagged onto οὐσία.

Student: But then all the difficulty of that is, as one can see from the *Physics*, that his analysis of motion is primarily an analysis of generation; that's in the third book. He then asserts that generation is not a motion. That's in the fifth book or somewhere, I don't remember where, but that comes as a tremendous shock because it turns out there are insuperable difficulties if you say that it is a motion. But then he says that it's a kind of change, but it is not a motion.

Student: Isn't one of the comparatively recent findings in physics that locomotion is a sufficient cause, at least of the decay of the converse to generation. That is, you take an object, apply uniform forces, rectilinear motion uniformly accelerated with no friction, eventually its mass disappears, if you push it long enough, and it turns into energy. I mean, it disappears, the way we think of decay. It's gone; it turns into something else. Isn't it possible that you could take energy and slow it down, perform the reverse procedure on it, so that it becomes mass. By the reverse procedure you have generation.

SB: But not kinds.

Student: No, just some kind of stuff.

SB: Yeah, right, it's true.

Student: The same kind of primordial stuff.

SB: Yeah, right. I'd like to take this of generation, by the way, that in terms of Newton's first law, that is, in terms of the principle of inertia, you notice that Aristotle has the principle of inertia for cosmological motion. That's very interesting historically, that what he actually denies for all terrestrial motions, that there could be a principle of inertia, that you could have a body in motion that does not alter, if it has locomotion, it necessarily will, something will happen to it, is asserted of planetary, of cosmological action, that it doesn't alter. That's very interesting, and so it's not accidental. And that's one of the curiosities of physics, that physics begins with an analysis of astronomical motion, which is then applied to terrestrial motion. That's very curious because it leads to certain fundamental tensions which have never been resolved up to the present time, as a consequence of that. I'm referring to action at a distance.

Student: But still, isn't the kind of goal that the terrestrial bodies are a part, wouldn't that be assimilable when the body of science is developed enough?

SB: Well, it would really have to be the other way around, because you would have to get rid of action at a distance.

Student: But you want to have the whole be the most comprehensive.

SB: This is *en passant*, so let's not discuss it much further. One of the difficulties is this: there is one element of energy in the universe which is not subject to the principle of entropy, and that's gravitation. Isn't that weird? That's rather queer, you see. If you want to say that there's such a thing as gravitational wave, how come you don't have a principle of entropy applied?

Student: We'd all get lighter and lighter as the world got older and older.

SB: Something like that would happen. OK. You notice in the split between simultaneous cause, which has to do with the εἰδή, and posterior and prior, which has to do with efficient causation, that they both fit in in terms of time, so that there is a tension between the secession of time and simultaneity that turns out to be a very important difficulty. Now, at 1070a31, he raises the question whether there are the same case causes of everything if one speaks sufficiently generally or by analogy.

Reader: [1070a31] "The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all. For one might raise the question whether the principles and elements are different or the same for substances and for relative terms, and similarly in the case of each of the categories. But it would be paradoxical if they were the same for all. For then from the same elements will proceed relative terms and substances. What then will this common element be? For (1) (a) there is nothing common to and distinct from substance and the other categories, viz. those which are predicated; but an element is prior to the things of which it is an element. But again (b) substance is not an element in relative terms, nor is any of these an element in substance. Further, (2) how can all things have the same elements? For none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of elements, e.g. b or a cannot be the same as ba. (None, therefore, of the intelligibles, e.g. being or unity, is an element; for these are predicable of each of the compounds as well.) None of the elements, then, will be either a substance or a relative term; but it must be one or the other. All things, then, have not the same elements."

SB: OK. The problem is this, are the causes of, say, man, the same as the causes of the images of man? And if they are the same, then the images of man and man are from the same thing, and then the question is, what is common to both of them? Now, as he remarks somewhere, all the categorial predicates can be understood as relative terms because they are all relative to οὐσία. And the same thing would be true of parts; they are in a sense relative terms because the head is a head of something. So, if there was something, it could not be an element because οὐσία does not belong to relation. Nor do relations belong to οὐσία. Now, he makes the remark that the principle and element are

different, 1070b23. So, the mover is in another, and the question is, does that mean that it only is as a relation? So, it's being as a principle and its being what it is are inseparable, but they are not the same. You can compare what Socrates says in the *Republic*, that when you go out of the cave one's awareness of it as itself in its place is different than its being the cause of all becoming. So that to the extent that such a principle is itself, it is not of another, and to the extent that it is of another, it is not itself. The problem would be, you could combine them if you could say that the totality of its otherness was itself. You see we're moving toward the problem of mind, the crucial question of the relation of mind and all the objects that it thinks. Alright. Now, at 1071b3, we're now moving on to the cosmological part. Would you read that?

Reader: [1071b3] "Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement. And there is no continuous movement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous."

SB: Yeah. Before we go back to this key argument, this assertation that it can only be circular motion doesn't at all follow; all it has to be is closed motion. It could be a figure eight, it wouldn't make any difference. It couldn't be a spiral, but it could be any closed motion whatsoever, provided that it didn't have any angles in it, so long as it was a smooth curve. OK, now, Aristotle sets out to prove that there is some kind of eternal unmoved οὐσία. And the argument is this: if all beings were corruptible, they would already have been corrupted, and there would be nothing. And if there were nothing, there would be no moving thing. But there must be a moving thing because motion is already motion. (You remember the problem of the magnitude.) Now, he puts this in terms of time. Every now presupposes a prior now because there can only be when the moving thing is already under way. In other words, the actualization of the measure presupposes the actualization of that which is measured. If the now coincided with the start of the motion, it would coincidence with the rest of the moving thing, which is contrary to the hypothesis because it would be before the start of the motion. And the reason for this is that the now is not part of the motion because, if the now were part of the motion, then there would exist two nows such that there were no now in between those two nows. Now why it looks as though this isn't so is because the entrance point of a magnitude looks like any point of the magnitude, but the entrance point is not a point but the end of the magnitude, and therefore it isn't there before the magnitude is there, whereas every point is only there potentially of the magnitude, and that corresponds to the now. So there is no continuum unless every prior and every later is also respectively later and prior because, if there were a prior that was not also later, it would be prior only subsequent to the later, so the later would establish, then the prior, and that would mean that the prior is always subsequent to the start. Furthermore,

if there were a later that was not also a prior, it would be a last later. Then, so many nows from now there would be nothing. But now there is nothing after the last now. But there cannot be a now which is of nothing, and consequently there cannot be a last now. Do you follow this argument? This is a very powerful argument to prove the eternity of motion. It is very difficult to see if he has made a mistake. He might have made a mistake, but it's hard to see it.

Student: Wait, did you already say that there cannot be a first now?

SB: Yeah. Because if there were a first now that was not also later, that was the point. It would be prior only subsequent to the later. So, the later would establish the prior and that would mean that the prior was always subsequent to the start.

Student: Because the now could only be understood as a now relative to some change in its status. The recognition of the now could only come when it becomes event ...

SB: Right. So it isn't the now which is in the first part [...] extremely shrewd argument. It seems that he really proves that there must be eternal motion.

Student: But isn't there a problem with the argument in that the now is defined as being intelligible with respect to a more or less human observer? He's right that there can never be a first now for any kind of human observer, and the now can only be a now when its status changes and we have it at some later stage. You don't say now if something never changes.

SB: You need two nows. So he raises the question in the *Physics*: Could there be time without the soul? So that would mean that the soul was absolutely indispensable for motion. But he never goes that far. Plato goes that far. Aristotle doesn't explicitly say that.

Student: But you can see why he could be justified in making that distinction between the soul's [...] of time but not of motion. Time is the measure of motion.

SB: Well, that's a very peculiar thing. That would imply the following very peculiar thought, that time is a *pathos* of motion which was accidental. It's very hard to see how that is possible.

Student: Accidental in a sense.

SB: That is, he wants to say that it is a per se accident. But to say that it is an accident not per se, it's very hard to see how that could be true.

Student: Well, why, that wouldn't follow, though. It could be a necessary ...

SB: Yes, one would ask you to analyze motion without time.

Student: You could still deny that, though. That you could analyze motion without time. Because the analysis would always presuppose, say, soul.

SB: You mean just because it is an analysis?

Student: Well ...

SB: That's not good enough, for you can do that with anything. Not everything has the same status, though.

Student: Right. But motion is ... but all measurements or observation of it require soul. That doesn't seem very unlikely.

SB: Give me an analysis of locomotion without time. Hmm?

Student: Aristotle says no.

SB: Aristotle says no, and that's very complicated because there does seem to be such a thing as that. But the question is whether that is not a derivative phenomenon. Right? Well, that is, you close your eyes, right, is what you mean by stop motion. You close your eyes, and you picture a house, say, and then you picture a box, and you scan the fact in your mind of this then and now. No motion. No locomotion. At least it doesn't seem as if there is any locomotion. The question is, whether that which looks like a completely free thought experiment does not, in fact, ultimately depend that you began with a clock as a five-year-old and saw the hands moving from place to place. Have you ever read Husserl's account of subjective time? It's very interesting, the example he begins with is music, a rather interesting case of this question of time consciousness. My impression is in reading it – and this is just off the cuff – is that it is a rather arbitrary example because the same thing is true of speech, as he analyzes it. The characteristic of a musical phrase is, right, that there is required retention of the past and a protention of the future. Otherwise, it is not going to come out as a whole, which is the way that you hear it. But the same thing is true of speech, as far as I can see. Because that is necessary of speech, too, because it is in time, and when the speaker is beginning to utter a sentence, you must anticipate the fact that [...] in the end. Alright, it seems to me that that is the same except that there is no consciousness of time. That is, you can become conscious of the fact that it is in time, that I can see, that is built in necessarily to that understanding. I think Husserl makes a mistake because it is possible, it is necessary. But maybe he is right. It is complicated.

Student: It might be a consciousness that has become unconscious. A consciousness of time in understanding, in communicating ...

SB: Yeah, right. That's why I left it open, whether it is there or in the background, and one doesn't see it.

Student: How can it not be? It seems that it would have to be, because you can become conscious of it and then you realize that it is there.

SB: Well, it's like counting.

Student: But that seems to strengthen his argument.

SB: No, no. You become conscious of its taking place in time without its in fact being time.

Student: [...] to remember a melody you have to remember the melody as it is.

SB: It's not a question of remembering; it's just a question of hearing it initially. Right? Unless you preserve the first note somehow, you'll never get the melody. Because it is successive. Yeah? The same thing is true of speech.

Student: Especially in terms of a sentence.

SB: Especially in terms of a sentence. Well, you don't even have to go to a sentence; it's true of a word, too. That the initial explosion of sound in the mouth is entirely dependent upon the way in which it's going to end. And one's understanding of it is necessarily based on one's making a very good guess about what's going to happen. Which is then either confirmed or disconfirmed. Usually confirmed. It's not an easy problem to solve, I don't think. What happens, we've all had this experience, you fall asleep in the late afternoon, you've been taking a nap in a darkened room, but you didn't intend really to fall asleep, sort of drowsed off, and then you wake up, and your initial experience is, that is, the identification of the two nows, between the moment at which you lost consciousness and the moment at which you gained consciousness, and then how do you know that in fact time has passed. You look at a clock. That is, there's nothing in the room that has changed, so that would seem to mean that motion is always involved. It's a very difficult issue.

Student: I was just thinking as regards the limitation of the absence of any first now relative to limited observation, that if you take the converse, that doesn't seem to tend to debunk the argument at all either, if you take an unlimited observer, an omniscient observer, God, then it would seem that it is impossible to distinguish between the various nows, for him, between before and after, since one of the conditions of his omniscience is that everything, no matter what time frame it occurs in for humans, it occurs for him simultaneously. To talk about now and before and later subsequently with respect to the mind of God just does not make sense at all. Because to the degree that those categories are applicable to the mind of God, it's precisely to that degree that his omniscience is limited. I mean, he would have to be able to detect a kind of logical order that certain things follow with respect to certain other things instead of their being chronological, the relationships of entailment, the unfolding of events in the universe, which correspond to his plan, too, ideally [...]. I mean, he wouldn't see things in terms of now and later.

SB: This would depend upon whether omniscience includes prediction, because there are certain paradoxes in relation to prediction that even govern God.

Student: Is that the same question as whether you would have to know the effects of something to know it?

SB: Well, you know some of the paradoxes about prediction? The following situation: There are two boxes. In one of them there's a dollar bill. In the other one, now, the thing is this ... If you choose that box, you'll get a dollar bill. If you choose both boxes, God will not put into the other box a million dollars. If you choose the other box, you will get a million dollars. Now, a hundred years ago, before these two boxes were given to you, God did one or the other. Could he predict what you were going to do? The problem is, there are actually three possibilities but only two possibilities. You would assume that you want to maximize your gain. And the maximization is to pick up both boxes and you will get a million and one. Right?

Student: But then it won't happen.

SB: Yeah, but God has already put in the million. That is, you will have no effect on the experiment which happened a hundred years ago. He either did or did not put a million dollars in that box. So, if he did and you picked up both of them, you will get a million and one. Right?

Student: That's against the premises.

SB: Why? He's assuming that you won't do it. Could he do it? You see the problem? A physicist worked out this paradox. It's extremely complicated.

Student: You mean there's a way out of it?

SB: No, no. There doesn't need to be a way out of it. That is, if you ask people. Which would you do? We would imagine a third man there who can see into the boxes. He can't tell you, however, what's in them. All you know is that in one of them there is a dollar. Now what would you do? Would you pick a box which might have a million in it? Or would you pick up both of them? And get a million and one. It would seem as though it would not be possible for a man who had perfect prediction to predict what you're going to do. Because on the basis of what he knew about you he would say that ... He either put it in or He didn't put it in. You see the problem? Well, it's hard to know why it happened. But that's because probability itself is so peculiar. [...] stupid about it, how peculiar it is. Now, the one thing you know is this. We have a penny which we are tossing up. Probability says fifty-fifty, in the long run. OK. But we all know that tossings of the coin are not cumulative. So, simultaneously we toss it a million times, and they all turn out heads; simultaneously we toss it an infinite number of times, and they all turn out heads. Now we take all possible worlds in which there is this coin which is perfectly balanced, all at

the same moment in time. And an infinite number of pennies that were tossed up in each of these worlds at exactly the same time, and they all turn up heads. By chance it would happen that any one would turn out to be heads, any time you toss them, even if you toss them all together, because they have no effect on each other. In all possible worlds at one and the same time, they all turn out heads. Because you keep on doing it at every possible moment, and they turn out heads. So what does it mean that it is fifty-fifty?

Student: Even if infinitely?

SB: Sure, why not. This is why I never understood probability. You see, we know that the gambler believes that the previous throw has some effect on his present throw, and that's why they lose all their money. In the long run they lose their money. Because, in fact, that isn't true. But if you have this coin which is perfectly balanced so that it's going to go either way, and it's going only one way. For ever and ever, it's going only one way.

Student: Probability is like a purely theoretical science.

SB: What does it mean, though. Because in fact it does make some sense to say that it is fifty-fifty, then it might go one way or the other. Here you have all possible universes that turn out, when you look at it, as though they are completely ordered and necessary, because you never know about the tails. Every time you look, it's heads. Yeah. That's the difficulty. I don't understand it myself. There's something about this problem about prediction which seems to me insoluble, too. Now, shall we go on or shall we stop. What shall we do? Go on? OK.

Now read what he says at 1071b12.

Reader: [1071b12] "But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers in the forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the forms enough; for if it is not to act, there will be no movement. Further, even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be."

SB: OK. So in order to be motion always, the moving thing must be at work. It is not sufficient that ... even if it has the capacity and is at work, but its being is to have a capacity. Because then there is no necessity. So only if its being is its being at work. That is, it is not enough that it be at work because, when it is at work, that is true of every being. It has to be the case that it is nothing but its being at work. And then he will argue that to be just what it is, which is to be at work, is only possible if there is no magnitude, that is, if there is no matter. Now, there must be an eternal cause of motion and there must be eternal motion, but there is no necessity that there be a unity of the moving thing. That he is not able to prove. Right? Now, that the motion must be locomotion by itself is dependent upon

the possibility that it can be locomotion without change. In other words, without alteration, which means ultimately without decay, alteration is ultimately decaying. OK. But then, of course, he would have to say that the cause of generation and decay must be different from this, different in its effect. So that means that the cause of this eternal motion cannot be always equidistant from the cause of generation and decay, and hence it could be. Because there must be variation there.

Student: And that variation itself is what causes the generation and corruption?

SB: Yeah. That's what he claims. Winter, spring. How that would hold in the case of war is obscure. OK. How about we make the first stab at the big problem, namely, in chapter seven, and then we'll stop. At 1072a23. Would you read that?

Reader: [1072a23] "Therefore the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire ..."

SB: More, more ["more than opinion on desire"]. Not rather. The way he puts it is that one excludes the other, which he does not want to say. Right?

Reader: "... for the thinking is the starting point. And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought, and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for 'one' means a measure, but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best.

"That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities, though the former does not. The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved. Now, if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. Therefore, if its actuality is the primary form of spatial motion, then insofar as it is subject to change, in this respect it is capable of being otherwise – in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle is the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first never produces. The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and insofar as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good ..."

SB: Is "beautiful" ...

Reader: "... is beautiful, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses: that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way.

"On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself and that which is thinking in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is *active* when it *possesses* this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best."

SB: OK. Let's see whether we can understand this. Now, there are a number of problems. Let me summarize what he says. He wants to say that only the desired or the desirable, and the intellective or the intelligible move, though they aren't moved themselves. And the difficulty is that desire is double. That is, it involves both an awareness and a desire for assimilation, whereas intellection would seem to be only a case of awareness without assimilation because, as soon as the distance which is required for intellection is removed, there is no intellection. Now, he says that in the first case in each class – that is, in the desirable, the desired, and in the intellected, the intelligible – they are the same. He implies that everywhere else they diverge, except at the top. And the first question is, what is the cause of that divergence? And the answer seems to be that they do not manifest themselves in the same way because by definition there cannot be a perceptible noetic object. So that the phenomenal beautiful things, which are the initial objects of desire but which do not bear the same relation to that which is truly beautiful as all the noetic things, are to the mind intellecting itself, which presumably corresponds to that which is truly beautiful. Now, the problem is, what makes it true that that which is truly beautiful is the same as that which strictly is? This is what he claims. And the answer is that that which strictly is is the noetic object, and on reflection of the fact that there is no desire of the beautiful without opinion, the more that opinion is transformed into that which is to be intellected, then of course the closer you come to that which is intellected itself. Now, there are a number of difficulties. Let's say this. The phenomenal beautiful, the apparently beautiful, won't turn out to be the good when it is one's own, that is, when you have assimilated it. That is, it is only the beautiful when you have not assimilated it. But at the moment when you have assimilated it, into the good, into your own good ...

Student: Necessarily?

SB: Well, that is, it cannot be that it retains its being beautiful in your assimilation of it, unless you want to say that you become beautiful. That doesn't seem to make sense.

Student: But is it assimilable?

SB: Well, that's the question.

Student: It's not assimilable insofar as it's beautiful.

SB: Insofar as it's beautiful, yeah, it's not assimilable. So that it always turns out on assimilation to be something else, let's say pleasure.

Student: [...] the good?

SB: Well, we're saying that the good might be pleasure. It doesn't make any difference whether you say that it is or it isn't. Right?

Student: I don't get, really, the relationship between the beautiful and the good.

SB: Well, let's start with a beautiful red apple. This apple's so very attractive that it makes you want to eat it. Now, when you have assimilated it, its attractiveness has disappeared. And it can only be understood in terms of the good, either a real good or an opinionated good. You can no longer say that it is beautiful. And let's say that it is a situation in which it is good for you, this apple, right, to keep the doctor away. So, you would then say that the apparent beauty of it is that which is in the coming of the good which makes you choose this thing which is good for you. And so, at the moment at which that happens, of course, the beautiful drops out.

Student: But you're not going to deny that the apparent beauty could hide something not good.

SB: No, no. Of course not.

Student: Or not even apparently good.

SB: No, sure. Let's say that it is a very attractive piece of candy which ruins your teeth. No, that doesn't make any difference. But the difficulty is this. You can argue two ways. Now, let's push the example of the red apple all the way up to the truly beautiful. Now, the truly beautiful is either what can never be one's own good and therefore lies always beyond one's own grasp, or it's potentially one's own good. Now, that argument would say that the truly beautiful is beyond any possibility of assimilation. So that the highest you can go is exactly at that moment at which the beautiful and the good diverge, so that what you get in the best case is the good but not the beautiful. Sexual attraction would in fact be a good example, for that's what in fact happens there. If you take it simply at that moment, so that if the thing which in fact is your desire in beauty of the other, but of course it always turns out that you never get it. That is in fact the real thing. You get all sorts of other things: children, pleasure, and so forth. But you never get what you wanted,

and it is not a cunning of the good, it just stands by itself. It is always beyond. Or you can argue this other way, that in fact it conceals the good in some way. He seems to argue this, that as one moves up in the case of desire, the δόξα begins to move toward reason and takes over from that initial desire. But you could argue this, that, precisely at the limiting case, desire ceases. So that the ultimately beautiful would be the limit of desire before it vanishes, before desire vanishes. And you could then say that at that moment of vanishing, then there is a true noetic object. Or, on the other hand, you could say that the good is the limit. And the beautiful is just the object as that object of contemplation with no assimilation.

Student: The good is the limit of the object ...

SB: The difference between the beautiful and the good, from this point of view, is on the basis of whether it can be one's own or not one's own. The good only makes sense if it is a good for somebody or something. You cannot conceive of a case in which the good is not a good for something. That is not true in the case of the beautiful. Now, arguing that way you could say that the noetic object really corresponds to the beautiful and not to the good precisely because for intellection you need this distance, you need this noetic distance, so that the degree of good that you get out of it, which is the thing which is causing your desire, ultimately, is precisely everything but the noetic object itself. And therefore, there can never be a desire for the noetic object in itself, and therefore, there is never assimilation, and therefore, there is never such a thing as mind thinking itself. Is that clear what the problem is?

Student: Is the premise of all this that desire is for something to be ... The premise is that it's for one's own, desire is for one's own. If that changed ...

SB: It would cease to be desire.

Student: Well, couldn't you say that the one's own is expanded to such an extent that ... desire, it's still desire ...

SB: What would that mean?

Student: Desire for the pure noetic object.

SB: Well, the question is whether one is able to have a desire for a pure noetic object. It might be, in other words, that the ...

Student: You only desire ...

SB: Or you can say the truly beautiful. The truly beautiful is in fact ultimately an appearance. But it is in fact that which you get, and all that is transformed into the good,

and then the last veil drops away, and there is the noetic object, but you no longer can desire it. And therefore, since you cannot desire it, it cannot be assimilated, precisely because its subject is different than the object.

Student: And I want to say that there is some kind of whole subject, there's some kind of ... in which desire, it would still be a form of desire, but the one's own would change ...

SB: Well, that's true, the one's own can change ...

Student: So much so that ...

SB: ... without ever ceasing to be one's own.

Student: That's what I want.

SB: Well, you would initially understand one's own as being entirely selfish, as meaning in fact body and soul together. And ultimately one can say that one's own is, in fact, mind. And one's own mind is in fact mind.

Student: So that really one's own doesn't mean too much. It doesn't mean anything fragmented.

SB: No, not necessarily. One difficulty is this, that it doesn't necessarily lead to Aristotle's conclusion that there is such a thing as God.

Student: Insofar as God is a collapse of subject and object.

SB: Is a thing always.

Student: Oh, that's a different thing.

SB: You see, it might be, in other words, that in fact it is always in a sense potentially. In terms of its actualization. What is really holding it together is not itself but something else – namely, the idea of the good.

Student: Which is not that.

SB: In other words, the cause of the thing being known or the cause of its being are not in the being and not in the knowing but in something else. Now, Aristotle wants to say that the cause is in the being, which is identical with its being known. Now you could easily say that it is true of the highest beings that they have the character of having a capacity of being known without saying that the highest being is something which only manifests itself in being known. Yeah?

Student: But is it? I think there is a way of looking at the beautiful differently than a kind of Aristotelian perspective, and in the confines of this it would make sense that it would be possible to assimilate the good. I mean, in a kind of crude way ...

SB: Wait a minute, before you go on, let me make a distinction. See whether you agree with this. There are only three kinds of assimilation. (1) The lover adds the beloved to itself. (2) The lover makes itself resemble the beloved, i.e., becomes a mirror of the beloved. In both those cases there is self-destruction, that is, self-destruction on the part of the lover. (3) The third possibility is that the lover and the beloved retain their character but come in contact. Now, that's what Aristotle is claiming, that there is such a thing as the last one.

Student: And each retaining its own identity?

SB: Well, apparently in some sense. They become the same what they are not separately, in some way. It's a third thing, which is neither one nor the other. Now, which one do you want to talk about? That, I think, there are only three possibilities. Now, in the case of human love, it's the first two which have a dialectical relation to one another. Sometimes it's one, and sometimes it's the other.

Student: [...] I think the first is the one that I am interested in. There is a kind of philistine aesthetic theory which most bourgeois adhered to in the nineteenth century and some in the twentieth century, that if you contemplate, the contemplation of the beautiful [...] somehow refines you, it transmutes the gross qualities that you have, such as they are, whether as intellect or as receptivity, into something more rarefied and fine, that is, association with the right kind of objects of art works itself on you imperceptibly. To that extent, what you were is destroyed. It's self-destruction. That is, that things are never really beautiful in themselves but rather excite the perception of beauty in the observer relative to the degree that the observer himself or herself is endowed with this predisposition for recognizing beauty. I think this deceptive way of looking at it accounts for the notorious relativity in one's notion of the beautiful. [...] I mean, what I'm saying is that the object of beauty doesn't present any kind of character which is intrinsic to the object itself but rather susceptible to a kind of power to excite beautiful thoughts on the part of the observer and that beauty understood this way is the beauty characteristic of concomicity, of recognizing and discriminating among the parts of something and seeing how in an elegant way they relate to the whole and how the whole in turn relates to the parts ...

SB: And that measurably isn't there?

Student: It doesn't seem to be. In actual life. Because someone will look at a Rembrandt and say it's dirty and musty and not particularly attractive, and I like my *Saturday Evening Post* drawings by Norman Rockwell, and somebody will say, My God, that's absolutely beautiful. And further, I didn't first recognize it, and I've been coming to this museum for ten years now, goaded by my wife and finally am able to put it all together, I just saw that it's really beautiful. As a recognition of beauty, I think sexual desire is a bad case

because it's notorious to be sexually attracted to people who we loathe personally and are not good for us as a matter of fact ...

SB: You mean, the Rembrandt is good for us?

Student: There seems to be a kind of movement in other kinds of perception of beauty and that it's possible for something to be beautiful in a way that's not at all instantaneous. And that involves an active working through, an active noetic process, in which it actually makes sense to say on one day that this is rather beautiful and to say, six months later, I see how incredibly beautiful this is now when I only had a dim inkling of it before. And I think [...] beauty wouldn't really belong in the object, the beautiful object, rather the power to incite perceptions of beauty would inhere in the object. In fact, it would not be the beautiful as such. I think this is a kind of twist on what Santayana talks about beauty.

SB: Is it connected with desire?

Student: I think it would have to be. This aspect of beauty as concomicity, and also there are mathematical proofs of beauty, too.

SB: But where's the desire?

Student: Design is in the object.

SB: No, desire. Is there any desire?

Student: Not to possess it, but to see it, to contemplate it, yes. Why would people go back to a museum, to gaze at it, look at it, one can find pleasure in that, one can find some kind of change of one's thinking even listening to music, I mean really great music ...

SB: But the question is whether that really has anything to do ... whether that's a very diminished form of νόησις and really has nothing to do with desire.

Student: Isn't seeing the object of beauty the assimilation?

SB: Hmm?

Student: I mean, it's not supposed to be eaten. It's meant to be assimilated to sight.

Student: When you say desire, do you mean sexual desire and sexual attraction as a paradigm?

SB: That's the word he uses.

Student: Eros.

Student: But assimilation doesn't mean that it is exclusively assimilated, does it? That once you have assimilated it, it's no longer there for other assimilations? By other people.

SB: That's true enough. It has that character to it. But the difficulty is this, to the extent that you get something out of it, that no longer seems to have anything to do with the beautiful. Except insofar as, as in this case, it comes very close to contemplation.

Student: Ultimately you're right, and Aristotle's right, when things are truly beautiful, when one is "transported" with the beauty of something, there is that erotic element of losing oneself, of losing consciousness of oneself, and rather than assimilating the beautiful, being assimilated by the beautiful. A curious thing. One starts out by wanting to devour, to possess, somehow, the beloved, and it turns out that one is possessed by it. [...] Yeah, I guess it would have to be desire. [...] something truly beautiful. The most beautiful.

SB: You remember this problem from the *Symposium*. Socrates as a young man believes that *eros* is of the beautiful. Diotima proves to him that it is really of the good. And the reason for this is that, when she asks him the question, what do you get when you get the beautiful which you desire, he is not able to answer the question. But when he is asked the question, what do you get when you desire the good, he is able to answer the question, and he answers, happiness. And the way the problem comes out is that when she presents the ladder of love, at the top is the beautiful and not the good. And it presents it in terms of contemplation and not in terms of desire. The curious thing about the beautiful as opposed to the good is that it's split, it seems to be necessarily split [...]

[tape turned]

[...] then where the possibility of being bad presumably diminishes when they finally are the same. Now, he claims that that is true.

Student: But then there would be no noetic beauty. Is that what you're saying?

SB: It isn't even as if there could possibly be any noetic beauty because thinking is thinking itself. Let me give the problem in another way. And leave out the question of the beautiful. The question is this: What is being-at-work, what is ἐνέργεια if it is not the being-at-work of anything? That is, if there is an οὐσία whose οὐσία is nothing but ἐνέργεια, ἐνέργεια cannot be the sole mark of being. Now, in the case of every bodily ἐνέργεια, the togetherness of potentiality and ἐνέργεια is the characteristic of it.

Student: Of the οὐσία?

SB: Yeah. Now, there's no being-at-work of every being-at-work. And yet the mind grasps every being-at-work, and it is at work when it does so. Now, through the work of itself it becomes aware of itself and only through its own work. That means that its identity is established across its diversity. The question is, is it the same as its diversity? Now, the

awareness of itself as a mirror fixes it. That is, the mind is both an eye and a hand. It's a hand as he says because it is the instrument of all instruments, the place of all kinds. Just like the hand can grasp anything without being any of them. And the eye corresponds to the contemplation of any being in it, in this hand. Now, you want a unity. Of the eye and the hand, in the case of mind. And that seems to be possible only if their difference is dissolved in the universal. That is, if the being-at-work of the eye is that of the hand because the eye sees itself wholly in the hand. Now, just one last point before we stop. I think a way in which one can understand what he means by this puzzling phrase, νόησις νοήσεως, or intellection of intellection, is this. "Therefore, too, are discovered by ἐνέργεια for by division they find them (or, 'they discover them'), and if they were already divided they would be evident, but now they exist potentially. Why is a triangle equal to two right angles? Because the angles around a single point are equal to two right angles. Now, if the line along the side was drawn, it would be immediately clear to one who saw it. And why in general is there a right angle in every semicircle, because if the three right lines are equal then it is clear to one who sees it." Right? Et cetera. Do you see that? Now, would you read the next thing?

Reader: [1051a23] "Consequently it is evident that one discovers what is potential by performing an operation. The reason is that knowing is an act."[2]

SB: Oh, he got it reversed. That's based on an emendation of Ross. But actually, it says this: "For it is evident that those things which are potentially are discovered by being brought into being-at-work, and the cause is that their being-at-work (*their* being-at-work) is intellection." Right.

Student: That certainly makes a difference in the meaning.

SB: Yeah, sure.

Student: You mean, their being-at-work is not being known.

SB: No, no. The potentially true theorem is discovered by being brought into a state of being-at-work. And the cause of their being discovered when it is at work is that their being-at-work, or its being-at-work, is our intellection. That is, when they are at work, we are thinking.

Student: The mind must be that, right?

SB: Well, what I believe it is is this. He gives two examples. I can explain what I think he means ... What I'm leading up to is this. His example is the triangle. And the proof that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles consists in drawing this line [writes

[2] The student is reading not from Ross but from the Richard Hope translation: Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), 197.

on board] parallel to one of the sides. And inspection shows that it is two right angles. Right? If you know the theorem of transverse across parallels. Yeah? OK.

[Top and bottom lines parallel.]



This construction, he says, if it was already there before you made it, would be self-evident, when looking at it, that in fact the theorem was true. And the same is the case in the case of the semicircle, as soon as you draw that line, since these three lines, being radii, are equal, then those two angles are equal, and these two angles are equal, and therefore this must be a right angle. Right? That follows necessarily by inspection. So, there's my translation of νόησις. Νόησις is truth by inspection. And νόησις by νόησις is the truth by inspection of the truth by inspection. And that's the ultimate ground of all ἐπιστήμη. When you look at it that way, it doesn't look like a puzzling phrase at all.

Student: Well, I don't know about that "at all."

SB: No, no. When somebody says intellection of intellection, it's very hard to see what that could possibly mean. But if you translate it this way, one sees immediately that, if there is such a thing as truth by inspection, which is precisely what he means by "contact," there necessarily ultimately must be a truth by inspection of truth by inspection. Right? And that's mind thinking itself.

Student: Is there any problem about infinity?

Student: Why infinity?

Student: The third man.

SB: Not if it's itself. If it is identical, there's no problem.

Student: What I was wondering was if that [...] would be a solution of the problem of the relations of principles of logic and principles of causality.

SB: Yeah, I don't know. There are a number of difficulties precisely because of the diversity of the noetic times [...] disappears in that. He doesn't seem to be able to get out of that difficulty. I think the interesting thing is this, that the key way to see it is mathematics, is mathematical construction. There are certain mathematical theorems, of which these

are not the best, which are true merely by looking at it and do not require any reasoning process whatsoever.

Student: But you would have to perform some operation prior to that conception?

SB: What one usually thinks is this. The diagram is not the proof because ... In a geometry textbook nothing is happening. Right? You have to do it! And when you do it, of course, it becomes a τόδε τι.

Student: The theorem?

SB: Yeah. For Aristotle, every theorem is an induction. Every geometrical theorem. From a single case. That's what it means to have a construction. We cannot construct on a generality. For him. And therefore it is necessary that you pick a "this." And the actualization of a "this" is the contemplation of it that, in fact, gives you this truth. My favorite example is [...]'s Theorem. This is a fantastic thing, that in three-space something which does not seem as though it could possibly be true, once you draw the diagram is true simply by looking at it and does not require you to make one single annotation at all. Do you know that theorem? Well, the theorem is this. It only works in three-space. For two-space, that is, the plane, it's very complicated. The theorem is this. If you have two triangles which have the following properties, they're not in the same place, such that, let me see, such that this is true. [Something is going on at the board.] The three vertices correspond in this way, so that they alternately hit a point. Right? Then the following is true. That if this line is extended and that line, the corresponding one is extended, and they meet in a point, and if this one is extended and this one is extended, and that meets in a point, this one is extended and that one's extended, and those three points lie on a straight line. And that is simply true by looking at it.

I do it this way not only because it is hard to do it right but also to reveal the fact that it does not require that the diagram be drawn accurately to see that it is true by inspection, which really proves his point about what it means to be at work. The diagram is at work when in fact you do it. You see why it's so?

[...]

And it's certainly true by inspection and does not require ... And it's a very interesting case because there's nothing which the teacher can say to the pupil except look at it. Of course, he can help him with his eye and tell him to look along each one until he sees that it is so. But there isn't any reasoning involved in the sense that you have to assume something and then do something from it. Right? Aristotle is, I think, claiming that that's, in fact ... that's the closest you can get to what he ultimately means.

Student: So the reason that you need more than ... the reason that things aren't always true by inspection is that the world isn't mathematically ...

SB: Well, where the problem comes out, as you know, is that this requires φαντασία. And φαντασία, of course, definitely means that there is matter and therefore that the

intellect cannot possibly be intellected. And therefore, if he has to say that, you move on to a higher level in which this is true when, as it were, the construction, i.e., φαντασία, is removed. Now, that's where it becomes difficult to believe that it is, in fact, sound because the removal of matter, or the removal of φαντασία, is equivalent, according to him, to an identification of every possible noetic object with one.

Student: You mean with the act of νόησις?

SB: Yeah, namely, with itself. It must be one, it can only be contemplating one thing. As he argues it later, you can get into insoluble difficulties if you say that it is more than one. Because then the question comes out, how long a time do you contemplate each one? And you can't give any account of that, so it can only be itself.

Student: But still, doesn't it have to be an indeterminate dyad sort of thing?

SB: Well, no, because it really has to be necessary, totally necessary.

Student: Right, but you also have to have some sort of internal distance.

SB: None, apparently. No internal distance. You wonder if it is really intellection. And not really the object of desire. Getting back to that formula. So that in the end what you would be getting is good, but it wouldn't be intelligence.

Student: Isn't that the equivalent of saying that when you prove something you make it evident to yourself, this kind of mathematical problem, you see it by proving it. You see the necessary quality of certain relationships which obtain in the figure. But somebody might come along and say, but by doing this you apply a criterion, you apply inspection. What validates your criteria? And you would say in response, you're saying that I'm employing logic. And your interlocutor will say, yes, you're employing logic. And then you're asking me, what is the logic of your logic? Don't you see that that's an absurd question. Because logic is precisely that criterion that one recognizes, by inspection, to be an ultimate criterion. Isn't this the structure of the argument?

SB: Yeah.

Student: It's very ... I don't mean to be terribly anachronistic, but it's very Wittgensteinian to say that sort of thing. If one did not have to work through stepwise, if one were not limited by one's human characteristics, one would grasp the logic of things, of proofs such as that, and the order of the world, immediately, and then logic for a god, this kind of god, would be reducible to saying, well, that's the way things are.

SB: But Aristotle wouldn't say that though, I don't think. Because for Aristotle's god there isn't any such statement as, that's the way things are. Because there aren't any things.

Student: You would have to throw off your divinity for a moment to see things in a limited way in order to see things, as such.

SB: The question is this, you see, why ... in order to get a perfect being, it is necessary that this νόησις νοήσεως be so. Suppose you said that it only sometimes was so. For an exceptionally gifted man such as Aristotle who gets it for a minute or so. You would need another principle.

Student: To explain his being when he wasn't being ...

SB: No, to explain the unmoved mover if that's in fact what you started out with. Now, this unmoved mover, in such a case, would have to lie beyond the mind and also even that which was thought. And it therefore would have the peculiar character that it would be something that you could never have. You would always get ... the highest [...] you would get would be self-intellection. But you would never get that which caused that self-intellection.

Student: But you would desire it?

SB: Yeah.

Student: But Aristotle claims that is impossible.

SB: He claims that is impossible, yeah, but I don't know why.

Student: So this stands on whether you think that at the highest level desire and intellect might be inseparable. That's what you're postulating?

SB: Uh hmm. And the separation of desire and intellect is ultimately the ground for contemplation. And without such a separation there is no contemplation. And there's an enormous difficulty would be caused if you asserted the fact that there's no such thing as a perfect being. That would be the consequence.

Student: Because it would be beyond being.

SB: Yeah, that being would be beyond being, and therefore there would be no perfect being.

Student: Couldn't you just expand being?

SB: No, then you get into a different mess.

Student: How is the desire constituted? By the limit? By what's beyond it?

SB: You mean what would cause the being?

Student: Yeah. Or how could such a desire be experienced?

SB: Well, the question would be whether in fact all desire would be an experience of it. Without one's being aware of it.

Student: To what degree does it make sense to say that such a being thinks in the way that we understand thinking. Would it be consistent to say that such a being has a thinking that consists of noetic motion? Wouldn't that be inconsistent with the hypothesis of a perfect being? Wouldn't one have to, in consequence, think of thinking as an activity wholly other in kind than a perfect being? If a perfect being's thinking is to be construed analogically to our thinking, then there is a moment when he doesn't know, and then there is a moment later when he does know. And that seems to be inconsistent with the hypothesis of a perfect [...] and with the other attributes of a perfect being that we have just been going over.

SB: Well, you could say that those two moments coincide, that it is a limiting case. And the reason why it is a limiting case is because, as our theorem shows, that's a case in which you either know or you don't know. There's nothing in between. But the real problem is that when you get to that, when you make this coincidence, what does this perfect being know? Now, he certainly doesn't know us. That's certainly out. He certainly doesn't know the external, the highest outer sphere. He doesn't know all that together, somehow, he just knows himself. Now, what is this thing that he knows? And one is completely baffled at this point. Except that it is something like truth. That is, what Aristotle means by making this ... Remember that strange remark he made? That truth is being in the most authoritative sense? Remember, all the commentators go wild over that? Now, I think what he means by that is that truth is the only sense of being in which it cannot be replaced by one. And therefore, in that sense ...

Student: Why?

SB: Well, you remember the four senses of being?

Student: Yeah, but why? Why can't it be?

SB: Can it be?

Student: It seems like it would be the prime example.

SB: Of one?

Student: Yeah

SB: I don't know. That is, that ...

Student: I said, doesn't it have to be two? And you said, no it's just one.

SB: It's the only case of identity that Aristotle allows, clearly. Maybe it is one. One in the sense of simple.

Student: One is the measure of ... I don't understand.

SB: I don't know. That's a problem.

Student: It's almost like blank meters facing themselves. As soon as you introduce an object and replace that object with another object and change state, and when you change state that contradicts your original hypothesis that god is permanent and perfect at every moment and that he doesn't obtain perfection [...] he doesn't work through to it. So that the substance of contemplation is purely devoid of individuating character. The substance of awareness and contemplation is just the substance of awareness and contemplation, so it's just as if logic looks at itself. And logic knows that it is true in the truest sense, in an authoritative sense. And all that logic is shorn of personality, too. I mean, we say he, we anthropomorphize rather glibly, but it's very difficult to understand if he would have any consciousness of himself as a self at all.

SB: Well, what Aristotle seems to imply is this, that because we see, an ἐνέργεια has always been related to a this, or an it, or something which you then say is the being-at-work of that. He replaces ... If you have a being which is nothing but ἐνέργεια, the substitute for the something is reflexivity, and he claims that reflexivity avoids the difficulty that you have an ἐνέργεια which is [...]

[tape ends]

Ian Alexander Moore

TRANSLATING GADAMER AND HEIDEGGER TRANSLATING ARISTOTLE: ÜBER*SETZEN* AND *ÜBER*SETZEN

In his 1942-43 lecture course on Parmenides, Martin Heidegger distinguishes between two types of translation.[1] The first he calls *übersetzen*, placing the emphasis on the penultimate syllable. This is the sort of translation computers can do increasingly well. When I type the word ἀλήθεια into Google Translate and select Greek (there is no Ancient Greek feature yet), the word "truth" appears in the right-hand, English-language column. I can even see that the translation has been reviewed and confirmed by other users of the neural machine translation service. *Alētheia* means truth. A successful translation. I may never have thought about the nature of truth or whether the word might have different valences in Greek than it does in English, but I can confidently say I know that ἀλήθεια and "truth" both point to the same thing.

But what if the differences between ἀλήθεια and "truth" were not so subtle? What if "truth" as, say, the agreement between a statement and a state of affairs had little do with ἀλήθεια or were, at best, a distant offshoot of it? If I had philological training or lexical proclivities, I might examine the word's etymology or historical

[1] Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, ed. Manfred S. Frings, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992), 14-20.

usages. I might learn, from the Great Scott, for example, that the word seems to be composed of an alpha privative and the verb λανθάνειν, "to escape notice" or, in its middle-passive form, "to forget."[2] If I were really curious, I could follow up on Liddell and Scott's reference to the fanciful Byzantine Greek-Greek lexicon known under its Latin title *Etymologicum magnum*, where the etymology of ἀλήθεια as "un-forgetting" is historiographically corroborated.[3] Nevertheless, a younger Paul Friedländer might tell me to put no stock in such wild speculations. Furthermore, Aristotle may well speak of "truthing" or *alētheuein* in *De interpretatione*, but there the Stagirite also asserts that only propositions admit of truth. What would it even mean "to truth"? Aren't we better off ignoring such linguistic idiosyncrasies, as does every published translation of *De interpretatione* that I have ever seen?[4]

Even if we do bear in mind the word's verbal usage and render ἀλήθεια literally as "un-forgetting" or "un-concealment" – translations, by the way, that Friedländer later assented to[5] – have we thereby understood it? No, Heidegger says, for it is not only the word that needs translating. We, too – and here we come to the second meaning of translation – need to be translated, carried across, into the domain in which Aristotle was thinking, at least to the extent possible. Heidegger marks this sort of translation with a shift in emphasis. Rather than *übersetzen*, he writes *übersetzen*, stressing the first syllable and hence the "over" into which we are to be "placed."[6] Or as we might say in Latinate English, *trans*lation (or transposition) is necessary for proper trans*la*tion (or interlingual transference). What emerges upon returning to the target language may look so different from the original as to be unrecognizable to those who have failed to transpose themselves or be transposed similarly. This unrecognizability can take many forms, such as an unexpected word, a hendiadys, periphrasis, altered grammar and syntax, or even a strict adherence to grammar and syntax.

I do not want to explain here how the distinction between *übersetzen* and *übersetzen* plays out in Heidegger's reading of ἀλήθεια in Parmenides and Aristotle. I will instead say a few things about how this distinction is at work in Heidegger's and his student Hans-Georg Gadamer's German translations of *Metaphysics* Lambda 6, as well as in my efforts

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[2] Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, revised and augmented by Sir Henry Stuart Jones with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), s.v. ἀληθής.

[3] Anonymous, ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΝ ΤΟ ΜΕΓΑ, ed. Friderici Sylburgii, new, corrected ed. (Leipzig: Weigel, 1816), s.v. Ἀληθὲς.

[4] For example, E. M. Edghill, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library), 2001, *De interpretatione*, ch. 4, 17a2-7: "every sentence is not a proposition [ἀποφαντικὸς]; only such are propositions as have in them either truth [τὸ ἀληθεύειν] or falsity. [...] Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry."

[5] On Friedländer's attack and subsequent retraction, see Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1989), 17-27.

[6] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 245: "This 'translation' ['*Übersetzung*,' namely, of *Physics* B 1 – I.A.M.] is [...] not a transference of the Greek saying into the *load-bearing capacity proper to our language*. It does not wish to *replace* [*ersetzen*] the Greek saying but rather only to place [*versetzen*] [us – I.A.M.] *into* the latter and, as such an emplacement [*Versetzung*], to disappear in it."

to translate these translations into English for the present issue of *Kronos Philosophical Journal*.[7]

My task, as translator of Gadamer and Heidegger translating Aristotle, was less to carry the latter's Greek over into English as smoothly as possible (which would, after all, efface the German) than it was to reproduce the uniqueness of their respective renderings. My task was less to transpose myself than to *ex*pose the singularity of their German. I needed to be as literal as possible, even, especially in the case of translating Heidegger, at the expense of awkward or improper English. I wanted to include the Greek and the German, so that readers with knowledge of these languages could see what I was doing. To read Gadamer and Heidegger translating Aristotle requires a double transposition, either into their German and then into Aristotle's Greek or into Aristotle's Greek and then into their German. I wanted, in my translation of the translations, to reduce, as much as possible (which is not to say that it is possible as such), the need for a third transposition – namely, of readers of the English into the space in which I was engaged in translating.

Take, for example, *Metaphysics* 1071b13-14: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. Gadamer renders this fairly straightforwardly – he *übersetzt* or trans*la*tes it – as "denn es kann ja das, was nur die Möglichkeit dazu hat, auch nicht tätig sein," which I gave as "for that which only has the possibility for it [namely, moving or bringing about – I.A.M.] is indeed also able not to be active." Heidegger, however, speaks here, not of activity for ἐνέργεια, but of movedness, and he interpolates the language of ontology. His rendering is the product of *Übersetzung* or (self-)*trans*lation: "Denn was so ist, daß es bewegen, ausrichtend auf etwas zugehen *kann*, braucht ja nicht seinen Seinssinn in der Bewegtheit zu haben." It was important to follow Heidegger's lead, even if I was tempted, by Aristotle's Greek and a long tradition of interpreting it, to include the language of activity and actuality. I translated it as "For that which is in such a way that it *can* move and go toward something in a directing manner need not, indeed, have its ontological meaning in movedness."

The question of how to translate Heidegger's understanding of ἐνέργεια was not yet solved for me, however. Indeed, one of the few moments in which I felt that I needed to be translated or transposed into the space in which Heidegger was thinking was with regard to the word *Zeitigung*, which Heidegger distinctively uses to render ἐνέργεια in later passages. As a reader of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, my first inclination was to render the word simply as "temporalization," anticipating the way in which time temporalizes itself in ecstatic temporality.[8] However, *Zeitigung* also calls to mind both ripening and the time it takes to reach maturity. Earlier in his 1922 lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger gives *Vollzug* ("accomplishing," "carrying out," "enactment") as a synonym.[9] *Energeia* would be a state of maturation that brings other things to maturation. But if I went only

[7] After the composition of this essay, presented in October 2021 at an online seminar organized by *Kronos Philosophical Journal*, I added Josh Hayes as co-translator of Heidegger's and Gadamer's translations of Aristotle.

[8] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1967), e.g., §65.

[9] Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, ed. Günther Neumann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2005), 42.

with "maturation," the connection to time would largely be obscured. The best solution, it seemed to me, was to follow earlier translators and deploy the hendiadys "temporal unfolding," whose transitivity is usefully ambiguous.

There is much more to say, of course; for example, about how πάθος is rendered by Heidegger as "a how," *ein Wie*, and by Gadamer as "a something," *ein Etwas*; about how τα εἴδη become not "forms" but in Gadamer *Ideen* or "ideas" and in Heidegger *die "worauf" der bewegten Dinge*, "the 'on the basis of which's [the plural of "on the basis of which" – I.A.M.] of moved things"; or about Heidegger's frequent preservation of grammar and syntax despite his creativity at the lexical level. But I will stop here, hoping to have conveyed – and thereby translated, in a way – some of the difficulties attending not only the task of translating Gadamer and Heidegger translating Aristotle but also the peculiar task of translating translations in general.

Paolo Di Leo

HEIDEGGER GA 62, TRANSLATING *METAPHYSICS* Λ 6: A CRITIQUE OF NEO-KANTIANISM THROUGH A NEW INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE

The scope of these few pages is rather limited: providing an analysis of Heidegger's translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Λ 6, 1071b6-20. The translation and exegesis of this passage represent an excursus within the interpretation of Aristotle's conception of human knowledge as it appears in *Metaphysics* A 1 and 2. Heidegger developed his interpretation during the summer semester of 1922, when he gave a lecture course at the university of Freiburg titled "Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik."[1]

These pages do not consider the question of whether Heidegger's way of translating Greek texts, in this case those of Aristotle, is correct since it is an idle question. They will, instead, provide a clarification regarding how Heidegger's way of translating operates. Moreover, these pages will not discuss Heidegger's way of translating, since he himself does so abundantly in the introductory pages of the so-called *Natorp-Berich*. They will show, instead, how this short excursus is connected to the rest of the lecture course, that is, to their most immediate context, and how they are in a way central to the overall theme of this lecture course, which is that of detailing the understanding of the phenomenon of human knowledge as fundamentally characterized by the phenomenon of movement, which culminates in θεωρία.

To gain the terrain out of which these thematic connections can be clearly grasped, one has to hold fast to the speculative context within which the reflection carried out in this lecture course has been developed. In short, that context is represented by a theoretical

[1] In the *Gesamausgabe* (GA), this lecture course, together with the so-called *Natorp-Berich*, appears in volume 62. I will refer to Heidegger's various works using the acronym GA followed by the relevant number. Heidegger's texts will be referred to only in German, because in Singapore, where I live and work, I do not have at my disposal the various translations into English, whereas I do own the entirety of the GA volumes so far published. All translations from the German and the Greek are mine unless noted otherwise.

opposition to Neo-Kantianism and aims at gaining a more primary and thus fundamental terrain for grasping the human phenomenon, a grasping that is free of any transcendentalism such as that of the Subjectivity postulated by Neo-Kantian authors.

The articulation of these pages will be the following: (1) an introduction to the general context; (2) an analysis of the translation of the Aristotelian passages; (3) a short conclusion, in which a problematic theoretical knot will be pointed out.

INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL CONTEXT

The lecture course on Aristotle of the summer semester of 1922 is a rather important one in the development of Heidegger's thought as it stands at the culmination of Heidegger's coming into the public life of German academia. The year 1919 marks the beginning of Heidegger's career as a teacher, starting from which, in less than three years, he became famous throughout German universities thanks to the circulation of his lecture notes. By 1922, he was already the "secret king" of German philosophy, as Hannah Arendt says.[2]

But the importance of this lecture course – as well as that of those that immediately precede and follow it – is not to be found solely in the reputation they gained. In these courses, which deal mostly with Aristotle, of whose texts Heidegger attempts a phenomenological interpretation, one finds the constitutive elements of the existential analytic that Heidegger carries out in *Being and Time*. In other words, these lecture courses represent a fundamental step in the development of Heidegger's reflection.[3] Moreover, it is significant that, in preparing the layout for the foundation of *Being and Time*, they focus on Aristotle: this fact shows us that "*die Destruktion der Tradition*," which Heidegger lists as one of the most important tasks of *Being and Time* as well as, we may add, of any phenomenological investigation, is on the one hand indeed foundational for posing again the *Seinsfrage*; on the other, it does not so much consist in a destruction, that is, a doing-away-with, of the tradition as instead in eliminating the various interpretations that have saddled and finally distorted the original questioning at the core of Aristotle's thought. To use an image, "*die Destruktion der Tradition*" is similar to the work of those restorers who eliminate the various layers of later additions, which, accumulated over the centuries, have all but covered up the original structure of an ancient building. That of the "*Destruktion*" is in a certain way a work of restoration.[4]

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[2] H. Arendt, "Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt," in *Merkur* 23 (1969): 893; English translation: "Heidegger at Eighty," in *Thinking Without a Banister: Essays in Understanding 1953-1975*, trans. A. Shields, ed. J. Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2018), 419-31.

[3] On the role played by the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle's thought in these first lecture courses, see T. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993), 221-309; F. Volpi, *Heidegger e Aristotele* (Rome: Laterza, 2010), 39-109.

[4] Heidegger himself says in GA 33: "Es handelt sich nicht um eine Verbesserung der Definition, um ein freischwebendes Grübeln über einzelne leblose Begriffe, sondern dieses Nach-rückwärts-überholen ist zugleich in sich die Anstrengung, durch die wir uns wieder vor die Wirklichkeit bringen, die in den für die Überlieferung abgestorbenen Begriffen im geheimen waltet." Kisiel, in *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time, 250, rightly speaks of a "retrieve of our Greek conceptuality" and goes as far as suggesting that, while Division Two of *Being and Time* is structured around the Aristotelian concept of φρόνησις "understood as interpretative insight into a concrete situation of action," the First Division is structured around the other Aristotelian concept – namely, τέχνη. In other words, the restoration or "retrieve" of Aristotle's way of conducting philosophical investigation would lie at the core of the Heideggerian project.

However, we must not fall into the mistake of thinking that this work of restoration of an access to Aristotle is a work of historico-archeological restoration. Heidegger does not have in mind a historical reconstruction of a supposed Aristotelian doctrine. In fact, he openly puts in doubt the very legitimacy of any such attempt, given it is already burdened by implicit and unexplored presuppositions, philosophical in nature, that have their roots in the present "hermeneutical situation" (*die hermeneutische Situation*).[5] In other words, any such attempt is already saddled with its own assumptions, which as such remain unchecked. The first thing to do, then, is to bring to clarity the "hermeneutical situation" that determines the present of the interpreter, understand it in its own right, and only then interrogate the text of Aristotle (for that matter of any author), trying in turn first of all to unearth the "hermeneutical situation" of that particular text, to then, secondly, solicit the questions that emerge from its distinct thought-movement and that enable us to open up more questioning paths. Put otherwise, Heidegger is not interested in an antiquarian approach while dealing with Aristotle but in a productive dialog out of which he can develop new conceptual tools for his own thinking path within his "hermeneutical situation."[6] Hence, any accusation of misinterpretation of the Aristotelian text, when raised from a narrow philological-antiquarian perspective, although in point of detail might be right, nevertheless misses the general point. The result, ultimately, is the reduction of Aristotle's text to an object of antiquarian curiosity and ultimately the reduction of philosophy to the History of Philosophy (*Philosophie*historie), as Heidegger himself puts it.[7]

Keeping this in mind is important because, far from being a marginal caveat for whoever wants to assess Heidegger's dealing with Aristotle, it makes clear that Heidegger himself approached Aristotle starting from a certain "hermeneutical situation," the one that determined the understanding of philosophy in his own time. The lecture courses on Aristotle (like those on the phenomenology of religion) have their base in an attempt to redefine the role of philosophy in direct contrast with the definition given to it by Neo-Kantianism, the two branches of which, represented by the school of Marburg and that of Heidelberg, had determined the development of German philosophical research since the end of the 1860s. Both schools, after the coming into crisis of Hegelian thought and its understanding of philosophy as the omni-comprehensive discipline (sort of meta-knowledge), with the subsequent affirmation of the particular sciences, especially the natural sciences and to a lesser extent the historical sciences, had understood philosophy as fundamentally a theory of knowledge (*Erkenntnistheorie*). The particular sciences needed no tutelage from philosophy; far from it – with the certainty they are able to reach, they are the ones that in fact provide philosophy with a secure ground to investigate the

[5] GA 62, 347-48.

[6] Regarding the "hermeneutical situation," cf. GA 62, 346-76, pages that appear all the more important when we consider that they work as a methodical introduction to the document containing his proposed interpretation of Aristotle, which he presented to Natorp. The importance of the *Natorp-Bericht* in the development of Heidegger's reflection is underlined by Gadamer, "Heideggers 'theologische' Jugendschrift," in Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, ed. Günther Neumann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013), 67-77.

[7] GA 62, 6-8.

structures that make knowledge possible and that legitimate its conclusions.[8] The most evident manifestation of this way of proceeding is the interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as fundamentally concerned with the theory of knowledge, particularly in relation to mathematical knowledge. This is the definition that Heidegger himself gives of Neo-Kantianism when solicited by his interlocutor Ernst Cassirer at the very beginning of the "Davoser Disputation."[9]

Aristotle's thought was read and interpreted starting from the theoretical presuppositions of the *Erkenntnistheorie* and its exigences. The first task of the "*Destruktion*" appears to be, then, that of freeing Aristotle's thought of this layer of interpretation, which alters its traits and limits its potentials for a more radical understanding of philosophy. For the ultimate goal of Heidegger in these years is that of reaching a new, more radical understanding of philosophy and its role, an understanding, that is, that is based not on theoretical presuppositions but on what makes any presupposition possible in the first place.[10] Heidegger is aiming at an exploration and an unearthing of the human phenomenon in its most basic status, what he will later call its facticity.

He recognizes that Neo-Kantianism had borne significant fruits, above all in its renewed effort at the clarification of the history of philosophy as the history of problems.[11] Presumably, in saying this, he has Zeller in mind and his magnum opus of a reconstruction of the history of Greek philosophy. And it is of Zeller and Brentano – together with Natorp and Jaeger[12] – that he is thinking when redefining the concept of the divine (τὸ θεῖον) proper to Aristotle as it appears in *Metaphysics* Λ.

The concept of the divine is in Aristotle tightly linked to that of θεωρία, that is, perfect and accomplished knowledge. Θεωρία belongs to the gods, whose existence is in fact determined by it. Heidegger is brought to clarify the concept of the divine by the need to determine the concept of θεωρία, which represents the culmination of the discussion

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[8] Regarding Neo-Kantianism, see M. Ferrari, *Introduzione al neocriticismo* (Rome: Laterza, 1997), French trans. T. Loisel, *Retours à Kant* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2001); É. Dufour, *Les Néokantiens* (Paris: VRIN, 2003). As for Heidegger's position toward and interpretation of Neo-Kantianism, see "Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger" and "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Lehrstuhles seit 1866," in GA 3, 274-96 and 304-11, respectively; see also GA 41, 55-61.

[9] On the "Davoser Disputation," see M. Ferrari, *Ernst Cassirer. Dalla scuola di Marburgo alla filosofia della cultura* (Florence: Olschki, 1996), 255-87, and Ferrari, "Paul Natorp: 'The Missing Link' in der Davoser Debatte," in *Cassirer-Heidegger. 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation,* ed. D. Kaegi and E. Rudolp (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002), 215-33.

[10] As T. Kisiel points out in *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 231, Aristotle's thought for Heidegger "still manifest[s] this close proximity to the natural attitude of immediate pre-scientific acquaintance, it lacks sophistication, it is, in a positive sense, theoretically naive."

[11] GA 41, 60: "Die allgemeine Erforschung der Geschichte der Philosophie, *insbesondere auch der antiken*, wurde am Leitfaden der Philosophie Kants auf einer höheren Ebene der Fragestellung gehalten"; italics are mine.

[12] Cf. GA 62, 98-99, 99n32 and n33, where he quotes the following works: E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung.* II. Teil, 2. Abt.: Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker. 4. Aufl., (Leipzig: Reisland, 1921), 368ff.; Fr. Brentano, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, *insbesondere seine Lehre vom* νοῦς ποιητικός. *Nebst einer Beilage über das Wirken des Aristotelischen Gottes* (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867), Beilage, 234ff.; P. Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der Aristotelischen Metaphysik I," in *Philosophiche Monatshefte* 24 (1888): 37-65. The full reference to W. W. Jaeger is given by the editor of GA 62: W. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1912), 122ff. I have here reproduced the references as they appear in GA 62.

of the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge he has developed through the analysis of the first two chapters of *Metaphysics* A.[13]

Through that analysis, he has shown that, far from being prescientific[14] in the derogatory sense of the term, the understanding of knowledge Aristotle develops is rooted in a genuine grasping of life in its most immediate facticity. In other words, the Aristotelian conceptualization of knowledge starts from an understanding of the human being's involvement and dealing with (*Umgang*) its immediate surroundings determined by care. This involvement is characterized, in its unfolding, by an increase in grasping, whereby the individual masters more and more the environment and his operating in it: the culmination of this upward movement is θεωρία, that is, that stage in which the human being comes to a full grasp of its own activity and its motives. Through this analysis of Aristotle's concept of knowledge, Heidegger stresses that, on the one hand, the theoretical moment is not separate from practical activity, thus the sciences cannot be construed to swim in a separate domain of reality, the reign of an abstract noetic subject, as Neo-Kantianism (and much of post-Cartesian thought) seems to hold; on the other hand and as a consequence of what was said above, any science within general human involvement is an activity that deals with the surrounding environment and is not separate from it. This Heideggerian analysis of the first two chapters of *Metaphysics* A are corroborated by the discussion of θεωρία and its relation to πρᾶξις developed by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX and X, where it appears clear that there is no gap between πρακτικός and θεωρητικὸς βίος, but the latter springs out of the former, thus representing in its own right a form of πρᾶξις.[15]

Moreover, what becomes clear here is that, while the gods do possess θεωρία in a specially stable manner, θεωρία is not seen by Aristotle as their sole possession but is within the range of things of which the human being is capable. Hence, for the human

[13] GA 62, 13-101.

[14] This adjective is used by Natorp in reference to the Aristotelian conception of the divine in a passage that Heidegger quotes polemically in GA 62, 99: "vorwissenschaftliches Stadium der Reflexion"; this passage comes from P. Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik I.," *Philosophische Monatshefte* 24 (1888): 56. Given the tight connection Heidegger reads in Aristotle's understanding of knowledge and of the divine, this adjective can be seen as characterizing both.

[15] Cf. GA 62, 120 and 309. This absence of a clear-cut division between πρακτικός and θεωρητικὸς βίος as something that characterizes Greek thinking at large is further confirmed by the treatment of the problem in Plotinus, particularly in *Enn*. III 8, in which it clearly appears that πρᾶξις and ποίησις (for Plotinus these two terms are synonymous, contrary to Aristotle's usage of them) represent the moment in which θεωρία, understood as the highest form of creative activity, gets exhausted and finally runs out of its power. Curiously, philologists still hold that πρᾶξις and θεωρία are instead thought of as two distinct things, among which there is basically no communication or substantial relation. This is an example, I submit, of how misguided a philosophically naive philological investigation can end up being: see, e.g., the recent article by R. Chiaradonna, "Plotino e l'etica di Aristotele: Teoria, *praxis*, ragionamento deliberative," in *Ethiké Theoria*. *Studi in onore di Carlo Natali*, ed. F. Masi, S. Maso, and C. Viano (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Lettartura, 2019), 387-401, where the author – without invoking Heidegger's magisterial exegesis but just reading *Eth. Nic.* – starts by assuming a fundamental contrast between Plotinus and Aristotle on the relation between θεωρία and πρᾶξις, which for Aristotle, the author submits, represent two completely different domains. While paying close attention to the development of its theme, it is hard to see how one could say that Aristotle advocated for the existence of "un dominio proprio dell'azione pratica distinto dalla contemplazione teoretica." Heidegger thinks that this exegetical error regarding the meaning of θεωρία and πρᾶξις and their reciprocal relation is rooted in the German idealistic tradition, that is, starting from Kant: see GA 62, 309.

being, Aristotle thinks, θεωρία does not simply represent a far-cast ideal but is instead the name of one of the ways in which the human being, in its involvement and dealing with the surroundings, can *be*. Because of this shared way of being – that is, because of θεωρία – the seemingly arbitrary juxtaposition of the first two chapters of *Metaphysics* Α and *Metaphysics* Λ represents in reality a legitimate interpretative move. In Heidegger's view, the passage in *Metaphysics* Λ 6 provides us with a description of θεωρία in its most accomplished form.

So, having clarified why the juxtaposition of *Metaphysics* Α with *Metaphysics* Λ is not only possible but is in fact needed, Heidegger gives a brief and dense account of the concept of the divine in Aristotle as he sees it.[16] As noted above, this clarification is part and parcel of Heidegger's push against Neo-Kantianism and the debate that was generated within that theoretical frame.

The understanding of the Aristotelian concept of the divine within which the Neo-Kantian analysis moves is one according to which that concept is interpreted as fundamentally rooted in transcendentalism: the Aristotelian concept of the divine would be, according to that interpretation, the name for a transcendental dimension, that is, a dimension that is fundamentally beyond the level of physical phenomena, determining them as if from the outside.

The authors Heidegger thinks of in highlighting this interpretation are mostly Zeller and Brentano, between whom a controversy centered on the question of whether Aristotle understood the divine as characterized by the concept of personhood and hence unfolded will.[17] Brentano thinks that this is precisely the case and consequently reads the productivity proper of the divine as a voluntary act of creation. Zeller, on the contrary, denies this and thinks instead that the concept of the divine is conceived by Aristotle as the culmination (*Abschluss*) of a process whereby shapeless matter lifts itself up in a sort of evolutionary process to the level of the stable form, which is precisely that of the divine.[18] For Zeller, the immobility of the first mover, the godhead, represents the necessary culmination of the ontological hierarchy of entities. In both cases, then, for Brentano as well as for Zeller, we are dealing with a hierarchy that in the case of Brentano is the result of a downward action, from the peak of being, God, understood as operating through will, to the lower realities that are shaped by that divine voluntary action, whereas in the case of Zeller that process is to be understood as being upward oriented, starting from the shapeless bottom up toward the perfect form, hence deprived of will. In either case, therefore, what operates is a twofold implicit assumption: a *transcendence* that

[16] GA 62, 97-102.

[17] In ibid., 98, Heidegger refers specifically to the "Kontroverse Zeller – Brentano" as an example of the "deturpations and misinterpretations" (*Verunstaltungen und Fehlauslegungen*) that hinder a correct understanding of the Aristotelian concept of the divine.

[18] See E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen. Entwicklung*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1879), 359: "Die Stufenreihe des Seins, welche vom ersten formlosen Stoff aufsteigend sich erhebt, kommt erst in der Gottheit zu ihrem Abschluss." Zeller's polemics against Brentano is explicitly developed in 368n1. It must be noted that Zeller's reading of Aristotle's ontology is also centered on the concept of motion; however, unlike Heidegger, Zeller reads this concept within a fundamentally mechanical frame, whereby matter *moves* constantly toward its accomplishment, namely, the form. In other words, Zeller does not connect the concept of motion to the problematic of knowledge and its incrementation, as Heidegger does.

determines an understanding of being based on an ontological hierarchy. These two moments, transcendence and ontological hierarchy, are inseparable.

Heidegger thinks that this interpretation of Aristotle's concept of the divine is to be traced back to the Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle's thought. He makes this clear in a later lecture course of 1933 in which he interprets the first chapter of *Metaphysics* Θ: whereas in Aristotle there is the fundamental refusal to solve the problem of being, the question regarding the ὂν ᾗ ὄν, through the concept of "analogy" (ἀναλογία), that solution is precisely the one Plotinus embraces, reading thus entities as disposed on a ladder of being, from the less to the most being. Thus Plotinus is the one whose thought opens up and determines the development of Medieval theological-philosophical thought, this latter being characterized by the centrality of the concept of the *analogia entis*.[19] This judgment is not made explicit in the lecture course of 1922, but it is nevertheless operative as the backdrop. Instead, what Heidegger explicitly stresses is the fact that the transcendental-hierarchical reading of Aristotle's concept of the divine that represents the terrain for both Zeller and Brentano requires the demonstration of the existence of God (*Gottesbeweis*), precisely because from a certain point on the very transcendence of the divine, that is, its fundamental being outside of the domain of the sensible, calls for a proof of its actual existence. Heidegger suggests that this exigence first comes to the fore with the Syrian Fathers of the church, through whose approach theology becomes a "science" in itself, separate from other forms of knowledge and in need to establish and prove its own object;[20] from there and through Islam this exigence is passed into Christian medieval philosophy. The necessity of the proof of God's existence is, therefore, to be situated within the emergence of a kind of thought that aims at scientificity, that is, the thematic systematization of human thought and knowledge. This kind of thought comes to its full form with modernity as it appears in the thought of Descartes.[21]

Heidegger suggests that the culmination of this understanding of the concept of the divine based on a theologically oriented thought, that is, on a theology either already scientifically established or to be established, is to be found in Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit.[22] This mention of Hegel is interesting not only because it sketches a possible reading of the history of philosophy as Heidegger saw it at the time of this lecture course but also because it suggests that Hegel's thought represents the hidden terrain on which the various problems and discussions regarding the history of philosophy developed

[19] GA 33, 46-48.

[20] Cf. GA 62, 101n54. Regarding Heidegger's identification of the Syrian Fathers as those with whom a scientific, so to say, theology began, one characterized by the problem of proving God's existence, the source is most probably A. von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Tubingen: Mohr, 1909), 116-29, where John Damascenus is explicitly mentioned as a thinker who produced several proofs of God's existence. This hypothesis seems all the more probable if one considers that on p. 117 von Harnack sees the usage of the proof of God's existence as depending on an Aristotelian influence and moreover recognizes already in Augustine the presence of this practice; two things, above all the latter, which Heidegger decisively denies (see GA 62, 101): "In der Geschichte der christlichen Theologie ist dann mehrfach, vor allem seit Augustinus, immer wieder der Versuch gemacht worden, die begriffliche Explikation des religiösen Lebens und des Seins- und Gegenstandssinnes von Gott in neuplatonischen Kategorien zu denken *und die Gottesbeweise zurückzudrängen"*; italics are mine.

[21] Cf. GA 62, 119-20, but above all 309, the *Nachschrift* by Walter Bröcker, and still on the same page, 309n4, with Helene Weiß's *Nachschrift*.

[22] Ibid., 100-101.

within the frame of the *Erkenntnistheorie* grow. In other words, the problems and the discussions and solutions thereof as formulated within the frame of *Erkenntnistheorie* operate ultimately on the basis of Hegel's systematic approach.[23] Already in the lecture course on Augustine and Neoplatonism of the summer semester of 1921, Heidegger had criticized the three approaches there taken under examination: that of Troeltsch, that of von Harnack, and finally that of Dilthey – in fact most particularly this last. He criticized them for availing themselves of "*hegelsche Manipulationen*" that work through "*überzeitliche Probleme*" and "*zufällige Realisierungen*,"[24] approaches that work with abstract categories and "supratemporal" questions – questions that amount just to ahistorical abstractions –imposed by them on the thing to be known. Thus, far from uncovering the thing to be known in its concrete reasons and motives, they cover it up, ending up losing any touch with the concreteness of the historical, discussing instead groundless categories and abstractions. Against this tendency, Heidegger vindicates the need to ground any research and any problem in the solid and concrete terrain of "*faktisches Leben*." The vindication appearing in the Augustine lecture course reappears here in the form of an accusation: Heidegger imputes to the e*rkenntnistheoretisches* approach a *Kritiklosigkeit*, a lack of critical acumen. As in the lecture course of one year before, in this lecture course Heidegger also calls for first of all a recuperation of a solid grasp on the historical concrete. In other words, he asks to start from "factual life."

We thus see how the exigence of a new approach based not on abstracted and over-imposed categories but on the "factual" constitutes the main point on which Heidegger builds his methodological opposition to the scholars and thinkers who, one way or another, fall within the schemes of the *Erkenntnistheorie*, while in its turn this latter falls within the frame of Hegelianism. What Heidegger demands is nothing short of a radical change in thought orientation; the same vindication that determined Heidegger's approach to interpreting Augustine is at work also in his interpretation of Aristotle. Paraphrasing the famous Husserlian motto, we can say that for Heidegger the imperative is Back to factual Life! The few pages on the concept of the divine in its connection with that of θεωρία have to be read against this larger radical backdrop.

ANALYSIS OF THE HEIDEGGERIAN TRANSLATION OF *METAPHYSICS* Λ 6, 1071B6-20

After having given the general framework in which the text of *Metaphysics* Λ 6 is interpreted by Heidegger, I will now proceed to an analysis of his translation of the text. The aim of this analysis will be to highlight the way in which Heidegger rendered some of Aristotle's words, which in his interpretation of the text and of Aristotle's thought in general represent as many key words.

[23] It seems that is what Heidegger suggests in GA 41, 59-60: "Die Rückkehr zu Kant war von der Ansicht geleitet [...]. Das war und ist in der Tat nicht der Fall."
[24] GA 60, 171.

1071b6-7 ἀλλ᾽ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἦν.	Die Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung ist so, daß Bewengungsein nicht selbst entstehen und vergehen kann. Bewegung war nämlich immer.	The ontological character of movement is such that being-as-movement, based on what it is, cannot emerge nor can it stop. That is to say that movement has always been.
1071b7-9 οὐδὲ χρόνον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου.	So ist es auch mit der Zeit; es gibt kein Vorher und Nachher, ohne daß die Zeit nicht schon war.	The same holds as for time; there is no Before or After without which time was not already in existence.
1071b9-10 καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος.	Auch ist die Bewegung – ebenso wie die Zeit– *sich* in sich selbst nach ihrem Seinssinn zusammenhaltend. Demnach ist die Zeit entweder dasselbe wie Bewegung oder ein Wie in der Weise des Seins der Bewegung.	Movement as well – precisely like time – is, according to its ontological sense, what holds itself together in itself. Consequently, time is either the same as movement or a How in movement's Way of being.
1071b10-11 κίνησις δ᾽οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ.	Sich in sich selbst –nach ihrem Seinssinn– zusammenhaltend ist nur die Bewegung als Fortgang von-zu, und zwar ein solcher Fortgang von-zu in der Weise des >Kreisens<.	Movement – according to its ontological sense – is what holds itself together in itself only as forward-movement from-to, and indeed such a forward-movement is in the form of a "circle."

In these first three passages, we can already note a central characteristic of Heidegger's way to translate the Aristotelian text – namely, making explicit the philosophical meaning of certain central words. This "making explicit" appears as an amplification of the text, whereby, for example, the word κίνησις in the first sentence is rendered with "*die Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung*" and with "*Bewegungsein*." The fact that Heidegger renders κίνησις here through this kind of amplification is not the result of an arbitrary and gratuitous choice on his part; rather, it serves to bring to light what the center of Aristotle's questioning here is: not "movement" simply apprehended and understood as the phenomenon of a certain thing that moves but "movement" as the ontological meaning of movement. In other words, when we say "movement is," we are saying that there is such a way of being (*Seinshaftigkeit*) as being-in-movement. Later on, in the already aforementioned lecture course held in 1933 on *Metaphysics* Θ 1-3, Heidegger will refer to the former way of questioning movement or any phenomenon connected to it as κατὰ

κίνησιν, whereas the latter way is κατὰ κινήσεως: when we ask κατὰ κινήσεως, we are asking regarding and starting from movement *as such*,[25] whereas when we ask κατὰ κίνησιν, we are asking regarding a certain *Vorhandenes*, as Heidegger clarifies in that later lecture course, using terminology that is not present yet in his 1922 philosophical vocabulary.

Reflecting on this amplification that makes explicit the proper philosophical meaning of the terms to be translated as it is applied to this one particular word, κίνησις, we can already notice that Heidegger has here taken from the start an exegetical position: Aristotle in this text is interested in the being more proper to movement. While asking the question whether this interpretation is correct or not and what its exegetical foundations are is indeed legitimate, it is, however, beyond the scope of this present article to address that question. Consequently, I will leave it aside, limiting myself to noticing that such is the situation with Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's text.

The other word that here comes to the fore as invested by that translation approach of amplification is συνεχής. That word is commonly rendered with the adjective "continuous," which is perhaps a Latin (*continuum*) semantic calque.[26] However, we tend to understand this word immediately in an abstract geometrical-mathematical way, whereas both in Greek and in Latin its meaning was much more concrete, determined by what Heidegger would call the context of *faktischen Umgangs*: the meaning of both συνέχω and *contineo* is essentially that of "keeping together," "holding fast," both verbs being to a certain extent two intensive forms of ἔχω and *teneo*, respectively. Considering this, Heidegger's translation of συνεχής as "[*das*] *sich in sich selbst Zusammenhaltende*" cannot appear extravagant at all for it brings forth the primary meaning of the word before it got understood in an abstract geometrical-mathematical way. That the ancients understood this word according to its primary and most immediate meaning, as given in Heidegger's translation, is made clear by a passage in Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones* 2, 2, 2, where the word *continuatio* is explained as "*partium inter se non intermissarum coniunctio*; *unitas est sine commissura continuatio*," where *continuatio* appears to be understood as a kind of *unitas*, a unity in which the various parts are not joined (*sine commissura*) nor are they separated by intervals (*inter se non intermissarum*), but they all fall into a unity characterized by a certain way of keeping itself together of each part with all the others and, thus, with the whole. In other words, the συνεχές or *continuum* of the ancients cannot be understood as a numerical series, which cannot be conceived as a unity,[27] tending as it does to infinity, nor as the joining together of discreet segments,

[25] Cf. GA 33, 52-56, especially 53: "Denn κατὰ κίνησιν fragen und die δύναμις als κατὰ κίνησιν nehmen ist grundsätzlich verschieden vom Fragen κατὰ κινήσεως (Genitiv), d.h. vom Fragen, ob mit der *Bewegung als solcher* δύναμις etwas zu tun hat; nicht nur sofern eine beliebige δύναμις ein Bewegtes bewegt und Bewegung hervorruft; sondern ob die Bewegung als solche durch δύναμις bestimmt ist."

[26] The Latin word *continuum* is, as noted, probably a semantic calque of the Greek συνεχές. I am presently unable to verify the first occurrence of that word in Latin; it is clear, however, that the word *continuatio*, another philosophically specialized word, was in usage already by the time of Varro, as noted in Ernout-Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1951), 1207-1208, where an account of the verb *contineo* and its derivation from *teneo* is given.

[27] Cf. what Heidegger says on page 325 of GA 62, which gives us one of Helene Weiß's *Nachschriften*.

the joining of which has necessarily to bridge intervals.[28] Instead, it must be understood as a unity, a wholeness, which keeps itself together insofar as it is characterized by parts. The totality implies and demands each part, and in the same way each part demands and implies the totality: this reciprocal implication is the keeping itself together of the whole as a unity, and as such it is literally a "with-holding." When we consider this, it becomes clear that the translation of the same word, συνεχής, Heidegger gives later on when dealing with *Physics* A 2, 185b5-25, that is, *Mit-haben*, is in agreement with the one given previously.[29]

The translation given by Heidegger does more than just clarify the actual meaning of the word, clearing up any understanding of it that is determined by modern assumptions; it brings to the fore the particular way of being of the entity that consists in being-as-movement. In doing so, this translation deepens the investigation of *faktisches Leben*, since, as Heidegger reminded his audience, this particular way of being, most proper to the gods, whereby they keep themselves in themselves, is a concrete possibility also for the human being, whose life, as determined and characterized by an innate being-as-movement, is what must be interpreted. When we keep in view this general frame, within which Heidegger's interpretation of this short passage of *Metaphysics* Λ unfolds, then it appears that the Way of being described here stands at the opposite end of that other Way of being, that other existential possibility – namely, what Heidegger in this seminar calls *Ruinanz* and later will call *Verfallenheit*. In other words, Heidegger reads the moment of θεωρία as that of *Eigentlichkeit*, corresponding to that existential possibility in which the human being owns itself and its possibility.

This "*sich in sich selbst Zusammenhaltendes*" has its inner consistency in ἐνέργεια, the word that is central to the few lines left in this analysis. Heidegger translates the word ἐνέργεια and its verbal forms in two different ways: he uses the word "*Bewegtheit*" and "*Bewegtheitsein*," motility and Being-as-motility, and then the word "*Zeitigung*," bringing to completion. The last word is the one he uses in the title of this section.[30]

1071b12-13 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔσται κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις.	Aber Bewegung *ist* nicht, wenn es zwar ein Bewegendes und etwas Aurichtendes gäbe, das aber nicht so wäre, daß es *ist* in der Weise der Bewegtheitseins.	However, it *is* not movement if there was indeed something that moves and something that has a direction, but it would not be so in such a way that it *is* in the Way of Being-as-motility.

[28] This is an argument that can be found explicitly in Aristotle, *Phys*. Θ 6, 259a13-20, where the συνεχές is opposed to the ἐφεξῆς, this latter characterizing the concatenation of a series, which for Aristotle cannot be thought of as movement.

[29] When translating Parmenides's Fr. VIII, 6 (DK), where the adjective συνεχές appears, Heidegger in GA 40, 145, uses again the expression "*das sich in sich selbst Zusammenhaltende*."

[30] The title has in parentheses: "*Der Seinssinn von Bewegungsein als reine Zeitigung* (ἐνέργεια)."

1071b13-14 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν.	Denn was so ist, daß es bewegen, ausrichtend auf etwas zugehen *kann*, braucht ja nicht seinen Seinssinn in der Bewegtheit zu haben.	Then, what is so, that it *can* move and following a direction get toward something, this does not need indeed to have its ontological sense in motility.
1071b14-15 οὐδὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ᾽ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀιδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη.	Es trägt aber auch nichts bei zur *Erhellung* des Notwendig-immer-seins von Bewegung, d.h. überhaupt des Seins von Bewegung, wenn wir die Weisen der Seinshaftgkeit als immer bestehen ansetzen – wie jene, die die >worauf< der bewegten Dinge also etwas ansetzen.	It would also be of no use for the *clarification* of the necessarily-stable-being of movement, i.e., particularly of the Being of movement, if we were to settle the Ways of the ontological character as something that is constantly stuck there – as do those who settle as something of the sort the "toward-what" of things that are in motion.
1071b15-16 εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν.	Das hilft nichts, wenn in diesem Sein nicht selbst ist, an ihm selbst, so etwas wie das Kann, *Woraus*, Ausgang von Umschlagen zu sein[31].	This does not help at all if in this Being there is not in itself, resting on itself, something like being the Can, the *Whence*, Starting point of change.
1071b16-17 οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ᾽ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη.	Aber auch so etwas ist fürwahr nicht genügend [dem Sinn des Seins von Bewegung nicht entsprechendes Woher], noch leistet das eine andere, neben die besagten Worauf gesetze Weise *solchen* Seins.	And also something like this would truly not suffice [a Where-from that would not correspond to the ontological meaning of movement], nor would putting another Way of *such* Being beside the Toward-what help in this sense.

[31] In Helene Weiß's *Nachschrift*, GA 62, 320-21, we can read a different translation of this passage: "Auch das als ewig Ansetzen [Platoniker] hilft nichts, wenn an dem Sein selbst nicht die Möglichkeit ist, der Ausgang zu sein für das Umschlagen (μεταβολή)" [Approaching this (as the Platonists do) appealing to eternity does not help at all either, if the capability to be the origin for change (μεταβολή) does not rest on the Being].

1071b17 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις.	Wenn das >woraus< nicht ist in der Weise der reinen Zeitigung, wird nie verständlich sein, was es heißt: Bewegung ist [*und zwar ewige reine Kreisbewegung*].	If the "Whence" is not in the Way of pure Bringing-to-completion, it won't be possible to understand what it means: it is movement [and indeed eternal and pure Circle-movement].

We see the same translation method in the treatment of these sentences, whereby the making explicit of what in the text remains implicit represents an interpretation already in itself. The core of Heidegger's interpretation of these passages is to be found in the differentiation between "*Bewegendes*," "*Ausrichtendes*" on the one hand, and "*Bewegtheitsein*," "*reine Zeitigung*" on the other: the former refer to movement and motion as phenomenally given, that is, as observable in something that one way or another is in motion; the latter, instead, refer to motility itself and to its determination, that is, not something in motion but *motility per se*. For motility is what makes movement possible in the first place.

The argument developed in these passages is one against Plato and his doctrine of ideas, as commentators, starting from Alexander of Aphrodisia, had already noticed.[32] Very significant is the way in which Heidegger translates the adjective ποιητικόν with the participle "*Ausrichtendes*," thus making explicit on the one hand that the proper character of ποιεῖν is that of a motion that moves toward something, toward a goal or end (τέλος), on the other hand that the ideas need to be thought of as models and goals toward which (*Worauf*) the motion of the making is directed (*ausrichten auf*). In other words, the Being of things for Plato would fundamentally be that of a motion understood as a making, which in its unfolding looks at a model as at its goal.

This interpretation of the ideas cannot be easily discarded as arbitrary when we think of what Plato says in the *Timaeus* regarding the working of the Demiurge.[33] The Craftsman of the *Timaeus* makes things by looking at the ideas: in this sense, the Craftsman is a ποιητικόν, "*Ausrichtendes*." But this determination does not go far enough in explaining the why, the how, and the whence (ἀρχή, *Woher*, *Woraus*, *Ausgang*) governing the making of the Craftsman: for, in order for the Craftsman to make, that is, to be in motion as the producer and hence set things in motion through its making, the Craftsman itself must necessarily already be thought of as determined by a motility, which in turn cannot but be *in* the Craftsman itself. There is the need that *in* the Craftsman τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχή μεταβάλλειν (1071b15-16), since otherwise it could have no relation whatsoever to any model or goal if not as what in its turn is set in motion by something else.[34]

[32] Cf. H. Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica* (Hildesheim: Olma, 1960), 489-90; reprint from *Aristotelis Metaphysica Volumen* II (Bonn: Marcus, 1849).

[33] Plato, *Tim*. 28aff., e.g., a6-b1: ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν κτλ.

[34] As ποιητικόν/*Ausrichtendes auf*, the Craftsman of the *Timaeus can* make indeed, but not starting from itself. Heidegger makes explicit this meaning of the word δύναμις in his translation of 1071b13-14, where Aristotle says that what has the capability to do/make something may very well not have in itself the inner motility, starting from and sustained by which the making is possible: cf. Heidegger's translation above.

The problem for Aristotle is, then, that of determining how motion is possible, and in this effort he reaches the concept of ἐνέργεια. Following the unfolding of the Aristotelian speculation, Heidegger tries to gain an understanding of the concept of ἐνέργεια – which, as noted above, he renders with "*Bewegtheitsein*" and "*Zeitigung*" – as this concept represents the determination of the kind of movement that, going through the different ways of human activity, culminates in θεωρία. We are, then, looking at two different problems, the former being that of Aristotle: How motion is at all possible; the latter being that of Heidegger: How to determine ἐνέργεια. The latter by way of interpretation grows out of the former.

This connection between Aristotle's and Heidegger's speculation becomes fully visible in the *Nachscriften* of Helene Weiß,[35] which give us a somewhat more articulated discussion by Heidegger of the difficulties regarding the determination of the meaning of the concept of ἐνέργεια.

In those notes, Heidegger's interpretation of the Aristotelian passages assigns a particularly important place to the concept of μεταβολή (*Umschlagen*), in which he recognizes the "*allgemeiner formaler Begriff*," under which the concept of κίνησις is to be read. In order for the ideas to be considered as principle (ἀρχή) of anything, they must not only be eternal but must be such as to be themselves the origin (*Ausgang*) of a μεταβολή, of change. Thus, eternity per se does not suffice to explain the phenomenon of motion, but the eternal principle must be such as to itself act as "*Zeitigung*," that is, such as to bring-to-completion.

When looked at this way, the understanding of motion based on finalism (τέλος, *Worauf*) is eliminated in favor of one in which motion is understood as the way of being of a certain thing, which in the case of Aristotle's speculation is recognized in the Circle-motion of the sky. With the elimination of any goal external to the motion of what is taken in any kind of change (μεταβολή), Aristotle's and Heidegger's perspectives seem to converge perfectly toward the elimination of any transcendental: the πρῶτον κινοῦν "must necessarily have the meaning of ἐνέργεια."[36] However, Heidegger notices that a difficulty arises here when one considers those other Aristotelian texts where the πρῶτον κινοῦν is understood as in itself unmoved and not-in-motion: since it is the ὀρεκτὸν καὶ ἐραστόν, it is the moving, insofar as other things are set in motion through their desirous tension toward it.

How can the πρῶτον κινοῦν, being itself ἀκίνητον, be fundamentally ἐνέργεια? In the notes of Helene Weiß,[37] this question is presented but not fully addressed. Heidegger seems only to suggest a possible solution by pointing out differences between Aristotle's way of proceeding on the one hand and that of his predecessor Plato and his medieval interpreter Thomas Aquinas on the other. Heidegger says that Aristotle reaches the concept of ἐνέργεια from *within* a reflection on motion and motility.

This seems to imply that Aristotle proceeds in a certain way phenomenologically: his speculation develops around the phenomenon of motion (κίνησις), in which he recognizes the kernel of whatever exists. In Plato, instead, Heidegger finds a substantial

[35] GA 62, 320.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.

inadequacy regarding the phenomenon of motion, in that Plato's understanding of it is "*eine konstruktive*." What does Heidegger mean by this adjective? I submit we understand it by considering how Heidegger has interpreted the word εἶδος in his translation, namely, as "*Worauf*": Plato *reaches* the concept of motion, starting from the positing of the ideas as models and hence the coming into being of things as the result of a making regulated on those models.[38] Whereas for Aristotle motion is the phenomenon from which he starts and keeps always at the center of his reflection, for Plato motion and any reflection on it would be only an afterthought. Thomas Aquinas's reflection on it is based also in a certain way on a sort of afterthought, in that, in his way of proceeding, what is first put to the fore is a given normativity (*vorhandene Gesetzmäßigkeit*) led back (*zurückführt*) to a given Creator (*vorhandene Urheber*). So, while all three reflections present an element of transcendentalism, the difference separating them – namely, Plato and Thomas on the one hand and Aristotle on the other – is that the former two start from a transcendental approach, while the latter starts from an interrogation regarding a phenomenon, that is, motion.[39] I will come back to this exegetical problem in the conclusion.

The last sentences analyzed by Heidegger in this subsection stress again that it is precisely the phenomenon of motion per se, that is, motility, that has to be investigated starting from itself. This means that any ἀρχή, "*Woraus*," that is, any starting point one considers must in itself, in its ontological meaning, be determined by motility.

1071b17-18 ἔτι οὐδ'εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ'οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις.	Aber auch wenn das Woraus so wäre, die reine Zeitigung machte aber nicht gerade den Seinssinn der ἀρχή selbst aus, bliebe alles unverständlich.	But even if the Whence were such that the Bringing-to-completion would not precisely show the ontological meaning of ἀρχή itself, everything would remain unintelligible.
1071b18-19 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀίδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι.	Auch so wäre noch keine ewige, ständig saiende und ständing *gleich* seiende Bewegung. Es kann das, was nur ist, so, daß es etwas aurichten *kann*, in diesem Kann-*sein* auch *nicht* sein.	Moreover, there would be no eternal, stably being and stably equally being motion. What is only in such a way that it *can* arrange and prepare something, in this being of it determined by the *can*, it can also *not* be.

[38] This, however, does not seem to be the case for the Platonic concept of κίνησις in the interpretation Heidegger gives of it in his Marburg course of 1924/25 on the *Sophist,* GA 19.

[39] The consonance Heidegger sees here between Plato and Thomas is in keeping with how he sees the path of Western thought: a Platonic reading of Aristotle, which started at the end of antiquity, will find its highest systematization during Scholasticism, to then determine fundamentally the subsequent development of philosophical discourse.

1071b19-20 δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.	Also muß es mit dem Sein der ewigen Bewegung für diese einen solchen Ausgang geben, dessen Seinshaftigkeit, Sinn des Seins, reine Zeitigung ist, ἐνέργεια.	So there must be with the Being of eternal Motion such an Origin whose ontological meaning, Meaning of Being, is pure Bringing-to-completion, ἐνέργεια.

In these last sentences, we find the same process of making explicit that we had already observed in the translations of the previous sentences. However, in the case of these sentences, the result seems at first glance so far from the original Aristotelian dictate as to sound arbitrary. A closer look at the translations will show that this is just an appearance because in this case as well Heidegger's translation represents a very well-grounded interpretation of the Greek text.

If we look at the first sentence, what immediately strikes us is the fact that the German text is much longer than the original Greek text, to the point, in fact, that it becomes difficult to establish which Greek words are translated by which German words. Heidegger is in reality clarifying what in the Aristotelian text is formulated in such a concise fashion as to be almost unintelligible. So, the German "*die reine Zeitigung machte aber nicht gerade den Seinssinn der ἀρχή selbst aus*" corresponds to the Greek "ἡ δ᾽οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις"; whereas the German "*aber auch wenn das Woraus so wäre*" corresponds to the Greek "ἔτι οὐδ᾽εἰ ἐνεργήσει"; finally, the presence of the word ἀρχή in the translation seems completely arbitrary, as does the addition of the sentence "*bliebe alles unverständlich*." The appearance of inaccuracy and arbitrariness of the translation, with the consequent sense of bewilderment, arises from the fact that Heidegger has turned into a long conditional sentence, containing in its middle a consecutive dependent sentence, what in the Greek text is a very short implicit conditional formed by two protases coordinated by a "but" (δέ), without an expressed apodosis, this latter being the apodosis of 1071b17: "[...] οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις." To be clear, I give here the grammatical schemes of both sentences, the German and the Greek:

Ἔτι οὐδ᾽εἰ ἐνεργήσει = **first protasis** (i.e., "if" sentence)	Aber auch wenn das Woras so wäre = **protasis** introducing a consecutive (so)
ἡ δ᾽οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις = **second protasis**	Die reine Zeitigung machte aber nicht gerade den Seinssinn der ἀρχή selbst aus = **consecutive**
"furthermore, not even if it were to act toward a completion, but (δέ) its being were potentiality"	bliebe alles unverständlich = **apodosis**, not present in the Greek text.
Greek **first protasis** =	= German **protasis**
Greek **second protasis** =	= German **consecutive**

From the above schematization it appears that Heidegger has here interpreted δύναμις (in the Greek protasis) as an ontological status that is not determined by the concept of ἐνέργεια understood as "*reine Zeitigung*," Bringing-to-completion. In other words, Heidegger interprets δύναμις negatively starting from the positive ontological status of "*reine Zeitigung*." This interpretation, whereby δύναμις is ontologically determined by a "not," is granted by the very text of Aristotle, specifically what is said in 1071b18-19, where δύναμις is defined as that status that *can* as well as *cannot* be.

The other thing to be noticed is the presence in the German translation of the Greek word ἀρχή, which does not appear in the original text. However, its introduction is not arbitrary, that word being found in 1071b19-20, where it clearly means a certain origin of a certain acting, whose ontological meaning, however, is not acting as pure Bringing-to-completion, "*reine Zeitigung*." Hence it appears that Heidegger translates ἀρχή with two different words: in 1071b17-18 with "*Woraus*," implicit subject of the verb "ενεργήσει," then again repeated in Greek, in 1071b19-20 with "*Ausgang*."

Finally, we must notice the translation of the Greek adjective ἀίδιος in 1071b18-19, through which Heidegger once again makes explicit by a sort of amplification the meaning of the adjective, not "eternal" but "constant" and "equal." Still more interesting is the introduction of the adjectival participle "*seiende*," clearly referred to "*Bewegung*," modified by the two adverbs "*ständig*" and "*gleich*," the latter italicized in the text. Heidegger thus makes clear that here Aristotle is not thinking of κίνησις as simply any motion but of motility itself, which is a certain Way of Being, as such characterized by constancy, whereby it is what it is. Aristotle is thinking here of an eternal motion in the sense of a motion that *is* stably and equally keeping itself in itself.[40]

CONCLUSIONS

As a way to conclude this contextual analysis of Heidegger's translation of *Metaphysics* Λ 6, I would like to reflect briefly on the aforementioned theoretical knot regarding the πρῶτον κινοῦν, which Heidegger himself points to in one of Helene Weiß's *Nachschriften*. The passages referred to are *Metaphysics* Λ 8, 1073a27, 1074a37; Γ 8, 1012b31; *Physics* Θ 6-10, *praes.* 259b20ff.

In all these passages, Aristotle states that there need be something that, occupying the first position, moves everything that comes after it, itself remaining unmoved either in relation to the other (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) or in relation to itself (καθ'αὐτό). Aristotle calls this the πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. Heidegger asks how what in its essence is pure bringing-to-completion, "*reine Zeitigung*," can be said to be ἀκίνητον. He then rather cryptically notices that "*Was sie* [i.e., ἐνέργεια] *ist, welche Art von Bewegung, auch das ergibt sich aus dem Sinn reinen Bewegtheit*." But what does this mean if not the absolute primacy of ἐνέργεια, fundamentally understood as *actus* – to use that word of the philosophical tradition from Scholasticism down to Hegel and Gentile, which Heidegger avoids so carefully? The meaning of "*reine Bewegtheit*" is, then, already determined by the meaning of ἐνέργεια, understood as *pure act*, a holding-itself-up that leaves no residue because it

[40] About this way of translating and understanding the adjective ἀίδιος, see T. Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 40-41.

has no matter, given the fact that it does not move but rests on its being-accomplished.[41] It is on the base of this πρῶτον κινοῦν that the whole, τὸ πᾶν, stands, that is, because it holds fast (συνεχές) to the principle (ἀρχή).[42] But what is this if not God, that is, the "*Grund*" of metaphysics and of the Christian theological tradition determined by metaphysics?

Asking this does not mean to question Heidegger's exegesis of Aristotle, as it appears in the lecture course we examined, from the point of view of philological and historical accuracy. This would mean on the one hand to fall back into the naive philological approach, unaware as it is of its own theoretical presuppositions; on the other, to fundamentally misunderstand the Heideggerian approach to the history of philosophy, which he sees as the destined unfolding (*Geschick* and *Geschichte*) of the beginning (*Anfang*) springing up from the Enowning (*Ereignis*).[43] This means for Heidegger not to reconstruct a supposed doctrine born out of the mind of each philosopher, as if what a thinker does is to build doctrines, but to interrogate in the direction of that which in the thought of each given thinker remains un-thought.

If we keep this in mind, we can then look at this theoretical knot in a more fruitful manner. This knot is centered on the fact that the very concept of the divine, representing the highest exemplarity of θεωρία, appears to be grounded on a transcendence whose linkage to the immanence of the visible phenomena, while suggested, remains unclarified.[44] Is this perhaps the un-thought (*das Ungedachte*) that Heidegger will try to think explicitly in the essay "Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik"?[45] There Heidegger tries to think out the "ungedachte *Einheit des Wesens der Metaphysik*,"[46] that "meaning-penetrating unity of the most common, i.e., of what has always and everywhere the same value, and reason-giving unity of the being-total, i.e., of what is the highest above all."[47] Does not perhaps that obscure unity start to appear to Heidegger already in this early confrontation with Aristotle?

When looked at this way, this theoretical knot, far from giving an opportunity for a sterile historical-philological polemics, provides us instead with a possible entry point into the movement of Heidegger's laborious and maze-like thought-path.

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[41] *Met.* Λ 8, 1074a37: τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον, ἐντελέχεια γάρ. The expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον is clearly another way to refer to the πρῶτον κινοῦν.

[42] *Phys*. Θ 6, 259b20-31: τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς μενούσης ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ πᾶν μένειν συνεχὲς ὂν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν.

[43] All these Heideggerian words would need a careful meditation in order to understand what they say, a task in which a German speaker does not stand on better ground than speakers of other languages. Any attempt at translating these words should first of all transport itself to the thought domain these words have reached, a task that cannot be undertaken here. As for *Ereignis,* I use the solution proposed by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly in their translation of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*; see Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, tr. P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

[44] The transcendence of the Aristotelian ἀρχή is also an immanence insofar as the ἀρχή does not exist in another dimension, as do the Platonic ideas or later on the Christian God, at least in a way in which Christian theology conceived it.

[45] GA 11, 51-81. This essay was composed by Heidegger more than thirty years after the lecture course of the summer semester of 1922.

[46] Ibid., 63.

[47] Ibid., 66: "Die Metaphysik denkt das Sein des Seienden sowohl in der ergründenden Einheit des Allgemeinsten, d.h. des überall Gleich-Gültigen, als auch in der begründenden Einheit der Allheit, d.h. des Höchsten über allem."

Silvia Fazzo and Jaka Makuc

HEIDEGGER'S 1922 TEACHING ON *METAPHYSICS* LAMBDA: A CHALLENGE FOR ARISTOTELIZING SCHOLARS

Whoever has been dealing with reading Aristotle in the twentieth century has come across Heidegger's path, which is powerful and significant for anyone involved in phenomenology and hermeneutics as philosophical currents on their own, regardless of whether or not ancient Greek philosophy is entitled to play a role in it.

By contrast, it does not often happen that special attention is paid to a dialogue with those Aristotelizing scholars who – for the most part, no doubt – never got involved in Heideggerian readings and who might well find them to be embarrassingly distant from their own, no less in method as in content.

It is precisely for this reason that both of us are honored to make a brief contribution to this change of views. The whole *Kronos* enterprise deserves the gratitude of Aristotelizing scholars. A bridge is being provided that qualifies and expresses the very nature of Aristotelian studies throughout the centuries – namely, building a dialogue on rational grounds, sharing viewpoints based on Aristotle's grammar of thought. This has proved to be a unique path for reciprocal understanding – no matter from which language, culture, religion, time, and place. It is, after all, Aristotle's main legacy to humankind.

Our comments will focus on what the impact hopefully can be to allow a closer understanding of Heidegger's distinctive and unconventional approach to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* book Lambda.

Heidegger's Lambda translations appear in his 1922 courses.[1] Three features and two references to contemporary scholarly works are worth commenting upon, insofar as they are especially significant and tightly interconnected.

One surprising fact could be that Heidegger's Lambda translations are there at all, since there is no hint that he devoted special attention to that (supposedly) theological book. On the contrary, following Jaeger's 1912 path, Heidegger does his best to avoid putting

[1] Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 62 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975-), 102-5 (hereafter cited as HGA with relevant volume and page numbers).

Lambda or any possible overarching book in the middle. Another remarkable fact is how short and fragmentary such quotes from Lambda are. The third striking feature is how distant such renderings of Aristotle's Greek into modern languages are from standard ancient Greek.

The three features are interconnected, not only with each other, as parts or steps in Heidegger's project, but also with the general historical context. This includes no doubt the state of Aristotelian studies in early twentieth-century Germany, as can be seen from Heidegger's suggested bibliography, which, though rich in Aristotle editions and translations, is very selective where scholarly literature on Aristotle is concerned.

Heidegger mainly indicates one very updated reference work and one main piece of relevant scholarship. The suggested reference work is F. Ueberweg's *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*.[2] A paratextual remark gives an idea of the way these courses were recorded for the sake of a tightly knit Freiburg community: "Anyone can find it in the reading room," which clearly means, Please, go and read it.

We can still locate the book in the Freiburg University Library. This is the eleventh edition of Ueberweg's *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, the second since Karl Praechter assumed the editor's office in 1907. Unlike the 1909 edition of the Ueberweg-Praechter, the eleventh, "*Neubearbeitete und stark vermehrte*," is radically revised.[3] Section 47 especially, the one about Aristotle's writings, was almost entirely new; it grew from scarcely one page in 1909 to being more than ten times longer in 1919. This means that the 1920 section 47 about Aristotle's writings is almost entirely new in this eleventh edition. Werner Jaeger's 1912 *Studien* are quoted there not less than twenty-five times.[4] Praechter, the main author of the section, summarizes in the most authoritative way the new state of Aristotelian studies.

Praechter does this all in light of Jaeger's hypotheses, which he follows closely, as he says,[5] and which he praises uniquely, without any shadow of criticism, while giving them a most appropriate overall shape. By doing so, Praechter in 1920 made Jaeger's hypotheses a main research stream for Heidegger and several generations of scholars to come.

The following year, 1921, Jaeger, in his turn, offered an enthusiastic review of Praechter's work. Jaeger ended with a wish, almost a forecast: "Perhaps it [i.e., Praechter's work] will also contribute to a new philosophical rethinking of the absolute content of the old philosophy, which we need more urgently than ever."[6] From 1921, Heidegger

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[2] F. Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. K. Praechter, vol. 1, 11th rev. ed. (Berlin: Mittler, 1920) (hereafter cited as Ueberweg-Praechter).

[3] The relevant volume (i.e., the copy of the eleventh edition of Ueberweg-Praechter that was in the reading room in 1922) is still in the University Library Freiburg with the signature B 200, ak-1 (we are grateful to Dr. J. Werner for this information). In 1926, the canonical Ueberweg-Praechter version, "*umgearbeitete und erweiterte*," was finally published. The work was superseded only in 1983: Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. H. Flashar, vol. 3: Ältere Akademie, Aristoteles, Peripatos (Basel: Schwabe, 1983); see Charles H. Kahn's review in *Gnomon* 62, no. 5 (1990): 397-404.

[4] Werner Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1912).

[5] Ueberweg-Praechter, 273.

[6] Werner Jaeger, "Praechters Grundriss der Geschichte der alten Philosophie," *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1921): 137-41; repr. W. Jaeger, *Scripta Minora*, vol. 2 (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1960), 253-56: "Vielleicht

reads ancient philosophy, and especially Aristotle, in his courses. Jaeger's hypotheses, widespread and reinforced by Praechter, mean something to him. They affect his approach to Aristotle, to his *Metaphysics*, and to *Metaphysics* book Lambda in particular.

A telling point of contact with Praechter is about Aristotle in general. Both Praechter and Heidegger are convinced that all of Aristotle's works are affected by the results of Jaeger's *Studien* on the *Metaphysics.* This is stated from the outset of the relevant section by Praechter ("in ihren Ergebnissen aber auch für die anderen Lehrschriften entscheidend waren") and then again by Heidegger, in very similar words: he praises Jaeger's "Ergebnis [...] für alle Aristotelesinterpretation grundlegenden Untersuchung."[7] Later on, in a 1952 seminar devoted to the relationship between *Physics* III and *Metaphysics* book Theta 10, Heidegger could still claim that his own philosophy was rooted in the texts of Greek philosophy he had already read as a gymnasial student in 1912 and that among these Jaeger's *Studien* were of particular stimulus to him. It is no coincidence that the *Studien* and the 1923 text on Aristotle[8] are referred to as "wichtige Werke." In *Von Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις*, Heidegger criticizes Jaeger's 1923 text for thinking in an "ungriechisch, scholastisch-neuzeitlich und neukantisch" manner; the *Studien* would instead be more correct because "vom 'Inhaltlichen' weniger berührt."[9] It is the methodological-formal nature of the *Studien* and so the new kind of philology they exhibit, not their proper conceptual content, that earns Heidegger's enthusiasm. As we shall see soon, this aspect is of the most relevance for understanding his idea of philology.

It is therefore Heidegger himself, and moreover in a mature phase of his thought, who makes explicit the fundamental importance that Jaeger's *Studien* had for his philosophical formation and production.[10]

As for the *Metaphysics*, it is Praechter's view that Jaeger's main progress is already breaking with the standard viewpoint in relation to broad and authoritative nineteenth-century scholarship: the first modern critical editors of the *Metaphysics*, Brandis, Bonitz, and Schwegler, are duly mentioned, with works published in the first half of the nineteenth century – 1823, 1847, and 1848, respectively. All of them strove for the best possible edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* after the damages it sustained in the course of the tradition. In fact, in Jaeger's view, there is nothing that classical philology can strive to reconstruct in a single work: the *Metaphysics* should not be regarded as a "work" at all since Aristotle did not have a unified conception of this subject.

In this regard, not only was Jaeger to dominate the exegetical debate about the *Metaphysics* for decades,[11] but his very key words come again in Heidegger's premises. In particular, Jaeger expressly plays a major role in Heidegger's 1922 courses. Let us consider this role more closely.

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trägt es auch zu neuer philosophischer Durchdenken des absoluten Gehalts der alten Philosophie bei, deren wir dringender denn je bedürfen,"

7 HGA 62, 5.

8 The same text was already recommended by Heidegger to his students in the 1924 course; see HGA 18, 4.

9 HGA 9, 242.

10 HGA 83, 654-55.

11 P. Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Essai sur la problématique aristotélicienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 7: "La thèse de W. Jaeger [...] ne parut révolutionnaire à beaucoup que parce qu'elle restaurait, contre les détours de la tradition, le point de vue du simple bon sens."

Jaeger's 1912 *Studien* consist of two parts (*Einteilungen*). The first is titled "Die Komposition der Metaphysik." Here, the very phenomenon of having the fourteen books of the *Metaphysics* assembled in their present form is severely scrutinized and deconstructed. The title of the second part is "Die literarische Stellung und Form der Metaphysik."

Heidegger follows Jaeger's path closely. The title in his *Vorbemerkung* is very close to Jaeger's: "Die Literaturform der überlieferten aristotelischen Schriften." The main difference, as we can see, is that Heidegger follows Praechter in generalizing Jaeger's claim concerning the *Metaphysics*: that it applies somehow to all of Aristotle's texts. This, even if it does not affect our present concern, which is with the *Metaphysics*, testifies to Jaeger's growing credit within the Aristotelizing community. It means that after Jaeger (1912), things turned critical for any traditional interpretation of Aristotle as a whole.

According to Jaeger, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* books were composed in a very different order from the traditional one, and the *system* that was made out of it is not Aristotelian in itself. This can apply to any Aristotelian work in several books.

In the general context of early twentieth-century Germany, the success of this change of perspective, putting value on the huge work accomplished under Hermann Diels's direction from 1882 to 1909 by the Berlin Academy on Aristotle's Greek commentators, deserves emphasis: these commentators thereafter became a separate field of research.

In Heidegger's view, however, Jaeger's deconstruction opens the door to something different still – that is, to Heidegger's further deconstruction of the *Metaphysics* from a plurality of viewpoints. At the very beginning of his 1922 *Vorlesung*, Heidegger refers to Jaeger's 1912 *Studien* as a work of philology. He states that such a philological work has relevance for "philosophic interpretation" in a negative way: the composition of metaphysical or just philosophical texts into a system could not be arranged "with violence," "forcibly" (*gewaltsam*). Heidegger says:

> The result [of Jaeger's investigation], which is fundamental for any interpretation of Aristotle, can be summarized as follows: What is available to us is scientific literature strongly characterized by investigation and ongoing research; namely, it is meant to communicate within the closed research community in the Lykeion (research institute!). [We have] Lecture notes in the movable form of the "treatise." Their *ekdosis* mode, the type of publication, is not an edition as a book and "philosophical work." Rather, it is the kind of communication that is in the form of a lecture (Aristotle's own manuscripts and their possible copies) for the sake of the introduction to and involvement in philosophical research. [...] For a philosophical interpretation, the result of Jaeger's investigation is important in a negative way: it means that it is not acceptable to connect the treatises forcibly in a single system of metaphysics or even of philosophy as a whole.[12]

[12] HGA 22, 5-6: "Das Ergebnis der für alle Aristoteles Interpretation grundlegenden Untersuchung ist kurz folgendes: Was vorliegt ist wissenschaftliche Literatur mit dem betonten Charakter der Untersuchung und eigentlichen Forschung; und zwar ist sie berechnet auf Mitteilung innerhalb der engeren Forschungsgemeinschaft im Lykeion (Forschungsinstitut!). Vorlesungsschriften in der beweglichen Form der 'Abhandlung' – ihre *Ekdosis*-Weise, Publikationsart ist nicht die Herausgabe als Buch und 'philosophisches Werk' –, sondern die Mitteilung in der

As we are about to see, Heidegger's understanding of *Metaphysics* Lambda is especially affected by the new trend – an especially deconstructing one, no doubt. The philological violence due to a systematizing will to which Heidegger alludes here can be traced back to a methodological approach, such as that of Wilamowitz. In a letter of December 1932 to Jaeger, Heidegger makes his criticism explicit: "I must confess that to this day the estimation of Wilamowitz precisely as philologist remains incomprehensible to me." And in that very letter, Heidegger contrasted Jaeger and Wilamowitz as "two completely different philologists."[13]

As we have seen previously, Jaeger has assigned to the *Metaphysics* an open and multilayered text, renouncing *systematizing* "forcibly" the fourteen books into a single "whole" (as seen before).[14] This is precisely what justifies Heidegger's esteem for Jaeger. In his summer 1926 course, "Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie," where he discusses Jaeger's *Studien* and Aristotle's reception, Heidegger writes, "Aristoteles sei der Baumeister, Zusammenhalt und Gebäude, Lehrgebäude. *Thomas*. Reine Finktion! Alles offen."[15] In spite of reserving some critics of Jaeger himself,[16] it is clear that this *motto* summarizes Jaeger's greatest achievement in Aristotelian philology. In a nutshell: "*system*" against "*Alles offen*."

This remains the cornerstone of the Heideggerian reading of Jaeger's work until later years, as seen above. That is why it is simple to bring together Heidegger's esteem for the new philological method developed by Jaeger and his occasional criticisms of some of his major theses.[17] We will shortly see the consequences of this for the Heideggerian reading of philology itself.

In Jaeger's, Praechter's, and Heidegger's accounts, little remains of the value of this twelfth book of Aristotle's so-called "theology," which had been regarded as by far the most important one in the *Metaphysics* since the third century CE. According to Jaeger,

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Vorlesung (eigener Manuskripte und deren [?] Nachschriften) für die Ein- und Mitführung in philosophische Forschung. [...] Für die philosophische Interpretation ist das Ergebnis der Jaegerschen Untersuchung in negativer Hinsicht wichtig: daß es nicht angeht, die Abhandlungen gewaltsam auf ein System der Metaphysik oder gar der ganzen Philosophie zu komponieren."

[13] We quote this letter from F. H. W. Edler, "Heidegger and Werner Jaeger on the Eve of 1933: A Possible Rapprochement?" *Research in Phenomenology* 27 (1997): 125. This essay is particularly helpful in shedding light on the relationship between Heidegger and not only Jaeger but also the philologists he influenced or was influenced by (i.e., Kurt Riezler, Karl Reinhardt, Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Julius Stenzel, Walter F. Otto; see ibid., 127).

[14] Heidegger writes, "so daß von vornherein das Bemühen auszuschalten ist, die 14 Abhandlungen der 'Metaphysik' über einen Leisten zu schlagen und in ihnen die einheitliche Darstellung des aristotelischen '*System*' zu sehen," HGA 18, 5 (my italics).

[15] HGA 22, 146. This may remind us of the *motto* in *exergo* to Aubenque's *Le problème de l' être chez Aristote*: *"Sine Thoma mutus esset Aristoteles"* (Aubenque, *Le problème de l' être chez Aristote*, 1). This is discussed in S. Fazzo's "L'Aristote sine glossa de Pierre Aubenque: notes pour une mise à jour" (in preparation).

[16] We will return to this matter soon; see note 31.

[17] The major one of them concerns, of course, Jaeger's interpretation of *Metaphysics* Theta 10 in relation to Schwegler and Ross, which cannot be examined more deeply here; see, for instance, HGA 21, 171-73; HGA 31, 81-84; HGA 83, 654-57. This is why in this last work (1951) Heidegger can say that he has been dealing with the problem for twenty years in his lectures (HGA 81, 609), referring precisely to GA 31. After all those years, he will still see Theta 10 as the "*Höhepunkt*"/"*Gipfel*" of both Aristotelian and ancient Greek thought (HGA 31, 82; HGA 81, 656-57).

Book 12, that is, book Lambda, had been removed from its traditional overarching role in the series of books.

Praechter summarizes the subject of book Lambda as follows: "Die Arten von Substanzen (sinnlich-vergängliche, sinnlich-unvergängliche, unsinnliche; letztere fallen unter eine besondere Wissenschaft [die Metaphysik], falls sie mit den sinnlichen von keinem gemeinsamen Prinzip abzuleiten sind)."[18] That is, in Praechter's account, Lambda is a treatise about kinds of substances, with no mention at all of the prime unmoved mover, let alone of theology. Praechter is clearly referring to Lambda 1, 1069a36-b2.[19] While grasping a single, aporetic sentence, he gives an opposite, especially iconoclastic result where the traditional interpretation of the *Metaphysics* and of book Lambda in particular is concerned.

Heidegger does not enter into the issue, but it is interesting to note that the spare passages he chooses to comment upon in book Lambda are those that are concerned with *movement,* the main theme of physics.

Later on, shortly after the war, Hans-George Gadamer as well, a former pupil of Heidegger's, produced a translation of *Metaphysics* Lambda. This translation covers the entire book and is known fairly well, unlike Heidegger's bits and pieces of translation, which have hardly been discussed. In spite of their differences in approach, Jaeger's reference is crucial to both. A comparison is telling: Gadamer's sounds like both a response and a follow up to Heidegger's idiomatic way of translating.[20]

Heidegger's and Gadamer's approaches thus show their differences and crucial similarities. Both scholars are very careful and focused on Aristotle's text. Yet, if one were to regard either work as philological, it is clear that philology means something different in the two cases. Gadamer's is as close and literal as one can be, above the average tendency of current Aristotle translations. He is both sharp-sighted on the context of meaning and faithful to the textual structure. Heidegger's translations, by contrast, rarely meet standard expectations about what a translation is supposed to be. Precisely for this reason, they call for close scrutiny.

Nevertheless, points of contact are strong and relevant. Gadamer's close rendering of the Greek text is as committed as Heidegger's to the deep meaning of entire sentences and arguments. Gadamer's translation also depends on Jaeger's 1912 edition,[21] as if it were as obvious and fundamental a reference work in 1948 as it was for Heidegger in 1922.

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[18] Ueberweg-Praechter, 379 (1926 ed., 367).

[19] This is a controversial passage: it paves the way to the argument of chapter 6-7, but, on a different reading, might imply that nonsensible substances belong to *Physics* and that First Philosophy collapses with physics (although not with *the Physics*, which is a much later collection of Aristotle's books) – and vice versa, as held in *Met*. Epsilon 1. For a review of issues at stake, see S. Fazzo, *Commento al libro Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele*, Elenchos 61.2 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2014), 226-32.

[20] See Aristotle, *Metaphysik XII*, trans. and comm. H.-G. Gadamer, 3rd. rev. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976). The first edition of the text dates back to 1948. Gadamer's translation has been translated in its turn; an Italian indirect translation based on Gadamer's circulates among scholars: Aristotle, *Metafisica libro XII. Introduzione e commento di Hans-Georg Gadamer* (Genoa: Il melangolo, 1995). I (S. F.) have seen the book in Enrico Berti's hands more than once at the Padua Aristotle Reading Seminar because, as Enrico says, of its small size. Since the parallel Greek text is given, it offers an easy way to bring along that very crucial book of the *Metaphysics*.

[21] Gadamer cites Jaeger's 1912 and 1923 works as "Die grundlegenden Arbeiten von Wernen Jaeger" (see Gadamer's *Einleitung* to his edition of Aristotle, *Metaphysik XII*, 8). In the third edition, he also mentions Düring's

We know that Gadamer took a different path than Heidegger when he moved to study philology. At that time, philology was becoming more and more relevant for Heidegger as well, not so much in itself but as a part of the relationship between philology and philosophy.

But what does *Philologie* mean in Heidegger? This is a very broad question, which can be addressed here only tentatively and partially. Our purpose is elucidating Heidegger's understanding of *Übersetzung* from Greek texts, a technique whose implication for philology is particularly tight. In Heidegger's view, no doubt, mastery of language, Greek especially, is necessary (*Sprachbeherrschung*). This must be what the very word and concept of philology is primarily referring to when *Philologische Sprachbeherrschung* is prescribed. But philology couples with hermeneutics as the very path for authentic understanding, which uses an interpretative method.[22] His very understanding of the term "translation" shows that there was no time when Heidegger's approach to Greek sources was not entirely focused on the philological reading – that is, on his own hermeneutics. One could even discuss whether or not Heidegger's *Übersetzungen* could be called translations since the German word is both broader and stronger and is in no way confined to words as sums of alphabetic letters.

We come now to our starting point, hoping we have achieved a further viewpoint on a current aporia. As mentioned above, scholars interested in Lambda's fortune can be perplexed by the fact that Heidegger seems to pay no special attention to one of the most important books in the history of philosophy, one that was traditionally regarded as the top of the *Metaphysics*. What is worse, he seemingly "translates" some few sentences of it in a way that does not at all meet standard expectations. Indeed, Heidegger's approach to Lambda offers a good example and an interesting case study: we see here in what way Jaeger's evaluation of the *Metaphysics* is so influential to Heidegger's deconstructing attitude.

In Jaeger's view, book Lambda especially is dramatically out of order: it is not one of the latest, nor the most important (as opposed to what is expressed in Alexander of Aphrodisias and, under his influence, in Averroes's *Commentarium Magnum*). In Jaeger's view, Lambda is still composed by Aristotle in the context of Plato's Academy. Therefore, Lambda should be an early book of reduced relevance in Aristotle's system, earlier in composition than the earliest (other) books of the *Metaphysics*. This contributes to our understanding of Heidegger's apparently dismissive attitude toward this book and to his extreme freedom in processing the series of bits and pieces from the Greek text during his 1922 classes.

The context is relevant as well. Heidegger looks at Lambda with the particular aim of grasping some information about the subject treated by him in those 1922 classes: "God" according to Aristotle. As a result, Jaeger's thesis tells us that Heidegger was looking for Aristotle's God not in Lambda but in *Metaphysics* Alpha, which explains that the discussion of Lambda passages does not belong to a class on Lambda but to a class on Alpha, chapter 2, as the running title of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* correctly shows.

1966 classic.

[22] HGA 62, 4-7.

Heidegger's starting point is a passage in Alpha 2, 983a5-10: an argument by *endoxon* by which Aristotle summarizes the current views about God held by Greeks, including Plato. In this sense, the passage does not properly say anything about Aristotle's view. Book Alpha is introductory and protreptic in its view. Wisdom is characterized by several viewpoints.

In this context, the highest wisdom is "divine." "Divine," which means "of God," has two meanings corresponding to the subject's genitive and the object's genitive: science belonging to God and science about God. Seeking wisdom is divine in both senses. This analysis by Aristotle in Alpha 2 is thus somehow similar to an etymological explanation of the very word "divine." This is the context in which Heidegger looks at Lambda, as if this were the standard place to look in order to find Aristotle's conception of God. The use of a few sentences of book Lambda is ancillary to an understanding of book Alpha. Surprising as this can be, such a use of Lambda makes sense in light of Jaeger's 1912 theory about the genesis of the *Metaphysics*.

One is struck by the shortness of his selected sections of the book, the reading of which, however, seems to have been inspirational for the attending students, as we can gather by the way notes were taken during the class: see, for example, the nominal sentence with an exclamation point: "[Met. Λ 9, 1074b34] – θεωρία!"[23]

As for Gadamer, who is also a Jaegerian (since in spite of this he translates the whole of book Lambda), the obvious difference between his and Heidegger's translation is integrality as opposed to partiality: Heidegger's translation covers a few lines only of the entire book. In this sense you may think that Gadamer's fills in Heidegger's gaps. On the other hand, Gadamer's is so literal that one is tempted to regard it as a response to Heidegger's.[24] But Gadamer's translation deserves credit on its own. Its strict literality is rewording in a field where so often one translator relies on the former, and translations so often all seem alike. Not so in Gadamer,[25] and definitely not so in Heidegger, as we are about to see. We might say that the master and the pupil share a precise common trend, insofar as both are approaching the Greek Aristotle text on its own, as a *sola scriptura* without intermediary filters. In fact, things are still more complicated than this. Gadamer translates in the narrow and current meaning of the word "translation." Heidegger's translations can

[23] In his *Nachwort* to volume 62 of the HGA, Günther Neumann reconstructs the chronology and writing of the 1922 course and points out that he was able to consult the notes of Walter Bröcker, Helene Weiß, and Franz Josef Brecht (HGA 62, 422).

[24] One is told that "Heidegger's initial distrust of the philosophical talent of his young assistant determined Gadamer's drastic decision to turn to the study of classical philology after completing his doctorate in philosophy in the spring of 1925. Paradoxically, it was precisely Gadamer's excellent results in this field that prompted Heidegger to propose his habilitation in philosophy in 1927." See G. Gregorio, "Lebendigkeit, Selbstbewegung und Erkenntnis. Zu Gadamers Interpretation des Timaios," in *Selbstbewegung und Lebendigkeit. Die Seele in Platons Spätwerk*, ed. M. Abbate, J. Pfefferkorn, and A. Spinelli (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 299n1.

[25] For example, for a most controversial point among scholars in 1071b12, see A. Laks, "Metaphysics L 7," in *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*. ed. M. Frede and D. Charles, Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 207-43 versus E. Berti, "Unmoved Mover(s) as Efficient Cause(s) in Metaphysics L 6," in ibid., 181-206, and Fazzo, *Commento al libro Lambda*, 290-95; on the textual constitution of that sentence, see also S. Fazzo, *Il libro* Lambda *della* Metafisica *di Aristotele*, Elenchos 61.1 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2012), 267; κινητικὸν is rendered in the most cautious way as "*ein Bewegen-Könnendes*." This not only avoids commitment with the nature of the implied kind of causality in κινητικὸν but allows space for a noncausal understanding as well for the same verbal adjective – namely, as potentiality to be in movement, and not only to move something else, as in most current translations.

be somehow similar, sometimes very different than a translation in the current meaning of this word. He thus does something both similar and different at the same time, as we are about to see, starting from some of his numerous relevant assessments, now collected by John Sallis for the sake of this special issue of *Kronos*; see text 1.

Some of these statements look like plain and clear assessments of the subjective value of every given translation, whose very mission is to bring the world of the author into the new world of the translator:

> **Text 1.** "Jede Übersetzung ist aber schon Auslegung."[26]

However, see text 2. If we look to more involved and engaged discussions about the very value of translating in Heidegger's perspective, we find something crucially different, in the light of which even the previous statement turns in a different direction.

> **Text 2.** "Da diese (Übersetzung) schon die eigentliche Auslegung ist, bedarf es nur einer Erläutrung der 'Übersetzung.'"[27]

Here, Heidegger does not speak about translations as a *genre* nor about translations as a whole. Since he does not do so, text 1's commitment to "Every translation" is in no way a neutral statement but paves the way to a completely different concern: "translating," so to speak – we shall see some telling examples very soon – as a way of making philosophy. Were it not so, one could not make sense of the ancillary role of "explanatory remarks" (*Erlaütrung*) *on* "translations."

The special force and meaning of Heidegger's concept of translation is made clear in text 3, where he plainly distinguishes "translation" in the current sense, a kind of displacement of meaning in a different language, and "translation" in his sense, a philosophical activity that moves from one context to another: from Greece of the fourth century BCE to Germany of the twentieth century CE.

> **Text 3**. "Die 'Übersetzung' ist allerdings keine Übertragung des griechischen Wortes in die eigene Tragkraft unserer Sprache. Sie will nicht das griechische Wort ersetzen, sondern gerade nur in dieses versetzen und als Versetzung in ihm verschwinden."[28]

For now it must be emphasized that nothing of all this would make sense were Heidegger's "translations" mere translations in the current sense. This does not mean that none of them ever looks – prima facie at least – like an ordinary translation. But in such cases, too, one has to pay attention to single changes of wording and even to seemingly irrelevant minutiae: any of these can be a further symptom of a work in the progress of appropriation – that is, the ownership of the philosophical activity is being handed to the "translator" (*Versetzer*).

[26] HGA 8, 107.
[27] HGA 9, 245.
[28] Ibid.

It is precisely at this point that it makes sense to return to what we saw about philology in the 1922 course. Already in this text it was said that "every translation is already a precise interpretation" and that translation "is always relative to the purpose [*Ziel*] of the interpretation."[29] An authentic translation is therefore always philosophical and not just philological. In other words, a nonphilosophical translation is simply not a translation but precisely a violent (*gewaltsam*) assemblage (i.e., Wilamowitz).[30] This allows us to resume Heidegger's interpretation and usage of Jaeger's work: to its credit, Jaeger's philology leaves room for the philosophical question to arise (but he is not the one asking philosophically),[31] which is decisive both for the correct approach to the philological problem being tackled and for its eventual explicative understanding.[32]

In what follows, we will not go through all of the bits and pieces, but we suggest a few remarks on some of them so as to justify our final conclusion, starting with Heidegger's first translated sentence,[33] our text 4. We therefore need to pay attention to a change of wording:

> **Text 4.** Λ 6, 1071b6-7: ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν
> "Die Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung ist so, daß Bewegungsein nicht selbst entstehen und vergehen kann. Bewegung war nämlich immer." Bewegung ist ihrem Seinssinne nach so, daß sie immer war. (Eigentlicher Seinssinn von Bewegung: der der ersten kreisenden ständigen Bewegung des ersten Himmels.)

Here Aristotle's "movement" becomes "*Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung*." It is quite evident that Heidegger is reading the passage in the light of its central concept of *Bewegtheit*, which in those years represents the core of his ontology of facticity. It is impossible here to go through the entire development of this concept, but it is important to point out that for Heidegger the ontological character of movement is both a practical and a theoretical process. We read in the *Sophistes*, "So ist jede πρᾶξις, jedes νοεῖν Bewegung."[34] As we will see later, this aspect is of particular interest because it will allow Heidegger to introduce movement also in the πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον as its constitutive component, arriving at results that are apparently paradoxical but consistent with the "kinetic ontology" he was elaborating in those years.[35]

Nevertheless, this move also has some justification in its favor from a strictly Aristotelian perspective. As a matter of fact, it seems that a general concept of κίνησις is found in the middle of Aristotle's sentence, and only in the course of the argument is one

[29] HGA 62, 6-7.
[30] This is fully clear in section 2 of HGA 18, 5, where Heidegger claims that the course he's starting has a philological purpose.
[31] In HGA 22, 145-46, Heidegger critiques Jaeger's "weil die philosophische Interpretation nur in engen Grenzen bleibt." It is clear that Jaeger marked a watershed with respect to Wilamowitz, since his philology makes it possible to enter into the "unterirdischen antiken Philosophierens" (Edler, "Heidegger and Werner Jaeger," 124 and 139-44); but he still remains incapable of asking "ur-philologish" (see HGA 83, 655), as his misunderstanding of Theta 10 proves.
[32] See always HGA 22, 146.
[33] Quotes from HGA 62, 102-5.
[34] HGA 19, 18.
[35] See R. Ansen, *Bewegtheit. Zur Genesis einer kinetischen Ontologie bei Heidegger* (Cuxhaven: Junghans-Verlag, 1990).

led to consider one special movement, that is the circular, eternal, and eternally regular movement of the sphere of the fixed stars. The point was already raised, in this very case, by Aristotle's direct pupils and ancient commentators: Eudemus, and thereafter the school of Aphrodisias, until the debate was recorded by Simplicius in his commentary to *Physics* 8. We can say that Heidegger as well, when he translates κίνησις as "*Seinshaftigkeit von Bewegung*," clearly sides with a general interpretation of the noun. This being said, is this not a kind of *overinterpretation* of Aristotle's text? If so, this is exactly what Heidegger says when he claims that "Every translation [his translation especially] is interpretation."

> **Text 5.** 1071b7-9: οὐδὲ χρόνον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου
> "So ist es auch mit der Zeit; es gibt kein Vorher und Nachher, ohne daß die Zeit nicht schon war."

This sentence is a very nice and not-too-literal translation of Aristotle's. In this case, it is also possible to advance some considerations. As we have seen in the previous passage, the main theoretical problem at this stage of Heidegger's thought is the analysis of the ontological character of movement (*Bewegtheit*) and its centrality for the relationship between *Dasein* and *Umwelt*. The question on time does not yet occupy a privileged place in the *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, which, not by chance, finds its reference text as the most relevant philosophical analysis of movement in the *Physic* and not in the *Metaphysics*. This may help to contextualize Heidegger's linearity in this and also in the following passage:

> **Text 6.** 1071 b 9-10: καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος
> "Auch ist die Bewegung – ebenso wie die Zeit – sich in sich selbst nach ihrem Seinssinn zusammenhaltend. Demnach ist die Zeit entweder dasselbe wie Bewegung oder ein Wie in der Weise des Seins der Bewegung."

A relevant change of punctuation occurs in text 6. Aristotle's argument is based on time: it is from the eternity of time that Aristotle argues for the eternity of movement. Nonetheless, it seems that Heidegger does not wish to make this use of the concept of time. As we have seen, in 1922 he had different projects with this very concept. The dynamic dimension remains here in the spotlight as the main thematic question, and this explains Heidegger's conceptual inversion of the Aristotelian schema.[36]

> **Text 7.** 1071b10-11: κίνησις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ
> "Sich in sich selbst – nach ihrem Seinssinn – zusammenhaltend ist nur die Bewegung als Fortgang von-zu, und zwar ein solcher Fortgang von-zu in der Weise des 'Kreisens.'"

[36] Heidegger appears to have in mind books III and IV of the *Physics*.

In text 7, *Bewegung* in its ontological sense is once more substituted for "movement."

> **Text 8.** 1071b12-13: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν
> "Aber Bewegung *ist* nicht, wenn es zwar ein Bewegendes und etwas Ausrichtendes gäbe, das aber nicht so wäre, daß es *ist* in der Weise des Bewegtheitseins."
> "Denn was so ist, daß es bewegen, ausrichtend auf etwas zugehen *kann*, braucht ja nicht seinen Seinssinn in der Bewegtheit zu haben."

No proper translation in the current sense is provided by Heidegger for text 8. A corresponding Aristotelian term for "*ausrichtendes*" is remarkably missing in the Greek text. We will return to this point shortly, in the considerations of texts 11 and12.

> **Text 9.** 1071 b 14-15: οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ' ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη
> "Es trägt aber auch nichts bei zur *Erhellung* des Notwendig-immer-seins von Bewegung, d. h. überhaupt des Seins von Bewegung, wenn wir die Weisen der Seinshaftigkeit als immer bestehend ansetzen – wie jene, die die 'worauf" der bewegten Dinge als so etwas ansetzen."

Several differences can be noticed in text 9. A telling one is that Aristotle puts special emphasis in his argument against Plato's theory of ideas. This part of the argument is obsolete in Heidegger's case, and it makes sense for him to put it aside. We find that further developments are instead apparently his own.

> **Text 10.** 1071b16-17: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη
> "Aber auch so etwas ist fürwahr nicht genügend [dem Sinn des Seins von Bewegung nicht entsprechendes Woher], noch leistet das eine andere, neben die besagten Worauf gesetzte Weise *solchen* Seins."

Something similar can be said about text 10. Once more, Aristotle's reference to Plato's ideas is the very conclusion of the argument, and it is introduced by "therefore" (τοίνυν). In Heidegger, τοίνυν becomes "*auch*" because this part of the argument is left aside. Heidegger, on the contrary, takes care to specify the directionality of the movement that he had already posited in the previous text. This introduction aims to recall the phenomenological lexicon that he is resemantisizing in his own hermeneutics of those years. The following two texts, which recall the problems seen above, are examples.

> **Text 11.** 1071b17-18: ἔτι οὐδ' εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις
> "Weiter. – Aber auch wenn das Woraus so wäre, die reine Zeitigung machte aber nicht gerade den Seinssinn der ἀρχή selbst aus, bliebe alles unverständlich." Es *wäre* nicht – gegenständlich gesprochen –, das Seiende

ist nur gehabt und da nach seinem Aussehen (Was – es ist), sofern es in seiner echten 'sachlich' genügenden Warumbeziehung steht.

Text 12. 1071b18-19: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι
"Auch so wäre noch keine ewige, ständig seiende und ständig *gleich* seiende Bewegung. Es *kann* das, was nur ist, so, daß es etwas ausrichten kann, in diesem Kann-*sein* auch *nicht* sein."

For texts 11 and 12, Heidegger makes no attempt to produce anything similar to a standard translation. Perhaps Heidegger was inspired by the verb ἐνδέχεται, which plays a role in Aristotle's practical philosophy as well, where it indicates the kind of events in which human choice can play a role. This could explain the occurrence in Heidegger of the already seen concept of "*ausrichtendes*," which could appear remarkably extraneous to Aristotle's context but has nevertheless a coherence with the passage. This word indicates not only a dynamic aspect but also the productive process that characterizes the ἀρχή: without this activity, it would not be possible to have a *Seiende*, since this would have no cause.[37]

Moreover, Heidegger speaks in text 13 of "*reine Zeitigung*." This, too, is a technical term in the Heideggerian lexicon, one about which Ian A. Moore has made some timely remarks in his contribution to this issue of *Kronos*. In particular, Moore rightly emphasized its relation to the question of time and the act. Given the breadth and technicity of the problem, we merely add here, in connection with what is now being said, that the question of temporality raised here is to be traced back to that of movement (always following *Physics*) and its relationship with the act: behind the question of *Zeitigung*, we must always keep in mind the fundamental question of movement.[38]

This is quite interesting for us because it appears clear once more that what is a pure act also knows some kind of inner movement for Heidegger. This intuition founds its proof in the following texts:

Text 13. 1071b19-20: δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια
"Also muß es mit dem Sein der ewigen Bewegung für diese einen solchen Ausgang geben, dessen Seinshaftigkeit, Sinn des Seins, reine Zeitigung ist, ἐνέργεια."

[37] I would like to mention that, precisely during the comparison seminar (30/10/2021) organized on these passages by Andrzej Serafin (University of Kraków), together with Ian A. Moore (Loyola Marymount University), we noted the difficulty of translating the term "*ausrichtendes*," which clearly exhibits a phenomenological derivation, at least in this specific context. – J. M.

[38] HGA 83, 19: "Sein heißt Temporalität (Bewegtheit), und: Seiendes *ist in Bewegung. In-Bewegung-Sein ist selbst ein bestimmtes Sein* und muß daher aus Bewegtheit (transzendentaler Bewegtheit) verstanden werden" and "Transzendentale Bewegtheit – Zeitlichkeit." Moreover, the act itself understood according to this transcendentality can be seen as "κίνησις" (see ibid., 20).

> **Text 14.** "Die sich aus der letzten sinnmäßigen Aufklärung des Seins von Bewegung ergebende Bestimmung des Seinssinnes des ersten Bewegers als reine ἐνέργεια und der Bewegtheit desselben als θεωρία."

I (S. F.) wish to reserve a final word for these two passages. The idea of pure ἐνέργεια is of Neoplatonist origin.[39] As Hegel could read in Brandis 1823 and Bekker 1831, the Greek text has the first unmoved as unceasingly *acting*. After Hegel, a vulgate was introduced that makes the first unmoved mover, that is, Aristotle's God, a *pure act*. This implies that a subscript iota was no longer added to some crucial occurrences of the word ἐνέργεια (including *De anima* III 5, based on Lambda).[40] In this regard, therefore, Heidegger's interpretation is partly removed from the Greek wording, but this is caused not only by his intellectual choice, which also plays a strong role, but also by the printed edition of the Greek text. Without such a text, it was more difficult for him to keep commenting upon that very passage as follows: "Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, wie Aristoteles den Sinn von ἐνέργεια bestimmt, wie aus dem reinen Bewegungsproblem nicht nur das notwendige Dasein des ersten Bewegers erwächst, sondern auch die inhaltliche Bestimmung der Bewegtheit desselben als νόησις νοήσεως [Met. Λ 9, 1074b34] – θεωρία!"

This theoretical outcome finds its own coherence within Heideggerian philosophy. Pure νόησις is also a form of *Bewegtheit*. As we read in the Natorp-Bericht "Der höchsten Idee reiner Bewegtheit genügt nur die νόησις als reines θεωρεῖν."[41] In opposition to the *Bewegtheit* that characterizes the *faktisches Leben*, which is always "ἐνέργεια ἀτελής"[42] and therefore never fulfilled, this is "*reine* ἐνέργεια" and therefore knows an ἐντελέχεια and differs ontologically from *Dasein* because it doesn't know a πρᾶξις. But the theoretical outcome proposed by Heidegger remains surprising and ingenious: the πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον would not be properly immobile; on the contrary, it shows "the highest idea of pure movement," a paradigmatic one.[43]

On the whole, if we look to Heidegger's methodological principles when talking about "translation," we find that his behavior is remarkably coherent, rich, inspirational. We believe that misunderstanding Heidegger's attitude occurs because his own principles, which he makes clear with extreme lucidity, are less well known than they should be when such an influential thinker is concerned.

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[39] It is interesting to note that shortly before, that is, during the summer semester of 1921, Heidegger had given a seminar titled "Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus" (see HGA 60).

[40] S. Fazzo, "Unmoved Mover as Pure Act or Unmoved Mover in Act? The Mystery of a Subscript Iota," in *Metaphysics Lambda – New Essays*, ed. H. Horn (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 181-205; see, in particular, 190-94 on *De anima* III 5 as a parallel case study.

[41] HGA 9, 386.

[42] Ibid., 291: "Die Bewegtheit der Bewegung is ἐνέργεια ἀτελής – das Im-Werk-Stehen, das noch nicht in sein Ende gekommen"; see also HGA 83, 7-8.

[43] While writing this account, I published another text in which the same thesis appears, albeit in relation to a different problem. – J. M.

Humberto González-Núñez

THE EMERGENCE OF BEING AND TIME AS ’ENEPΓEIA: HEIDEGGER’S UNFINISHED CONFRONTATION WITH ARISTOTLE’S *METAPHYSICS*

Aristotle is simply attempting, though to be sure in a radically philosophical way, to make ontologically understandable only what lies in the phenomenon of motion itself

[GA 22, 329/240][1]

One of the most noteworthy albeit unappreciated aspects of Heidegger’s sustained engagement with Aristotle’s philosophy is the Stagirite’s constitutively ambiguous place in the history of being.[2] For instance, Heidegger clearly outlines this view in the following passage from sec. 126 of *Mindfulness*, “1. Aristotle as the completion [*Vollendung*] of what was earlier still strange [*Befremdlichen*]: φύσις grasped as ἐντελέχεια. 2. Aristotle as the commencement [*Beginn*] of what becomes subsequently conventional [*Geläufigen*] for a long time” (GA 66, 397/351).[3] As illustrated by this passage, Heidegger understands Aristotle as a transitional figure within the history of metaphysics. On the one hand, Aristotle brings the originary experience of being found in the fragments and sayings of

[1] Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993).

[2] The constitutive ambiguity of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle has received greater attention in the current scholarship. For a well-argued discussion of the ambiguity or duplicity of Aristotle’s position in the history of philosophy, see Christopher P. Long, “The Duplicity of Beginning: Schürmann, Aristotle, and the Origins of Metaphysics,” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 29, no. 2 (2008): 145–59. In this text, Long challenges Reiner Schürmann’s interpretation of Aristotle in *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). According to Long, what Schürmann fails to recognize in this early text and somewhat begins to appreciate in a later text – *Broken Hegemonies*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) – is the way in which Aristotle’s text resists being reduced simply to the founder of the great metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy. For a similar approach to the one suggested by Long, see also Pierre Aubenque, *Faut-il déconstruire la métaphysique?* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009).

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Mindfulness*, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2006); M. Heidegger, *Besinnung*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997).

Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus to a completion. But, on the other hand, Aristotle also establishes the foundations of the conventional constitution of the metaphysical tradition.

How, then, can we begin approaching this crucial tension in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle? While Aristotle's texts have frequently been contextualized within the conventional understanding of metaphysics, one could argue that there remains the accompanying possibility of recovering the faint echo of the vitality of the first or even a potential other beginning that appears in his writings.[4] One of the most well-known attempts to carry out this nuanced approach to Aristotle's texts can be found in Heidegger's 1939 essay, "On the Essence and Concept of φύσις in Aristotle's *Physics* B, 1." Heidegger's attempt to retrieve the faint echo of the originary sense of φύσις in Aristotle's writings as it appears in Heraclitus is widely known. Thus, I will not be focusing on it in the present essay. Instead, my interest here lies in the way in which Aristotle aims to retrieve the originary experience of being of his predecessors in his own terms, which primarily takes the form of the word ἐντελέχεια.

There is no term more difficult to comprehend in Aristotle's texts than ἐντελέχεια. In order to illustrate this point, it is worth recalling the apocryphal tale mentioned by Heidegger in his 1928 Summer Semester lecture course, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*:

> In the Renaissance, Hermolaus Barbarus (1454-1493) translated and commented on Aristotle and on the commentary of Themistos, and he did so in order to restore the Greek Aristotle against medieval Scholasticism. Naturally his task harbored considerable difficulties. The story goes that, compelled by his difficulty and embarrassment [*Not und Verlegenheit*] over the philosophical meaning of the term ἐντελέχεια, he invoked the Devil to provide him with instruction. (Today we are in the same situation.) (GA 26, 105/84; trans. modified)[5]

Our situation remains the same because, as Heidegger notes in his 1939 essay, Aristotle never truly explains the meaning of ἐντελέχεια throughout his writings (GA 9, 352/216). Even though the term appears as the fundamental word of his thinking, Aristotle nonetheless leaves the term, in a deep and meaningful sense, undefined.[6]

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[4] For a well-argued account of how Heidegger's interpretation of the ancient Greeks opens up the possibility for an original repetition of the first beginning as another beginning, see Claudia Baracchi, "Contributions to the Coming-to-Be of Greek Beginnings: Heidegger's Inceptive Thinking," in *Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays*, ed. John Panteleimon Manoussakis and Drew A. Hyland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 23-42.

[5] Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); M. Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978).

[6] A casual survey of the various books, essays, and even translations of Aristotle's texts would show that the question concerning how exactly to translate ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια in order to capture the complexity of its neologistic meaning remains a debated issue in Aristotelian scholarship. For an excellent philological account of the difficulties and perplexities surrounding this debate, see George A. Blair, *Energeia and Entelecheia: "Act" in Aristotle* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1992). Although the issue is mentioned somewhat briefly in various

Given this situation, how are we supposed to make sense of Aristotle's claim that οὐσία is a kind of φύσις, that is, an ἐντελέχεια? Although such a question might simply appear to be a matter of philological speculation, Heidegger introduces the philosophical stakes of such an investigation in the following manner: ""Ἐντελέχεια' comprises the basic concept [*Grundbegriff*] of Western metaphysics in whose changes of meaning we can best estimate, and indeed must see, the distance between Greek thought in the beginning and the metaphysics as followed" (GA 9, 352-3/216).[7] In the later essay, "Metaphysics as History of Being," Heidegger provides a thought-provoking account of the way in which ἐντελέχεια through its related term, ἐνέργεια, has been at the center of the development of the history of being. According to Heidegger, the term ἐντελέχεια, which is often translated as "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*), is at the foundation of the ordinary understanding of being as "that which is simply actual." The reduction of being to actuality should, at this point in the history of being, be something quite familiar to us. In fact, this experience of being as actuality is precisely what characterizes the everyday comportment and leveling of experience and existence. Constantly, throughout our everyday engagement with beings and the world, there is nothing more apparent and obvious than the fact that being is only what is actual – that is to say, what is limited both to presence and to what is present.

As a result, Aristotle's understanding of being as ἐντελέχεια provides the fundamental groundwork for such a reduction of being to actuality and presence. The traditional interpretation and reception of Aristotle's writings have established his understanding of being as ἐντελέχεια as the most perfect illustration of how being only is when it is truly actual. And yet I suggest, following Heidegger, that there is something else at stake in Aristotle's thinking. While translating οὐσία as "enduring" (*Verweilens*), Heidegger nonetheless recognizes that Aristotle's understanding of being can and perhaps should be understood in the sense of "presencing" (*Anwesens*) understood in a verbal sense as bringing-forth [*Her-vor-bringen*] (GA 6.2, 403/4).[8] Among the many ways in which Aristotle brings this notion to bear in his attempt to think being in connection with movement (κίνησις), Heidegger identifies the term ἐνέργεια as the single most important term in Aristotle's thinking alongside ἐντελέχεια. Hence, if we were to formulate this point in a more polemical tone, then one could say that the very meaning of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια for Aristotle's understanding of being lies ahead of us as something to be developed more fully.

To enter further into the enigma of the terms ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, we should recall that we are dealing with Aristotelian neologisms. Both ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια

translations of Aristotle's writings, Joe Sachs's translations of these texts offer many insightful comments and remarks on the difficulty and importance of translating these two terms. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002); Aristotle, *On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection*, trans. Joe Sachs (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2004); Aristotle, *Physics: A Guided Study*, trans. Joe Sachs (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995); Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).

[7] Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); M. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976).

[8] Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Zweiter Band*, ed. Brigitte Schillbach (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997); M. Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973).

were coined by Aristotle to give expression to something that the existing philosophical Greek vocabulary of his time did not and could not express.[9] Even though the notion of ἔργον provides a hint into the way in which being is understood as a "work" or "deed," the attempt to think being as ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια, according to Heidegger, means thinking being as "presence-as-work (presence understood verbally) in the work of work-ness [*im Werk als-Werk-Wesen (Wesen verbal begriffen) oder die Werkheit*]" (GA 6.2, 404/5). While Heidegger's attempt to remain faithful to the ontological meaning of ἐνέργεια as presencing (*Anwesens*) risks being understood simply as a tautological formula,[10] there are profound reasons for adopting this strategy. Aristotle's use of the term ἐνέργεια to describe the way in which beings show themselves in their being can be understood as nothing short of a protophenomenological attempt to get at the meaning of being. Heidegger seems to recognize this alethic or disclosing aspect of ἐνέργεια, for instance, when he writes the following gloss on the meaning of the term: "That something is [*Daß-sein*] and what something is [*Was-sein*] are revealed [*enthüllen*] as modes of presencing [*Weisen des Anwesens*] whose fundamental characteristic [*Grundzug*] is *energeia*" (GA 6.2, 407/8). Expanding on this protophenomenological role of ἐνέργεια, we could add that this unconcealing aspect of Aristotle's understanding of being as what discloses itself from itself as a result of its being-at-work is perhaps nothing short of a primordial echo or trace of the originary experience of being found in those inceptual thinkers when they attempted to think the meaning of being as ἀλήθεια.[11]

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[9] The claim that the terms ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια were coined by Aristotle are, by now, a mainstream assumption of contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. However, a survey of the literature on these terms would reveal that the neologistic origin seems to have had little effect on the translation and interpretation of their meaning. See Daniel W. Graham, "The Etymology of ΕΝΤΕΛΕΧΙΑ," *The American Journal of Philology* 110, no. 1 (1989): 73-80; Stephen Menn, "The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Ἐνέργεια: Ἐνέργεια and Δύναμις," *Ancient Philosophy* 14, no. 1 (1994): 73-114. One of the few studies that tries to do justice to the strangeness of Aristotle's invention of two terms to give expression to the way in which being manifests itself can be found in Blair, *Energeia and Entelecheia*.

[10] This passage provides us with a clear illustration of how Heidegger interprets Aristotle's use of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια in a phenomenological or even protophenomenological manner. As illustrated in the passage cited above, these terms express the coming-into-presence of being in its disclosedness and emergence. Hence, there are good reasons for drawing a strong connection between Aristotle's ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια and Heidegger's later guiding-word for being, namely, *Ereignis*. Thomas Sheehan has suggested this connection in a couple of essays. See Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle: *Dynamis* and *Ereignis*," *Philosophy Research Archives* 4, no. 1258 (1978): 278-314; T. Sheehan, "On the Way to *Ereignis*: Heidegger's Interpretation of *Physis*," in *Continental Philosophy in America*, ed. H. Silverman, J. Sallis, and T. Seebohm (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1983), 131-64. See also Achim Oberst, "Heidegger's Appropriation of Aristotle's Δύναμις/Ἐνέργεια Distinction," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 78, no. 1 (2004): 25-51.

[11] One of the outstanding aspects of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle (although outside the scope of the present essay) was a more precise and detailed account of the relationship between two of the major themes in his thinking – namely, ἐνέργεια and ἀλήθεια. In his earliest interpretations of Aristotle's writings, Heidegger emphasized the significance of the claim that one of the primary meanings of being was tied to the notion of ἀλήθεια. One of the most crucial ways in which Heidegger sought to emphasize this aspect of Aristotle's thinking can be found in the 1930 Summer Semester lecture course, *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: Continuum, 2005); M. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*, ed. Harmut Tietjen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982). In this seminar, Heidegger lays the groundwork for a revolutionary interpretation of Aristotle's most sustained discussion of being as δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in *Metaphysics* Θ, which famously concludes with a discussion of being as ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος that has often been received as an editorial addition without any consequence for the otherwise unified theme of the treatise. While Heidegger seemed cognizant of the revolutionary implications of his interpretation, he nonetheless did not follow through with developing the conclusions of this reading, even though

This faint echo and trace of the primordial experience of being as ἀλήθεια in Aristotle's understanding of being as ἐνέργεια has been somewhat ignored given the dominance of the traditional interpretation of his texts as the founder of the conventional conception of metaphysics. Even though we are dealing with Aristotle's most innovative attempt to give expression to an experience of being that could not find words in the Greek language of his time, there has been a tendency, even in Heidegger's own interpretation,[12] to simply translate these terms as "actuality" and therefore avoid the complexity of what is at stake in Aristotle's understanding of being as ἐνέργεια.[13] Heidegger was one of the few readers of Aristotle who subtly understood the significance of the neologistic origin of these terms, despite not going the step further of dwelling in the experience that caused these terms to come about. Even though Heidegger recognized the decisive importance of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια in the history of being in "Metaphysics as History of Being,"[14] he nonetheless seemed at times to believe that these terms simply provided a further confirmation of the traditional ontotheological interpretation of Aristotle's text whereby he would be the founder of the metaphysics of constant presence.

But, to begin critically reflecting on this constitutive ambiguity in Heidegger's interpretation, we could ask: Can ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια simply be reduced to the sense of being as actuality? Is it true that the indiscriminate Latin translation of these terms as *actualitas* fully capture their meaning?[15] While the traditional reception of Aristotle's thinking has gone as far as to suggest that *actualitas* actually offers a better and clearer

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he proceeded to offer a lecture course on the first three chapters of *Metaphysics* Θ in the Summer Semester of 1931, which was probably condensed due to lack of time. See M. Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); M. Heidegger, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990). Even as late as the 1950s, Heidegger was aware of this connection between, on the one hand, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια and, on the other hand, ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος. See M. Heidegger, *Seminare: Platon – Aristoteles – Augustinus*, ed. Mark Michalski (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2012). For an excellent overview of the complexity of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, see Francisco J. Gonzalez, "Δύναμις and *Dasein*, 'Ενέργεια and *Ereignis*: Heidegger's (Re)Turn to Aristotle," *Research in Phenomenology* 48, no. 3 (2018): 409-32.

[12] A key example of this can be found in Heidegger's 1939 essay where he claims that the reason why Aristotle ultimately attributes priority to ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια over δύναμις is due to the fact that the former "fulfill[s] the essence [*Wesen*] of intrinsically stable presencing [*ständigen Anwesung*] more essentially than δύναμις does" (GA 9, 357/219).

[13] Although Heidegger often translates the term ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια in a rather traditional manner as "actuality" [*Wirklichkeit*], this more literal rendering of the term can be found as early as his 1924 Summer Semester lecture course, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, where he writes: "ἐνέργεια in an entirely distinctive sense, perhaps the fundamental character of being (*fundamentale Charakter des Seins*), a how of being in an entirely distinctive sense (*ein Wie des Seins ein einem ganz ausgezeichneten Sinn*). He means the 'being-at-work' ('*Im-Werke-Sein*') itself. If our expression 'actuality (*Wirklichkeit*)' were not so worn out (*abgegeriffen*), it would be an excellent translation" (GA 18, 70/49-50).

[14] "The pro-gression [*Fort-gang*] of metaphysics from its essential beginning [*Wesensbeginn*] leaves this beginning behind, and yet takes a fundamental constituent of Platonic-Aristotelian thinking along" (GA 6.2, 410/10).

[15] The question of the reducibility of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια to the notion of "actuality" and "presence" is a heated debate that continues to this day. Even though Heidegger recognizes the difficulties and nuance surrounding this issue, there have been attempts to suggest that even Heidegger falls into this view. See Francisco J. Gonzalez, "Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heidegger's Interpretation of *Energeia* and *Dunamis* in Aristotle," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 44, no. 4 (2006): 533-68. In a more recent essay, Gonzalez has developed a more nuanced critique of Heidegger's interpretation as more of the *Gesamtausgabe* has become available, especially volume 82. See Gonzalez, "Δύναμις and *Dasein*, 'Ενέργεια and *Ereignis*."

sense of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, there are good reasons, upon closer inspection, for doubting whether this is truly the case. As Heidegger notes in his own interpretation of this decisive shift in the history of being, "*Actualitas* no longer preserves [*bewahrt*] the essence [*Wesen*] of *energeia*. The literal translation is misleading. In truth it brings precisely another transposition or misplacement to the word of Being" (GA 6.2, 412/12).[16] Although it seems tempting to believe that the meaning of ἐνέργεια is preserved and even brought to further clarification with the Latin translation *actualitas*, this supposedly "literal" translation is misleading, especially given its role in the development of our own modern understanding of the term "actuality." What this translation of ἐνέργεια accomplishes is a leveling down of the originary experience that led Aristotle to invent a word for describing the coming into presence of a being from itself through its activity and deed. In a sense, to adopt this seemingly unproblematic translation would imply ignoring the fundamental question that Heidegger poses in his 1968 seminar in Le Thor and that most forcefully expresses the difficulty and perplexity behind the term ἐνέργεια – namely, "Through what fundamental experience [*Grunderfahrung*] does Aristotle arrive at ἐνέργεια?" (GA 15, 25/49).[17]

In order to arrive at a preliminary answer to this question, I would like to focus attention in what follows on one of the rare but crucial instances in which Heidegger confronts Aristotle's attempt to think of being in terms of ἐνέργεια. Although Aristotle deals with the meaning of being as ἐνέργεια in several places, there are few more interesting, problematic, and decisive for his overall understanding of being than its role in *Metaphysics* Λ. The reason for choosing this text, among many others, is in a sense purely strategic. Although Aristotle develops a thorough and detailed account of the meaning of being as δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in *Metaphysics* Θ, which Heidegger follows and traces (albeit partially) in his 1931 Summer Semester lecture course,[18] it is in *Metaphysics* Λ that Aristotle's investigation into the source (ἀρχή) and cause (αἰτία) of being finds its highest and most complex development.

At the beginning of *Metaphysics* Λ, Aristotle identifies his investigation (θεωρία) as concerned with οὐσία, that is, being[19] (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069a19).[20] More specifically, what is at stake for Aristotle in this treatise is nothing less than an attempt to seek and disclose the principles and causes (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια) of being (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069a19-20), which is

[16] M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Zweiter Band*; M. Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*.

[17] Martin Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012); M. Heidegger, *Seminare*, ed. Curd Ochwadt (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986).

[18] See Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1-3*; *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1-3*.

[19] In this essay, I will adopt a rather unconventional (albeit more literal) translation of the term οὐσία as "being." Although there are many reasons one could invoke to justify such a translation, I am relying on the tendency of more contemporary literature, which has (to my mind, rightly) recognized that continuing to translate οὐσία as "substance" often entails a flattening out of the meaning of the term. Thus, by translating οὐσία simply as "being," it becomes easier to situate Aristotle's writings within the general context of the question of being as it appears in his predecessors (e.g., Plato) as well as in ancient Greek philosophy as a whole. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties of translating οὐσία, see Aryeh Kosman, "Translating Ousia," in *Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 267-79.

[20] In the present essay, I will be referring to Aristotelis, *Metaphysica*, ed. W. Jaeger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957).

precisely the goal of the sought-after science described at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* since wisdom (σοφία) deals most of all with principles and causes (*Met*. Α 1, 982a1-3). Aristotle proceeds to identify three ways in which being (οὐσία) is said to be (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069a30-1). First, being is said to be perceptible (αἰσθητή), whether the being can be considered as eternal (ἀΐδιος) or finite (φθαρτή), while the other sense of being is said to be without reference to movement (ἀκίνητος) (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069a31-34). Aristotle continues by noting that the perceptible kind of beings would be the subject of natural science (φυσικῆς) since they involve movement (κίνησις), whereas the latter, because unmoved (ἀκίνητος), would be the subject of another science (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069b1-2). These opening lines of *Metaphysics* Λ are often read as justifying the division between natural and theological science (ἐπιστήμη), which would then show how Aristotle's thinking, while developing an account of nature (φύσις), is nonetheless in the end directed toward theology as the ultimate ground of being. However, another reading of the passage is made possible when attention is drawn to the important qualification made by Aristotle immediately after introducing this supposed division between natural and theological science, which reads, "unless there is no common principle to them all" (εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή) (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069b2; my trans.). It will be worth keeping this reference to a common origin (ἀρχὴ κοινή) in mind since it will prove decisive in Aristotle's further remarks in *Metaphysics* Λ.

After laying out the foundations for the investigation being carried out in this treatise, Aristotle proceeds to investigate the main characteristics of perceptible being (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία), which is characterized above all by its relationship to change (μεταβλητή) (*Met*. Λ 1, 1069b4). In the chapters of *Metaphysics* Λ that follow, Aristotle draws on several aspects of his other writings, which include the definition of movement (κίνησις) and its intricate connection with change (μεταβολή), the distinction between matter (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος), and the meaning of being as δύναμις and ἐνέργεια.[21] Without offering a thorough exegesis of Aristotle's account of perceptible being, it is worth stressing Aristotle's decisive use of the meaning of being as δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, which was developed at length in *Metaphysics* Θ and appears to play a central role in this treatise as well. After all, both δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are at work in the distinction between form and matter, given that the terms are often employed in a strictly parallel manner. Furthermore, they play an equally decisive role in Aristotle's definition of the phenomenon of movement, which would hardly be comprehensible without the complex interweaving of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια.

It is as a result of the overarching role of the meaning of being as δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in Aristotle's writings that he goes on, in *Metaphysics* Λ, to make the following decisive claim: "And further, there is another way in which, by analogy, the principles are the same – namely, being-at-work and potency" (*Met*. Λ 5, 1071a4-6; my trans.). This passage provides an important insight into the way in which δύναμις and ἐνέργεια can be understood as a primary sense of being. Although the meaning of being as οὐσία is frequently stressed by Aristotle throughout his writings, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια play

[21] After introducing the three ways in which being is said to be, Aristotle proceeds to discuss perceptible being (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία), which involves a discussion of change (μεταβολή). These perceptible beings are described by Aristotle as composed of both matter (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος), which are further understood in terms of potency (δύναμις) and activity (ἐνέργεια). See *Metaphysics* Λ 2-5, especially 1069b3-34.

an equally decisive role in the unconcealment of beings in their being. And yet the latter sense of being seems to introduce the particularly *dynamic* character of Aristotle's understanding of being. If οὐσία can be understood, in a sense, as "beingness" or even "being-there," then it is only with the aid of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια that such a being begins to reveal itself in its being as *what it is* (τό τι ἦν εἶναι) – that is, by way of the interplay of its different capacities, potencies, abilities, activities, deeds, and functions. Given the broadly disclosive role of both δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, it becomes clearer why Aristotle appeals to them analogically as the principles of being of all things. While Aristotle has described both eternal and finite perceptible beings according to a common origin (ἀρχὴ κοινή) in the meaning of being as δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, it remains to be seen in what way the unmoved being (ἀκινήτος οὐσία) is to be understood if it is the case that none of these aspects of perceptible being applies to it.

In turning to the exceptional case of the unmoved being, Aristotle is turning, in a sense, to what has traditionally been interpreted as his explicitly theological science. In other words, given the distinction between perceptible and unmoved being, Aristotle's turn to the unmoved being has often been read as directing his attention away from the realm of nature (φύσις), perception (αἴσθησις), and movement (κίνησις) in order to transcend and move toward the realm of the divine (τὸ θεῖον) – that is, God (θεός). It is precisely in these later chapters of *Metaphysics* Λ that we find the very few explicit sustained attempts to consider the role of the prime mover in Aristotle's ontology, whose activity is described most famously as thought thinking itself (νόησις νοήσεως νόησις) (*Met*. Λ 9, 1074b34-5). Without being able to do justice to the contents of this treatise in their entirety, I would nonetheless like to direct my attention in what remains of this essay to Heidegger's attempt to translate and interpret the crucial passages in *Metaphysics* Λ 6 where Aristotle most explicitly discusses the need for an unmoved being that would be the origin of all being.

In an obscure but crucial section of his 1922 Summer Semester lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger carries out a groundbreaking and innovative translation and interpretation of *Metaphysics* Λ 6. According to Heidegger, what is at stake in this crucial chapter of Aristotle's treatise is nothing less than "the ontological sense of the being of movement as pure temporal unfolding" (*Der Seinssinn von Bewegungsein als reine Zeitigung*) (GA 62, 102).[22] I claim that the single most important aspect of Heidegger's entire translation and interpretation of *Metaphysics* Λ is his sustained attempt to render the term ἐνέργεια as temporal unfolding (*Zeitigung*). Although I will go on in what follows to elaborate on the significance of this translation, it is worth noting at the outset that, by interpreting ἐνέργεια in this explicitly temporal dimension, Heidegger is able to revitalize the Aristotelian text. If it is the case that ἐνέργεια is related to the coming to be or bringing

[22] The seminar in question is volume 62 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, *Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, ed. G. Neumann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005). Curiously enough, this volume of the *Gesamtausgabe*, which was originally published in German in 2005, has yet to be translated into English. However, Ian Alexander Moore and Josh Hayes have produced an outstanding translation of the relevant section of this seminar, which is published in this issue of *Kronos*. In what follows, I will be relying on the Hayes and Moore translation. I would like to thank Andrzej Serafin for sharing this translation with me.

about of time and its ripening,[23] then there is a more profound way of understanding the role of the prime mover in Aristotle's thinking than the one offered by the conventional ontotheological interpretation. According to the traditional interpretation, the role of the prime mover in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Λ is to guarantee the stability and eternity of the being of all things through its pure ἐνέργεια. In contrast, in Heidegger's interpretation, the possibility remains of understanding the enigmatic pure ἐνέργεια of the prime mover as something like the originary pure temporalizing of being as the ripening and bringing about of time in its unfolding, while at the same time withdrawing and giving space and time for things to be.

Heidegger begins his interpretation of *Metaphysics* Λ 6 by focusing on Aristotle's contextual remarks dealing with the fundamental ontological characteristics of the phenomenon of movement, which suggests that "it is not possible for movement to either come to be or pass away. For it always was" (ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν) (*Met.* Λ 6, 1071b6-7; my trans.). This passage introduces one of the fundamental pillars of Aristotle's understanding of the natural world – namely, the assumption that movement always was. The main evidence for the always having been character of κίνησις can be found, according to Aristotle, in our experience of this phenomenon. Even though there are instances of movement that clearly convey a beginning and an end, a coming to be and a passing away, the first movement, that is, the origin (ἀρχή) of movement, is in a sense distinct from all other movements insofar as it has always seemed to be. Taking this passage as his point of departure, Heidegger offers the following interpretive translation of the text: "The ontological character [*Seinshaftigkeit*] of movement is such that the Being of movement [*Bewegungsein*] cannot itself emerge and pass away [*enstehen und vergehen*]. Because movement always was [*Bewegung war nämlich immer*]" (GA 62, 102).[24] What is worth emphasizing in Heidegger's approach to Aristotle's claim concerning the phenomenon of movement is its always having been character, which is captured by the German *war immer*. It is the always-having-been character of κίνησις that is responsible for its nongenerated and indestructible characteristic. Movement neither emerged nor passed away. Rather, it has always been.

On the basis of this ontological interpretation of movement as always having been, Aristotle continues his account in *Metaphysics* Λ 6 by suggesting that the same characteristics can be found in the phenomenon of time (χρόνος). Continuing his line-by-line translation of the text, Heidegger translates lines 1071b7-9 of *Metaphysics* Λ 6 as follows, "And likewise, time [χρόνον]. For it is not possible for there to be an earlier and a later without time not already having been" (GA 62, 102). In other words, both movement and time, the two fundamental pillars of Aristotle's understanding of the realm of nature (φύσις), are characterized in their being as always having been. But at this point,

[23] I am indebted to Moore and Hayes for a note in their translation on this wide lexical range of the German term *Zeitigung*. They make the following insightful observation: "It should be noted that the verb *zeitigen* also has the sense of 'ripening' and 'bringing about.' Earlier in the lecture course (GA 62: 42), Heidegger uses the German *Vollzug* ('carrying out,' 'enactment') as a synonym."

[24] Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*. Throughout the present essay, I will be referring to the Hayes and Moore translation on pages 5-10 of this issue of *Kronos*.

the following question seems to emerge: If both movement and time have always been, then how can we begin to make sense of their coming into being? This appears to be a significant impasse (ἀπορία) in Aristotle's thinking. Given that Aristotle does not appeal to a creator god that would have brought both κίνησις and χρόνος into being, another explanation is required for their always having been. It would be a willful distortion of Aristotle's thinking to believe that the prime mover can be understood as the origin and cause of movement and time in this specific sense.[25] Rather, an effort must be made to understand the following perplexing state of affairs: on the one hand, Aristotle identifies the being of both κίνησις and χρόνος as always having been, but, on the other hand, there nonetheless exists a kind of being that is unmoved (ἀκινήτος), which is somehow responsible for these without having brought them into being.

Perhaps the solution to this impasse (ἀπορία) can be found in Aristotle's use of the term συνεχής to describe the being of movement and time in *Met*. Λ 6, 1071b9-10, which reads in Heidegger's translation as follows: "Movement – just like time – holds itself together [συνεχὴς] in itself according to its ontological sense [*sich in selbst nach ihrem Seinsinn zusammenhaltend*]" (GA 62, 102).[26] This passage is crucial for understanding the way in which Aristotle claims that both movement and time maintain themselves in their being. With the aid of Heidegger's unconventional yet thought-provoking translation of συνεχής as "holds itself together in itself" (*sich in selbst zussamenhaltend*), we obtain a clearer sense of how to elucidate the being of both κίνησις and χρόνος. Following Heidegger's suggestion, we could say that the most useful way of understanding the fundamentally continuous[27] aspect of movement and time is as a kind of gathering that is reminiscent of the originary sense of the Greek word λέγειν.[28] What characterizes both

[25] As I will note throughout the remainder of this essay, it is important to emphasize this non-generable and indestructible character of movement. Although Aristotle's texts have often been interpreted as establishing the ontotheological tradition whereby God ought to be understood as the ultimate principle and ground of being, it is necessary to contrast this ontotheological critique with the way in which Aristotle thinks of the divine. Aristotle claims neither that God is the creator of movement nor that God will eventually bring this movement to an end. On the contrary, whatever God's role might be in the Aristotelian cosmos, it cannot be understood according to the usual schema of the ontotheological critique as a "creator God." For this reason, as I hope to show in the remainder of this essay, it is necessary to rethink the role of the unmoved being in Aristotle's ontology as somehow affecting the very nature of movement but without being responsible for either its creation or its destruction.

[26] Although outside of the scope of the present essay, it would be worth comparing Heidegger's translation of this passage with the one offered by Gadamer. Gadamer translates the term συνεχής as "constantly self-sustaining" (*beständig anhaltend*). Although Gadamer seems to approximate the fundamental insight drawn by Heidegger in his translation of συνεχής as "holding itself together in itself," the crucial difference seems to be that Gadamer calls upon the meaning of "constantly self-sustaining" in a way that draws on the notion of being as "constant presence," whereas Heidegger emphasizes the gathering (*zusammenhaltend*) aspect of the Greek term. See *Aristoteles Metaphysik XII: Übersetzung und Kommentar von Hans-Georg Gadamer*, trans. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004).

[27] It is worth noting that "continuous" is how the term συνεχής is often translated into English. While this translation is not misleading in itself, it has often been interpreted to mean that movement and time can be understood as a "constant presence" in the natural world, especially by way of its eternity. The main benefit of both Heidegger's and Gadamer's respective translations of συνεχής as "holding itself together" and "constantly self-sustaining" is the recovery of the eminently dynamic character of this gathering aspect of movement in Aristotle's thinking.

[28] There are several places where Heidegger develops this interpretation of λέγειν and λόγος as gathering throughout his writings. One of the most well-known references can be found in his insightful essay on Heraclitus's Fragment B 50 in *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper

κίνησις and χρόνος is their ability to hold themselves in their being and in this way provide a constant source of change and time understood as before and after. Although the term συνεχής has often been interpreted as indicating the "eternity" of time understood as constant and static presence, Heidegger's translation allows for a rethinking of the always-having-been character of movement and time as a moment of gathering and scattering insofar as both κίνησις and χρόνος hold themselves together while at the same time giving expression to the dynamic character of being as capable of change.

In order to elucidate this fundamental ontological character of both movement and time as συνεχής, Aristotle appeals to the image of movement in a circle (κύκλος). Heidegger offers the following translation of Aristotle's famous illustration of the self-sustaining aspect of κίνησις and χρόνος with the aid of circular motion in *Met*. Λ 6, 1070b10-11: "Holding itself together in itself – according to its ontological sense – movement is only as a progression from-to [κατὰ τόπον], and indeed, such a progression of from-to in the manner of 'circling'" (GA 62, 103). With the aid of this cyclical understanding of time, Aristotle offers an account in which the phenomena of both movement and time can be understood as constantly maintaining both their sameness and their difference. At any point in the circumference of a circle, one is always already at both a beginning and an end. In this sense, it is worth recalling the following expression from Heidegger's description of the hermeneutic circle in *Being and Time*: "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way" (*Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern in ihn nach der rechten Weise hineinzukommen*) (GA 2, 153/143).[29] Thus, I argue that the most productive way of getting into the circular aspect of both movement and time is precisely by noting the simultaneous identity and difference involved in the self-sustaining character of these phenomena.

Having clarified the self-sustaining aspect of κίνησις and χρόνος in *Metaphysics* Λ, we arrive at a further impasse (ἀπορία), which can be formulated in the following manner: If movement and time are self-sustaining phenomena that have always been, then of what use is it to posit some prime mover? This question, it should be noted, cuts across the ontotheological critique of Aristotle's writings. The true difficulty in Aristotle's account is to imagine the precise role of the prime mover given that both κίνησις and χρόνος are self-sustaining and self-gathering phenomena that do not require this unmoved being for either their coming-to-be or passing-away. In order to begin addressing this difficulty, we should note that Aristotle's claim thus far has been limited to the always-having-been character of movement and time, but it has not really addressed the *futurity*[30] of these

Collins, 1984), 59-78; *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 211-34.

[29] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010); *Sein Und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977).

[30] By referring to the "futurity" of movement and time, I am situating Aristotle's previous claim regarding the always-having-been character of these phenomena now within the context of their always going to be. This difference seems worth emphasizing given that Aristotle's claim earlier in *Metaphysics* Λ 6 seems to imply the futurity of κίνησις and χρόνος without explicitly mentioning it. I suggest that this is due to the fact that the always-having-been character informs but does not determine the claim that both movement and time will always be (in the future). In fact, as I aim to show in what follows, it is precisely once one notices this distinction that the role of the unmoved mover becomes clearly associated with the futurity of both κίνησις and χρόνος.

phenomena. Put otherwise, Aristotle has argued that there is no coming to be or passing away of κίνησις or χρόνος due to their always having been. But one could ask: Will they always be? The answer to this question does not explicitly seem to follow from Aristotle's account as presented in *Metaphysics* Λ 6. The self-sustaining and self-gathering aspect of movement and time only touches on the always-having-been character, but the futurity of these phenomena is, in a sense, dependent on some other source (ἀρχή), which Aristotle has identified as the prime mover.

As mentioned previously, Aristotle's appeal to the prime mover as the source and cause of the being of movement and time cannot be understood according to the modern understanding of the creator God since this would make the prime mover responsible for the coming to be of these phenomena, which is something that Aristotle has explicitly rejected throughout his discussion in *Metaphysics* Λ 6. A further contrast might help elucidate the strangeness and uniqueness of Aristotle's claim. Aristotle clarifies the distinctly anti-Platonic character of his account of the being of the prime mover in *Met*. Λ 6, 1071b14-15, which reads as follows in Heidegger's translation: "Yet it also does not contribute anything to the *illumination* of the always-being-necessary of movement, i.e., in general of the Being of movement, if we posit the ways of having Being as always persisting – as do those who posit the 'on the basis of which's of moved things as something like this'" (GA 62, 103). What this passage establishes beyond doubt is the distinctly anti-Platonic attempt by Aristotle to account for the origin and cause of movement and time. In other words, the prime mover cannot and should not be understood as an eternal (ἀϊδίους) principle comparable to the forms or ideas (τὰ εἴδη). Rather, what is at stake for Aristotle in the account of the prime mover is something like a fundamental rethinking of the eternal source of movement and time since this being is clearly responsible both for the always having been of movement as well as its futurity without being responsible either for their generation or for their destruction.

How, then, does Aristotle describe the enigmatic being and activity of this prime mover? The clearest answer to this question can be gathered from the following passage: "For unless there is being-at-work, then there will be no movement" (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις) (*Met*. Λ 6, 1071b17; my trans.). But it is precisely with reference to this passage that Heidegger's innovative and revolutionary translation and interpretation appears. As mentioned earlier, the ingenious aspect of this approach rests squarely on Heidegger's attempt to translate ἐνεργήσει as pure temporalizing (*reinen Zeitigung*). By understanding ἐνέργεια in temporal terms as a kind of "temporalizing," Heidegger offers a surprising suggestion concerning the role of the prime mover in Aristotle's thinking. What accounts for the futurity of movement and time – that is, the possibility of their being – is nothing other than the temporalizing thrust through which both phenomena are being-at-work (ἐνέργεια). In order to more clearly appreciate the innovative and groundbreaking aspect of Heidegger's translation, it would be worth quoting at length his rendering of this passage, which reads, "If the 'from out of which' is not in the manner of pure temporal unfolding [*reinen Zeitigung*], it will never be possible to understand what this means: movement is [*Bewegung ist*] [*and indeed eternal pure circular movement*]" (GA 62, 103-4). In addition to this translation, which already introduces several glosses on the Greek, the stakes of Heidegger's translation and interpretation are revealed in the alternative

rendering that builds more explicitly upon the pure temporal unfolding of ἐνεργήσει in Aristotle's text: "If the ontological meaning [*Seinssinn*] is not posited as such – that it can be explicated as to be understood from temporal unfolding [*Zeitigung*] – it will never be possible to understand what 'there is movement' means [*wird es nie verständlich sein, was es heißt: es ist Bewegung*]" (GA 62, 104). In both attempts to translate this crucial passage, what is at stake for Heidegger in Aristotle's claim that ἐνέργεια is at the core of the futurity of both movement and time is nothing other than the way in which these phenomena are given. Put otherwise, ἐνέργεια, understood as "pure temporalizing," offers an important insight into the nature of the givenness of being as time. The enigmatic moment of the circle that is always folding into itself and yet nonetheless maintains a certain difference with itself provides the exemplary illustration of how ἐνέργεια also allows for the givenness of time and movement as a self-same and self-differentiating phenomenon.

Heidegger ends his partial translation and interpretation of *Metaphysics* Λ 6 by directly confronting the crucial line in which Aristotle introduces the claim that the being (οὐσία) of this prime mover must be understood as purely determined by ἐνέργεια. The passage in question reads "Therefore, it is necessary for there to be such an origin whose being is being-at-work" (δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια) (*Met.* Λ 6, 1071b19-20; my trans.). In Heidegger's own rendering, the passage becomes "Thus, with the Being of eternal movement, there must, for the latter, be a point of departure whose ontological character, meaning of being, is pure temporal unfolding, ἐνέργεια" (GA 62, 104). As has been noted throughout the present essay, Heidegger provides a groundbreaking and innovative approach to the way in which Aristotle introduces the need for a being whose οὐσία would be characterized by pure ἐνέργεια. In Aristotle's thinking, the prime mover is not responsible either for the coming to be (γένεσις) of time, as it might seem to be the case for the cosmological account of time offered by Plato in the *Timaeus*,[31] nor for its passing away. Instead, the few remarks that Aristotle in fact dedicates to the being of the prime mover do not go beyond suggesting, always in a very elusive way, the manner in which such a being would be an enigmatic origin or source of temporalizing that would allow both for the always-having-been character of movement and time and its futurity. Through the image of continuous circular motion, such a granting of movement and time to being seems to occur incessantly but perhaps always and each time in a novel and unexpected manner.

[31] See Plato, *Timaeus* 28a. However, even with regard to this intimation of a creator God in Plato, the following question could still be raised: Can this demiurgic God be so easily translated into our own modern and contemporary notion of the divine? See, for instance, Serge Margel, *The Tomb of the Artisan God: On Plato's Timaeus*, trans. Philippe Lynes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019). I believe that greater caution is required in order to make sense of the ancient Greek conception of the divine. As suggested previously at the beginning of this essay, we should resist the otherwise conventional tendency to believe that the Christian and modern reception of ancient Greek thought provides us with a seamless translation and transition. On the contrary, what remains thought-provoking and noteworthy is the enduring strangeness of the ancient Greek conception of God with our own. I have suggested that this distinct notion of the divine can be more suggestively elucidated through the fundamental experience of being found in ancient Greek thinkers. I understand the present interpretation of Aristotle's use of ἐνέργεια in his conception of the unmoved mover as a preliminary albeit necessary step toward deconstructing the ontotheological interpretation of the Stagirite's texts and more productive reappropriation of his thinking of the divine.

In the preceding discussion, I hope to have elucidated at least one possible way of retrieving the latent possibilities that can be found in Heidegger's unfinished interpretation and translation of *Metaphysics* Λ. By paying attention to the productive ambiguities and ambivalences of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, I have sought to show that the issue of Aristotle's role in the history of being and metaphysics is perhaps fundamentally undecidable. I have argued that Aristotle cannot simply be reduced to the founder of the Western ontotheological tradition of metaphysics. Instead, by way of Heidegger's interpretation, my goal has been to amplify some of the suggestions found in Aristotle's text, which can be interpreted as elusive traces of a more originary thinking of being that remains ahead of us. As Heidegger has demonstrated time and again throughout his various interpretations of Aristotle's texts, there are still latent traces of an other-than-metaphysical thinking that remain worthy of further consideration and provide a way to fundamentally rethink the traditional constitution of Western philosophical thought. One of the most significant affinities between Heidegger's thinking and Aristotle's writings can be found in the latent connection between ἐνέργεια and *Ereignis*, which Thomas Sheehan has notably suggested share an important correspondence.[32] In both terms, we can see a concern with thinking the nature and origin of time through its givenness. Without being able to fully explore this connection, I nonetheless hope that the present essay has shown the extent to which Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle provides us with a way of reappropriating the dynamic character of ancient Greek thought.

[32] See Sheehan, "Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle" and "On the Way to *Ereignis*." Another important intimation of this connection can also be found in Oberst, "Heidegger's Appropriation of Aristotle's Δύναμις/Ἐνέργεια Distinction."

Abraham P. Bos

BASILIDES OF ALEXANDRIA AS AN ARISTOTELIAN GNOSTIC I: ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO *REFUTATION OF ALL HERESIES*[1]

When I took my doctoral degree in 1971 with a thesis centering on Aristotle's work *On the Heavens* (*De caelo*),[2] I was entirely convinced of the correctness of W. Jaeger's hypothesis that it is necessary to distinguish three phases in Aristotle's philosophical development. Following in his footsteps and those of F. Nuyens, W. K. C. Guthrie, A. J. Festugière, and J. Pépin, I tried to detect traces of the "early Aristotle" in the work *De caelo*. Later, in 1976, I focused my attention on the doctrine of a "limited Providence," often attributed to Aristotle in Antiquity,[3] and on the fragments of Aristotle's lost works.[4]

But I also became fascinated by the splendid work *On the Cosmos* (*De mundo*), which has been passed down under Aristotle's name but is generally denied to him in the modern era.[5] Together with Professor G. Reale (Milan), I published an Italian edition of this work with an extensive commentary,[6] in which the entire modern debate over this treatise is critically examined and the reasons for denying it to Aristotle are shown to be unsound.

From that time on, I have continued to wonder what the consequences for Aristotle's overall philosophical conception would be if the work *On the Cosmos*, in which the author regards *pneuma* as the "ensouled substance" in all living beings and talks about God as the "begetter" of all things through the Power (Δύναμις) that originates in Him, was genuinely by his hand.

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[1] The second part of this study, titled "Basilides's Doctrine of the World Seed," is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming issue of *Kronos Philosophical Journal*.

[2] A. P. Bos, "Een onderzoek naar de kosmologie van Aristoteles in de eerste jaren van zijn wijsgerige activiteit" (PhD diss., Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 1971).

[3] A. P. Bos, *Providentia Divina: The Theme of Divine Pronoia in Plato and Aristotle*, Inaugural Lecture, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976).

[4] A. P. Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology in Aristotle's Lost Dialogues* (Leiden: Brill, 1989).

[5] *Aristoteles, Over de kosmos*, intro. and trans. A. P. Bos (Meppel: Boom, 1989).

[6] G. Reale and A. P. Bos, *Il Trattato Sul Cosmo Attribuito ad Aristotele* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1995).

In this period, I became aware that there was something fundamentally wrong with the interpretation of the Aristotelian Corpus because Aristotle's psychology has been misunderstood through the fault of Alexander of Aphrodisias. This led me to suspect that the opposition between Aristotle's lost work and the surviving Corpus, as posited by W. Jaeger and F. Nuyens, needed to be rejected once and for all.[7] At a later stage, this led to the conclusion that the work *On the Life-Bearing Spirit* (*De spiritu*) had been denied to Aristotle on the basis of the same wrong picture of Aristotle's philosophy as in the case of the treatise *On the Cosmos*.[8] I have increasingly come to understand that the conception of Aristotle, if stripped of the varnishings applied by Alexander of Aphrodisias and his followers, could be seen as a serious alternative to Plato's dualism and his philosophy of the divine Demiurge, and that Aristotle had presented God not just as "Unmoved Mover" but precisely in this capacity also as Principle of origin (Ἀρχὴ γενέσεως).

This finally made me realize that the Philonic and early Christian debate over God the Creator and the divine *Logos* should be seen to result from Aristotle's replacement of the "Maker" metaphor of Plato's *Timaeus* by the "Begetter" metaphor. The debate over this played an important role in early Christian Gnosticism.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In Book VII of his *Refutation of All Heresies*, the church father Hippolytus of Rome (c. 170-235 CE) or perhaps an Anonymous discusses the doctrine of the Gnostic Basilides of Alexandria, who lived ca. 125 CE. The author describes him as a follower of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, and he notes that he acquired his wisdom in Egypt.[9] In his introduction, the author mentions Basilides in the same breath as his son Isidorus (who was not just a "spiritual child" but son and pupil at once).[10] He presents Basilides and Isidorus as people who did not speak for themselves but saw themselves as interpreters of

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[7] A. P. Bos, "Aristotle's Psychology: Diagnosis of the Need for a Fundamental Reinterpretation," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (1999): 37-51; A. P. Bos, "Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers: A Core Text of 'Aristotelian Dualism,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41, no. 3 (2003): 289-306.

[8] A. P. Bos and R. Ferwerda, "Aristotle's *De Spiritu* as a Critique of the Doctrine of Pneuma in Plato and His Predecessors," *Mnemosyne* 60, no. 4 (2007): 565-88; *Aristotle, On the Life-Bearing Spirit (*De Spiritu*): A Discussion with Plato and His Predecessors on Pneuma as the Instrumental Body of the Soul*, intro., trans., and com. A. P. Bos and R. Ferwerda (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

[9] Hippolytus, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* VII 27, 13; for the Greek text, see *Hippolytus, Werke*, ed. P. Wendland, vol. 3, Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte, vol. 26 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1916; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1977); *Hippolytus: Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*, ed. M. Marcovich (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1986). W. A. Löhr (*Basilides und Seine Schule. Eine Studie zur Theologie- und Kirchengeschichte des Zweiten Jahrhunderts* [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1996], 29) includes this text as Testimony 8. "Egypt" could well stand for "the heathen world" in this text.

[10] *Haer.* VII 20, 1: Ἰσίδωρος, ὁ Βασιλείδου παῖς γνήσιος καὶ μαθητής. Cf. Clem. *Stromateis* VI 53, 2-5: Ἰσίδωρός τε ὁ Βασιλείδου υἱὸς ἅμα καὶ μαθητὴς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν τοῦ προφήτου Παρχὼρ Ἐξηγητικῶν = Löhr, *Basilides*, frag. 15. K. Rudolph (*Die Gnosis: Wesen und Geschichte einer spätantiken Religion* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1977; 2nd ed. 1980], 337) nevertheless maintains that there need not be any question of sonship in a biological sense. C. Osborne (*Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987], 283) translates γνήσιος (by mistake?) in the quoted passage as "illegitimate." The expression is used in the New Testament in 1 Tim. 1:2 and Titus 1:3 to designate Timothy and Titus as "true children in the faith" of Paul. Isidorus is explicitly mentioned in *Nag Hammadi Codices* IX 3, *Testimony of Truth* 57, 6-8 (= Löhr, *Basilides*, Testimony 15). It is remarkable that this passage mentions a son of Basilides, in whose theology the theme of the "Sonship" plays such a central role.

a doctrine that had been passed down to them. This supposedly involved "secret words" (λόγοι ἀπόκρυφοι) that Matthias had spoken to them and that he himself had heard from the Savior during private instruction.[11]

1.1. Basilides Presented as a Pupil of Aristotle

It is remarkable that the author of the *Refutation*, in his critical discussion of Basilides, constantly brings up the philosophy of Aristotle (384-322 BCE).[12] We should not accept these statements uncritically. Rather, they should prompt us to investigate carefully what exactly were his views on Basilides and on Aristotle and then whether it was the author himself who established this relationship or an author that he used for his rendering of Basilides's views. Next, we shall also have to try to discover whether there was anything in Basilides's conception that led him to make a special connection with Aristotle's philosophy.

It is interesting, too, that at a crucial point in his discussion of Basilides's views, where the author describes how the Great cosmic Archon begets a Son, he brings up the definition of the soul that we know from Aristotle's *On the Soul* II 1. The way he connects the view of Basilides and the psychology of Aristotle may show that he understood this definition differently from its present-day interpretation. An important issue here is whether this definition was brought up by the author independently or whether perhaps he took his cue from Basilides. If the passage on Aristotle's definition of the soul was purely devised by the author of the *Elenchos*, we can conclude that ideas about the meaning of this definition differed, even around 220 CE, from views made current by the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias (200 CE). And if we have to conclude that Basilides's doctrine of the Great cosmic Archon and his Son can only be understood against the background of Aristotle's theory of the soul as the entelechy of a "natural body that is *instrumental* (ὀργανικόν)," as the text of the *Elenchos* implies, this would mean that both Basilides and the author testify to an explanation of Aristotle's definition of the soul that is different from the prevailing view today.[13] The writings of Basilides's contemporary Plutarch of

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[11] *Haer.* VII 20, 1: φασὶν εἰρηκέναι Ματθίαν αὐτοῖς λόγους ἀποκρύφους, οὓς ἤκουσε παρὰ τοῦ σωτῆρος κατ' ἰδίαν διδαχθείς, and *Haer.* VII 20, 5. Cf. Löhr, *Basilides*, 24-29. J. H. MacMahon (*Hippolytus, The Refutation of All Heresies*, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vol. VI, 1 [Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1868]) notes that E. Miller, in *Origenis Philosophumena sive Omnium Haeresium Refutatio* (Oxford: E typographeo academico, 1851), "erroneously reads 'Matthew.'" These words are central to the argument of D. Harting ("Basilides als Getuige voor de Echtheid van het Vierde Evangelie," *Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, Department of Literature* 12 [1869]: 29-57) against P. Hofstede de Groot (*Basilides am Ausgange des Apostolischen Zeitalters als Erster Zeuge für Alter und Autorität neutestamentlicher Schriften: insbesondere des Johannesevangeliums: in Verbindung mit andern Zeugen bis zur Mitte des Zweiten Jahrhunderts* [Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1868]), who on this basis proposed to bring forward the time of Basilides's life and work to the time of Emperor Trajan (97-117 CE) because he assumed on the strength of these words that there must have been *oral* contact between Matthias and Basilides (and his son Isidorus?). On the theme of the "secret words," cf. also G. P. Luttikhuizen, "Vroege Tradities over Jezus in een niet-canonieke bron: het Evangelie van Thomas," *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 38 (1998): 120-43.

[12] Described as "sehr überflüssige und vergebliche Mühe" by A. Hilgenfeld, *Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag [R. Reisland], 1856; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966), 111.

[13] See A. P. Bos, *Aristotle on God's Life-Generating Power and on Pneuma as Its Vehicle* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018); A. P. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 69-94; A. P. Bos, "Basilides as an Aristotelianizing Gnostic,"

Chaeronea also suggest an earlier interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the soul than the position standardized by Alexander of Aphrodisias.[14]

1.2. The Way Aristotle Is Presented

The author is also knowledgeable about Aristotle's philosophy. He describes at length what he presents as Aristotle's doctrine of being (οὐσία) but also talks about his theology and his psychology. We can occasionally establish from Aristotle's own extant writings that he was well acquainted with certain central elements in Aristotle's philosophy. But often we must also conclude that what he says is hard to reconcile with what we know about Aristotle.

It seems almost certain that the description of Aristotle's doctrine, as in the case of the other Greek philosophers, is based on handbook knowledge. All of Book I of the *Refutation* was already shown by H. Diels to bear a close relation to the doxographical tradition.[15] In Book I, the author represents a number of Aristotle's positions without mentioning any works in which he defended them. His more extensive discussion in Book VII 15-19 is radically different, both as regards the views of Aristotle and because he mentions titles of Aristotelian works and even gives literal, traceable quotations. But it raises major questions because the contents of the works mentioned by the author seem to differ greatly from the contents of the works we possess under the same titles and because what is said in Book I about Aristotle's psychology seems totally at odds with his statements in Book VII.

CHAPTER 2. ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO *REFUTATION* I 20, 1-7

2.1. The Stoic Perspective of the Review of all Greek Philosophers in Book I

A simple tripartite division is adopted in Book I of the *Refutation of All Heresies* in which the natural philosophers come first, followed by the ethicists and then the dialecticians. Finally, there are Epicurus, the great opponent of all earlier philosophers; Pyrrho and the sceptical Academy; and the paraphilosophers, including the Brahmans from India, the Celtic Druids, and the old Greek poet of the *Theogony*, Hesiod.

It seems that the author's source had a systematic point of departure in the view that philosophy had started with Thales as "natural philosophy"; that Socrates's adage "Know thyself" had shifted the focus from the world around us to man and the norms for human action; and that philosophy had become "all round" through Aristotle's solid elaboration of logic. This division itself seems to have a Stoic provenance (in particular

Vigiliae Christianae 54, no. 1 (2000): 44-60; Bos, "Aristotle's Psychology"; A. P. Bos, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Instrumental Body of the Soul," *Philosophia Reformata* 64, no. 1 (1999): 37-51; A. P. Bos, "Basilides of Alexandria: Matthias (Matthew) and Aristotle as the Sources of Inspiration of His Gnostic Theology in Hippolytus' *Refutatio*," in *The Wisdom of Egypt: Jewish, Early Christian and Gnostic Essays in Honour of G. P. Luttikhuizen*, ed. A. Hilhorst and G. H. van Kooten (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 397-418; A. P. Bos, "De Gnosticus Basilides en zijn Theologie over de Levensfasen van de Kosmos," *Philosophia Reformata* 70, no. 1 (2005): 41-63.

[14] Cf. Plut. *Plat. quaest.* 8, 1006B, and A. P. Bos, "Plutarch's Testimony to an Earlier Explanation of Aristotle's Definition of the Soul," in *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles*, ed. A. Pérez Jiménez, J. García López, and R. M. Aguilar (Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999), 535-48.

[15] H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1879; repr. 1976), 551-76. On this, see J. Mansfeld and D. T. Runia, *Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1997-2009).

the term "dialecticians" for the third group).[16] And this division probably explains why Plato is classified under the "ethicists," though the enumeration at the beginning of Book I adds incongruously, "He mixed the three philosophical disciplines together (presented them as a unity)."[17] The author apparently does not want to deny Plato the honor of being an early investigator of dialectics, yet he thinks that Aristotle can arguably be seen as the real founder of logic as a philosophical discipline.[18]

The systematic perspective from which Book I is written strongly determines the descriptions of the various philosophers. Because it is the view of someone from the antimetaphysical time of the Stoics and Epicureans, the doctrine of the "separate" Ideas is totally disregarded in Plato, and his theology is presented by means of the famous quotation from *Laws* IV 715e7: "God, as the ancient account (Λόγος) has it, holds both the beginning, and end, and middle of all things." This quotation is then explained in the sense that God "pervades all things."[19]

Likewise, the chapter on Aristotle in Book I passes over the fundamental distinction that Aristotle introduced between the soul (as inextricably connected with an "instrumental" body) and the intellect-in-act (as totally immaterial) and his related distinction between physics as the scientific study of all material reality and "first philosophy" as the study of that which transcends the physical. After Aristotle, the reality and knowability of a metaphysical world had become discredited throughout Greek philosophy. All reality was presented as material, changeable reality, guided and regulated by the all-pervasive *Logos* (= Zeus), and man as a "living being endowed with reason [λόγος]."

2.2. Aristotle as the Completer of Philosophy on account of His Contribution to Logic (I 20, 1-2)

So the primary emphasis on Aristotle's significance for logic makes good sense, for he had fashioned philosophy into a complete coherent discipline. In the view of the doxographer, this gives him pride of place at the head of the third series. That is also why the author starts his account of Aristotle with a summary of his doctrine of categories.

And he sums up its essence by means of Aristotle's distinction between "the οὐσία" and "the accidental" (I 20, 1), which seems a rather superficial piece of information. But on closer examination of Aristotle (and Basilides), we will be able to establish that it is not as superficial as it appears. Straight after that, in 20, 3, he stresses Aristotle's agreement

[16] Cf. Diog. Laertius VII 39-41, and A. C. J. Habets, "Geschiedenis van de indeling van de filosofie in de oudheid" (PhD thesis, University of Utrecht, 1983), 55ff., 137.

[17] See also *Haer.* I 18, 2: ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν ἀπομαξάμενος συνέστησε τὸ διδασκαλεῖον μίξας ὁμοῦ φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν διαλεκτικήν. This can also be taken to mean that Plato did not yet present the three disciplines separately.

[18] Cf. also I 5, 1, and I 20, 1: λογικώτερος ἐγένετο.

[19] *Haer.* I 19, 6: τὸν δὲ θεὸν οἱ μὲν ἕνα φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ὡς λέγει ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις· " ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων " – οὕτως <γὰρ> ἕνα αὐτὸν τὸν διὰ πάντων κεχωρηκότα ἀποφαίνεσθαι. This quotation from Plato's *Laws* also forms the conclusion of Arist. *Mu.* 7, 401b24-6, which says that God is always named in terms of his effects on the cosmos. One of these is that his "Power [...] pervades" all things (401b10). It is generally assumed that this Platonic quotation of the "ancient account" refers to the Orphic tradition of which Aristotle quotes nine lines in *Mu.* 7, 401a28-b7. In these lines, Zeus is not just called the "beginning, middle, and end" of all things but also "male" and "female."

with his teacher Plato on ethics, as I 20, 5, goes on to qualify, indicating that Aristotle's threefold classification of good things differs from the position of his teacher.

2.3. The Crucial Point of Difference between Plato and Aristotle (I 20, 4 and 6)
But this is immediately followed by a remarkable statement:

> In most points he [Aristotle] is in agreement with Plato, except the opinion concerning soul. For Plato affirms it to be immortal, but Aristotle [affirms] that it continues to exist; and that it eventually also vanishes into the fifth body, which he supposes, along with the other four [elements], – viz. fire, and earth, and water, and air, – to be something more subtle [than these], like πνεῦμα. [...]
> 20.6. This philosopher also affirms [...] that the soul of the entire world is immortal, and the world itself is eternal, but that [the soul] of an individual, as we have before stated, vanishes [into the fifth body]. (trans. J. H. MacMahon, with changes)[20]

In his report on Plato, the author had mentioned his theology, his epistemology, and his doctrine of the creation of the world (I 19, 1-9). Anybody familiar with the works of Aristotle knows that Aristotle was highly critical of many matters in Plato's philosophy: of his theory of Ideas as a redundant duplication of reality; of his view that scientific knowledge of the norms for human action was possible; and of Plato's doctrine of the creation of the cosmos, which for Aristotle necessarily implied the possible destruction of the cosmos. So the question suggests itself: How can this author claim of Aristotle that "In most points he is in agreement with Plato, except the opinion concerning soul"?

Yet we should not be too ready to solve this conundrum by accusing him of incomprehension or muddle-headedness. It may be that he is following the same line here as Cicero did in the first century BCE. Via an Epicurean mouthpiece, Velleius, this Roman ascribed a series of un-Platonic doctrines to Aristotle and presented all these differences between Plato and his pupil as leaning on one fundamental point of difference.[21] And Cicero does so in a text that refers explicitly to Aristotle's lost dialogue *On Philosophy*.

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[20] *Haer.* I, 20, 3-4; 6 (Marcovich, *Hippolytus*): καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα τῷ Πλάτωνι σύμφωνός ἐστιν πλὴν τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόγματος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων ἀθάνατον, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπιδιαμένειν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ταύτην ἐναφανίζεσθαι τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι, ὃ ὑποτίθεται εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεσσάρων ... λεπτότερον, οἷον πνεῦμα. 6. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὲν ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ἀίδιον, τὴν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, ὡς προείπομεν, ἀφανίζεσθαι.

[21] Cic. *N. D.* 1 13, 33 = Arist. *Philos.* frag. 26 Ross; 25, 1 Gigon: "Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multo turbat a magistro uno [Platone] dissentiens." On this text, see Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology*, 193-95; Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, 260-61; J. Pépin, *Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne (Ambroise, "Exam" I, 1, 1-4)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 140. A. J. Festugière, in *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. 2 (Paris: Gabalda, 1949), 243n1, also defended the reading "*uno*" and took it to refer to Aristotle's introduction of a fifth element. In a later correction (see vol. 1, 2nd ed., 444), he abandoned his defense of the reading "*uno*." See also *Aristóteles, Fragmentos*, intro., trans., and annotation Álvaro Vallejo Campos (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 2005), 316ff.; *Aristoteles, Fragmente zu Philosophie, Rhetorik, Poetik, Dichtung*, trans. and comm. H. Flashar, U. Dubielzig, and B. Breitenberger (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), 27, 138-39.

In addition, the author, when formulating this difference in doctrine of soul, does not say that Aristotle considered the soul to be as mortal as the body, which is how everybody nowadays interprets Aristotle's position in *On the Soul*, or that he attributes immortality to the soul, as Aristotle had taught in his lost work the *Eudemus*, according to all modern scholars (but this would have left no difference compared with Plato). Instead, he ascribes to Aristotle the doctrine that the soul survives for a while after the death of the individual, but not infinitely. Now this is precisely a theory that until recently no one had ever presented as Aristotelian![22] Moreover, the author states that according to Aristotle the World Soul is immortal, and evil plays a role only in sublunary reality (which implies that the supralunary sphere is governed by divine Providence).

It is therefore perfectly understandable that these statements were never accepted as a testimony regarding Aristotle's philosophy. Someone who, like J. Mansfeld, is certain that the doctrine of a limited divine Providence, which the author attributes to Aristotle, is non-Aristotelian and that the Stoa was the first to present souls as parts of the highest element and therefore not Aristotle; and who believes that a survival of souls for a certain period after death was first taught by the Stoics and is convinced that Aristotle did not hold a doctrine of a World Soul – such a person will of course conclude that the author cannot have derived his information from Aristotle but must have drawn it from secondary and unreliable sources.[23]

Yet this point of view requires reconsideration. In the first place, we can note that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Lambda contains an intriguing passage that says it is possible that the soul survives. We read there:

> The moving causes exist as things preceding the effects, but causes in the sense of formulae are simultaneous with their effects. For when a man is healthy, then health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere. But we must examine whether any form also survives afterward. For in some cases this may be so, e.g., the soul may be of this sort [– not all soul but the intellect; for doubtless it is impossible that *all* soul should survive.].[24]

In this passage, W. Jaeger puts the section of 1070a24 "But we must [...] survive[s]" in square brackets because he suspects it to be a later addition. On the basis of the traditional

[22] Tatian, *Or.* 25 (27, 2), has: ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς ψυχῆς διαβάλλει τὴν ἀθανασίαν. This can be explained in the way that the author of the *Elenchos* understands Aristotle's position – that is, not as a rejection of any survival of the soul, but as a rejection of the immortality of the individual soul.

[23] J. Mansfeld, *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus' Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 136-40.

[24] Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1070a21-26: τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα. [εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι μένει, σκεπτέον· ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως] (*Oxford Classical Texts*, ed. W. Jaeger [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957]). An important passage in this connection is *Anim.* II 1, 413a8-9, which asks whether the soul is the entelechy of the instrumental body as a sailor is of his ship. The traditional explanation has always rejected this question as absurd. Cf. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, 123-29.

explanation of *On the Soul* II 1, he is right. But it may well be that only the section of 1070a25 "– not all soul [...] should survive" is a later addition on the basis of the incorrect interpretation of Aristotle's psychology introduced by Alexander of Aphrodisias. The passage in question deals with "causes of motion." Aristotle often presented the soul, but never the intellect, as a principle of motion. And it is strange, to say the least, that the author first mentions the soul as an example of a cause that continues to exist, whereas he later corrects this by advancing "the intellect" as part of the soul. For Aristotle the intellect-in-act is not part of the soul.

Moreover, there is a remarkable systematic connection between what the *Elenchos* says in I 20, 4, about Aristotle's psychology and what it claims about Basilides's doctrine in VII 22, 12-13, which talks about the dissolution of the pneumatic vehicle of the "second Sonship" in the Firmament, and what it says in VII 24, 1-2, where the author quotes precisely Aristotle's famous definition of the soul. This has always been overlooked.

It could therefore be that the author of the *Elenchos* directs us toward a solution to some crucial problems relating to the philosophy of Aristotle. For he makes it clear, though without overemphasizing, that Aristotle established a close relation between the soul and a special physical body and that in his view the soul after man's death ascends until the soul-body has reached the ethereal sphere of the supralunary and dissolves into it.[25] The author thus underlines a core contrast between Plato (who had always held the soul to be immaterial[26] and had repeatedly founded its immortality on this) and his pupil.

But this Aristotelian theory of soul is a theory not just about individual souls but also about the World Soul. The author explicitly claims that Aristotle considered the World Soul to be immortal (I 20, 6). But the implication of his discussion is also that the World Soul is likewise connected with *sôma* – namely, with ether.

Further on, the author will mention that Aristotle talked about God as "the thinking of thinking" (VII 19, 6-7). This clearly shows his awareness of the fact that for Aristotle the highest entity is not the World Soul but a divine Intellect. The crucial feature of Aristotle's theory of soul in the *Elenchos*'s conception is therefore that the intellect was presented as being of a higher order than the soul but that the World Soul and individual souls are connected with σῶμα. In this account of Aristotle's doctrine, it is clear that the souls of individual living creatures are connected with a fifth element. The import of I 20, 6, is undoubtedly that Aristotle considered the World Soul to be connected with the supralunary sphere as a whole. There, the idea is that the soul-body of an individual, after being liberated from the perishable body, ascends to the heavenly region and there, in due course, dissolves into the entire ethereal sphere, with which the World Soul is connected. We will see in Book VII that the author is familiar with the distinction between an "instrumental natural body" of the soul and the soul as "entelechy" (cf. VII 19, 5-6, and 24, 1-2).

All other differences compared with Plato can be derived from this fundamental difference between intellect and soul. For Aristotle, the visible body is constantly in

[25] In I 20, 4, it is said that according to Aristotle the soul dissolves "into the fifth element." Perhaps we can assume that he did not identify this "fifth element" with the "fifth οὐσία," which he brings up in VII 19, 3-4, as the divine (immaterial) substance, and that he knew that Aristotle sharply distinguished the soul from the intellect.

[26] In fact, this was not totally certain for the author of the *Refutation*, witness *Haer.* I 19, 10, where he mentions that, according to some, Plato connected the soul with a "luminous body."

γένεσις, the soul is active in πρᾶξις, and the intellect-in-act is engaged in θεωρία. By contrast, the generation and decay of all living beings in the sublunary sphere is brought about by the ensouled celestial spheres, which he presented as cosmic and visible gods, charged with the government of and care for the underlying spheres. And the forms that develop in the visible world are the direct result of activity not by a divine Intellect but by souls that are called εἶδος and μορφή and λόγοι and that, though immaterial, are always active in the sphere of natural bodies. Hence Aristotle's rejection of Plato's doctrine of the transcendent (eternal) Ideas and his own introduction of the (eternal) immanent Forms. His introduction of the doctrine of the fifth element should doubtless be seen in connection with his critique of Plato's doctrine of the soul.

If we start by interpreting the information provided by the author of the *Elenchos* with the greatest possible internal consistency, the result is that he attributes to Aristotle a theory of soul in which the soul (of an individual mortal living creature, of celestial beings, and of the cosmos as a whole) was presented as inextricably linked to a fine-material instrumental body (the fifth element), but in which the intellect of the soul was taken to be a potentiality of the soul that, when realized, has no connection with material reality but is purely transcendent and immortal and equal to God.

In any case, we can cite Proclus as a witness to the attribution of such a view to Aristotle, when he argues in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* that Aristotle (like Plato) talked about a pneumatic vehicle (ὄχημα) of the soul, which together with the immortal part of the soul takes up residence in the visible body and leaves it again but which is nevertheless mortal.[27] If we accept this psychology as Aristotelian, we can safely observe that the Stoa held exactly the same views, though they scrapped the notion of the soul as entelechy. But both the idea that the individual soul is part of the World Soul and the idea that the individual soul lives on for a limited time after death but finally dissolves into the World Soul may have been adopted by the Stoa from Aristotle.[28]

The highly remarkable doctrine of a restricted divine Providence that is ascribed to Aristotle,[29] and was widely attributed to Aristotle in Antiquity, can also be understood as a consequence of the sharp distinction that Aristotle drew between Intellect and Soul. There is a direct relation (κοινωνία) between the Intellect and the sphere of the Soul that does not and in fact cannot exist between the Intellect and the individual concrete reality. In the same sense, Aristotle may have argued a direct relation between the Unmoved Prime

[27] Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.* V 312C (*Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl, vol. 3 [Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-6], 238, line 19): οἱ νέοι θεοὶ παράγουσι πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἄλογον καὶ ὄχημα ἄλλο πνευματικόν, οἷον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὑπέλαβε, συνεξίον τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ συνειστόν, θνητὸν δὲ ὅμως ὄν. Cf. Themistius, *In Arist. De anim.* 19, 33; Galenus, *De Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 3, 7, 25-26; Ps.-Plu. *Hom.* 2, 128. A. P. Bos, "The 'Vehicle of the Soul' and the Debate over the Origin of This Concept," *Philologus* 151 (2007): 31-50.

[28] Cf. Diog. L. VII 156 = *SVF* II 774 and Cic. *Tusc.* I 31, 77 = *SVF* II 822, and R. Hoven, *Stoïcisme et Stoïciens face au Problème de l'Au-delà* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1971), 44-65.

[29] In *Haer.* VII 19, 2-3. In I 20, 6, the same doctrine is implied in the statement that the negative exists only in the sublunary sphere. This differs somewhat from the rendering by Mansfeld (*Heresiography*, 136): "What is below the moon is full of evils." On the theme of restricted Providence in Aristotle, see Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, 265-69; on this doctrine of "Non-Sublunary Providence," see also R. W. Sharples, "Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle," in *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath*, ed. D. Frede and A. Laks (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 13-14, 22ff.

Mover and the supralunary celestial spheres that does not exist between the transcendent Principle and the sublunary sphere.

Anyone who reconstructs in the above manner the philosophy of Aristotle as does the author of the *Refutation* can see more easily that he, certainly superficially speaking, had good reasons for discovering fundamental Aristotelian features in the system of Basilides.

My claim therefore is that what the author reports about Aristotle's psychology – that is to say, that the soul consists of the fifth element and eventually dissolves into the celestial ether – contains valuable information and should be included in every collection of the "fragments" of Aristotle's lost works. The text agrees with what we know about Aristotle's lost dialogue *Eudemus*, in which death is reinterpreted as a "return home" and immortality in the proper sense is attributed to man's intellect. But it also agrees with the view of *On the Soul* that presents the soul as an immaterial form-principle indissolubly linked to an "instrumental body" (ether, or πνεῦμα). Aristotle in *On the Soul* does *not* say that the soul is indissolubly linked to the visible, gross-material body. The fundamental conception in *On the Soul*, too, is that on the death of the individual human being the soul leaves the visible body together with its instrumental body and climbs up to the celestial spheres. In this process of the soul's "liberation," it is able to realize its highest potential – namely, its intellectual and truly divine activity, the only activity for which it does not need an instrumental body.

Starting from a corrected interpretation of Aristotle's theory of soul, we need to comb through the patristic and Gnostic traditions to see where it was not Plato but Aristotle who exercised the greatest influence.

2.4. The Fifth Element, Πνεῦμα, and the Soul (I 20, 4)

The author's conception, therefore, is that according to Aristotle the soul of mortal creatures is related to "the fifth body (element)" and in due course "dissolves" into it. It is entirely correct that he attributes to Aristotle the doctrine of a "fifth element" distinct from Earth, Water, Air, and Fire. But in this brief survey he does not make it clear whether he means that according to Aristotle the soul is this fifth body or is connected with this fifth body. Aristotle himself had declared with some emphasis that the soul is "not without σῶμα" but also that it is not a σῶμα itself (*Anim.* II 2, 414a19-21). Nor does the author of the *Elenchos* advise us here that in VII 19, 3, he will attribute a doctrine of an (immaterial) "fifth οὐσία" to Aristotle and identify it with the surface of the outer celestial sphere.

We can add that the author here in I 20, 4, locates the distinction between the four sublunary elements and the fifth element in the fact that the latter is made of finer matter. To clarify this, he refers to πνεῦμα. We should note that Aristotle clearly stated that *pneuma* belongs to the "instrumental natural body" of the souls of human beings and animals in the sublunary sphere.[30] The fifth element, on the other hand, is the natural body of the ensouled divine beings in the supralunary spheres.

However, in the well-known chapter II 3, 736b29-737a1, of *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle did state that the δύναμις of every soul has something of another and more divine

[30] Cf. Aristotle, *De Spiritu* 9; Bos and Ferwerda, *Aristotle, On the Life-Bearing Spirit (*De Spiritu*).*

body than the so-called elements and that this is the vital heat in πνεῦμα. Πνεῦμα can therefore be regarded as an equivalent (ἀνάλογον) of the fifth element. It is in the same way a "natural body which is instrumental to the soul."

In what follows we will have to discern how the author saw the relation between the fifth element and πνεῦμα.[31] Here we note that a doctrine of a psychically characterized σῶμα that is absorbed into the astral sphere is not an entirely unknown theory in Greek philosophy. We know it from the myth at the end of Plutarch, *De Facie in Orbe Lunae* (941Fff.), but also from *Corpus Hermeticum* X 15-19. Elsewhere I have argued that this is a doctrine that implies a "double death," in which the divine principle is first liberated from the gross-material body and then deposes the fine-material soul-body too and that it was a consequence of Aristotle's more precise distinction of intellect-in-act on the one hand and soul on the other and of the "Aristotelian dualism," which he introduced.[32]

It is a serious misunderstanding to infer from texts such as the passage from *Refutation* I 20, 4, discussed here that Aristotle once had a phase in which he did not yet or not anymore consider a doctrine of an immaterial intellect to be necessary, as J. Pépin, following well-known predecessors such as H. von Arnim, W. K. C. Guthrie, and A. J. Festugière, has argued.[33]

2.5. Three Interpretations of Plato's Doctrine of the Soul in *Refutation* I 19, 10

In his discussion of Aristotle's doctrine, the author contrasts Aristotle's theory of soul with one specific view that he attributes to Plato. According to I 20, 4, Plato argued that the soul is immortal. In this way he creates a clear contrast between the position of Plato and that of his pupil, to whom he ascribes the view that the soul disappears with the passage of time by dissolving into the fifth element (which is itself immortal).

But in his treatment of Plato's views in I 19, 10-3, he adopts a more subtle approach. He mentions that three different interpretations have been put forward for Plato's theory of soul:

(a) the soul is ungenerated and imperishable;
(b) the soul is generated but imperishable by virtue of God's will;
(c) the soul is a composite thing and both generated and perishable.[34]

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[31] In *Haer.* IV 43, 8, he talks about πνεῦμα and fire, water, and earth as the four elements of which the cosmos is composed. In the period after Aristotle, the independence of ether as a special, fifth element was denied, particularly by the Stoa, and ether and πνεῦμα were often used as synonyms.

[32] Cf. Arist. *Anim.* II 2, 413b24-7, and Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, 279-81; A. P. Bos, "'Aristotelian' and 'Platonic' Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian Philosophy and in Gnosticism," *Vigiliae Christianae* 56, no. 3 (2002): 273-91; Bos, "Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers."

[33] Pépin, *Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne*, 164-72. On this, see chap. 3.10. and our commentary on VII 19, 3. A comparable view was defended by R. Bodéüs, *Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).

[34] *Haer.* I 19, 10: καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸν ἀγένητον λέγειν καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ὅταν λέγῃ· 'ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος· τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον' καὶ ὅταν αὐτοκίνητον αὐτὴν ἀποδεικνύῃ καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως· οἱ δὲ γενητὴν μέν, ἄφθαρτον δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν. οἱ δὲ σύνθετον καὶ γενητὴν καὶ φθαρτήν· καὶ γὰρ κρατῆρα αὐτῆς ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ σῶμα αὐτὴν ἔχειν αὐγοειδές, τὸ δε γενόμενον πᾶν ἀνάγκην ἔχειν φθαρῆναι. Cf. Löhr, *Basilides*, 129n25. It is remarkable that the author here applies the dialectical tripartition to Plato's doctrine of soul that Philo of Alexandria uses for the cosmos in *De Aeternitate Mundi*, 1-20. Cf. A. P. Bos, "Philo on God as Ἀρχὴ Γενέσεως," *Journal for Jewish Studies* 60, no. 1 (2009): 32-47.

It is clear that he takes position (a) to be the position of Plato's *Phaedrus* 245c5ff. But positions (b) and (c) are presented as equally Platonic on the basis of propositions that Plato argued in his *Timaeus*. The term "God's will" refers to *Timaeus* 41b4 and to Plato's proposition that the entire visible cosmos, though "generated" and therefore perishable, will not decay by virtue of God's will. And the term "mixing bowl" refers to *Timaeus* 41d4 and to the "mixture" of the components of the soul in 34b10ff.

So the author is well aware that the debate over Plato's theory of soul, particularly in connection with his *Timaeus*, has led to very different positions. But it is also striking that the discussion of the various interpretations is dialectically ordered. The author gives the following scheme:



Such dialectical schemes are typical of the doxographical tradition. But almost certainly they also originate in the Peripatetic school tradition. Hence, we should consider the possibility that this discussion on the interpretation of Plato's theory of soul had its origins in his direct pupil Aristotle, who often took a critical stance on the *Timaeus* in his surviving work *On the Soul* and who in his dialogue *Eudemus* developed his own theory of soul in pointed contrast with the views of Plato.[35]

In this connection it is particularly interesting to look closely at position (c). According to this view, Plato presented the soul as "composite" (σύνθετος) and as "generated and perishable." But the soul is also said to possess "a body shining like light (σῶμα αὐγοειδές)." M. Marcovich refers here to *Timaeus* 44d3ff. and 69c5. But these places talk about the visible body of human beings into which the soul is built. Plato never uses the term "shining like light" (αὐγοειδές). (Nor for that matter does Aristotle in his surviving works.) The term belongs to the tradition that saw the soul as inextricably linked not to the visible body but to a very special soul-body as its ὄχημα or vehicle.[36] This body

[35] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* IV 8 [6] 1, 27ff. On this, see W. Burkert, "Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles," in *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation Offered to C. J. de Vogel*, ed. J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk (Assen: van Gorcum, 1975), 137-46; J. Mansfeld, "Heraclitus, Empedocles and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria," *Vigiliae Christianae* 39, no. 2 (1985): 131-56; D. Zeller, "The Life and Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria: The Use and Origin of a Metaphor," *Studia Philonica Annual* 7 (1995): 19-55; J. Pépin, "La Légende Orphique du Supplice Tyrrhénien," in *L'Art des Confins: Mélanges offerts à M. de Gandillac*, ed. A. Cazenave and J. F. Lyotard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), 387-406.

[36] Cf. Orig. *Cels.* 2, 60: τὴν ὑφεστηκθῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ αὐγοεοδεῖ σώματι ψυχήν. Cf. *In Mt.* 17, 30: αἰθέρια καὶ αὐγοειδὲς φῶς. Procl. *In Tim.* 33BC (vol. II 81, 19-21 Diehl); 33C (vol. II 85, 3; 44CD (III 355, 16). See also Iambl. *Myst.* 5, 10, 3, and Suda s.v. Philop. *In De an.* 18, 26: σῶμα οὐράνιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀίδιον, ὅ φασιν αὐγοειδὲς ἢ ἀστροειδές. Also Hermias, *In Phdr.* 69, 18C; Simpl. *In Phys.* 615, 31-35; Galenus *P.H.P.* VII 7, 25. Cf. C.-H. Puech

is described as "light-like" because, although it is not pure "light," it is the σῶμα most akin to the intelligible light.

We should consider here that it was Aristotle in *On the Soul* who argued that the soul is connected with its σῶμα φυσικὸν ὀργανικόν in such a way that it forms a "composite substance" with it, of which the "φυσικὸν σῶμα" is the material side and the soul the formal principle (II 1, 412a15-6). Also, a broad tradition attributed to Aristotle the view that the soul is connected with a special σῶμα that is distinct from the visible body.[37] As we saw above, the author of the *Refutation* also belongs to this tradition.

His statements in I 19, 10, could therefore suggest that his interpretation (c) goes back to Aristotle and that Aristotle in his dialogue *Eudemus or On the Soul* presented his new theory of the soul as a composite substance of form and soul-body by way of an alternative to what Plato says in the *Timaeus* about the "mixing" of the soul-substance in a "mixing bowl."

2.6. The Overall Perspective on Greek Philosophy (I 26, 3)

To use the *Elenchos*'s information properly, it is important to remember at all times what its overall perspective on Greek philosophy is. In particular, this can help to illuminate the way in which its author treats the theology of Plato and Aristotle. He gives this overall view at least three times in his work.

At the end of Book I he says:

> All these, then, made the foregoing statements in their doctrine, regarding both the nature and the generation of the universe. But all, sinking below what is divine, busied themselves concerning the substance of existing things, being astonished at the magnitude of creation, and supposing it constituted the Deity, each speculator selecting in preference a portion of the world, failing, however, to discern the God and maker of these. (J. H. MacMahon 2-3)[38]

He formulates this position again in Book IV:

> Among all those who throughout the earth, as philosophers and theologians, have carried on investigations, there has prevailed diversity of opinion concerning the Deity, as to His essence or nature. For some affirm Him to be fire, and some Πνεῦμα, and some water, while others say that He is earth.

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and G. Quispel, "Les écrits gnostiques du Codex Jung," *Vigiliae Christianae* 8 (1954): 15-18; Bos, "The 'Vehicle of the Soul.'"

[37] Cic. *Tusc.* 1, 10, 22 = Arist. *Philos.* frag. 27b Ross; 994 Gigon; Cic. *Tusc.* 1, 17, 40-41 = Arist. *Philos.* frag. 27c Ross; 995 Gigon; Cic. *Tusc.* 1, 26, 65, and 27, 66 = Arist. *Philos.* frag. 27d Ross; 996 Gigon; Philo *Her.* 283; Procl. *In Ti.* III 238, 19; Ps.-Plu. *Hom.* 2, 128.

[38] *Haer.* I 26, 3: Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν πάντες περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φυσεώς τε καὶ γενέσεως ταῦτα, καθὼς ἐξεθέμεθα, τῇ αὐτῶν δόξῃ ἐξεῖπον. οἱ δὲ πάντες κάτω τοῦ θείου χωρήσαντες περὶ τὴν τῶν γενομένων οὐσίαν ἠσχολήθησαν, τὰ μεγέθη τῆς κτίσεως καταπλαγέντες καὶ αὐτὰ τὸ θεῖον εἶναι νομίσαντες, ἕτερος ἕτερον μέρος τῆς κτίσεως προκρίναντες, τὸν δὲ θεὸν τούτων <κτίστην> καὶ δημιουργὸν μὴ ἐπιγνόντες (Marcovich, *Hippolytus*). There is no need to add <κτίστην> here.

> And each of the elements labours under some deficiency, and one is worsted by the other. To the wise man of the world, this, however, occurred, which is obvious to persons possessing intelligence. [I mean] that, beholding the stupendous works of creation, they were confused respecting the substance of existing things, supposing that these were too vast to admit of deriving generation from another, and at the same time [asserting] that neither the universe itself is God. As far as theology was concerned, they declared, however, a single cause for things that fall under the cognizance of vision, each supposing the cause which he adjudged to be the most reasonable; and so, when gazing on the objects made by God, and on those which are the most insignificant in comparison with His overpowering majesty, not, however, being able to extend the mind to the magnitude of God as He really is, they deified these. (MacMahon, 108-9)[39]

He reiterates this in X:

> I consider, however, that at present it is enough to elucidate those causes of which the Greeks, not being aware, glorified, in pompous phraseology, the parts of creation, while they remained ignorant of the Creator. And from these the heresiarchs have taken occasion, and have transformed the statements previously made by those [Greeks] into similar doctrines, and thus have framed ridiculous heresies. (MacMahon 394-95)[40]

For these passages, M. Marcovich rightly refers to Romans 1:25, where Paul says about the heathens, "They exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator."[41] But it remains curious that the author levels this reproach against all Greek philosophers collectively, although Plato and Aristotle, with their doctrine of a supraphysical reality, seem not just exempt from this judgement but used the same argument to define their own position against that of the pre-Socratics.[42]

As we pointed out above, this may well be due to the fact that the author derived his knowledge of Greek philosophy from a source that seems strongly influenced by the "postmetaphysical" and "antimetaphysical" view of the Stoa.

But it also seems useful to ask how far his approach here was inspired by the example of Philo of Alexandria, who in his work *On the Creation of the Cosmos* 7 sees the great evil of philosophy in the fact that it awards too much honor to the cosmos and thus fails to arrive at knowledge of the Maker of the cosmos. Elsewhere I have argued that Philo

[39] *Haer.* IV 43, 1-2. He goes on to mention Persians, Babylonians, and Egyptians.

[40] *Haer.* X 32, 5: Ἕλληνες κομπῷ τῷ λόγῳ τὰ μέρη τῆς κτίσεως ἐδόξασαν, τὸν κτίσαντα ἀγνοήσαντες, <ἀφ'> ὧν ἀφορμὰς σχόντες οἱ αἱρεσιάρχαι, ὁμοίοις λόγοις τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων προειρημένα μετασχηματίσαντες αἱρέσεις καταγελάστους συνεστήσαντο.

[41] Rom. 1:25: οἵτινες μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:20-21.

[42] Cf. Pl. *Soph*. 246aff.; Arist. *Mu.* 1, 391a18-b3 and b6. See Reale and Bos, *Il Trattato sul Cosmo attribuito ad Aristotele*, and Bos, *Aristoteles, Over de Kosmos*, 4 and 55ff.

in this work is criticizing not Aristotle but the immanental philosophy of the Chaldeans and that he describes Abraham as the one who was the first to achieve recognition of the true, transcendent God.[43] On that occasion I also argued that Philo was following the example of the author of *On the Cosmos*, who presents truly valuable theology as being the knowledge not of the splendor of the cosmos but of the Cause of the entire cosmos, that is, of the transcendent God.[44]

Philo, however, could suffer Plato and Aristotle alongside Abraham and Moses, as "philosophers of the Transcendent." The author of the *Elenchos* has much more of a problem when he presents all Greek philosophers as "sages of this world."[45] It is therefore more probable that he was led by his Stoic handbook and Paul's radical rejection of the "wisdom of the world" to virtually ignore any details of the theology of Plato and Aristotle that sat uncomfortably with this image! This is particularly striking in his account of Aristotle's philosophy. His treatment contains no trace of Aristotle's theology of a divine Intellect, though Book VII shows that he was familiar with it.[46] And in his discussion of the human soul he flatly disregards Aristotle's remarks about the human intellect, which in his view is alone in deserving to be called "separate" and "immortal." We will return to this when encountering the remarks about Aristotle's philosophy in the introduction to his critical discussion of Basilides in Book VII. We can, however, say something about what we could call "the second beginning" of the metaphysical tradition. This "second beginning" of "metaphysics," with its revival of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition in the first century BCE, can be understood to follow from the discovery of this scheme (through the discovery of the Aristotelian Corpus, including the work *On the Cosmos*). Both Philo of Alexandria and the author of the *Elenchos* seem to have disqualified the earlier time as the time of a theology that focused on the effects of God's activity instead of a theology of the supreme God himself!

CHAPTER 3. THE PHILOSOPHY AND WORKS OF ARISTOTLE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF *REFUTATION* VII 15, 1-19, 9

There are a number of remarkable aspects to this presentation of Aristotle's philosophy, too.[47] The author of the *Elenchos* starts from the concept of οὐσία central to Aristotle's philosophy. He had already said in I 20, 1, that it forms the basis of all things together with the notion of "accident" (*accidens*). Here he mentions that, according to Aristotle, being can be divided into three kinds: genus, species, and "indivisible being." The postulation

[43] A. P. Bos, "Philo of Alexandria: A Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle," *Studia Philonica Annual* 10 (1998): 68-88; cf. D. T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 122.

[44] Cf. Arist. *Mu.* 6, 397b9-13, in contrast to 1, 391a18-b3. Cf. A. P. Bos, "Gnostische Spiritualiteit: de Grieks-filosofische Component," *Philosophia Reformata* 67, no. 2 (2002): 108-27.

[45] *Haer.* IV 43, 2. See also Clement, *Protr.* V 66, 4, where Clement makes Aristotle an "immanental philosopher" as well.

[46] It seems unlikely that the author in *Haer.* IV 43, 1, is referring to Aristotle when he says that "some regarded Πνεῦμα" as God. He is probably thinking of the Stoics.

[47] Cf. P. J. G. A. Hendrix, *De Alexandrijnsche Haeresiarch Basilides: Een bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der gnosis* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1926), 114-17.

in VII 18, 2, and 18, 6, that Aristotle referred to the concrete, individual being as "the primary being and the being *par excellence*" is a correct rendering of a central proposition in the *Categories*, likewise, that a species and a genus can be predicated of this concrete being. And Aristotle also uses these basic axioms in his extensive analysis of οὐσία in *Metaphysics* Z-Θ, in which he tries to discover the essential character of being.

3.1. The Genus as a Heap (σωρός) and Mixture of Seeds (15, 2)

A striking notion is that of the genus as a heap that is a mixture of many and different seeds. We do not find such an identification anywhere in Aristotle. But it does call to mind Aristotle's interest in and appreciation of Anaxagoras's doctrine of the "seeds" that in the beginning were "all together" and that Aristotle interprets both as "beings in potentiality" and as "non-beings in actuality."[48] But it could also suggest that this exposition is given with a view to the discussion of the World Seed in Basilides's cosmogony. The author's aim may have been to present this central doctrine of Basilides's as deriving from Aristotle and not from Jesus's instruction (though Basilides most probably connected it with Jesus's parable of "the Sower").

But we should allow for the fact that the term "σπέρμα" is also used in the fundamental chapter of Aristotle, *On the Soul* II 1, with which the author of the *Elenchos* was familiar. Aristotle argues there that the soul "is the first entelechy of a natural body that potentially possesses life and is instrumental" (412a27-b1 and b4-6). Next, he emphasizes that the soul forms an indissoluble unity with the body that potentially possesses life. This is followed by a passage in which Aristotle says that this should also be investigated for "the parts." This text has always been incorrectly explained, as if Aristotle is concerned whether the soul is also inextricably linked to "the parts" *of the body.* But he means "the parts" *of the soul*! His point there is that the natural body that potentially possesses life must also contain "the parts" *of the soul*. These are not added later. They are already present, if only potentially. Aristotle clarifies this in the important statement, "but seeds and fruits [καρπός] are bodies which are potentially of that sort" (412b27). Aristotle means there: σπέρμα or a fruit (a grain of wheat, a beechnut) is a purely "natural body" that does not yet display signs of life but that can display life as soon as the potential for life is activated. Of "natural bodies," such as Earth, Fire, and Air, Aristotle says that they do not form a unity but are still a σωρός, a formless mass, a heap, as long as they have not been converted in a digestive process into a new, individual entity (*Metaph*. Z 16, 1040b8-10).

It may be that the author interpreted Basilides's theory of the World Seed as a theory about the development of different levels of life, with the main difference in level being the distinction between purely cosmic life and the true, higher life of the beings endowed with γνῶσις.

[48] Arist. *Metaph*. Λ 2, 1069b18-21. Aristotle is probably accurate in his description of Anaxagoras's initial situation in the words: ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα in Λ 2, 1069b29, and 6, 1071b28. But from Anaxagoras we probably also have the term πανσπερμία (mixture of seeds); cf. Arist. *Phys*. III 4, 203a21; *Cael*. III 4, 303a16; *Anim*. I 2, 404a4. The author of the *Elenchos* often uses this term for Basilides's "World Seed": 21, 1; <21, 5>; 22, 5; 22, 16; 23, 4; 24, 3; 25, 1; X 14, 8, and also only in his discussion of Basilides.

To clarify the Aristotelian theory, he gives the example of the genus "living being."[49] In talking about the origin of the visible world in his *Timaeus*, Plato had started from "the intelligible Living Being" and had presented concrete, visible reality as a visible image of this Being.[50] The problem in Plato's dialogue is that this makes the Demiurge "the Father and Maker" of the visible living being that is the cosmos. In reaction, Aristotle will emphasize much more strongly that God is the "cause of vitalizing motion" for everything that lives in the cosmos. Perhaps for a similar reason the author has opted here for the example of the genus "living being" because he will argue further on that Basilides presented cosmogony as a "zoo-gony." We should note here that Aristotle had also included vegetable life in his system. In the *Elenchos*, plants are completely out of the picture, and the vegetative or nutritive function of mortal living beings is not mentioned separately either, apart from the growth of teeth mentioned in VII 22, 1. In 18, 4, "living being" is defined as "an ensouled substance potentially perceptive." This is a typically Aristotelian definition. In Plato we could expect a formulation along the lines of "an ensouled substance characterized by self-motion." Aristotle recognized that there are living beings that do not possess the power of locomotion. But in any case, a living being always possesses at least one sense, the sense of touch.[51]

So the author, it seems, simply gives an "example" (παράδειγμα) to make something clear about the relation of genus, species, and concretum. But a background factor here may be that this "logical" relation is further on given an ontological interpretation that wants to outdo Plato's and Philo's way of talking about cosmogony. In Plato, the visible world was made by the Demiurge after the example (παράδειγμα) of the intelligible Living Being, who as a genus "comprehends all living creatures, individually and in terms of species" (*Tim.* 30c). But the problem here is that living beings are not produced by a Craftsman.[52] Passing on life is not a matter of τέχνη but of nature. Other problems involved in Plato's choice to present God as "Father" on the one hand but as "Maker" on the other, as the later discussion about the *Timaeus* showed, are that the Demiurge seems subordinate to the Intelligible Model and that he seems to be the producer of the visible, material cosmos (which for Aristotle is at odds with Plato's identification of the Demiurge with "Intellect").

Philo of Alexandria tried expressly to avoid these problems. He makes God (the Intellect) produce the Logos (as "Son" and Εικών of the divine Intellect itself, and as "Example/Archetype" for the visible world), and he presented the Λόγος as the life-giving, ensouling principle that acts on the "passive principle."[53] But this raised the problem of the status of the "passive principle," which was transformed into a perfect product of God's

[49] *Haer.* VII 16, 1. Cf. Arist. *Cat.* 5, 2a16-19. For the *Categories*, see *Aristote [Catégories]*, trans. and ed. R. Bodéüs (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001).

[50] Pl. *Tim.* 30c-d. For the term εικών, cf. *Tim.* 29b2.

[51] Cf. Arist. *Anim.* II 2, 413b2-5: τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἴσθησιν, ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφή. Cf. *Gener. anim.* II 1, 732a12-13.

[52] One of Aristotle's important criticisms of Plato's *Timaeus* seems to have been that in Plato the cosmos apparently belongs to the category of the "products of handicraft." Philo, who reports this in his *De Aeternitate Mundi* 10-11 (Arist. *Philos.* frag. 18 Ross; 916 Gigon), regards this criticism as wholly in keeping with the true philosophy (of Moses).

[53] Philo, *Opif.* 8, and Bos, "Philo on God as Ἀρχὴ Γενέσεως."

creative work. Moreover, this conception failed to explain in what way the cosmos can be said to have "come into being."

Did Basilides want to avoid the need to postulate a "passive principle" by talking about a "World Seed" in which God's Logos is present and that is developed with all the principles/germs it contains? He thus avoids having to relate God directly to concrete, material reality. In this conception, God only has a direct relation to the World Seed, which we can identify with the Genus in Aristotle's philosophy and with the Logos in Philo's theology.[54]

So the author of the *Elenchos* draws a picture in which Aristotle sees all concrete, generated entities as deriving their principles from a genus. Remarkably, however, he emphasizes in 17, 1, and 18, 6, that the genus itself is not a being and that therefore all concrete living creatures exist thanks to the genus in which they participate and thanks to their accidents, both of which are not "beings." It is true that the author can base himself with some justification on the analyses of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z-Θ. But we should bear in mind here that he will say of Basilides that he presented all cosmic reality as a product of "the non-being World Seed" and "the non-being Sonship." The Anonymous wanted to indicate a parallelism between Aristotle's doctrine of genus and Basilides's doctrine of the World Seed and between Aristotle's doctrine of species or the Forms and Basilides's doctrine of the tripartite Sonship as (both transcendent and immanent) form-principle.

Remarkably, too, the author indicates in his discussion of Aristotle's doctrines that there is an entity responsible for the "deposition" of this Genus as the all-encompassing principle of generated things.[55] He thus anticipates Basilides's special theology of creation,

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[54] This aligns Basilides with the philosophical theology criticized by his contemporary Justin Martyr, that is, the theology in which God relates only to genera and not to the individual – *Dialogus* 1.4: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειροῦσι πείθειν ὡς τοῦ μὲν σύμπαντος καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν ἐπιμελεῖται θεός, ἐμοῦ δὲ καὶ σοῦ οὐκ ἔτι καὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα. On this text, cf. J. C. M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho Chapters One to Nine* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 30-39; see also his *De Ware Wijsheid: Wegen van Vroeg-christelijk Denken* (Baarn: Ambo, 1992), 25-29. Van Winden finds a theory of "limited providence" here. This is relevant for us, inasmuch as the author of the *Elenchos* ascribes to both Aristotle and Basilides such a doctrine of limited providence. But we should note that Aristotle and Basilides gave a cosmological interpretation of this theory, not an ontological one. They stated that divine Order and Providence were manifest in the celestial spheres but not in the sublunary sphere. This is not the same as saying that God only concerns himself with the general and the genera but not with individual identities. But there is the possibility of a parallelism here if we can identify the sublunary sphere with the sphere of the plurality of individual specimens and the supralunary sphere with the sphere of the soul and the eidetic form-principles. In effect, the necessary consequence of a theology that identifies God with a pure Intellect is that God can only stand in a direct relation to the psychical sphere, not to the sphere of perceptible reality.

[55] *Haer.* VII 17, 1: τίς δὲ ὁ ταύτην καταβεβλημένος. The verb used here can mean "to deposit," "to lay" (e.g., a foundation), but it is also common for the sowing of seed and the process of fertilization (cf. Arist. *Mirab.* 80, 836a21; *Probl.* XX 12, 924a3). The derived noun καταβολή occurs often in the New Testament as the "foundation" of the cosmos: Mt. 13:35, which talks about "what has been hidden since the foundation [of the world]" (quoting Ps. 78:2/77:2 [LXX]), and Mt. 25:34, which talks about "the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world," and also Eph. 1:4-5: "even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him. He destined us in love to be his sons through Jesus Christ [...]." Basilides probably explained this text in the sense of: "before the deposition of the World Seed." Cf. also Lk. 11:50; John 17:24. The term can also be used in the sense of "fertilization," Heb. 11:11. On this remarkable text, which attributes the production of semen to Sarah, see P. W. van der Horst, "Sarah's Seminal Emission: Hebrews 11:11 in the Light of Ancient Embryology," in van der Horst, *Hellenism – Judaism – Christianity: Essays on Their Interaction* (Kampen: Pharos, 1994), 203-23. The author of the *Elenchos* takes up this theme in 21, 4.

which he will set out in 21, 4. But the thrust of his argument seems to be that Aristotle had presented the role of the transcendent principle just as Basilides had and that Basilides had followed Aristotle in this, too.

In the presentation of the *Elenchos*, the transcendent God, whom Aristotle had called "the thinking on thinking," is given the role of being the Cause of the Principle that contains the seeds of all generated substances. In this way it seems that Aristotle had also supported a cosmogony or at least a cosmology that defended a deduction of visible reality from the spiritual.

That is to say, the author attributes to Aristotle a philosophical conception in which the genesis of the visible cosmos as a living being that contains all living beings is described after the model of a self-propelled development process as elaborated by Aristotle in *Generation of Animals*, while at the same time he leaves room for an external First Cause as initiator.[56]

In assessing this representation of affairs, we should certainly consider that Aristotle himself had described the generation of living beings as a process that takes place in φύσις, the only exception being that the actualization of the potential for intellectuality for the beings possessing this potential cannot be explained physically but is caused "from outside."[57]

The question of who made this connection between Aristotle and Basilides in 17, 1, and 19, 7, admits of two answers. It could be that Basilides suggested such a connection. But the fact that the *Epitome* in X 14 does not make any explicit link with Aristotle, as J. Frickel has noted[58] (the statement in X 14, 3, "For He is desired by every nature, each in its own way," is the clearest reminiscence), must prompt us to be cautious and to identify in the first place the author of the *Elenchos* as the one who made the connection artificially in order to carry out his plan to present the heretics as followers of Greek philosophy and to push into the background the underlying biblical data.

3.2. The Λόγος as Principle of Differentiation and the Soul as Principle of Individualization

To clarify the discussion, I point out some relevant notions from Aristotle's extant work. In the first place we need to pay attention to the term "unseparated together," which we encounter in the *Elenchos*.[59] At the beginning of his *Physics*, Aristotle describes the human cognitive process as a process that starts with "the undifferentiated." From

[56] We can note here that Aristotle's system as we know it from the Aristotelian Corpus does raise the question of how Aristotle saw the originative relation of the divine in man and the divine in the astral world with regard to the transcendent Intellect. For he emphatically postulated the "dependence" of all levels of life on the metacosmic life of the divine Intellect. The place where this question was treated must have been the *Eudemus or On the Soul*, where Aristotle must have discussed the great theme of man's genesis in Silenus's "Revelation" to King Midas, *Eudem.* frag. 6 Ross; 65 Gigon. Cf. A. P. Bos, "Aristotle on God as Principle of *Genesis*," *The British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 18, no. 3 (2010): 363-77.

[57] Cf. Arist. *Gener. anim.* II 3, 736b27-29. For the problems related to this, cf. P. Moraux, "À propos du νοῦς θύραθεν chez Aristote," in *Autour d'Aristote: Recueil d'Études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955), 255-95.

[58] J. Frickel, *Die "Apophasis Megale" in Hippolyt's Refutatio (VI 9-18): Eine Paraphrase zur Apophasis Simons* (Rome: Pontificum Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1968), 30-87.

[59] *Haer.* VII 18, 1: ἐθέμεθα τὸ ζῷον εἶναι γένος [...] [ἔτι] συγκεχυμένον δὲ ὅμως ἔτι. Cf. Philo, *Plant.* 3.

there the components and the principles then become known as a result of dihaeresis, or differentiation. Hence we start with the general and later arrive at the particular.[60]

However, as regards natural reality, Aristotle had presented the soul as the εἶδος of a developing individual living being. That is the basic idea of his formula in which the soul is described as "the (first) entelechy of a natural body which is ὀργανικόν." For this means that the soul is already present as form-principle in the semen of an animal or human being and in the seed of a plant. According to Aristotle, all natural processes of generation are led by a soul as μορφή and εἶδος of what develops. The soul as such is a generic form. It is not the form of an individual. But the soul as εἶδος and μορφή realizes a concrete individual in matter. According to Aristotle, the εἶδος is also the essence or the "whatness" of the living being – that which is expressed in the definition.[61] But the development of individual entities also displays a process from the general to the particular. All living beings start their time of life in a vegetative phase; only later do the motor and sensitive functions develop in animals and human beings.[62]

The author of the *Elenchos* also seems to see cosmogony as a process of differentiation of what is undifferentiated, in two phases: (a) a differentiation of the species from the undifferentiated genus (this seems to be the work of a divine Logos, comparable with the Logos that Philo presents as the Architect who elaborates in sections the great plan for a new city [*Opif.* 17-19] and as the "separating Logos");[63] (b) an individualization by souls as form-principles or "λόγοι σπερματικοί." In relation to the highest level, both derived levels can be understood to result from a loss of unity in comparison with the absolute unity of the Origin.

3.3. The *Genus* Is Not One of the Beings That Have Come into Being (16, 2)

But there is something very remarkable about the way the author of the *Elenchos* talks about the genus in Aristotle. He repeatedly and persistently characterizes the genus as "one" and as "not one of the things that have come into being." In 15, 2, he says that the genus, "being one," "suffices for all existing things." In 16, 2, he says twice that the genus itself is "not one of the existing entities," as he does in 17, 1 (twice). In this last place, he also says of the genus that it "is not one of those." In 18, 3, he again refers to the genus as "being one."

This way of talking is not found directly in Aristotle's extant texts. We could think of *On the Soul* II 1, 412a6, where Aristotle says that one category of "beings" is the substance (οὐσία), in which "matter" and "form" can be distinguished. Since Aristotle emphatically presents God as separate from all matter and potentiality, we can conclude that he does not count God among "the things that are." And in *Generation of Animals*

[60] Arist. *Phys.* I 1, 184a21: ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι.

[61] Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* A 3, 983a27-28: μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον).

[62] Cf. Arist. *Gener. anim.* II 3, 736a35-b5, and A. P. Bos, "Aristotle on Soul and Soul-'Parts' in Semen (GA II 1, 735a4-22)," *Mnemosyne* 62, no. 3 (2009): 378-400.

[63] Cf. Philo, *Heres* 130ff.; cf. U. Früchtel, *Die Kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philo von Alexandrien: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Genesisexegese* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 41-52, and the *Logos* in John 1:3: "All things came into being through the *Logos*."

II 1, 732a1-3, he states that "the male" and "the female" are present in "the things that are" (H. J. Drossaart Lulofs's correction of the Greek text here is mistaken) for the sake of sexual reproduction. So there, too, we can conclude that Aristotle's God cannot be regarded as "a being." But it is clear that Aristotle's discussions in *Metaphysics* Z-Θ may also have provided the inspiration for it.[64] In a recent study, M. Furth has submitted convincing evidence for his proposition that Aristotle's "metaphysics of substance [...] was to a great extent motivated [...] as a deep theoretical foundation [...] for the biological sciences."[65] The author may also have been inspired by texts such as *Metaphysics* Λ 3, 1069b35ff., where Aristotle argues that, whereas εἶδος and *matter* can be distinguished in all things that come into being, the principles of εἶδος and *matter* themselves do not come into being. But in his discussion of Aristotle's philosophy, the author of the *Elenchos* anticipates what he is going to say about Basilides's doctrine. It is apparently crucial for Basilides that there is a distinction between "all things that have come into being" and what does not belong to these. But we should consider here that the forms of the many species also belong to what has "come into being" – that is to say: to the "beings." Basilides can distinguish between material and intelligible beings, which have meta-transcendent Principles as their origin. The principles of "all things that have come into being" are said to be "God who sows" and "the seed that is sown." Both are not that which has come into being. All things that have come into being have the one cosmic seed as their principle, but this one seed is the Logos of God (22, 2-3). This Logos of God is like light that works in the Darkness and has a differentiating and ordering effect, in the way of a *Logos spermatikos*.

3.4. Aristotle's Doctrine of Being Adapted to Fit the Teachings of Basilides (15, 1-18, 6)

Looking at the account of Aristotle's philosophy in *Elenchos* VII 15, 1-18, 6, we find that the author relates all the striking elements in it to the conception of Basilides that follows:

(a) in the first place, the identification of the genus as "a kind of heap (σωρός) of many and different seeds mixed together" (15, 2); this corresponds to what Basilides has said about the World Seed (21, 3-4; 22, 5);

(b) the mention that, according to Aristotle, existing concrete things have their foundation in non-beings (17, 1); this corresponds to Basilides's references to the non-being God and the non-being World Seed (21, 1-5);

(c) the remark that he will talk later about the one who deposited the non-being principle (17, 1), which clearly anticipates the discussion about Basilides's doctrine of the deposition (καταβολή) of the World Seed in 21, 2-4;

(d) and finally, the affirmation (again) that what Aristotle called being in the proper and highest sense sprang from non-Beings (18, 6).

But in the *Elenchos*'s account of Basilides we do not find any further trace of the trio genus, species, and indivisible being. In this way the author manages to push the

[64] Cf. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*, 44: "How much these arguments derive directly from Aristotle's own discussion of the difficulties concerning substance? It is apparent that the details can be located in the discussions of the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*, although the style of the attack is not Aristotelian."

[65] M. Furth, *Substance, Form, and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 68.

biblical foundation of Basilides's doctrines into the background. His presentation seems intended along the lines of Odysseus's method: the ears of people who come into contact with the seduction of heretic doctrines are plugged with extensive discussions about pagan philosophers so that they are not tempted to think that biblical texts such as the Parable of the Sower could really be meant the way they were interpreted by a man such as Basilides.

He also seems to have regarded Aristotle's doctrine of homonyms in the *Categories* as a crucial point (cf. 20, 5) in his discussion of Aristotle's οὐσία doctrine. This doctrine of homonyms is the central section in his discussion of Basilides's language theology, in which he presents the world of all things possessing independent existence as the reality of beings and of named things, but for the causal principles of all these "beings" he points to a reality that cannot be denoted in ordinary language but that eludes human language and is "known" as non-being in a different manner. Just as it is problematic in Aristotle's system that the transcendent Intellect emanates a Power that produces ensouled beings on all kinds of levels and visible, physical reality, so it is hard to understand the basic proposition in Basilides's system that the God who is raised above all speech "willed to produce a World" and to this end deposes a World Seed through "a Word [Λόγος] that is spoken" (22, 4). Basilides may have been inspired by Aristotle's repeated use of the contrast between the eye of a living human being and the eye of a dead person or a stone eye (which is only an "eye" in a homonymous sense – i.e., physical substrate of "seeing" and of the soul-function of perception).[66] Ultimately, the Aristotelian system is aimed at understanding all forms of cosmic (human, animal, and vegetable) "life" as homonymous with the "life" of the (hypercosmic) Intellect![67]

I would provisionally suggest that Basilides presented the transition from the non-being World Seed to the reality of existing and generated beings as a process in which the World Seed, as the Δύναμις of the Λόγος (as Tatian talks about it in his *Oratio ad Graecos*),[68] emerges from God and has then also been materialized as the *Logos prophorikos*.

3.5. A Second Aristotelian Doctrine of Being (19, 1)

In 19, 1, the author concludes his rather extensive discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of threefold being in the *Categories* with a surprising twist. He mentions that Aristotle's philosophy also talked about "being," distinguishing "matter," "form," and "privation."[69] But he leaves it at that.

The formulation he uses here is reminiscent of *Physics* I 8-9, where Aristotle talks about genesis within physical reality. In this context, Aristotle describes matter as "non-being in an accidental sense" but στέρησις (*privatio*) as "non-being in a proper sense."

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[66] Cf. Arist. *Gener. anim.* II 1, 734b24-27, 735a7-8; *Anim.* II 1, 412b17-22. On this, see Bos, "Aristotle on Soul and Soul-'Parts'"; see also C. Shields, *Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

[67] Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072b26.

[68] Tatian, *Or.* 5 (5, 21 Schwarz), with a clear reference to John 1:1: Θεὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγου δύναμιν παρειλήφαμεν.

[69] *Haer.* VII 19, 1: οὐ μόνον δὲ ἡ οὐσία καλεῖται [τὸ] γένος, εἶδος, ἄτομον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕλη καὶ εἶδος καὶ στέρησις.

And matter is there called "almost a being" but στέρησις, "absolutely not a being."[70] A text that comes closer to what the author says is Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Λ 2-3. Though this book forms part of the present *Metaphysics*, it could well have been a separate treatise "On the Οὐσία," which was combined with other texts by Andronicus of Rhodes.[71] There Aristotle mentions the three terms referred to by the author of the *Elenchos* but calls them "explanatory principles": "The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is λόγος and εἶδος, and the other privation; and the third being the matter."[72] Aristotle immediately continues, "Next we must observe that neither matter nor form comes to be."[73] Aristotle then underlines his theory that everything that comes into being out of something of the same category comes into being through nature or human craft.

He goes on, "There are three kinds of οὐσίαι, – matter, which is a 'this' by being perceived (for all things that are characterized by contact and not by natural unity are matter and substratum); nature, a 'this' and a state that it moves toward; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g., Socrates or Callias."[74]

This agrees with Aristotle, *On the Soul* II 1 (the chapter containing the definition of the soul, which the author of the *Elenchos* quotes in 19, 6), 412a6ff. There, Aristotle also discusses the genus of being and distinguishes three meanings: (a) matter; (b) μορφή and εἶδος; and (c) the compound substance resulting from the composition of (a) and (b). He adds that matter is "potentiality" (δύναμις) and εἶδος, the "entelechy." Within the latter, Aristotle distinguishes the first entelechy and the ultimate entelechy.

Aristotle says significantly in *Metaphysics* Λ 2 that all visible things result from what is accidentally not but which is potentially. He refers here, again significantly, to Anaxagoras's catchphrase "all things together." We could discern a connection in this text with the statement by the *Elenchos* author that for Aristotle the "οὐσία" and the "accidental" are the basic principles of beings (I 20, 1), and with Anaxagoras's doctrine of the "seed-mass," and with Basilides's doctrine of the World Seed, and with Aristotle's doctrine of the "ὑποκείμενον" as that which differs from perfect being by being in potency. In a certain reflection on Aristotelian themes, the visible world may have been interpreted as the combination of the divine οὐσία and the potential for οὐσία as an accidental non-being. Consider, too, that Aristotle in *On the Cosmos* drew an emphatic distinction between God's οὐσία, which is not in the cosmos, and his δύναμις, which is present throughout the cosmos and is moreover life-generating. The δύναμις that proceeds from God goes together

[70] Arist. *Phys.* I 9, 192a4-6: καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐκ ὂν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ' αὑτήν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

[71] Cf. M. Frede, "Introduction," in *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. M. Frede and D. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 1-4. On Andronicus's redactional activity, cf. O. Primavesi, "Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: vier Kapitel zur frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum," *Philologus* 151, no. 1 (2007): 51-77.

[72] Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 2, 1069b32-34: τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.

[73] Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1069b35: μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος.

[74] Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1070a9-13: οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν: ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας.

with a reduction of being (*elleipsis* – *On the Heavens* I 1, 268b3-4) and thus effects the transition from what is accidentally not but is potentially, to a being. The ὕλη mentioned here is the female aspect of beings, of which *Generation of animals* II 1, 732a1-3, says that it must also be present as ἀρχὴ γενέσεως in "all beings."[75] This was also emphasized by Aristotle in *Physics* I 9, 192a13-25!

So the statement in 19, 1, seems incorrect as regards privation (στέρησις).[76] But in this passage he does find a certain justification for his proposition that genus and species in Aristotle's doctrine of categories and ὕλη and εἶδος in his metaphysics correspond to each other. In particular, his remark that "matter and substrate" do not possess a unity of their own but are loosely connected probably warrants for him the identification of "matter" with the genus as "heap."[77]

The motive for the additional remark about the three principles including "matter" will have to be sought in the fact that the author, in his description of Basilides's system, is confronted with the World Seed on the one hand and with "Formlessness" on the other (cf. VII 27, 10). Though cosmic living beings receive their vital principles from the World Seed, they also take part in the Formlessness upon which the vital principles act.

The sentence that follows in the *Elenchos* is almost certainly corrupt, but it is unclear how it should be corrected because we do not know exactly what agreement and what difference the author actually recognized in this twofold doctrine of οὐσία according to Aristotle.[78] Perhaps he holds that, in the case of both distinctions, concretely existing things are explained there on the basis of "non-beings," just as he had concluded in 18, 6 – that is, genus and species on the one hand and matter and privation on the other.

3.6. The Concept of the "Underlying" (Ὑποκείμενον) (18, 2-4)

There is another problem here with regards to the exposition on Aristotle's doctrine of οὐσία and its relation to Basilides's doctrine of the World Seed. This problem is bound up with the author's use of the term "the underlying" (ὑποκείμενον).

In 15, 9-19, 1, the author talked about Aristotle's doctrine of οὐσία. He rightly concluded there that according to Aristotle the genus and the εἶδος are always assigned to something "underlying" and that only the "first οὐσία" in the sense of the concretely existing is not attributed to something "underlying" (18, 2-4). The genus and the εἶδος are οὐσίαι, but not in the sense of concretely existing things that have come into being. In Plato they belonged to the sphere of intelligible substances. In Aristotle they are assigned to the universals and the sphere of the λόγος and speech.

In the second Aristotelian doctrine of οὐσία, to which the author of the *Elenchos* briefly refers in 19, 1, he mentions the principle of ὕλη (matter). Insofar as this refers

[75] The correction by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs (Oxford Classical Texts, 1965) of "οὖσιν" to "ἔχουσιν" in 732a3 should be rejected.

[76] The author of the *Elenchos* might have taken the principle of στέρησις to refer to the absolute Non-being.

[77] Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* Z 16, 1040b5-10.

[78] *Haer.* VII 19, 1. [I propose the following correction: διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέ<ν>, ἐν τούτοις μὲν †<ὄντος τοῦ> μὴ <ὄντος> †.] Marcovich (*Hippolytus*) has: διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέ<ν>, ἐν το<ῖς α>ὐτοῖς μενούσης τῆς τομῆς. Τοιαύτης δὲ οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας, ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διαταγὴ γεγενημένη κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτόν τινα τρόπον. D. Holwerda (2003), 598, corrects § ἐν τούτοις to ἐν το<σο>ύτοις.

to Aristotle's discussions in *Physics* I 7-9, we should note that this passage always talks about a material substrate as "the underlying." It also specifies that the genesis of new οὐσίαι, too, is based on a material substrate – for instance, in the cases of plants and living beings, the seed underlies the vital principle that comes into being.[79]

In themselves, these two Aristotelian positions are perfectly defensible. Genus and εἶδος are predicates of concrete entities, belonging not to physical, material reality as such but rather to the λόγος or form of concrete entities. With regard to seeds of plants and living beings, Aristotle can say that they are only "rudimentarily" the concrete entities that they will become. And in this process of development from rudimentary entity to actually existing entity, Aristotle observed that first the general characteristics (of the genus) emerge, then those of the species, and finally those of the concrete individual.[80]

Aristotle also emphasized that seed always contains a form-giving soul-principle that is inseparable from "a natural body that is its instrument." So for Aristotle seed is always something that has a physical aspect and a formal aspect, the (first) entelechy, which contains the λόγος of all parts of the future living being according to their own nature (bone, blood, fur, etc.).

Further on in his account, the author suggests that the World Seed in Basilides's doctrine can be put on a par with the genus in Aristotle's theory. This emerges most clearly from 22, 5: "This is the seed that contains within itself all the seed-mass that Aristotle says is the genus divided into boundless species."

But he also calls this World Seed "underlying" (ὑποκείμενον).[81] This seems totally at odds with his discussion in 18, 2-4, where he explained that according to Aristotle the genus is only predicated "*of* something underlying." The Anonymous also calls the Great Archon in 23, 4, "wiser [...] than all the underlying," and this Archon produces his Son from "the underlying" (23, 5). The term "the underlying" also occurs in 24, 3 and 4, in connection with the Second Archon. Strikingly, too, 25, 6, talks about "the formlessness of the heap" and 26, 7, about the third Sonship that has stayed behind "in the formlessness" (cf. 26, 10; 27, 9; 10; 11 and 12).

We will probably have to explain this contradiction as a result of the author's tendency to connect matters in Basilides's doctrine with themes in Aristotle, even if they do not wholly correspond. The first Aristotelian line of "being" as "genus, species, and ἄτομον" was used by the author of the *Elenchos* to disqualify Basilides's distinction between concrete beings and non-being principles. The second Aristotelian line of "matter, form, and privation" is the scheme that he considers applicable to the development of the things that spring from the World Seed. I agree with D. Holwerda, who (in a letter of 11 December 2003) stated his view that in the discussion about Basilides starting at VII 20 the term "the underlying" has a primarily spatial sense. Basilides described the levels of the cosmos successively, starting with the highest and descending to the lowest. All these have ascended from the World Seed, which, after being generated, lay "below." This comes out most clearly in 27, 2, where it is said of the final state of the cosmos, "Nor will any

[79] Arist. *Phys*. I 7, 190b3: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι ὃ ὑπόκειται, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σπέρματος.
[80] Cf. *Gener. anim*. II 1, 736b2-5.
[81] *Haer.* VII 22, 6: Ὑποκειμένου τοίνυν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ σπέρματος.

tidings or knowledge of higher things abide in those below, so that the lower souls shall not be tormented by yearning after the impossible."

But in this we can also find an indication that Basilides presented the World Seed as sown in "the field" of materiality and that it functioned there as a Light that shines in the Darkness, which is the opposite of the Light. For the action of the vital germs in the World Seed produces three levels of living being, which also display degrees of materiality.

3.7. Creation as Development

There is another way in which the author's description of Aristotle's doctrine of substance anticipates his discussion about Basilides's doctrine of creation as development. Aristotle distinguished genus, species, and individual entity. Of these the individual entity has a proper name, which makes it nameable and graspable (18, 1). The species (the εἶδος) does not have a proper name but is a name *common* to all the specimens of the species. However, the εἶδος does constitute the essence of the individual entity and is expressed in a definition (ὅρος, λογισμός). And the individual entity is only knowable insofar as it can be grasped in a λόγος, in a definition. Aristotle always regarded the individuality of the individual entity as unknowable in the proper sense.

On the other hand, every εἶδος has its principle (ἀρχή) in the genus (16, 2). But this genus does not have concrete existence as such. It is purely an object of thought.

In this way the author presents Aristotle as a philosopher who sees the principles of all individual living entities in form-principles that are active in matter as soul-principles. And he presents these rational soul-principles as having their origin in a higher, pure reality of thought. This leads to an analogy between the series:

genus	–	Soul as totality / World Soul
species	–	souls as form-principles in matter
physically characterized individual entity	–	corporeal entities

Though the tradition contains no trace of such an ontology and ontogenesis as an Aristotelian doctrine, we must recognize that it thinks through fundamental Aristotelian elements in a way that cannot be called un-Aristotelian.[82]

And though the author presents Basilides's doctrine of creation as a process in which a pure Intellect first produces the spiritual level of the Sonship and a differentiation then occurs within this World Soul, his description of Aristotle's philosophy groups various properly Aristotelian elements in such a way that he can say with a certain justification that Basilides's doctrine of creation-by-development has its origin (ἀρχή) in Aristotle's philosophy.

The interesting thing is that in his description of the "way back," the way of liberation from individuality and the corresponding materiality, up to realization of the

[82] Cf. E. Berti, "Logical and Ontological Priority among the Genera of Substance in Aristotle," in *Kephalaion*, ed. Mansfeld and de Rijk, 55-69.

potentiality for pure intellectuality, he can entirely base himself on Aristotle's ontology and epistemology!

3.8. Tripartition of the Cosmos according to Aristotle: A Problem (19, 2-3)

It also seems useful to consider whether the author of the *Elenchos* surmised a connection between the tripartition of the οὐσία in Aristotle and the tripartition of the cosmos, which he subsequently attributes to Aristotle.

According to Aristotle, the cosmos is divided into many "different" parts. And the part of the cosmos that exists from the earth as far as the moon is without providence and governance but is merely preserved thanks to its own nature. But "that which is" beyond the moon up to the surface of the heavens is ordered with all order and providence and is (so) governed.

But the limiting surface, which is a fifth οὐσία, "is" free of all natural elements of which the cosmos consists, and it is "immaterial" according to Aristotle, this fifth οὐσία, as it were a hypercosmic οὐσία.

However, the description in 19, 2-3, of the division of the cosmos according to Aristotle (a) contains a problem of inner consistency and (b) raises the question of how this report relates to what Aristotle really taught.

(a) It seems strange that the author can say that he represents "the order of the cosmos" according to Aristotle when he goes on to recognize not just the sublunary sphere and the supralunary celestial spheres but also a *hyper*cosmic reality as a third part. It seems hard to regard a *hyper*cosmic reality as part of the cosmic order.

(b) Moreover, it is hard to understand how he can say that according to Aristotle the outer sphere of the cosmos is free of all natural elements and consists of a fifth οὐσία and is as it were hypercosmic.

If we follow the transmitted text of 19, 2-3, exactly, we thus find the following distinctions: the part from the earth to the moon; the part from the moon to the limiting surface of the cosmos; the limiting surface.[83]

The sublunary surface (1) is "without providence or governance but is preserved purely thanks to its own nature"; and the supralunary sphere (2) is "ordered with all order and providence." This agrees entirely with the cosmology commonly attributed to Aristotle in Antiquity and found in the work *On the Cosmos*, which, if it is not by Aristotle's own hand, in any case reflects an authentic Aristotelian doctrine.[84] Aristotle's doctrine of "limited Providence" can be understood to follow from his criticism of Plato's doctrine of soul and his sharper distinction of Intellect – Soul – Body and his doctrine that the Intellect acts only on the Soul and the Soul (by means of its instrumental body) only on the visible Body.[85]

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[83] Cf. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*, 55-56.

[84] In his apparatus to the text of the *Elenchos*, Marcovich refers twice here to *On the Cosmos* 2. For this work, see Reale and Bos, *Il Trattato Sul Cosmo*. In fact, the term "providence" itself does not occur in *On the Cosmos*, but the term "ordered" does: 2, 392a32. For the theory of "Non-Sublunar Providence," cf. Sharples, "Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle," 13-14 and 22ff.

[85] Cf. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, 44-45, 265-69.

The most likely hypothesis is that the content of the passage in 19, 2-3, with the division of the cosmos represented there, ultimately goes back to the treatise *On the Cosmos*.

When he goes on to describe the division of Aristotle's philosophy in its parallelism with the division of the cosmos, we should consider that the author's account may also reflect his knowledge of Aristotle's lost work *On Philosophy*. The fact that he cites titles of Aristotelian treatises in the edition by Andronicus of Rhodes does not rule out the possibility that the words "his system of philosophy" in 19, 3, originally referred to that important work by Aristotle. In any case it is certain that *On Philosophy* contained a third book dealing with theological matters. And above, in chapter 2, we already noted that the statement in *Refutation* I 20, 4, that there is only one fundamental point of disagreement between Plato and Aristotle could well derive from that work.

When the author says in 19, 8, that Aristotle "not only put forth books *On Nature* and *On the Cosmos* and *On Providence* and *On God*," we should at least consider the possibility that he is referring to *On the Cosmos* on the one hand and *On Philosophy* in at least three books on the other.

3.9. A "Fifth Οὐσία" (19, 3)

But the author then goes on: But the limiting surface, which is a fifth οὐσία, "is" free of all the natural bodies of which the cosmos consists, and it is "immaterial" according to Aristotle, this fifth οὐσία, as it were a hypercosmic οὐσία.[86]

This passage raises the following problems:

(a) To talk about a "fifth οὐσία" is to assume four other οὐσίαι, which are not mentioned in this context. It seems too hard to take the "fifth οὐσία" in any other way than in contrast to the four known οὐσίαι, and in connection with Aristotle's philosophy these will have to be the four sublunary elements. But it is striking in this context that we find not the word σῶμα or στοιχεῖον but οὐσία. The reference to a "[fifth] οὐσία" in the context of the Aristotelian cosmic order suggests Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Λ 1: "There are three kinds of substance [οὐσίαι] – one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable) [...] and another that is immovable."[87]

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[86] *Haer*. VII 19, 3: ἡ δ' ἐπιφάνεια <τοῦ οὐρανοῦ>, πέμπτη τις οὖσα οὐσία, φυσικῶν <ἐστιν> ἀπηλλαγμένη στοιχείων πάντων, ἀφ' ὧν ὁ κόσμος τὴν σύστασιν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη [τίς] ἡ πέμπτη κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην οὐσία οἱονεὶ οὐσία τις ὑπερκόσμιος. In a letter of 6 August 2004, D. Holwerda proposed to read: καὶ ἔστιν <ἄϋλός> τις ἡ πέμπτη [...] οὐσία. He believes that ἄϋλός was mistakenly read as αὕτη because, in the abbreviation of ἄυ plus a λ suprascript, the λ was interpreted as τ, which often happens in miniscule manuscripts. τις can be retained and reinforces the rhetorical emphasis on the previous word. Cf. Aristotle's reference to the separation between the four sublunary elements and the fifth element in *Cael*. I 2, 269b14: ἔστι τι παρά τὰ σώματα τὰ δεῦρο καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα συστάσεις, θειοτέρα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἁπάντων; 269b14-17 (χωρισμένον) and I 3, 270b10: τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας τῶν σωμάτων.

[87] Arist. *Metaph*. Λ 1, 1069a30: οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή – ἧς ἡ μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή [...] ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος. Cf. 6, 1071b3: ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία δ' ἡ ἀκίνητος. Cf. also Γ 2, 1004a2: καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη φιλοσοφίας ἔστιν ὅσαι περ αἱ οὐσίαι: ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα πρώτην καὶ ἐχομένην αὐτῶν. For Aristotle as we know him, the highest οὐσία is free of all the elements that make up the cosmos and is hypercosmic (though in the extant works Aristotle never uses the term "hypercosmic" but always "separated" (χωριστός), "outside" (ἔξω), or "above" (*Cael*. I 9, 279a20).

(b) If the limiting surface is in fact free of all natural elements that make up the cosmos, it must be incorporeal, and D. Holwerda's correction introduces this into this text.

(c) If the author of the *Elenchos* saw the limiting surface as immaterial, this means that he attributes to Aristotle a doctrine of an immaterial fifth οὐσία, where the entire doxographical tradition, including the author himself (I 20, 4), presents Aristotle as the one who introduced a fifth element or σῶμα.[88] Though this σῶμα was different in kind from the four sublunary natural bodies, it is explicitly said to be a body (σῶμα) and possessed of eternal motion in a circular orbit.

(d) In I 20, 4, the author had spoken emphatically about the "fifth body," to be distinguished from Fire, Air, Water, and Earth and bearing a special relation to the human soul and Πνεῦμα; and in his summary of the views of the Greek philosophers in X 7, 4, which he literally borrowed from Sextus Empiricus[89] (and not from his own Book I), he says again that Aristotle made the cosmos consist of five elements and that he considered the celestial beings to consist of the orbiting fifth body.

(e) Because the author said that according to Aristotle the entire sphere from the Moon to the outer celestial sphere is ordered by divine Providence and governance, he seems to imply that the even higher sphere was associated by him with the highest divine God and with the origin of this Providence and governance. This is also the implication of 19, 4, where the book Aristotle wrote separately about "the fifth essence [οὐσία]" is said to have contained his theology. But in 19, 7, the author states that according to Aristotle God is defined as "the thinking on thinking," and he takes this up in 21, 1, when talking about Basilides's theology of the absolutely transcendent God. Aristotle always regarded the Intellect-in-act as "free of corporeality" and "separate" from everything in the cosmos and φύσις.

(f) In what follows we will see that, according to the *Elenchos*, Basilides talked about the holy Πνεῦμα as essentially distinct from the Sonship and therefore "left behind" (22, 12-14). As "Firmament," the holy Πνεῦμα forms the boundary between the cosmos and the hypercosmic, truly divine according to Basilides.

So the text of the *Elenchos* is not supported in every respect by the information we possess from Aristotle's surviving works. For it is plain there that Aristotle distinguished one special σῶμα from the four sublunary elements, a body that he called "the first" and "separate" from the other bodies but that brought the number of cosmic elements to a total of five.[90] In this conception, the fifth element or the fifth body is an elementary

[88] Perhaps we should assume that the author here is following a doxographical report in Sextus Empiricus, *Hypotyp.* III 218: Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ἀσώματον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Cf. Ps.-Plu. *Plac.* I 7, 881E-F (= Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, 305): Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν εἶδος χωριστὸν ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντός, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλούμενον. A cause of confusion in a text like this may also be the reader's impression that Aristotle identified the highest God with the Form of the outer celestial sphere. But εἶδος χωριστόν means "form that is separate from all material reality." But the text of Ps.-Plutarch says emphatically that the outer celestial sphere is itself a σῶμα, that is, ethereal, or the fifth σῶμα. So the doxographical report in Ps.-Plu. is entirely correct inasmuch as it defines God analogously to the way the soul is defined in *On the Soul* II 1: the celestial sphere is the σῶμα ὀργανικόν or ὄχημα of God. But unlike the soul, God as Form is *separate* from all materiality.

[89] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. physicos* II 310-18. Cf. Frickel, *Die "Apophasis Megale,"* 51, 74.

[90] Cf. *Mu.* 3, 392b35-393a1.

body that forms part of the cosmos and is the substance of the supralunary region and all stars and planets but shares nothing with the four elements, which have a common basis and can therefore merge into each other. If we want to adhere to the text of the *Elenchos*, we will have to assume that its author used a source here that provided information about Aristotle's lost writings or that he used a conception that adapts the information about Aristotle to the tripartite cosmology that he attributes to Basilides further on and that consists of the Πνεῦμα, the domain of the Great Archon, and the domain of the Lower Archon. The first view, which implies that there were several positions in Aristotle's thought, was adopted by J. Pépin.[91]

3.10. J. Pépin's Hypothesis

Pépin believes that the text of the *Elenchos* is witness to the attribution of a theory to Aristotle in which the ether was viewed as "l'ultime enveloppe du ciel, extérieur à la sphere des fixes elles-même et de ce fait hypercosmique."[92] But his further explanation of the consequences of this hypothesis shows that he sees this view as contrasting with a later theology of Aristotle's in which a transcendent Unmoved Mover plays a role. Pépin sees in our text a remnant of the tradition that goes back to Aristotle's lost work *On Philosophy*. Following in the footsteps of A.-J. Festugière, Pépin sees this work as being written to defend a *cosmic theology*.[93] That is to say, the *Elenchos*'s testimony that Aristotle regarded the outer celestial sphere as "in a certain sense hypercosmic" is used by Pépin in such a way that Aristotle did not hold a hypercosmic but a cosmic theology. If we then ask Pépin what the cosmic celestial spheres with the planets and fixed stars consist of, his answer is that they *also* consist of ether according to Aristotle.[94]

What it comes down to is that in Pépin's view Aristotle's work *On Philosophy* had not yet postulated the doctrine of a (hypercosmic) Prime Unmoved Mover but a double doctrine of ether in which the cosmic celestial sphere consists of the element ether and the outer celestial sphere is described as in a certain sense hypercosmic and as a "fifth substance" and "free of all the natural bodies of which the cosmos consists." To support this thesis, Pépin cites doxographical reports that ascribe to Aristotle a theology of an immaterial God and that Pépin interprets as not implying a doctrine of an Unmoved Mover. If Pépin is right, this would support the *Elenchos*'s thesis that Basilides was strongly influenced by Aristotle, but specifically by Aristotle's dialogues that represented *an earlier phase* of his thought!

But we do well to bear in mind here that Pépin's argument is based on the presupposition of a profound change in position on Aristotle's part, from the position of the lost work *On Philosophy*, in which the soul was presented as consisting of a fine-material element and in which God was presented as the limit of the ethereal sphere, to the later Aristotelian position of *Metaphysics* Λ and *On the Soul*. But Pépin fails to consider that the author of the *Elenchos* is familiar not just with the content of the theology in *Metaphysics* Λ

[91] J. Pépin, *Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne. (Ambroise, Exam. I 1, 1-4*) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 164-72.
[92] Pépin, *Théologie Cosmique*, 168.
[93] Ibid., 171.
[94] Ibid., 165.

but also with the psychology of *On the Soul* and the ethics of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and with the *Categories*. And the author never indicates clearly that he had direct knowledge of Aristotle's lost works.[95] Moreover, Pépin did not realize that the surviving work, too, attributes to Aristotle a psychology of an immaterial form of a (fine-)material instrumental body and a theology that runs parallel with it. Pépin's proposal was in keeping with a tradition in which scholars were wholly convinced of a process of development in Aristotle. But this conviction was *a fundamental error*.[96]

Also, a crucial theme in Basilides's doctrine, his doctrine of the "Enlightenment" of the Sons of the Archons and the sons of God in the human sphere (26, 1-10), which results in the union of these Sons with the already blissful Sonship, strongly resembles the (late-)Aristotelian doctrine according to which the intellect-in-act is a realization of the potentiality of the rational soul – an Aristotelian doctrine that was always founded in the distinction between an immaterial reality of pure thought and the (fine-material) reality of the soul.

This resemblance seriously compromises the plausibility of Pépin's hypothesis. We have to reject Pépin's view as unnecessarily complicated. His hypothesis solves a problem, which does in fact exist, by creating new problems. So we should not use this text of the *Elenchos* to attribute to Aristotle a conception that he held in his lost work and that is hard to square with any possible development in Aristotle. But we will have to go on searching for a meaningful explanation of the *Elenchos*'s account of Aristotle's views.

I would like to recall that the author's overall perspective on Greek philosophy, either because he followed a Stoically colored doxographical tradition or because he accepted Paul's criticism of all earlier philosophy, involves a presentation of *all* Greek philosophy as "wisdom of this world." And that by contrast he, as Philo had done before him, sets forth his own philosophy as a philosophy that had achieved true profundity through the awareness of transcendence. For this reason, he presented Aristotle's theology as a cosmic theology, even though he had introduced the notion of an almost hypercosmic substance.

We might consider that the author of the *Elenchos* was familiar with a theology of Aristotle in which he presented God as the entelechy of the astral sphere,[97] just as Aristotle presented man's intellect as the entelechy of the σῶμα ὀργανικόν of the human soul. This could mean that the author is emphasizing here that Aristotle identified God with the Form of the ethereal sphere – that is, with the ἐπιφάνεια that forms the boundary of the ether and the cosmos.

Though no Aristotelian text has been passed down in which God is identified with the outer celestial sphere, we can infer from *On the Cosmos* 6 and *Physics* VIII 10, 267b6-9,

[95] In our discussion of Basilides's theo-cosmogony, we will make proposals to relate Basilides's views on the eschatological "Great Ignorance" in VII 27, 1, and on the "subjection to torture" of the inner man in the visible body in 27, 1-2, to Aristotle's lost dialogue *Eudemus*. But the author of the *Elenchos* does not make any connection here.

[96] Cf. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, and Bos, "Die Aristotelische Lehre der Seele: Widerrede gegen die moderne Entwicklungshypothese," in *Der Begriff der Seele in der Philosophiegeschichte*, ed. H.-D. Klein, vol. 2 (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2005), 87-99.

[97] Cf. Clem. *Protr.* V 66, 4, and A. P. Bos, "Clement of Alexandria on Aristotle's (Cosmo-)Theology (Clem. *Protrept*. 5.66.4)," *Classical Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1993): 177-88.

that Aristotle believed God to be not omnipresent but located at the periphery of the cosmos. Whereas Aristotle's extant work shows that God cannot possibly be identified with any part of the outer celestial sphere,[98] which is in motion, it is authentically Aristotelian to say that God is the εἶδος or the *entelechy* of the cosmos in its entirety as a living being and of the ethereal sphere as an instrumental body in particular.

I would like to add an extra consideration. Aristotle uses the term "ἐπιφάνεια" in the sense of "plane," "surface." For him, a geometric "plane" is always an abstraction from the surface of a natural body. But a "surface" of a natural body has no thickness and is not itself a σῶμα. When Aristotle talks about "ἐπιφάνεια" of the heavens, he seems to be referring to the immaterial geometric form of the astral σῶμα. The work *On the Cosmos*, which was always attributed to Aristotle in Antiquity but which many modern scholars deny to Aristotle, talks once about the ἐπιφάνεια of the heavens as the plane in which all the fixed stars complete their daily revolution (2, 392a18). But the same work also says at one point that "a spherical surface [ἐπιφάνεια] contains substances of opposite natures and compels agreement and thus brings about the preservation of the cosmos."[99] Moreover, *On the Cosmos* presents God as "having obtained the first and highest place, [...] on the topmost crest of all heaven" (6, 397b24-27). It is conceivable that, on the basis of a combination of these texts, a reader of *On the Cosmos* assumed a close relationship between Aristotle's God and the ἐπιφάνεια of the heavens.[100]

3.11. The Doctrine of a Restricted Divine Providence in Aristotle (19, 2-7)

In this passage, the author also says explicitly that Aristotle does not find providence or governance in the sublunary sphere. But he does see the supralunary part of the cosmos as being ordered by providence and divine governance (19, 2-3; 19, 4; 19, 7). In Antiquity this doctrine is commonly attributed to Aristotle.[101] In our time it is just as commonly denied to Aristotle.[102]

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[98] Cf. Arist. *Motu anim*. 4; *Phys.* VIII 10.

[99] Arist. *Mu.* 5, 396b28: μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις ...καὶ μιᾷ <ἡ> διαλαβοῦσα σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐπιφανείᾳ τάς τε ἐναντιωτάτας ἐν αὐτῷ φύσεις ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκάσασα ὁμολογῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τούτων μηχανησαμένη τῷ παντὶ σωτηρίαν. Marcovich, *Hippolytus*, 284, wrongly fails to mention this passage in his critical apparatus.

[100] See also Clem. Rom., *Recognitiones* 8, 15 = Arist. *Philos.* frag. 27 e Ross; 986 Gigon: Aristoteles etiam quintum introducit elementum, quod ἀκατονόμαστον, id est incompellabile, nominavit, sine dubio illum indicans qui in unum quatuor elementa coniungens mundum fecerit.

[101] Cf. Ps.-Plu. *Plac.* II 3; Diog. L. V 32, and Tatian, *Or.* 2; Athenag. *Leg.* 25; Clem. *Protr.* V 66, 4; *Strom.* 5, 14; Orig. *Cels.* 1, 21; 3, 75; Eus. *Praep. ev.* XV 5, 1; 5, 12; Greg. Naz. *Or.* 27, 10; Epiphanius, *Haer.* 3, 2, 9; Theodor. *Aff.* 5, 77, 47; 6, 86, 7; Ambros. *Off.* 1, 13, 48; Chalcid. *In Ti.*, 250 (ed. J. H. Waszink, 260). Cf. Bos, *Providentia Divina*, 5; Bos. *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*, 265-69; Sharples, "Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle," 13-14 and 22ff.

[102] Particularly due to the influence of A. J. Festugière, "Aristote dans la littérature grecque chrétienne jusqu'à Théodoret," in Festugière, *L'idéal religieux* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1932), 221-63 (cf. D. T. Runia, "Festugière revisited," *Vigiliae Christianae* 43, no. 1 [1989]: 18), and P. Moraux, "La Doctrine de la Providence dans l'École d'Aristote," in Moraux, *D'Aristote à Bessarion: Trois exposés sur l'histoire et la transmission de l'aristotélisme grec* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1970). Cf. Mansfeld, *Heresiography*, 136. Bodéüs, in *Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals*, 33, also attributes great influence on the tradition of Aristotelian theology to *On the Cosmos*, which he considers to be later in date. (But such influence is only possible if the work can be safely regarded as authentically Aristotelian.)

But our view of Aristotle needs to be reconsidered in this matter, too. The doctrine of restricted divine Providence is the consequence of Aristotle's consistent separation of the sphere of the Intellect and that of the Soul, which are mutually irreducible. For Aristotle there could be interaction between the intellect and the soul on the basis of κοινωνία, but not between intellect and visible body. In the same way, Aristotle assumed a direct effect of the transcendent Principle on the ethereal sphere of the celestial region but considered a direct effect of the transcendent Principle on the sublunary sphere to be impossible.

Yet there is something special in the way the author describes this doctrine. He does not say which entity is the subject of this Providence. On the basis of doxographical reports in other classical authors, we are inclined to read the text as if the transcendent, supreme God is providentially directed at the order of the celestial spheres, or, at the very least, divine thought is the ultimate cause of the existence and life of all ethereal reality. But he does not say this explicitly. In his account of Basilides's cosmology, he does have an analogous division of the cosmos, with the celestial regions being ordered by Providence and the sublunary sphere being abandoned to (its) nature (24, 3-5). But he emphatically identifies the subject of Providence in the celestial sphere as the Great Archon (or his Son).[103]

Nevertheless, we will have to qualify this conclusion by observing that everything the Great Archon performs is governed and led by his Son, who is "much more excellent and wiser" than he is himself. The actions of the Great Archon must be seen in their dependence on the non-being God. To this extent the order in the celestial spheres follows from the Providence of the transcendent Principle. For even in his phase of great self-overestimation, the Great Archon performs only what the non-being God had previously planned (22, 6; 23, 5-24, 2).

3.12. The Author's Knowledge of Aristotle's Writings (19, 3-4)

In 19, 3-4, the author declares that "his [Aristotle's] system of philosophy is also divided in accordance with the division of the cosmos, viz. into three parts, a *Physics*, a *Metaphysics*, and a *Theology*."[104] But he adds that the *Physics* deals with all matters in the region from the earth to the moon, which are ordered by nature and not by Providence, and the *Metaphysics*, with the supralunary region. His *Theology* is said to deal with the fifth οὐσία. We should bear in mind here that Aristotle himself in *Metaphysics* Γ 2, 1004a2-3, declares that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are οὐσίαι. And that in *Metaphysics* Λ 1, 1069a30-34, he distinguishes "three οὐσίαι," which correspond to the sublunary, the supralunary, and the transcendent. At first sight this lends much plausibility to his statement about Aristotle's writings. And we should also consider that the tripartition

[103] *Haer.* VII 24, 3: Πάντα οὖν ἐστι προνοούμενα καὶ διοικούμενα ὑπὸ [τές μεγάλές] τοῦ ἄρχοντος τοῦ μεγάλου τὰ αἰθέρια–ἅτινα μέχρι <τῆσ> σελήνης ἐστίν.

[104] There is reference here to "his λόγος <*On*> *Philosophy*" or to "his treatment of philosophy." Perhaps the author of the *Elenchos* is citing the title of Aristotle's most famous lost work. But it may also be that he knew the work *On the Cosmos* under this title. Julian, *Ep. ad Themist.* 10 (26, 21-24, ed. C. Prato and A. Fornaro 1984) also mentions a θεολογικὴ συγγραφή by Aristotle: τοῦτο [...] Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ [...] ἔοικεν ἐννοήσας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μὴ μεῖον αὐτῷ προσήκει φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ θεολογικῇ συγγραφῇ τοῦ καθελόντος τὴν Περσῶν δύναμιν. The title *On the Cosmos* is also unsuitable inasmuch as the most essential entity of this cosmos is said to be a transcendent God.

attributed here to Aristotle is the same as that of Basilides, who distinguished the realm of the Second Archon (the sublunary), that of the First Archon (the supralunary), and the limiting Πνεῦμα. Perhaps the author of the *Elenchos* presents a tripartition in which the purely physical (a) was distinguished from the psychical (b), which never occurs without corporeality, and the noetic (c), which is entirely free of corporeality.

Important questions here, of course, are how our author can know the titles of Aristotle's lecture writings *Physics* and *Metaphysics* but gives the information that the physics dealt with the sublunary sphere, which is not ruled by Providence, and the metaphysics related to the astral region but emphatically not to theology, which he says was discussed in a "separate treatise."[105] For although the ontological classification is certainly not un-Aristotelian, it is not clearly the guiding principle for the writings *Physics* and *Metaphysics* in the way that these have become current thanks to the redactional activities of Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BCE. It seems that the author of the *Elenchos* took the title *Metaphysics* to refer to "everything beyond the purely physical," or perhaps even to "everything *inseparably connected with* physical reality."[106] After discussing the elementary bodies and their natural or man-made compositions, Aristotle may have designated the entire sphere of living nature as the domain of the physical plus something else. Aristotle had drawn attention to this problem in *On the Soul* I 1, 403a27-b16: the sphere of the soul is partly the sphere of the "φυσικός," but there is one aspect that falls outside the scope of the φυσικός, and this must be discussed by the man of "first philosophy."

Confronted with this problem, we will have to consider on the one hand whether we are somehow dealing here with information about Aristotle that has not been passed down but that does have a basis in his lost writings. This impression may be given by the passage in VII 19, 8, where we read that Aristotle "left behind not only discourses *On Nature* and *On the Cosmos* and *On Providence* and *On God* but also ethical works."[107] We must also accept this for the *Elenchos*'s statements about Aristotle's psychology in I 20, 4; 6. But, on the other hand, we should recognize that this tripartition of Aristotle's philosophy as given by the *Elenchos* fits very well with Basilides's theology of the two Archons and the Πνεῦμα and that "adaptation" by the author may be involved.

There is another point of possible note. The *Metaphysics* as we know it refers to a theology, but it is a theology of "*being as being*."[108] And precisely this for Basilides is outdated theology of a "cosmic" kind. Basilides opts for a different approach from Aristotle, in that he characterizes all ontology as "philosophy of this world" and presents

[105] *Haer.* VII 19, 4. Cf. also Pépin, *Théologie Cosmique*, 165. Perhaps we should allow for the possibility that *On the Cosmos* was interpreted as an Aristotelian treatise on theology. But in VII 19, 7, the author quotes from Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 9.

[106] Note that the term "*metaphysica*" does not occur in the writings attributed to Aristotle. It is conceivable that from the study of physical reality Aristotle emphatically distinguished that of ensouled reality as a higher-order reality, which includes the celestial spheres. Perhaps he distinguished theology as a third level. But such a hypothesis does imply that the editorial activities of Andronicus of Rhodes were more drastic than is usually assumed.

[107] *Haer.* VII 19, 8: καταβέβληται δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ μόνον περὶ φύσεως καὶ κόσμου καὶ προνοίας καὶ θεοῦ [...] . Cf. MacMahon, *Hippolytus*: "These works must be among Aristotle's lost writings." For this expression, cf. Arist. *E. N.* I 3, 1096a10; *Mu.* 6, 397b20.

[108] Arist. *Metaph.* Γ 1, 1003a21-32; E 1, 1026a18-32; K 3, 1060b31; 7, 1064a28-29; 1064b1-3.

truly good theology as "μή-ὄν-tology," as a "doctrine of non-Being." The most explicit example of this criticism is found precisely in this section of doxography on Aristotle in 19, 7: after the author there has given the definition of "God" according to Aristotle as "thinking on thinking," the text continues with the mysterious sentence, "And that is He, while He is entirely non-Being." The non-being God of Basilides is also brought up in the context of Basilides's doctrine of creation in 21, 1, and he adds there just as bluntly, "whom Aristotle calls 'a thinking on thinking,' but they the non-Being One."

In this we can see the traces of the author's strategy to present Basilides as a follower of Aristotle, as in the fact that in Basilides's doctrine of the Great Archon and his Son he brings up Aristotle's definition of the soul, which was already mentioned in 19, 6.

At this stage of our investigation, however, we must also realize that Basilides himself may already have written a history of human knowledge in which he presented Aristotle as the one who came furthest in the evolution to knowledge in world-time from before the great "Enlightenment." But he may have presented his own theology and cosmology as the radical refutation and cancellation of all this earlier wisdom.

3.13. Additional Remarks by the Anonymous on the Writings of Aristotle (19, 5-8)

The statement about the tripartition of Aristotle's work is followed by isolated remarks on individual works. First there is a statement about the high degree of difficulty of the three treatises *On the Soul* and of the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the "entelechy of a natural body that is instrumental [ὀργανικόν]."[109] We need to say first and foremost that the author of the *Elenchos* fails to mention that Aristotle calls the soul the "*first*" entelechy.[110] We can also ask in which of the three principal categories this work *On the Soul* should be grouped according to the author or his source. Aristotle had designated most of psychology as the field of the φυσικός. And the connection made with a "natural body" in the definition of the soul could suggest that the author must subsume it under the *Physics*. But because the soul itself is not a "natural body" and because he in I 20, 4, has connected the soul with a "fifth body," we could also relate it to the second main part of philosophy. The soul can be called "metaphysical" in the sense of being "always connected with physical σώματα as its instruments."

Is the author perhaps going back here to a source that distinguished between the sublunary sphere as the research field of physics, the sphere of ether as the sphere of all that lives and as the field of psychology, and the transcendent sphere as the sphere of the properly divine and theology? Could the work *On Philosophy* have been arranged in this way?

[109] *Haer.* VII 19, 5-6. All modern translators of the text of the *Elenchos* translate this passage as they find it translated in modern editions of Aristotle's *On the Soul*. MacMahon, *Hippolytus*, 272, has: "For soul, he says, is an εντελεχεια of a natural organic body"; F. Legge (1921), vol. 2, 65: "an entelechy of the physical organism"; H. Leisegang, *Die Gnosis* (Leipzig: Kröner, 1924; repr. 1934), 220: "Das ist die aristotelische Entelechie eines physischen, organischen Körpers"; H. U. Meijboom (vol. 2, 77): "De ziel, zegt hij namelijk, is de werking van het natuurlijk organisch lichaam"; Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*, 281: "The soul is, he says, 'the actuality of a natural organic body.'" Nowadays the term "ὀργανικόν" is usually translated as "instrumental."
[110] Arist. *Anim.* II 1, 412a27; 412b5.

An intriguing question is whether he or his source intended to establish a connection between the "natural body" of which he says in 19, 6, that the soul is the entelechy, and the "fifth body" to which he has related the soul in I 20, 4. And whether his reference to the difficulty of Aristotle's definition of the soul had any basis in knowledge of profound disagreement among learned expositors of this definition.[111]

Here we can already note that the author of the *Elenchos*, like his contemporary Plutarch of Chaeronea, did not take the term "ὀργανικόν" in Aristotle's definition of the soul to mean "equipped with organs" but "instrumental." And he did not interpret "ὀργανικὸν σῶμα" as a body of a concrete living being in the sublunary sphere. This will emerge even more clearly from the passage in which he again brings up Aristotle's definition of the soul, in his discussion of Basilides (23, 7, through 24, 1-2).

He goes on to mention that Aristotle's definition of God raises even more problems than his psychology (19, 6-7). The definition that he gives is a correct rendering of what we find in *Metaphysics* Λ 9, 1074b34. So this is in the work we know under the title *Metaphysics*, of which he had said in 19, 4, that it dealt with the supralunary region. Because this specifically concerns Aristotle's theology, to which the author says a "separate treatise" had been devoted, this seems to indicate an independent existence of the treatise we know as *Metaphysics* Λ or provenance from a different source (e.g., Book III of *On Philosophy*). But we also lack a more detailed explanation of the way this "thinking on thinking" was connected with "the limiting surface" of 19, 3.

In the third place, 19, 8, mentions *Books on Ethics*. This goes well with what I 20, 5, said about Aristotle's ethical position. But again, it is unclear how this ethics fit into Aristotle's three-part philosophy as a whole.

3.14. Conclusions: The Author's Knowledge of the Philosophy and Writings of Aristotle

What final conclusions can we now draw about the author's knowledge of the philosophy and work of Aristotle?

We know that he mentions the name of Andronicus of Rhodes in his discussion of the Sethians and knows him as "Peripatetic" and author of a work *De Mixtione*.[112] But we do not know whether he was also familiar with Andronicus's involvement in the circulation of Aristotle's lecture writings as we know them from the Aristotelian Corpus, which Porphyry informs us about in his *Life of Plotinus* 24.

We can also establish that he quotes passages from the *Categories* and Aristotle's definition of the soul and his description of God's activity as we know them from the Aristotelian Corpus, which was probably not in circulation before Andronicus's time (first century BCE). He knows about three treatises *On the Soul*. He knows the titles of

[111] Note that Alexander of Aphrodisias's new interpretation of Aristotle's psychology, according to which the soul is the entelechy of the visible body "equipped with organs," was known around 200 CE. The *Refutation* was written after 223 CE.

[112] *Haer.* V 21, 1: πείθουσι δὲ <διὰ τοῦ> ἐντυγχάνειν τῷ περὶ κράσεως καὶ μίξεως λόγῳ τοὺς μαθητευομένους, ὃς μεμελέτηται πολλοῖς <τε> ἄλλοις καὶ Ἀνδρονίκῳ τῷ Περιπατητικῷ. This text is found in the description of the Sethian heresy.

Aristotelian writings familiar to us, too: *Categories*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and *Ethics*; and he also knows that the *Physics* was a lecture treatise.[113]

But as regards the definition of the soul, it also seems quite clear that he was familiar not with the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias but with an earlier interpretation that took "ὀργανικόν" to mean "instrumental."

The Anonymous says things about the contents of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* that we cannot find there. He also seems to talk about a separate work in which Aristotle set out his theology. And he remarkably states in the first book that according to Aristotle the soul is not immortal but survives after man's death, until it finally dissolves into the fifth element, and that this was the great point of disagreement with Plato. This information seems to indicate the use of a doxographical source that dates from the time of or before Cicero.

What he says about the parallelism between Aristotle's division of the cosmos and his writings, about his interest in "providence," and about "the limiting surface" (ἐπιφάνεια) of the cosmos could perhaps be explained as resulting from his own reading of *On the Cosmos*, which he may have known as a treatise *On Philosophy*.[114]

My (rather complex) hypothesis therefore comes down to this, that the author of the *Elenchos* obtained his knowledge of Aristotle from two sources:

(a) the work *On the Cosmos*; and

(b) a doxographical report of early origin (that is, before the circulation of the Aristotelian Corpus), which later, after Andronicus's edition, was supplemented with information about the lecture treatises.

[113] *Haer.* VII 19, 4: Φυσικὴ γάρ τις ἀκρόασις αὐτῷ γέγονεν.
[114] This would agree with the common practice of naming a work after a central word in the first line.

Carl A. P. Ruck

WITH PLATO IN THE CAVE OF THEATRICS

According to a well-established biographical tradition, Plato (ca. 428-424 to ca. 348 BCE) intended to compete in the upcoming Dionysia as a tragedian poet when, at about the age of nineteen (ca. 407 BCE), he heard Socrates discoursing and thereupon consigned his tetralogy to the flames.[1] Euripides (ca. 480 to ca. 406 BCE) was about a decade older than Socrates (ca. 470-399 BCE) and may have been counted among his friends, at least in the common view of the public, as portrayed in comedy, where Socrates was considered to be the source of the playwright's sophistic views (τὰς τραγῳδίας τὰς σωκρατογόμφους, "Socratic bricolage"), even his collaborator, or suspected of being the actual author.[2] Euripides and Sophocles, who was a generation older, would have been the preeminent tragedians in Plato's formative years as an aspiring playwright. Agathon (born ca. 448), whose first victory in the Lenaia Dionysian festival (416 BCE) is celebrated as the occasion

[1] Diogenes Laertius (third century CE), *Vitae philosophorum*, 3.6: ἔπειτα μέντοι μέλλων ἀγωνιεῖσθαι τραγῳδίᾳ πρὸ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ θεάτρου Σωκράτους ἀκούσας κατέφλεξε τά ποιήματα; Aelian (third century CE), *Varia historia*, 2.30: καὶ δὴ καὶ τετραλογίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ ἔμελλεν ἀγωνιεῖσθαι, δοὺς ἤδη τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς τὰ ποιήματα [...] τοῦ ἀγωνίσματος οὐ μόνον ἀπέστη τότε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελέως τὸ γράφειν τραγῳδίαν ἀπέρριψε. The accounts are not identical. Diogenes Laertius claims that the episode occurred in front of the theater, whereas Aelian implies that it was temporally in anticipation of the upcoming competition in the performances, with the production already in rehearsal. The difference implies that they each have interpreted an earlier, now lost, source. George Boas, "Fact and Legend in the Biography of Plato," *The Philosophical Review* 57, no. 5 (September 1948): 439-57.

[2] Diogenes Laertius, *Vita philosophorum*, 2.5: ἐδόκει δὲ συμποιεῖν Εὐριπίδῃ. Diogenes quotes from the *Clouds* of Teleclides (erroneously cited as Aristophanes): Εὐριπίδῃ δ' ὁ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιῶν (Teleclides, frag. 39 Kaibel). The phrase τὰς σωκρατογόμφους ("Socratic patchwork") probably belongs to the same passage, describing Euripides's tragedies as "nailed together from Socrates's ideas." Nietzsche blamed Euripides as the poet of aesthetic Socratism for the death of tragedy; see Werner J. Dannhauser, "Socrates in *The Birth of Tragedy* and in Nietzsche's Early Writings on the Greeks," in *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974, 2019), 42-139. Nietzsche is far from having an unimpeachable understanding of the meaning and nature of tragedy; see Paul J. M. van Tongeren, "A Splendid Failure: Nietzsche's Understanding of the Tragic," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies,* no. 11, Conscience and Pain, Tragedy and Truth (Spring 1996): 23-34; and W. Geoffrey Arnott, "Nietzsche's View of Greek Tragedy," *Arethusa* 17, no. 2, Under the Text (Fall 1984): 135-49. Nietzsche is unaware that Apollo is an unstable version of the same beneficent mediation with madness represented by Dionysus/Bacchus (the two names not being completely synonymous); see Carl A. P. Ruck, Clark Heinrich, and Blaise Daniel Staples, *The Apples of Apollo: Pagan and Christian Mysteries of the Eucharist* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000); Carl A. P. Ruck, "Duality and the Madness of Herakles," *Arethusa* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 53-75; Ruck, "The Wolves of War: Evidence of an Ancient Cult of Warrior Lycanthropy," *NeuroQuantology* 3 (2016): 544-56; Ruck, "Reorienting the Shamanic Axis: Apollo from Wolf to Light," *SexuS Journal* 3, no. 8 (2018): 665-710; and Ruck, "The Beast Initiate: The Lycanthropy of Heracles," *Athens Journal of History* 5, no. 4 (October 2019): 225-46.

for Plato's *Symposium* dialogue, would have been known as Plato's older contemporary. Inevitably, they all, within the limits of their overlapping lifespans, would have been known to each other to differing degrees through work in common with the staff, artists, and technicians of the Theater of Dionysus. Agathon was the first to write a tragedy with an original, not mythically traditional plot,[3] as did Plato later in his prosaic Socratic dialogue dramatizations.[4] In Aristophanes's *Thesmophoriazusae* (performed for the Dionysia of 411 BCE), Euripides and Agathon not only know each other and are on familiar terms, but the younger tragedian is parodied for his effeminacy as the recipient of Euripides's father-in-law's pederasty, and Aristophanes derides the similar prettified verbiage of the elder and younger tragedians[5] and further implies that both are attended by embarrassingly excessive adoring fans, as was Socrates.[6] Plato similarly associates the two playwrights in the *Symposium*, where Agathon quotes a verse from Euripides about love.[7]

In his dialogues, Plato quotes most frequently from the plays of Euripides,[8] which implies considerable mnemonic familiarity with the works, and there is a garbled tradition that he knew the great playwright personally, even perhaps traveling with him to Egypt, obviously while still a very young man.[9] The account, if authentic, is garbled because Plato allegedly traveled to Egypt after the death of Socrates (who died five years after Euripides while away from Athens in residence at the court of King Archelaus in Macedonia), and hence, this later trip has been confused with an earlier trip, otherwise undocumented, of Euripides to Egypt (perhaps merely invented for his *Helen*, which was produced in 412 BCE). The trip with Euripides was supposedly to visit the prophets, perhaps a reference to the role of the prophetess Theonoe in the *Helen*, and Plato, it is said, took ill but was cured by sea bathing, commemorated in a verse supposedly by him about the power of the sea to wash away sickness. If the verse is not spurious, it presumably was penned before his renunciation of poetry and the death of Socrates.

The biographies of ancient literary celebrities are a hodgepodge of garbled citations, arrayed to exemplify misinterpretations of their works and justify a pseudohistory of evolving literary transmission and progression.[10] Euripides was the most frequently parodied tragedian on the comic stage, not because, as it is claimed, the audience hated his

[3] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451b, 20.

[4] Evidence is lacking, but it is perhaps probable that the Platonic dialogues were performed, but not in the theater; see G. J. de Vries, "Platonic Dialogues Performed?" *Mnemosyne* 37, no. 1-2 (1984): 143-45. Even if not performed, they are clearly theater without the theater. Private reading in antiquity was not commonly done silently but aloud, sounding out the words so that the communication was not visual but aural; see Bernard M. W. Knox, "Silent Reading in Antiquity," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 9, no. 4 (1968): 421-35; and R. W. McCutcheon, "Silent Reading in Antiquity and the Future History of the Book," *Book History* 18 (2015): 1-32.

[5] Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae*, 49, 58, 159, 187 (μόνος γὰρ ἂν λέξειας ἀξίως ἐμοῦ: "You alone can speak in a manner worthy of me"); see Harold W. Miller, "Some Tragic Influences in the *Thesmophoriazusae* of Aristophanes," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 77 (1946): 171-82; and M. F. Burnyeat, "Postscript on Silent Reading," *The Classical Quarterly* 47, no.1 (1997): 74-76.

[6] W. Rhys Roberts, "Aristophanes and Agathon," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 20 (1900): 44-56.

[7] Plato, *Symposium*, 196E.

[8] F. L. Lucas, *Euripides and His Influence* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), 47-49.

[9] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum*, 3.6: ἔνθεν τε εἰς Αἴγυπτον παρὰ τοὺς προφήτας, οὗ φασι καὶ Εὐριπίδη αὐτῷ συνακολουθῆσαι.

[10] Mary R. Lefkowitz, "The Euripides Vita," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 20 (1979): 187-210.

plays, but because he was the most currently popular. If he did indeed die in Macedonia,[11] it is not because he had fled an unappreciative Athenian populace into self-imposed exile but because he had accepted the challenging opportunity to establish a new theater afforded by a royal patron with lavish funding, one that could perhaps stage the collapse of the palace of Cadmus/Pentheus, as required for the *Bacchae*,[12] unstageable in the Athenian Theater of Dionysus.[13] The biographical notice that Sophocles dressed his chorus and actors in mourning upon learning of the death of Euripides instead of displaying their elaborate costuming for the *proagon* publicity event for the up-coming festival production in 406 is probably too distinctive an anecdotal episode not to be an authentic indication that the playwright was indeed absent from the city and that the older playwright recognized his younger competitor's legacy. The depredations of the Peloponnesian War and the oligarchic coup of 411 in Athens would have provided sufficient reason for anyone with a viable option to absent himself from the city.

Both Agathon and the Magna-Grecian painter Zeuxis also accepted invitations to the court of Archelaus; and Sophocles, too, was invited but did not go.[14] The invitation of the three playwrights (Sophocles, Euripides, Agathon) apparently recognized them as the preeminent exponents of three successive generations of tragedians, to celebrate the king's inauguration of such dramatic contests as the Athenian Dionysia. Agathon, who went to Macedonia with his older lover Pausanias,[15] did not return, dying there about five years after Euripides, around 400 BCE, the year before the trial of Socrates. Aeschylus had similarly died during his visit to the court of Hieron of Syracuse in 458. No one has ever proposed that either Aeschylus or Agathon left Athens because of dissatisfaction with the reception of their work in that city.

That Euripides won just four competitions (plus one posthumously) in the Athenian Dionysian theatrical competitions, compared to thirteen cited for Aeschylus and eighteen

[11] Disputed: Scott Scullion, "Euripides and Macedon, or the Silence of the Frogs," *The Classical Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (November 2003): 389-400. Scullion argues that Aristophanes does not craft any sarcastic jabs against the recently dead Euripides for his absence in Macedonia. The Macedonian death is risible only if the playwright had left Athens permanently in frustration for his lack of success in his home city, not if he was away pursuing fulfilment of new enterprises; see Edmund Stewart, "Tragedy and Tyranny: Euripides, Archelaus of Macedon and Popular Patronage," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*, Supplement 21 (2021): 81-101; and P. T. Stevens, "Euripides and the Athenians," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 76 (1956): 87-94.

[12] Euripides, *Bacchae*, 586: τάχα τὰ Πενθέως μέλαθρα διατινάξεται πεσήμασιν; 633: δώματ' ἔρρηξεν χαμᾶζε; see E. R. Dodds (*Euripides Bacchae*, 1960): "We need not suppose that the cracks are visible to the audience, still less that any part of the back-scene falls down at this point – it is doubtful if built-up sets were in use even at the end of the fifth century."

[13] Gilbert Norwood, *The Riddle of the Bacchae: The Last Stage of Euripides' Religious Views* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1908); A. W. Verrall, *Euripides, the Rationalist* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1895); and Verrall, *The Bacchae of Euripides and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910). The unstageable destruction of the palace is used to argue that the supposedly rational playwright is demonstrating and contemning the delusional reality of the bacchant chorus since the audience would find it risible that the chorus is demonstrably hallucinating. The play was somehow staged posthumously in the theater in Athens, presumably without the physical demolition of the stage building that represented the palace of Cadmus.

[14] Diodorus, 27.16.

[15] Little is known about this Pausanias beyond his relationship with Agathon. He figures as a speaker in the *Symposium* and *Protagoras* (set ca. 430) of Plato and in Xenophon's fourth-century *Symposium*, whose dramatic date is set for 422 BCE.

for Sophocles, does not prove his unpopularity since, by the terms of the contest, only five votes of the ten judges, chosen by lot, determined the outcome, thus allowing a role for the deity as chance or Τυχή in judging the contest. There is no evidence that Euripides was ever refused a chorus (i.e., not allowed to be one of the three competitors in the dramatic festivals), and the Suidas Byzantine encyclopedia records that he exhibited (tetralogies) twenty-two times. The tale that Athenians captured in Sicily during the Peloponnesian War (Sicilian Expedition, 415-413 BCE) secured their freedom or better treatment by reciting verses of Euripides indicates the contemporary popularity of Euripides not only outside Athens but also in his native city since the soldiers had committed verses to memory.[16] When they returned to Athens, they expressed their gratitude to the playwright. In the century after his death, episodes from Euripides's dramas were frequently depicted in vase paintings.[17]

Plato's supposed career-altering encounter with Socrates is dated in Diogenes Laertius to his twenty-eighth year (γενόμενος ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη), suspiciously coinciding with the time of Socrates's trial and condemnation to death for impiety in 399 BCE and the ensuing prosecutions for profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Since Plato, fearing involvement, withdrew temporarily from the city with the other disciples of the philosopher,[18] he must have already been counted among his entourage of students, suggesting the other dating of a decade earlier for his first encounter with Socrates. The two dates, the first encounter and the renunciation of a theatrical career, have been conflated in the biographical tradition. The trial, not his first encounters with Socrates a decade earlier, was the decisive event that finally motivated his abandonment of the theater. The trial demonstrated the irrational mentality of the jurors, who were outraged at his counter proposal that the penalty should reward him instead with a dole of public support for life, in that a greater number chose the death penalty than originally had found him guilty.

Training to be a playwright for the Theater of Dionysus would have required education in music and dance, since the technical designation was that the playwright as "teacher" (διδάσκαλος) "taught" (ἐδίδαξε) the score (verses, music, and dance) for his play to his actors (of whom he was usually one)[19] and his chorus, and the resulting theatrical performance or production was the διδασκάλιον ("teaching" – production). At the time of his renunciation of a career in the theater, he was not a novice but already well enough recognized to have been chosen as one of the three competitors in the contest and awarded a chorus and expenses by the ruling archons. As a boy, Plato would have attended performances in the theater of the playwrights he hoped to emulate; Euripides[20] and Agathon would have been prime among these. Even boys were in the audience for

[16] Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*, 29.2-3.

[17] Oliver Taplin, *Pots and Plays: Interactions between Tragedy and Greek Vase-Painting of the Fourth Century B.C.* (Los Angeles, CA: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2007).

[18] Diogenes Laertius, *Vita philosophorum*, 3.6.

[19] Plutarch, *Solon*, 29.6; Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1403b23. The Byzantine Suidas encyclopedia records that Sophocles ceased acting because he did not have a powerful enough voice.

[20] David Sansone, "Plato and Euripides," *Illinois Classical Studies* 21 (1996): 35-67.

both comedies and tragedies, and it was also acceptable for them to participate in the performances.[21]

It is likely that Plato not only was an adolescent spectator in the theater but was apprenticed in learning the art, a familiar with the actors and playwrights. Although evidence of guilds of artists and performers for the Athenian theater does not survive before the third century,[22] it is unlikely that such a cultic professional organization did not exist from the earlier years of the theater. In addition, presumably one did not compose or perform for the Theater of Dionysus without an exceptionally inspirational experience of the god's gift of wine or probably even special initiation into the Dionysian Mystery, whatever that would entail.

Aeschylus was said to have received his call to serve the god as a youth when the god appeared to him in a dream as he slept in a vineyard; upon awakening, he found that he suddenly had the art.[23] Not only is the spontaneous acquisition of the complex requisite skills highly unlikely, but the visionary experience in the vineyard probably masks a personal encounter with the deity in a ritual of initiatory intoxication. As a tragedian, he was said always to have been "drunk" (μεθύων) when he composed or acted (ἐποίει, "made," as in ποιητής, "poet") in his tragedies.[24] This probably refers to frenzied possession by the deity as the inspiratory inception of the drama. In Aristophanes's *Frogs* (405 BCE), the legendary Aeschylus is described in the full frenzy of tragic inspiration, "his eyes whirling (στροβήσεται) with terrible mania."[25] The common metaphor for the effect of such intoxication was the delivery of a thunderbolt (συγκεραυνωθείς) to one's mind.[26]

In all references to vinous intoxication, the nature of ancient Greek wine must be reckoned as a variable inebriant composed of herbal and other toxins suffused in an aqueous medium of wine diluted with at least three, and often more, parts water, yielding a very weak concentration of ethanol (less than the average beer) – not to assure the maintenance of sobriety since the purpose and customary outcome of the drinking party was to get drunk[27] – but nevertheless capable of inducing intoxicated mania with a succession of as few as four modest (three to four fluid ounce) rounds of drinking extended over a prolonged time of multiple hours, variable and dependent upon the nature of the additives.[28] Neat wine (approximately fourteen percent ethanol) in a single drinking

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[21] Arthur W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 263, 279.

[22] Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, 279 *et seq*.: ἡ σύνοδος (τὸ κοινὸν) τῶν περὶ Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν; and E. J. Jory, "Associations of Actors in Rome," *Hermes* 98, no. 2 (1970): 253n1.

[23] Pausanias, 1.21.2.

[24] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, 1.39: μεθύων δὲ ἐποίει τὰς τραγῳδίας Αἰσχύλος, citing the disciple of Aristotle Chamaeleon (frag. 22); Plutarch, *Moralia*, 715e.

[25] Aristophanes, *Frogs,* 816-17: μανίας ὑπὸ δεινῆς ὄμματα στροβήσεται.

[26] Archilochus, frag. 120: οἴνῳ συγκεραυνωθεὶς φρένας.

[27] Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1252: τὸ δεῖπνον [...] συσκεύαζε νῷν ἵνα καὶ μεθυσθῶμεν διὰ χρόνου (Prepare our dinner so that we can get drunk at last). Philocleon replies, "No way. Drinking is bad. From wine comes breaking down doors [to get to your boyfriend], street fights, throwing stuff around, and when it's done, you have to pay the penalty of a drunken hangover" (μηδαμῶς. κακὸν τὸ πίνειν. ἀπὸ γὰρ οἴνου γίγνεται καὶ θυροκοπῆσαι καὶ πατάξαι καὶ βαλεῖν, κἄπειτ᾽ ἀποτίνειν ἀργύριον ἐκ κραιπάλης).

[28] R. Gordon Wasson, Albert Hoffmann, B. D. Staples, and Carl A. P. Ruck, *The Road to Eleusis: Unveiling the Secret of the Mysteries* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978; Los Angeles, CA: Hermes Press, 1998;

could result in death, obviously not from the ethanol. A fifth-century red-figure hydria from a cemetery in Enez (ancient Ainos), Turkey, depicts a cultic scene, probably relative to burial, in which a mushroom is highlighted among the botanical specimens being added to a partially buried *pithos*, presumably of wine.[29] The tombstone itself was commonly designed as what can only be termed explicitly mushroom-shaped.[30] Strainers survive on storage jars and mixing kraters, with holes too large to filter out vinous debris from fermentation but designed to catch leaves, stems, and other additives before drinking.[31]

Different kinds of drinking cups or wineskins were customary for the various social occasions or types of drinking, and the resultant alteration of consciousness differed as appropriate for the ritual or event involved. The kylix (κύλιξ, cognate with "chalice," but probably assimilated from a word of pre-Greek origin) was characteristic of the symposium, a mushroom-shaped broad shallow saucer supported on a slender stem (like a wineglass, but broader and shallow); it was designed to challenge the drinker's sobriety, easily unmanageable when tipsy. The kylix was apparently linked with the urban symposium, which was designed as a challenge to maintain civilized culture on the tipsy brink of irrational mania. In contrast, the skyphos (σκυφίον) was a deep, sometimes quite sizeable cup with two protruding "ears" (ὦτα) as handles (perhaps suggesting an anthropomorphism as a diminutive skull-cup, σκυφίον), characteristic of peasant or rural drinking. It was the cup depicted for drinking by the women conducting the Lenaean ceremony (named for the bacchant women of the "winepress/wine-trough," or ληνός) for the presumably dead god Dionysus, apparently not the deity of the wine, which was still in the process of being fermented, but of the wild intoxicants of the primitive previnicultural world that prevailed during the interregnum that began at the deity's sacrificial slaughter with the harvest and pressing of the grapes. The two aspects of the deity are expressed in his two names as Dionysus and his previniculture persona as Bacchus, the leader of the bacchants. This was the period when the previticulture forces of madness roamed the world, materialized as ithyphallic zoomorphic anthropomorphisms such as goatish satyrs (σάτυροι) and equine sileni (σιληνοί). The *lenaiai* (ληναῖαι) women are depicted with their heads thrown back in states of frenzied intoxication, as the drink is ladled into skyphoi. Other types of vessels were characteristic for other drinking occasions, each indicative of the nature and symbolism of the event and its particular type of intoxication.

The name of the drink that was drunk in the theater (probably from a portable wineskin, ἀσκός) is recorded, the *trimma* (τρῖμμα) or "grind" (from τρίβ-ειν, "rub") indicating not only that it contained a ground or macerated and abraded additive but also

Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2008); and Carl A. P. Ruck, "The Wild and the Cultivated: Wine in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *Journal of Ethnopharmacology* 5, no. 3 (1982): 231-70.

[29] Carl A. P. Ruck and Mark Hoffman, "Coda: A Flower of a Different Sort," in *Dionysus in Thrace: Entheogenic Themes in the Mythology and Archaeology of Northern Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey*, ed. Carl A. P. Ruck (Berkeley, CA: Regent Press/Entheomedia, 2018), 257-62.

[30] Donna Kurtz and John Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 242-44; Carl A. P. Ruck, *Sacred Mushrooms of the Goddess: Secrets of Eleusis* (Berkeley, CA: Ronin Publishing, 2006), 61; and Ruck *Dionysus in Thrace*, 18-19: tombstone of Lysandra from Dascylion in ancient Bithynia.

[31] David Eric Brussell, "Medical Plants of Mt. Pelion, Greece," *Economic Botany* 28, Supplement (Winter 2004): S174-S202.

that it was customary to drink throughout the daylong performances in the theater.[32] The theater provided no known facilities for feeding the large audience, and it is implausible that they went without eating or liquids for upward of eight hours. Food, however, was available since on occasion the audience expressed its displeasure by tossing morsels at the performers.[33] The only feasible solution was the ἔρανος or packed lunch and drink.[34]

For the theatrical experience, the spectators, probably women as well as men,[35] submitted themselves to an enchantment in harmony with the male actors' impersonations, the music, and the dance that materialized the imagined world of myth and comic fantasy, weeping, terrified, riotously laughing, stomping, and shouting. It was said that women aborted from fright when Aeschylus brought the Furies (Erinyes) on stage for his *Eumenides* (458 BCE);[36] and for Aristophanes's *Clouds* (423 BCE), the audience was so delighted with the mask-maker's art that they forced Socrates to stand so that they could compare the likeness.[37] The theater intoxication was conducive not to rational judgement or philosophical contemplation but rather to a patterned design of total emotional submission to an empathetic oneness with the event witnessed. In the *Apology*, Plato has Socrates say that, when it came to the poets, "those of tragedies and dithyrambs and the others" (τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους) – there, he thought he would surely find someone wiser than himself, but when he took up some verses "that seemed really well done" (ἅ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς):

> Pretty much anyone present could speak better about what the poets had done [...] because they did what they did not rationally but by some kind of natural impulse [φύσει τινί] and in a state of altered consciousness [ἐνθουσιάζοντες], like prophets and soothsayers.[38]

The evidence is indisputable, the words of a tragedian himself, and the playwrights whom Socrates confronted would have been people such as Sophocles, Euripides, Agathon, and even perhaps the young Plato himself, who is here confessing that he could not himself explain exactly what his tetralogy meant. Xenophon's account of the trial in the *Memorabilia* includes no mention of the encounter with the poets.

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[32] Alexander Numenius (rhetor, second century CE), composed of pounded groats and spices, 188, etc. Hesychius (fifth-century CE lexicographer), *s.v., trimma*. The citation in Liddell, Scott/Jones, *Greek Lexicon*, omits the mention of drinking *trimma* in the theater; see R. Gordon Wasson, Stella Kramrisch, Jonathan Ott, and Carl A. P. Ruck, *Persephone's Quest: Entheogens and the Origins of Religion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 221; and Ruck, *Dionysus in Thrace*, 72ff.

[33] Pollux (second century CE), *Onomasticon*, 4.4.

[34] The *trimma* was also the drink drunk at weddings, although probably without the same aromatic additives. Hesychius, ἀρωματίζον πόμα ἐν γάμοις πινόμενον, "aromatic drink drunk at weddings."

[35] Women were probably also in the audience; see Jeffrey Henderson, "Women and the Athenian Festivals," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 121 (1991): 133-47; and Alan Hughes, "'Ai Dionysiazusai': Women in the Greek Theater," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 51 (2008): 1-27.

[36] *Aeschyli Vita*, 9; Pollux, 4.110. Since the plays of Aeschylus were also produced as revival performances after the playwright's death, the date of the reported incident of terrified female spectators is not possible to establish.

[37] Aelian, *Varia Historia*, 2.13. The mask was probably the stock Silenus; see C. W. Marshall, "Some Fifth-Century Masking Conventions," *Greece and Rome* 46, no. 2 (October 1999): 188-202.

[38] Plato, *Apology*, 22a-c: ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν [...] ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί.

The wineskin from which the theater potion was drunk was make from the hide of the goat, a goatskin, the animal that grazed upon the "tamed" (ἡμερίς) grapevine, hence an enemy to the cultivation of the fruit upon whose bloody juice was grown the civilized drink of the fermented wine. Hence it was the appropriate container for the ethanol that supplanted the wild and natural intoxicants of primitivism, represented by whatever the theatrical *trimma* signified.

Although tragedies and comedies eventually were both staged at the two annual Athenian festivals of drama, the Lenaea (Λήναια ἱερά, in January/February, the "marriage month" Γαμηλιών) was originally for comedy and the Dionysia originally only for tragedy (Διονύσια τὰ Μεγάλα, τὰ ἐν Ἄστει, at the vernal equinox in March/April or Ἐλαφηβολιών, called the City Dionysia to distinguish it from the Rural Dionysia), as was appropriate for the dual persona of the deity, the Bacchus (Βάκχος) of the maenads and the ithyphallic creatures of the bacchanalia for the comic "*komos*-song" or κωμῳδία of the κῶμος, "revel," as contrasted with the Dionysus (Διόνυσος), the wine-god liberated by the sacrifice of the "goat" (τράγος) for the τραγῳδία.[39] Comedy enacts a world that escapes the strictures of society, reimagined at the whim of the basest libidinous instincts symbolized as the erect phallus that was the obligatory costuming of the performers, while tragedy enacts the societal acquiescence to the loss of primordial innocence, although there was great leeway in how this was enacted, including humor and happy denouements. Aristotle's definition of tragedy is not an authentic descriptive general summary based on the many productions in the Theater of Dionysus but a proscriptive desideratum of what pattern would produce a beneficial salutary experience for the spectators, to counter Plato's critique of the theater.[40] Plato, however, like all the tragic playwrights, would have concluded his tetralogy with a satyr play, in which the mythical tale was given a happy ending, with a chorus composed of ithyphallic satyrs and with some of the obscenity of the comic diction expressed in the high style of tragedy. Only one satyr play survives intact, the *Cyclops* of Euripides, although there are extensive fragments of two others, one by Aeschylus and another by Sophocles.

Both drama festivals eventually also included an entire day of dithyrambs, danced by ten teams of as many as fifty men and another ten of boys, led by the poet as singer. Thus, the audience at a typical festival would have experienced nearly forty dramatic and choreographic presentations in a span of four days (roughly equal to the entire dramatic corpus surviving from antiquity), leaving little time or emotional comedown for rational dissection of individual works, except as recollections later, in tranquility. The earliest mention of the dithyramb is a fragment of the seventh-century Parian Archilochus, who wrote, "I know how to lead the fair dithyramb song of the Lord Dionysus when my wits are thunderstruck with wine,"[41] which implies a tradition similar to the supposed drunkenness of Aeschylus.

Whatever special experience may have precipitated Plato's decision to embark upon a career in the theater, he would have been exposed in his youth to the customary

[39] Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*.
[40] Gerald F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
[41] Archilochus, frag. 120, quoted above.

societal indoctrination into the numinous metaphysical realm of human experience over which his chosen deity of intoxication presided. As a child at the age of three or four, like his brothers[42] and sister[43] and all other children of the city, Plato would have been introduced into the experience of intoxication, drinking from the tiny triple-lipped *choes* (χόες) handle-less pitchers, miniature exemplars of the adult pint-sized *choes* containers (from χέ-ειν, "pour")[44] with both his father and his mother at the three-day festival of the *Anthesteria* (Ἀνθεστέρια) that brought the entire family together to celebrate the broaching of the "jugs" (πίθος) of newly fermented wine, for which the first day of the festival took its name as *Pithoigia* (Πιθοίγια, πίθος + οἴγ-ειν). The festival, which lent its name to the month corresponding to late February/March, marked the return toward the spring-time season of "flowering" (ἄνθος) agrarian abundance, although the actual flowering was still months ahead and the winter grain crop in mid-growth.[45] With the broaching of the jugs, the deity, who presumably had died, slaughtered at the time of the October harvest, was released from his transitional entombment in the *pithos* jug, twice-born, Semele's child Bacchus now returned as Dionysus, the son of his father Zeus, *Dithyrambos* (Διθύραμβος), the god who came, as was the folk etymology,[46] "twice to the gates of birth" (δὶς θύραδε), for whom the dithyramb was named.[47]

At the time of the festival, the graves of the dead throughout Attica gaped open, allowing the dead ancestors to return for an extended family celebration that spanned the divide between the living and the dead (comparable to the Mayan Hanal Pixán).[48] For such a feasting with beings polluted with the putrefaction of death, a special etiquette of dining was required. Hence separate pitchers were employed as drinking vessels instead of using the common krater (κρατήρ, from κερ-άν-νυ-εν, "mix") or common mixing urn, from which the drink would ordinarily be drawn into the kylixes as for the symposium drinking party. Similarly, the guests did not sit around a common table but each had a separate little table, laden with food and drink, the ghostly visitors welcomed but kept apart at a safe distance. Thus, from a very early age, children learned the significance of the god's wine as symbolic of resurrection, just as the deity slaughtered at the October harvest of the grape was now returned as the spirit of the divine infant resident within the wine, fellow mate of their own age, hence they were indoctrinated with the idea of their own Dionysian

[42] Plato had two brothers, his elder Glaucon, who is a speaker in the *Republic* and is mentioned in the *Symposium* and the *Parmenides*, and Adeimantus, who is also a speaker in the *Republic* and is mentioned in the *Apology* and the *Parmenides*. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Glaucon is presented as much younger than Plato. His half-brother Antiphon appears in the *Parmenides*.

[43] Plato's older sister was Potome, whose son Speusippus became Plato's successor as head of the Academy. The whole family was thus in the entourage of Socrates.

[44] Jan Bazant, "Iconography of Choes Reconsidered," *Listy filologické* 98, no. 2 (1975): 72-78.

[45] Henry R. Immerwahr, "Choes and Chytroi," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 77 (1946): 245-60; Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*; and Richard Hamilton, *Choes and Anthesteria: Athenian Iconography and Ritual* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

[46] *Etymologium Magnum* (twelfth-century Byzantine lexicon), s.v.: ὁ δὶς θύραζε βεβηκώς; Euripides, *Bacchae*, 526; Plato, *Laws*, 700b; probably folk etymology, for θρίαμβος, "triple-ἴαμβος," "three-step" chorography, or non-Greek for "tomb"; it may be related to θρῖον or "fig leaf," hence perhaps phallic in implications, but probably it is pre-Greek.

[47] Θριάζ-ειν means "be ecstatic, enthusiastic." The dithyramb became *triumphus*, "triumphant," in Latin.

[48] Blaise D. Staples, "Invitation to the Dance: Hanal Pixán and the Anthesteria," in Ruck, Heinrich, and Staples, *The Apples of Apollo*; and *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics* 12, no. 2, 3rd series (Fall 2004):105-25.

persona. Many small *choes* survive, apparently from grave offerings of children who died before the age for this essential *Anthesteria* initiation. The impressionable children were also thus trained to imagine ghostly beings, otherwise unseen, gathering at the perimeter of the feasting.

During the *Anthesteria*, a secret rite of marriage was performed. The bride was the woman who bore the title of "Queen" (βασίλιννα) as wife of the Archon *Basileus*,[49] who in the democratic government had inherited the ancient sacral duties of kingship by right of royal lineage and was the magistrate in charge of religious affairs. At a temple in the sanctuary of Dionysus in the Marshes,[50] which was opened just this once each year,[51] the *basilinna* was married to the god Dionysus, attended by a sisterhood of elder priestesses, the γέραιαι, probably of equally noble lineage. The temple was supposedly at the spot of the original royal residence, but it bore the designation of a *bucoleum* (βουκολεῖον) or house of the "cow/bull-tender," reminiscent of the palace of Pentheus in Euripides's *Bacchae*.[52] It is unlikely that the royal house, however one may interpret the term to include a whole farmstead with outbuildings, would house an actual bull. The rite was probably enacted as a shamanic ritual of spiritual possession and altered consciousness accessed by a zoomorphic sacrament of the deity designated with fungal bovine and taurine metaphors.[53] Scholars have assumed that the *Basilinna* merely had sexual concourse (amidst the attending elder priestesses) with her husband, who was perhaps wearing a Dionysus mask.[54] Vase paintings, however, depict a tipsy Dionysus approaching the *bucoleum*, the *basilinna* coyly awaiting beyond its door left ajar, with a satyr sitting on its steps as gatekeeper. The rite probably derives from a pre-Greek time when there was an Athena/Medusa presiding over the city, attended by her sisterhood of Athena-priestesses, after which the city was named.

The *Basileus* and his *Basilinna* would have been distant relatives of Plato's family. By ancestral tradition, Plato's father traced lineage from the last of the mythical kings of Athens, Codrus, whose son was the first supposed Archon, and ultimately back to spiritual possession by Poseidon. On his mother's side, the lineage was equally noble, supposedly related to Solon of the Eupatrid clan, which similarly traced descent back to Codrus.

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[49] Grace H. Macurdy, "Basilinna and Basilissa: The Alleged Title of the 'Queen-Archon' in Athens," *The American Journal of Philology* 49, no. 3 (1928): 276-82.

[50] John Pickard, "Dionysus ἐν Λίμναις," *The American Journal of Archaeology and of the History of Fine Arts* 8, no. 1 (January-March 1893): 56-92; and Geoffrey C. R. Schmalz, "The Athenian Prytaneion Discovered?" *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 75, no. 1 (January-March 2006): 33-81.

[51] Pseudo-Demosthenes, 59 (*Contra Neaeram*), 76.

[52] Euripides's *Bacchae*, 614ff.

[53] Ruck, *Dionysus in Thrace*, 96. For depictions in vase painting, see Eva C. Keuls, "Male-Female Interaction in Fifth-Century Dionysiac Ritual as Shown in Attic Vase Painting," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 55 (1984): 287-97; as depicted in marble reliefs from the Theater of Dionysus, see Mary Sturgeon, "The Reliefs on the Theater of Dionysus in Athens," *American Journal of Archaeology* 81, no. 1 (Winter 1977): 31-63.

[54] Aristotle (*Constitution of Athens*, 3.5) called it a σύμμιξις, "sexual intercourse" (instead of γάμος), which is rationalized as physical copulation with her husband wearing a mask of Dionysus; or merely a "meeting," in commemoration of the legendary Ikarios, who met the god and shared the gift of wine with his herders, who killed their mates, thinking themselves poisoned by the wine. See Noel Robertson, "Athens' Festival of the New Wine," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 95 (1993): 197-250.

The Archon *Basileus* presided over trials involving religion, such as the charge against Socrates for impiety.

It is obviously related to this sacred Dionysian marriage that, during the *Anthesteria*, adolescent girls signaled their menarche and hence potential marriageability by bidding farewell to childhood, hanging their plaything dolls from trees. Death by hanging was considered the appropriate mode for females to commit suicide,[55] and hence the hanged dolls represented the end of their childhood persona. Vase paintings depict the adolescent girls themselves swinging above the opened wine jugs, oscillating, levitating like the spirts released with the new wine, and being pushed from behind by a Dionysian satyr with hands on her buttocks – inappropriately seductive, especially in view of the ithyphallic nature of satyrs. Thus, marriage was indoctrinated with metaphysical connotations of spiritual possession. In the bacchanalian revel, the deity supposedly materialized, crossdressing as a female; reciprocal crossdressing was characteristic of the actual marital night, especially as documented for Sparta.[56] The ritual of swinging was called the *Aiora* (Αἰώρα), and it was supposedly in commemoration of Ariadne's hanging when abandoned by Theseus, or, with similar significance, the suicide of Erigone, who hanged herself when she found her father, Ikarios, killed by his fellow shepherds when they thought themselves poisoned by the wine of Dionysus that he had shared with them. Alternatively, Ariadne as the bride of Dionysus was cited as the mythical precedent for the ritual enacted by the *basilinna*.[57] There are also depictions of the rite where boys, apparently as avatars of the baby deity, are being placed upon the swing by their fathers, with an adjacent unoccupied *klismos* (κλισμός) reclining chair provided for the expected arrival of Dionysus or his queen as spectator; or with costly garments instead, probably intended for the nuptials, on the swing as they are impregnated with fumes above a fire being doctored below with a poured aromatic unguent.[58] Thus, the young boy was similarly cast in the persona of the baby god and his future nuptial role as spiritual abductor.

A similar nuptial indoctrination for adolescent males at the autumn harvesting of the grapes cast them in the adult persona of the deity. The event was called the *Oschophoria* (ὠσχοφόρια). Two naturally effeminate pubescent males, impersonating women, intensified by both crossdressing and facial cosmetics, apparently as representatives for the whole ephebic group,[59] led a parade from the Temple of Dionysus in Athens toward the coast

[55] Frederica Doria and Marco Giumen, "The Swinging Woman: Phaedra and Swing in Classical Greece," *Medea* 2, no. 1 (June 2016): 1-33.

[56] Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 15.3; Margaret C. Miller, "Reexamining Transvestism in Archaic and Classical Athens: The Zewadski Stamnos," *American Journal of Archaeology* 103, no. 2 (April 1999): 223-53.

[57] B. C. Dietrich, "A Rite of Swinging during the Anthesteria," *Hermes* 89, no. 1 (1961): 36-50; Eva Cantarella, "Dangling Virgins: Myth Ritual, and the Place of Women in Ancient Greece," in "The Female Body in Western Culture: Semiotic Perspectives," *Poetics Today* 6, no. 1-2 (1985): 91-101; Sarah Iles Johnston, "Demeter, Myths, and the Polyvalence of Festivals," *History of Religions* 52, no. 4 (May 2013): 370-401; and Ruck, *Dionysus in Thrace*, 113ff.

[58] Cornelia Isler-Kerényi, *Dionysos in Classical Athens: An Understanding through Images*, chap. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 135ff.

[59] J. M Bremmer, "Dionysos travesti," in *L'initition: Les rites d'adolescence et les mystères*, ed. Alain Moreau, vol. 1, Actes du Colloque International de Monpellier (Montpellier: University P. Valéry, 1991), 195-96.

and the temple of Athena Skiras at Phaleron.[60] Crossdressing was a ritual that mediated the rigid categories of gender, status, and ordinary reality, and it was characteristic of male Dionysian revelers or komasts (κωμασταί), presenting themselves as personifications of the materialized adult deity in his role as the spiritual possessor of the bacchants.[61] Other komast depictions show males disguised as ithyphallic satyrs. The youths in the *Oschophoria* parade carried "vine-twigs" (*klēma*, κλῆματα/κλῆμματα) fruiting with grape clusters (*botryes*, βότρυες). These grape-cluster twigs were called *oschoi* (ὠσχός/ ὄσχος), hence the name of the rite as the "*oschoi* bearing," with the "grape-cluster twigs" representing the scrotum (ὄσχη). The rite was in commemoration of Dionysus's abduction of Ariadne from the island of Naxos and included a footrace of ephebic males[62] and the drinking of a special celebratory potion composed of five ingredients.[63]

The third day of the *Anthesteria* took its name, *Chytroi*, from the stew pots (χύτροι) of beans and other legume seeds not intended for human consumption but poured as seeds of life on the tombs in honor of Hermes as conductor of souls, as the ghostly visitors were bid farewell, escorted to the threshold of their proper home in the otherworld with the invitation to return the following year. Agrarian seeds as something scattered (σπεῖρ-ειν) were homonymous with genital semen (σπέρμα/σπόρος), and hence crop cultivation was analogous to spiritual resurrection. At the completion of the three-day feasting, the *Askolia* (Ἀσκώλια) was a contest that required the competitors to demonstrate that, despite the three days of drinking, they had managed to maintain sufficient sobriety to balance themselves upright upon a greased goatskin wineskin.

The Rural Dionysia (Διονύσια τὰ κατ᾽ ἀγρούς) at the winter solstice (December/ January) celebrated the partially fermented and effervescing *vin bourru*. This was the time of the drunken komast revelry in the villages, corresponding to the maenadic/bacchant mountain rites, which originally were celebrated exclusively by women enacting ritual mimesis of root-digging or plant-gathering, with the only males present as figures that materialized from the mythical realm, the bearded deity crossdressing as a female and his

[60] The rite is conflated with the Skirophoria, which was apparently a separate event; see Margaret C. Miller, "The Parasol: An Oriental Status-Symbol in Late Archaic and Classical Athens," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 112 (1992): 91-105. Skiron (Σκίρων) was the robber who guarded the pathway along the Skironian Rocks that narrowed the passage along the shore from Megara to Eleusis. The rocks are named for their "hardness" (σκῖρος), perhaps chalk, hence the white parasols and sun-canopy of the Skironion festival, which apparently coincided with the Thesmophoria. Skiron required travelers to wash his feet as toll for the passage as they attempted to inch by, and as they stooped for the task, he kicked them from the precipitous cliff into the sea below, where they were fed upon by a giant tortoise. As a version of the Skiapodes "Shadefoot" fungal anthropomorphism, see Carl A. P. Ruck, Mark Hoffman, and José Alfredo González Celdrán, *The Beer of Dreams and the Entheogenic Mystery Tradition* (Taos, NM: Entheomedia, 2020), 478ff.

[61] Miller, "Reexamining Transvestism."

[62] Plutarch, *Theseus*, 23.2; William S. Ferguson, "The Salaminoi of Heptaphylai and Sounion," *Hesperia* 7, no. 1 (1938): 1-74; Ian Rutherford, "The Race in the Athenian Oschophoria and an Oscphophoricon in Pindar," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 72 (1988): 43-51; Noel Robertson, *Festivals and Legends: The Formation of Greek Cities in the Light of Public Ritual* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); and Eric Csapo, "Riding the Phallus for Dionysus: Iconography, Ritual, and Gender-Role De/Construction," *Phoenix* 51, no. 3-4 (Autumn-Winter 1997): 253-95.

[63] The *pentaploa* (ἡ πενταπλόα [κύλιξ]): Philochorus (third-century BCE historian), 43; Aristodemus (first-century BCE historian) *apud* Athenaeus, 11.495ff. The ingredients of the drink were wine, honey, grated cheese, barley flour, and olive oil.

entourage of lascivious, ithyphallic creatures, zoomorphic anthropomorphisms as goat-like satyrs and equine sileni and centaurs. By the Roman period in Grecian southern Italy, the bacchanalian rite had expanded to include men and promiscuous sexual intercourse of both genders and actual ritualized murders, making physical what had earlier been spiritual metaphor.[64]

The Rural Dionysia included a parade of male phallus bearers (*phallophori*, φαλλοφόροι) and young girl basket bearers (*kanēphori,* κανηφόροι), representing the vaginal recipient of the penis, as well as others bearing phallic-obelisk loaves of bread (*obeliaphoroi*, ὀβελιαφόροι), kneading troughs for the bread loaves (*skaphēphori*, σκαφηφόροι), jugs of water (*hydriaphoroi*, ὑδριαφόροι), and wineskins (*askophoi*, ἀσκοφόροι). The combination of phallic loaves and kneading troughs, apart from the obvious ribald obscenities, associated human sexuality with Dionysus and Demeter and the basic two foods of humankind, the liquid and the dry. Aristophanes's *Acharians* comedy (425 BCE) presents a private celebration of the Rural Dionysia and ends with the Anthesteria.[65]

Such were some of the Dionysian rituals of indoctrination to which Plato's parents would inevitably have subjected their young son. Something beyond that must have motivated him to embark upon a career in the theater. His writings show him conversant in the language of the Mysteries,[66] and he frequently references the ecstatic, frenzied enthusiasm of the Corybants[67] and the bacchants.[68] There is little doubt that Plato writes of these ecstatic initiations from personal experience. In particular, Alcibiades in the *Symposium* likens Socrates as a captivating inspiration to the sileni, the Dionysian ecstatic possessing hircine/equine materializations of the wilderness revelry, and to Marsyas, the satyr flautist who composed the divine captivating Olympian music that "intoxicates and makes manifest whoever needs initiation into the mysteries of the gods" (κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους).[69]

Various referents have been proposed as the genesis for Plato's allegory of the cave in the *Republic* (514a-519a), from Megarian puppetry[70] or the Syracusan λατομία stone quarries[71] or the Orphics and the grotto of Empedocles[72] or the Dionysian Corycian Cave

[64] Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus (186 BCE).

[65] Martha Habash, "Two Complementary Festivals in Aristophanes' Acharnians," *The American Journal of Philology* 116, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 559-77.

[66] Bianca M. Dinkelaar, "Plato and the Language of the Mysteries," *Mnemosyne* 73, no. 1 (2020): 36-62.

[67] Crito, Ion, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Symposium, Laws; see I. M. Linforth, "The Corybantic Rites in Plato," *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 13, no. 5 (1946): 121-62; and Ellisif Wasmuth, "ΩΣΠΕΡ ΟΙ ΚΟΡΥΒΑΝΤΕΣ: The Corybantic Rites in Plato's Dialogues," *The Classical Quarterly* 65, no. 1, new series (May 2015): 69-84.

[68] John Anton, "Some Dionysian References in the Platonic Dialogues," *The Classical Journal* 58, no. 2 (November 1962): 49-55.

[69] Plato, *Symposium*, 215a4-222b7; David Sansone, "Socrates, Satyrs, and Satyr-Play in Plato's *Symposium*," *Illinois Classical Studies* 43, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 58-87.

[70] Asli Gocer, "The Puppet Theater in Plato's Parable of the Cave," *The Classical Journal* 95, no. 2 (December 1999-January 2000): 119-29.

[71] Ingrid D. Rowland, *The Divine Spark of Syracuse* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2019).

[72] Plotinus, *Ennead*, 4.8.1; Porphyry, *De antro nympharum*, 8.

at Vari above Delphi[73] to the cavernous Telesterion initiation hall of Eleusis.[74] All of these would have been familiar to Plato. It is unlikely also that he was unaware of the cave on the island of Salamis where Euripides was reported to have made his dramas.[75] This cave was well known to the people of Athens. In the lost other version of Aristophanes's *Thesmophoriazusae*,[76] perhaps produced at the Lenaean festival of 423 or earlier,[77] the women celebrating the Thesmophoria seek out Euripides in his cave to murder him, but the Muses save him. As a fellow dramatist and perhaps personal acquaintance, the notorious Salaminian cave could not but have attracted his interest. What did Euripides do in his cave with the Muses, who are obviously entities materialized from an alternative dimension of reality?

The Roman antiquarian Aulus Gellius visited the cave in the second century CE, motivated by the biography of Euripides that the Athenian historian Philochorus, a man of the priestly class who was also a seer and shaman, had written nearly a century after the tragedian's death.[78] The cave also features in an account of the tragedian's second-century BCE biographer Satyrus of Callatis.[79] The site became a destination for literary pilgrimage. A ceramic sherd of a classical age skyphos bearing the partial remains of the tragedian's name is probably a costly antique vessel that a tourist dedicated at the site, evidence of a probable early cultic sanctuary for hero worship of the tragedian. In the words of Gellius, the cave was a "foul and horrible place" (*spelunca taetra et horrida*),[80] as indeed it is.[81] Nor is it convenient, requiring a strenuous ascent up the mountainside. The cave is narrow of access, extending approximately forty-seven meters deep, damp and gloomy, requiring torchlight illumination, with a labyrinthine series of ten low-roofed chambers and a system of narrow corridors, niches, lofts, and many stalagmites and isolated stone columns, in use as a sanctuary since Neolithic times, with remains of hundreds of clay vessels and a half complete figurine of a Cycladic-style phallic-necked female in white marble (ca. 6000 BCE), testifying to its earlier sanctity for the Minoan goddess. Euripides was reported to house his extensive library here. The cave is totally unsuited for the preservation of manuscripts, one of which he was supposed to have lent to Socrates, and even more impossible as a place for his supposed dramatic writing. Here, however, the great tragedian did consort with the muses, as was the contemporary testimony, probably in

[73] John Henry Wright, "The Origin of Plato's Cave," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 17 (1906): 131-42.

[74] William H. Desmonde, "The Ritual Origin of Plato's Dialogues: A Study of Argumentation and Conversation among Intellectuals," *American Imago* 17, no. 4 (Winter 1960): 389-406.

[75] Carl A. P. Ruck, "The Cave of Euripides," *Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness, and Culture* 8, no. 3 (2015): 279-302.

[76] That there were two versions of the comedy is indicated by the scholiast comment to verse 298 that refers to the "other *Thesmophoriazusae*."

[77] James Butrica, "The Lost 'Thesmophoriazuae' of Aristophanes," *Phoenix* 55, no, 1-2 (Spring 2001): 44-76. The early date is based on frag. 348 (mention of Aristophanes's older contemporary Krates); frag. 347-48 (cretic-paeonic metrics characteristic of early Aristophanes); and the scholiast to *Wasps,* verse 61 (produced in 422), which assumes that Aristophanes has already produced a *Thesmophoriazusae*. The extant *Thesmophoriazusae* is dated to 411.

[78] Philochorus, *FGH* 328 F 219 (Jacoby).

[79] Satyrus (second century BCE), frag. 39.

[80] Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 15.205.

[81] Ruck, "The Cave of Euripides."

rituals appropriate to the neolithic antiquity of the sanctuary, probably not alone, however, but with his lead actors and troupe of dancers in a Dionysian mystery, a bacchanalia perverted on the comic stage as rumors of decades-long ecstatic wife swapping.

Similar rites are attested for the sixth-century Pythagoras, who was said to have lived in a cave on the volcanic island of Samos, where he discovered the musical octave that forms the basic structure of the cosmos while listening to the pounding of the subterranean blacksmith who worked the fiery forge of alchemical transmutation at the core of the mountain. Implausibly, he was said to have conducted classes in his cave. Parmenides, who is an interlocutor in Plato's *Parmenides*, was a member of the religious brotherhood that espoused a system of esoteric and metaphysical beliefs known as Pythagoreanism, reportedly descended into caves on shamanic vision quests.[82] The fifth-century Empedocles of Agrigentum (in Sicily) was also counted a Pythagorean and was said to have drunk a potion of life from the volcanic caldera. He ended his corporeal existence by jumping into the fiery core of Mount Etna, and in proof of his immortality, the mountain coughed up the brazen sandal he had worn as priest of Apollo. Euripides's cave belongs to this tradition of ecstatic communion with spiritual entities in a Dionysian mystery rite that was considered the motivating agency for his work as a tragedian. Euripides did not write his tragedies in his cave.

It is probably no simple coincidence that the *cava* (seating area) of the Theater of Dionysus on the southeastern slope of the Athenian Acropolis spreads like a funnel fanning out from the mouth of a cave at the base of the rock cliff so that the events enacted in the theater below are like ghostly materializations of visionary experience emanating from the cave. The sanctity of the cave passed on to the Christian Virgin, whose Byzantine chapel inside bears the epithet of the All-Holy Lady of the Golden Cave (*Panaghia Chrysospeliotissa*), distinct from the church of the same name in the center of the city. Lord Elgin removed a Hellenistic marble statue of the seated Dionysus from the site in 1802 as part of the Elgin Marbles now in the British Museum.[83] The Christian chapel has obliterated all evidence of its earlier sanctity, but it probably was once sacred to the most ancient goddess of the city. The golden metaphor of the Holy Lady refers to the metaphysical golden radiance within the cave and to the waters of its sacred fountain. Another fountain flows on the slope beneath the cave. The tragedian Sophocles was a priest of the healing deity Asclepius, and he tended the sacred giant serpent in his private house until a suitable shrine could be erected to lodge it at the spring. The mouth of the cave was closed as a temple façade with triple pilasters. In the fourth century, Thrasyllos of Deceleia erected a pillar with bronze tripod above the mouth of the cave to commemorate his victory as trainer of the chorus for one of the performances. His son, of the same name, added a tripod in 269 to commemorate his own victory in a musical competition. Niches in the rock indicate that this was the most popular place to display theatrical trophies, probably as much to do with the symbolism of the cave as the origin of the dramas enacted below, more than with its mere proximity to the theater.

[82] Peter Kingsley, *In the Dark Places of Wisdom* (Inverness, CA: Golden Sufi Center, 1999).
[83] Seated Dionysus from the Choregic Monument of Thrasyllos, ca. 270 BCE, BM 432.

Plato did not really renounce a career as a dramatist, nor probably its deity Dionysus,[84] only the venue of the theater and its emotively manipulated attendance. The dialogue as a genre is Plato's unique innovation,[85] and his writings are still grouped as trilogies or tetralogies,[86] like the productions for the theater, nor does he pretend that what he has written expresses the true message, which itself remains inexpressible, apprehensible only as a vision beyond words.[87] The ostensible subject of the *Symposium* is the nature of love, and although the participants have determined to drink only lightly in view of their drunkenness from the previous day, the guests, after the disruption caused by the arrival of Alcibiades, drink themselves into a drunken slumber from which the narrator awakens at dawn to discover that only three have continued the conversation throughout the night – Socrates with the tragedian Agathon and the comedian Aristophanes, still drinking heavily – on the subject that Socrates claimed the same inspiring force produces both tragedy and comedy.[88] That would indeed be an intriguing discourse, but we don't need to hear it since the answer is clearly implied. Alcibiades had compared Socrates to a seductive Dionysian satyr, and the answer is affirmative – Plato as comedic tragedian, inspired by the comically grotesque philosopher.[89]

[84] Kenneth R. Seeskin, "Platonism, Mysticism, and Madness," *The Monist* 59, no. 4, The Philosophy of Mysticism (October 1976): 574-86.

[85] A. B. Mathur, "The Dialogues of Plato," *The Indiana Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July-September 1987): 400-17.

[86] Thrasyllus of Alexandria (end of first century BCE to beginning of first century CE); see R. G. Hoerber, "Thrasylus's Platonic Canon and the Double Titles," *Phronesis* 2, no. 1 (1957): 10-20.

[87] Plato, *Seventh Epistle*, 341c: "There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled."

[88] Plato, *Symposium*, 223d: "He said that Socrates was driving them to the admission that the same man could have the knowledge required for writing comedy and tragedy – that the fully skilled tragedian could be a comedian as well."

[89] Diskin Clay, "The Tragic and Comic Poet of the Symposium," *Arion* 2, no. 2, new series (1975): 238-61.

Mark Shiffman

METAMORPHOSES OF POLITICAL *THUMOS*[*]

I. RECOVERING THUMOTIC PSYCHOLOGY

In his 1992 book *The End of History and the Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama brought the Platonic psychology of *thumos* (spiritedness) back into the wider discourse of political theory. Observing that liberal theory tends to reduce human agency to a combination of calculation and appetites ("rational choice"), he sought to restore awareness of this third part of the soul that cares for dignity and recognition, even to the point of risking death. It is precisely on the strength of this revival and its deployment that Peter Sloterdijk asserts, plausibly, that "Fukuyama's work presents the most thought-through system of analysis of the post-communist world situation up until the present day – and the same can be said about its relationship to political anthropology," in which Fukuyama accomplishes a "recovery of an authentic political psychology."[1]

Even "the most thought-through system of analysis" may, however, require more thinking through in order to be adequate to its task. Plato's elaboration of thumotic psychology has more to offer than Fukuyama draws from it, not least for the question central to Fukuyama's project (and increasingly urgent three decades later): the question of the fate of liberalism. Even after Fukuyama, our political anthropology still remains far from adequate to this task, in part because Fukuyama's reappropriation of Plato is limited by his reliance on the Hegelianism of Alexandre Kojève. At the heart of Kojève's political anthropology is his understanding of the desire for recognition as the engine driving human history, and Fukuyama uses the Platonic term "thymos" as merely another name for this desire.[2] Plato himself provides a far richer account of the phenomena embraced by the term.

A more adequate phenomenology of thumos promises much more, however, than amplification and refinement of the contributions of Fukuyama and Kojève, as valuable as that would already be. It also promises to enrich the thought of two other authors who

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[1] Peter Sloterdijk, *Rage and Time* (New York: Columbia University Press), 36-38.

[2] Fukuyama follows British convention in rendering the Greek letter upsilon with the English letter "y" yielding "thymos" as a transliteration. As an American and a classicist, I favor the closer phonetic equivalent "thumos."

powerfully illuminate our times, René Girard and Pierre Manent. Both are embedded in the postwar world of French philosophy for which Kojève is a principal orienting point, and both offer correctives to Kojève's thought. Like Kojève, Girard sees violent conflict rooted in rivalry as the beginning of human history and the fundamental source of social order, but he attempts to provide a better account of the mimetic or imitative desire at the root of rivalry. Manent, like Kojève, seeks to offer an interpretation of the meaning of the modern liberal state; but his political phenomenology, rather than focusing on recognition, seeks to recover a proper understanding of the human capacity for action as the key feature of the political condition and of its intelligibility.[3] A proper account of thumos is indispensable for understanding not only the desire for recognition but also the place of violence and rivalry in human psychology, as well as the nature of action as such.

A central question for all of these authors is the anthropological question: What makes us distinctively human? For Kojève and Girard, this is the question of "hominization" or "anthropogenesis" – a question of the origin of our humanity. Fukuyama cites Kojève on this point:

> All human, anthropogenetic desire – the desire that generates self-consciousness, the human reality – is, finally, a function of the desire for "recognition." [...] Therefore, to speak of the "origin" of self-consciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight to the death for "recognition."[4]

Fukuyama then goes on to offer several reformulations of this idea:

> Not only is man not determined by his physical or animal nature, but his very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate that animal nature. [...] The reason that I fight is to get another human being to recognize the fact that I am willing to risk my life, and that I am therefore free and authentically human [...]. Only man is capable of engaging in a bloody battle for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he has contempt for his own life, that he is something more than a complicated machine or a "slave to his passions," in short, that he has a specifically human dignity because he is free.[5]

As the orienting quote from Kojève indicates, what is at stake is *self-consciousness*, specifically having my consciousness that I am stronger than my animal nature confirmed by the recognition that I compel another consciousness to give me. All that is human

[3] I use "political phenomenology" here as a rough indication of the attempt, exemplified by Manent, to attend to political phenomena on their own terms and to draw out their intelligibility or perplexities in critical conversation with other sources of insight into their coherence, and especially with the most influential and illuminating political philosophers. In different ways both Tocqueville and Strauss are political phenemonologists (Strauss in a stricter and more deliberate sense, as a student of Husserl and Heidegger), both of whom serve as guiding lights for Manent.

[4] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 143

[5] Ibid., 150-51

unfolds from the original violent confrontation that seeks to establish this relationship between the one who risks his life and the one who submits in order to preserve it – the Master and the Slave.

> But while this struggle for recognition is the first authentically human act, it is far from the last. The bloody battle between Hegel's "first men" is only the beginning point of the Hegelian dialectic, and leaves us still a very long way from modern liberal democracy. The problem of human history can be seen, in a certain sense, as the search for a way to satisfy the desire of *both* masters and slaves for recognition on a mutual and equal basis; history ends with the victory of a social order that accomplishes this goal.[6]

The violence that initiates our humanity thus sets it on a historical course that is only resolved when this human desire for recognition is satisfied reciprocally and universally.

The Girardian narrative has the same starting point and a similar shape. "As Kojève explains, only a man can desire 'an object perfectly useless from the biological point of view (such as a medal, or the enemy's flag)'; he desires such objects not for themselves but *because they are desired by other human beings*."[7] Already for Kojève, then, the desire that motivates violence is mimetic desire. But in his account the awakening of the desire for recognition occurs first in the bloody battle – motivated by a desire whose object is the other's desire rather than some third thing – while the mimetic desire for objects that signify victory in such a battle is a derivative phenomenon. Girard reverses the causal direction: It is because we are mimetic, prone to imitate others, that an object of another's desire becomes an object of mine at the same time. Only thence do rivalry, conflict, and violence arise.[8]

The disagreement between Girard and Kojève on this point can be reframed as a disagreement on the naturalness of thumos. For Kojève, thumos, which negates and overcomes nature, is in a sense the nature that is distinctly or essentially human. This thumotic nature thus finds fulfillment through a combination of the originally violent struggle for recognition and the grand (and metaphysically violent) project of overcoming and negating nature-as-given in technocratic mastery via both natural and social sciences. Hence violence is the child of thumos. For Girard, thumotic phenomena are accidents of human sociality, which spurs the development of our mimetic capacity while at the same time giving it greater occasion to operate and to become contagious to the point of indiscriminate conflict and violence, threatening the destruction of the community that generates it. Hence thumos is the child of violence because violence is the child of mimesis, which only becomes thumotic under the influence of structural changes.

For Kojève, self-consciousness seeking to satisfy itself generates the human social world.[9] For Girard, primitive sociality generates (spontaneously and physiologically, we

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[6] Ibid., 152

[7] Ibid., 147 (emphasis added).

[8] Girard discusses these similarities and differences with Kojève in *Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre*, trans. Mary Baker (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 30-31.

[9] Girard will call this a "romantic" notion of desire.

might say) a violence out of mimetic desire that finds its path back to social harmony by polarizing unanimously around a scapegoat. The rituals that reproduce this serendipitous solution are the origin of the symbolic order and are thus productive of distinctly human consciousness and culture.[10] Kojève sees a certain mathematical progression by which history begins with recognition for the few and, after meeting the demand of the revolutionary many, finally extends recognition to all; desire is thus satisfied socially. For Girard, once Christianity has exposed the lie of scapegoating violence for what it is and drained religious ritual of its harmonizing power, history has no plan for putting the thumos-genie back in the bottle because desire has no natural satisfaction. One way or the other, the account of the origin of the human – hominization or anthropogenesis – shapes our hope or fear about the human future.

Manent approaches the anthropological problem differently, in the spirit of Aristotle's dictum that the human being is by nature an animal suited for the city. In other words, something decisive in our becoming human occurs within the context of the classical polis. Girardians, if they ever address the political directly, tend to treat it as secondary to the social and cultural. Manent directly challenges this tendency when he attempts to articulate what is distinctive about the human being as citizen:

> Humans have always acted in some fashion, but they have not always known that they were capable of acting [...]. In the beginning people gather, fish, hunt, even make war, [...] but they act as little as possible. They leave the greatest room for the gods, and they hamper themselves as much as possible by all sorts of prohibitions, rites, and sacred constraints [...]. The city is that ordering of the human world that makes action possible and meaningful [...] the first complete implementation of human action [...]. It is in the city that people discover that they can govern themselves and that they learn to do so. They discover and learn politics, which is the great domain of action.[11]

The newly discovered capacity for action elevates the human being beyond the imperium of ritual and instinctual activity that characterizes archaic or primitive society.

Girard seems to operate entirely within a distinction between highly ritualized "primitive and traditional societies" and "what we see around us now [...] modern society."[12] The polis would appear to be a missing link in this narrative. We might call the challenge Manent's investigation poses "the problem of politicization," the making of the *politēs* or citizen. The conflict over the priority between these two problems for understanding our modern condition stretches back to Manent's critical 1974 review of *Violence and*

[10] It may be worth noting that behavioral biology cannot resolve this disagreement. Mimesis and rivalry occur in animals, and so the Girardian can conclude that naturally humans differ only in degree, but when they reach a tipping point of social and brain development, it generates the crises that ultimately lead to hominization. The Kojèvian can point out that primate instincts maintain their dominance fights within nonlethal limits, and only humans push beyond those limits to risk their lives and become self-conscious as free from nature's dominion.

[11] Pierre Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 3-4.

[12] René Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 92.

the Sacred in *Contrepoint*. In a recent interview, he states his criticism succinctly: "In Girard there is a certain systematic incapacity – an incapacity rooted in his system – to understand political situations, because political situations are always to some degree conflictual."[13] The competing goods to which the parties are committed matter at least as much as the fact and dynamics of the conflict. Thumos in the service of an agenda is not merely a given of any proper political phenomenology but also a necessary lens through which to make political phenomena visible.[14] Tocqueville described the task of the political phenomenologist as seeing not differently than the parties but farther.

According to Manent, this capacity for action makes an essential contribution to self-consciousness as well:

> It is the distance between his empirical, real being, and the end he pursues – justice, wisdom, truth – a distance that is recognized so as to be eliminated, and yet always invincibly maintained by reason of the "sinful" or simply "intermediary" character of man, that opens a space where he can reflect on himself and recognize himself as man.[15]

Recognition of this distance, and thus also opening of the intermediate space in which genuine human self-consciousness dwells, comes from the act of deliberation, in which the distinctions between ends, means, desire, reasons, choice, capacity, virtues, and deficiencies become explicit. They come to light as considerations that depend on me and that could also be otherwise than they are. It is thus the self-consciousness of the open-ended capacity for action and the necessity for deliberation – brought to light in the polis – that opens up the full prospect of what it is to be human. If we recognize the role of thumos in this process, we can see it as necessarily end-oriented and inherently governed by considerations of the good and thus involving a positive self-transcendence rather than the purely negative transcendence to which Kojève and Fukuyama limit its operation.

Our assessment, then, of Fukuyama's recovery of Platonic psychology and its adequacy to the needs of political anthropology and psychology bears upon multiple themes and questions in the mostly implicit three-way conversation among Kojève, Girard, and Manent. These include hominization and politicization; violence and rivalry; recognition, action, and self-consciousness; the negative character of thumos and its orientation to the good; and in general, how coincident a phenomenology of thumos would be with (or how distinguishable from) a thoroughly articulated political phenomenology, as well as what these might contribute to our reflections on the prospects of liberalism. The scope of the present essay will be far from sufficient to unfold these themes fully, much less to answer

[13] Pierre Manent, *Seeing Things Politically*, trans. Ralph C. Hancock (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2015), 73.

[14] A caveat is necessary at this point to save myself innumerable caveats and hedges in what follows. While Manent acknowledges thumos as a psychological principle, he almost never incorporates it thematically into his analyses. He almost always relies on Aristotle rather than Plato to articulate the political experience of the Greek polis. I proceed to explicate his thought as if the thumotic thread were integrally woven into his analyses, though in fact I am performing this operation myself. To maintain the distinction punctiliously would make this exposition far more complicated than it already is.

[15] Pierre Manent, *The City of Man*, trans. Marc A. LePain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 136.

the many questions they involve. My hope here is to provide promising outlines of the beginning of such an undertaking.

II. PLATO ON THE "THUMOTIC NATURE"

If we wish to recover the full range and depth of thumos as Plato understood it, we cannot do better than to follow how the phenomenon comes to light in the course of his great political dialogue *The Republic*.

In his attempt to consider how the polis comes into being starting from basic human requirements, Socrates first sketches a modest village in which bodily needs are met in peaceful coexistence through rudimentary division of labor. The passage to the polis at first glance involves only an economic change to this economic system: further complexity and productivity is necessary to supply unnecessary desires with luxury goods. This development is accompanied, however, by the emergence of a group animated by motives other than economic ones: the soldiery needed to defend this excess wealth and control the territorial resources required for producing it. In considering what kind of nature (φύσις) these warriors will need, Socrates proposes that, if they are to be courageous, they must be spirited: "Haven't you noticed how irresistible and unbeatable spirit is, so that its presence makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything?"[16]

The word for "spirited" is θυμοειδής, "thumiform" or "the thumotic type." With respect to our twofold theme of hominization and politicization, this first appearance of thumos is ambiguous. On the one hand, it only shows itself as a notable character trait in the context of the passage from village to polis. On the other hand, the examples Socrates provides of this trait are animals: "[W]ill horse or dog – or any other animal whatsoever – be willing to be courageous if it's not spirited?"[17] Thumos is natural in a twofold and ambiguous sense: some people are just more that type than others, but the same is true of animals. But it is also distinctly political in that this human character difference comes to light more distinctly in the polis.

Once the polis has enabled thumos to manifest itself, it poses a threat to the community: "[W]ith such natures, how will they not be savage to one another and the rest of the citizens?"[18] Note that in this formulation, all are citizens, but at the same time those with thumotic natures and those without constitute different categories as targets of savagery. While the distinction between the two types may well remind us of Kojève's masters and slaves, Manent's reflections on the origins of the city shed more light on the relationship between the two groups as different types of *citizen*. Manent implicitly shifts the distinction Kojève makes from the register of recognized self-consciousness to the register of political phenomenology. In properly political terms, Manent suggests, the distinction Kojève points to reflects that between heroes and people: "The quarrel of people and heroes is coextensive with our history, even if they are at times hard to recognize beneath their metamorphoses. Their polarity remains active even in the low tides of history seemingly peopled only with satisfied men."[19]

[16] Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 52 (375b).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City*, 51.

This last phrase seems formulated with Kojève in mind: the satisfied men of egalitarian liberalism represent not the end of history but one of its low tides. They present themselves (especially to themselves) under the aspect of "universal humanity," but the heroic or thumotic pole remains present and half-visible "in the chronic dissatisfaction of democratic societies, in the muted and ongoing revolt against the tedium of bourgeois peace."[20]

The distinctive significance of this citizen-relationship between heroes and people gains clarity from a comparison between Sparta and Athens. Every Spartan citizen is required to live in the heroic mold, while the "people" are a subjected and enserfed population ("helots"). Manent reverses the judgement of Rousseau, for whom the Spartan is the citizen par excellence. The Spartan city is, on the contrary, the minimally politicized city. It retains the threefold warfare that characterizes the "heroic republic" of the Homeric band of warriors: warfare with other bodies of warriors (foreign), with the subjugated people (domestic), and with one another for honor (rivalry). Manent remarks, "It could be said that our political history consists for the most part of the successive, though imperfect, pacification of the three kinds of war."[21] The monarchies and the modern state pacify the quarrelsome aristocrats, liberal economic policy's "rising tide" mutes class conflict, and globalizing institutions aspire to quell international war.

We can see this threefold warfare reflected in Socrates's constitution of the warrior class for deployment against foreigners and his concern that they will fight both each other and the nonwarriors. His description of the two groups as fellow citizens, on the other hand, suggests the dynamic Manent observes in Athens, which "brought the politicization of the polis to its highest degree of actualization."[22] This involves something quite different from the Kojèvian master-slave relationship still operative in Sparta:

> Warfare between heroes and people gives way to people's participation in the heroic life. [...] Aristotle shows us the transformation of the war between two groups who have *nothing in common* but their mutual hatred into the conflicting confrontation of their respective claims to govern *the* city – the same city that they now share. [...] The true city comes into being, or rather strives to exist, through the effort of the many to have a share in the life of the few. [...] The good city educates the people who are capable of sharing in the life of the city.[23]

As Manent goes on to explain, the confrontation of claims to govern requires from both groups a self-decentering, an entry into the common space where reasons are given, and this deliberative rationality provides action with its largest horizon of possibilities. Because the city exists as a common thing and a site of shared deliberation, practical reason

[20] Ibid., 50.
[21] Ibid., 54.
[22] Ibid., 53
[23] Ibid., 52, 98, 99 (emphasis in original).

becomes a revelatory and defining feature of fully developed humanity. Only a political anthropology can be an adequate anthropology.[24]

The remedy Socrates proposes to this danger presented by the savage tendencies of thumotic natures lies somewhere between the Athenian and the Spartan alternatives.[25] Socrates does not eliminate the distinction between the warriors and the people (the productive class) by turning the people into citizens sharing in governance, but he does eliminate the warfare between them by civilizing the souls of the warriors through education and formation (παιδεία). As in Sparta, the thumotic nature will acquire discipline and firmness through exertion in physical training, but it will also acquire grace, measure, and appreciation for rational order through music (including poetry and the other arts). Exclusively physical training on its own is bad education because it produces precisely the harshness and proneness to violence Socrates is concerned to prevent.

But the problem Manent notes of discontented democratic man also becomes evident when Socrates considers the ill effects of one-sidedly musical education. If a man who has a spirited soul "spends his whole life humming and exulting in song," then "the spirit is weakened and made temperamental, quickly inflamed by little things and quickly extinguished. Thus these men have become quick-tempered and irritable from having been spirited, and they are filled with discontent."[26] Through the prism of these two unbalanced thumotic educations, we might glimpse Red America's football culture and militias and Blue America's hypersensitive politically correct culture snobs and *New York Times* readers (or, in fact, anyone who spends too much time in front of a screen being entertained).

This attentiveness to thumotic "types" and their integration into the city may be characterized as an exercise of political phenomenology. As he turns to a more psychological consideration, Socrates states what seems to be a presupposition of this phenomenology:

> Isn't it quite necessary for us to agree that the very same forms and dispositions as are in the city are in each of us? [...] Surely they didn't get there from any other place. It would be ridiculous if someone should think that the spiritedness didn't come into the cities from those private [or individual: ἰδιωτῶν] men who are just the ones imputed with having this character.[27]

[24] On this topic, it is worth at least noting that the distinction between those with and those without thumotic natures – and the question of the political metamorphoses of these types and their relationships – considerably complicates the Girardian notion of the contagion of violence, which treats human beings as undifferentiated. This homogeneity might sufficiently describe prepolitical human social existence, and it might be at least superficially plausible in modern egalitarian societies adhering to the ideal and self-image of undifferentiated humanity, but Manent's analysis raises questions about its applicability in a properly political context.

[25] "Savage" here translates ἄγριος, which literally means field-dwelling or wild and thus implies a contrast to the city and its formative influence. It is the city that especially brings into view the "natural" in its sense of the uncultivated. I would suggest that this is due to the new capacity for action and choice inseparable from the liberation of thumos to express itself; without thumos, there is no true action or choice. This liberation of thumos makes cultivation (civilization) necessary, especially in the form of laws.

[26] Plato, *Republic*, 411b-c.

[27] Ibid., 435e.

The fact that some are more thumotic types than others is something we observe in the political phenomena and take as a given. This is clearly the case for Kojève in the original anthropogenetic differentiation of master and slave, but the end of history coincides with the elimination of the distinction of these two types in liberalism's universal mutual recognition. Manent, as we have seen, also assumes the distinction but does not think the polarity of heroes and people will ever be entirely eliminated. It seems that Girard, on the other hand, would reject the naturalness of the distinction. This rejection goes hand in hand with the constriction of his investigations within a hermeneutics of culture, and it raises the question whether his insights can be integrated into a political phenomenology or (as Manent seems to suggest) are intrinsically incompatible with this mode of analysis. We will return to the question of integrating Girard's contribution at the end of our reflections. For now, let us consider Plato's political psychology and the light it sheds on the divergences between Fukuyama-Kojève and Manent.

III. PLATO AND FUKUYAMA

It is precisely at the transitional point in the *Republic* from political phenomenology to psychology that Fukuyama begins his account of Platonic thumos. He remarks, "In his first approach to the problem, Socrates describes *thymos* from the outside: we only know that it is associated with courage – that is, the willingness to risk one's life – and with the emotion of anger or indignation on behalf of one's own."[28] If Fukuyama's claim that "we only know" these two aspects has merely the restricted meaning of "by contrast with what the psychology will go on to reveal," then it might be justifiable; but our previous cursory examination has shown that we "know" considerably more, for example, that the human being shares thumotic characteristics with animals. (This latter point presents some potential difficulty for Fukuyama's later claim that "Plato's *thymos* is therefore *nothing other than* the psychological seat of Hegel's [anthropogenetic] desire for recognition.")[29]

More significant, however, is the pair of characteristics to which Fukuyama reduces the results of the "external" view of thumos. By specifying that courage is "the willingness to risk one's life," Fukuyama evokes Kojève's account of the freedom of rising above our natural instinct for self-preservation and risking death for the sake of recognition. By specifying that anger is "on behalf of one's own," he echoes the main emphasis of the commentary on the dialogue by his teacher Allan Bloom, himself elaborating on the Straussian theme of "love of one's own."[30] Fukuyama provides a striking formulation of how he understands the connection between the two. After listing what he takes to be a series of more or less equivalent terms, from Plato's thumos to Hegel's desire for recognition (and, noteworthily, including Rousseau's amour propre, love of oneself/one's

[28] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 163

[29] Ibid., 165 (emphasis added).

[30] Consider especially Bloom: "Spiritedness first appeared in the city as the means to protect its stolen acquisitions. And this is a key to the nature of spiritedness: it is very much connected with the defense of one's own. [...] The tendency of anger is to give the color of reason and morality to selfishness" (Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," in *The Republic of Plato*, 355).

own),[31] he remarks, "All of these terms refer to that part of man which feels the need to place *value* on things – himself in the first instance, but on the people, actions, or things around him as well."[32]

I place a value on myself and subsequently on other things that count as "my own" or extensions of myself insofar as they are associated with my self-valuing. I want the Other to confirm the value I have conferred on myself and my own, and I respond with anger if he seems to disrespect me by treating any of this as if it has lesser or no value. Anger leads to violence, which I am sure to insist is just punishment. These are all phenomena we can observe in ourselves and others. Psychological analysis will help us to see connections between these and other phenomena, as well as providing insight into causal relations and the transformations in our thumotic profiles and expressions brought about under different political orders. Let us consider first what insights the Platonic text yields and then what Fukuyama makes of it.

As Fukuyama rightly notes, the challenge Socrates faces at this point is to determine whether thumotic phenomena spring from a distinct and differently motivated source within the soul or whether they arise from some interplay of the more obvious motives of our appetites and rational calculation. There is a natural tendency to think of the desire to be recognized or to hurt another as instances of a more general category of desiring, like hunger or thirst. To get at the distinctiveness of thumos, Socrates tells the story of the Athenian Leontius, who tried to resist the urge to look at the corpses of recently slain men as he was walking past the place of public execution. When he ultimately gives in, he berates his own wide-open eyes as he runs toward the corpses: "Look, you damned wretches, take your fill of the fair sight." Socrates highlights the implication that "anger sometimes makes war against the desires [ἐπιθυμίαι] as one thing against something else."[33]

Socrates here points to anger (ὀργή) as a thumotic phenomenon and distinguishes it from appetite (ἐπιθυμία) as he had proposed (and indeed he had used the verb ἐπιθυμοῖ when saying Leontius desired to look at the corpses). If, as Socrates suggests, the appetites are those desires ordered primarily toward comfortable self-preservation, it is not clear (and a matter of much controversy) how we are to understand what exactly the appetite in question would be in this story. However interesting that question may be, let us stick to what Socrates does indicate with some clarity. Leontius is angry because he tried to resist this urge and failed. He is angry at himself, though he speaks to his own eyes as if they were somehow other than himself: he calls them "damned wretches" (κακοδαιμονίες, literally evil-spirited or possessed) and sarcastically bids them enjoy the "fair" (κᾶλον, beautiful or noble) sight. Leontius has failed to act with self-command, failed to act with unity or integrity, and failed to act as someone committed to the truly noble would act.[34]

[31] Noteworthy as well is the failure to include the Latin scholastic equivalent of thumos, the irascible. Like Bloom, Fukuyama seems entirely unacquainted with this tradition, which arguably offers the richest articulation of the phenomenon.

[32] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 162-63. This is a particularly Nietzschean formulation.

[33] Plato, *Republic*, 440a.

[34] It is noteworthy as well that anger seeks blame, and Leontius both directs that blame at himself but also treats a part of himself as alien and a target for that blame. This is suggestive of the attraction to Manichaeism that

The warrior-hero dramatically exhibits the two most vivid manifestations of thumos: anger at another that motivates violence, and the courage that overcomes pain, fear, and the desire for self-preservation in the exercise of violence. In the story of Leontius, however, anger is directed at oneself and reveals something of the inner conflict that is implicit in self-command, which becomes more visible in the failure of self-command. Not only is this a movement into the interior of the soul and its workings, but it is moreover a movement that helps us to see (recalling Manent) how the soul of the warrior is related to the soul of the law-abiding citizen.[35] The entire disagreement between Manent and Fukuyama-Kojève regarding the political significance of thumos and the meaning of the modern liberal state is concentrated in the question of how we understand this relationship between heroic thumos and citizen thumos.

For Kojève, the desire for recognition is the anthropogenetic desire of the proto-aristocrat to have his sense of freedom from his animal appetites not only demonstrated in violent action but also verified by another consciousness. Fukuyama describes thumotic activity as a "process of valuation and self-valuation."[36] Its many manifestations trace back to this root of self-consciousness seeking validation.

> *Thymos* emerges in the *Republic* as being somehow related to the value one sets on oneself, what we today might call "self-esteem." Leontius believed himself to be the type of individual who could comport himself with a certain dignity and self-restraint, and when he failed to live up to his own sense of self-esteem, he grew angry with himself. Socrates suggests a relationship between anger and "self-esteem" by explaining that the nobler a man is – that is, the more highly he evaluates his own worth [meaning, for Kojève, the more ready he is to throw away his life to prove his worth] – the more angry he will become when he has been dealt with unjustly [...]. Anger [...] is not a desire for any material object outside the self; if we can speak of it at all as a desire, it is a *desire for a desire*, that is, a desire that that person who evaluated us too low should change his opinion and recognize us according to our own estimate of our worth.[37]

While Fukuyama acknowledges the possibility of a self-esteem not dependent upon others, he suggests (and Kojève's anthropology requires) that this phenomenon must be understood as derivative from the original self-consciousness that generates the desire for recognition. On the one hand:

Augustine describes in his *Confessions*: it allowed him to view his own weakness of character as the malign influence of a part of himself (the body with its passions) that is imagined as an alien and enemy force with a will of its own. Reflection on the connection between these two texts would lead toward an account of the Christian transformation of the economy of thumos, a crucial topic but one beyond the scope of this essay.

[35] As its Muslim commentators especially have recognized, the *Republic* is fundamentally concerned with elaborating a psychology of lawfulness.

[36] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 170.

[37] Ibid., 164-65.

> It is possible for one to feel thymotic pride in oneself without demanding recognition. But esteem [...] is a state of consciousness, and to have subjective certainty about one's own sense of worth, it must be recognized by another consciousness. Thus *thymos* typically, but not inevitably, drives men to seek recognition.[38]

On the other hand, thumos "initially came into being for us as an evaluation of one's own worth."[39] Though Fukuyama goes on to describe a variety of thumotic phenomena, they all continue to revolve around the desire for recognition.

This "reduction to recognition" applies as well to the engine of the long arc of history that leads to liberal modernity: the labor of the slave. For a moment, Fukuyama gives the impression that he intends to provide an account of labor that reveals a hidden dynamism of thumos differing from its aristocratic manifestations. He notes, "The failure to understand the thymotic component of what is normally thought of as economic motivation leads to vast misinterpretations of politics and historical change."[40] But he offers no interior look at the psychology of work. Its source of thumotic gratification remains extrinsic: "Man derives satisfaction owning property not only for the needs that it satisfies, but because other men recognize it."[41] In a chapter misleadingly called "The Thymotic Origins of Work," Fukuyama attributes the "work ethic" present in successful liberal economies to inherited cultural traditions (Protestant anxieties to demonstrate proof of "election" in the west, the aristocratic samurai ethos in Japan), suggesting that liberal societies might need to draw upon such preliberal sources if they are to remain highly productive. In none of these discussions does he mention Plato, whose thumotic account of oligarchic psychology (as we shall see) provides an illuminating perspective on liberalism and its connection to these cultural forms. This Platonic account is a further specification of the varieties of citizen psychology, which is to say of the metamorphoses of citizen thumos. Let us then return to the point of divergence between Kojève and Manent on this topic.

Succinctly stated, Fukuyama's Kojèvian interpretation of the Leontius story is that it represents a man's angry reaction to his failure to sustain the aristocratic self-image that he is superior to his urges and thus free. For reasons left unexplored, the anger that originally would have been directed toward the other man whose recognition I desire is instead directed at myself for failing to convince myself that I deserve such recognition in the first place. This would seem to require that the desire for self-esteem that spontaneously seeks external verification has become more articulately self-conscious, has acquired a more explicit "inner" domain of activity than the bloody-minded consciousness of the "first man" was capable of giving it. What accounts for this development?

As we have seen, for Manent this interior consciousness is engendered by the capacity for action and deliberation opened up by the polis. Politicization reveals an anthropological dimension that lies concealed and latent in tribal humanity governed overwhelmingly by ritual and tradition. We can elucidate what is indirectly implied in

[38] Ibid., 165-66.
[39] Ibid., 181.
[40] Ibid., 174.
[41] Ibid., 195.

Manent thus: When the inner structure of action becomes explicit, it makes manifest the role of thumos that remained mostly hidden beneath the surface of prepolitical human doings. The failure of Leontius to abide by his resolve – a resolve that is both a matter of free individual struggle and tutored by the city's legal order – brings to light for the first time in the dialogue that the core exercise of thumos lies in self-command in commitment to a resolution to do something. When prepolitical life proceeds according to ritual form, through the performance of roles so strongly communally reinforced that nonperformance is almost inconceivable, the thumotic moment of resolute commitment remains virtually invisible. Nonetheless, any determination to do something involves a commitment to seeing it through despite distractions from the purpose.[42] All intentional commitment to doing is thumotic, and deliberated action is explicitly and visibly so.

It is the essentially political character of the full deployment of this human capacity for action that provides the orienting principle for Manent's interpretation of liberal modernity. In framing the narrative for this interpretation, he makes a bold anthropological claim:

> Western humanity – that is, humanity understood as having entered into history – has known two great changes, two revolutions, affecting the conditions of action. The first consisted in the crystallization of the city in Greece, the second in the construction of the modern state. These are the two revolutions that have most deeply affected the human being, that have most deeply transformed it.[43]

The Greek polis, as we have seen, maximally opens the field of action by liberating deliberative choice to participate in argumentative speech about the common concerns of the city as a shared whole. "The dominance of the state," by contrast, "is the cause of

[42] Socrates, observing that a man's thumos drives him to attain redress when he believes he's been treated unjustly, asks, "even if it suffers in hunger, cold and everything of the sort, doesn't it stand firm and conquer, and not cease from its noble efforts before it has succeeded [...]?" (440c-d). See also St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, Q.23, art.1: "the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty."

[43] Pierre Manent, *Natural Law and Human Rights* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020), 84. Manent immediately adds: "Between these two, the Christian religious revolution must surely be given its place. This revolution, for the first and only time in human history, proposed principles of action independent of all previously existing political association and capable by themselves of producing a human community of an unprecedented kind, that is, the church." He characteristically declines to enter further into the texture of this Christian transformation of action. While the question of its genealogical relationship to Christianity is one of the great puzzles of the meaning of the modern liberal state, Manent rarely sees more in this relationship than the attempt on the part of early modern political philosophers to address a problem of coherence introduced by the church in relation to the political authority. I have begun to try to correct this genealogical deficiency in my examination of the role of victimhood in legitimating the modern state (see Mark Shiffman, "The Victimological Legitimation of the Modern State," *New Polity* 3.2 [Spring 2022]). What is further required, it seems to me, is a careful examination of the Christian transformation of what I call the "thumotic economy" and of the corresponding meaning and experience of action.

an ongoing withering of human action and, at the same time, inseparably, of the growing obscurity of our understanding of action." This withering results from the fact that, in the "moral penumbra of the state, the citizen unlearns what it is to obey and even more what it is to command. He unlearns together the two modalities of human action, particularly the main modality, that of commanding."[44]

This dynamic of command and obedience, participation in which defines the ancient citizen, is precisely what we see internalized in the struggle of Leontius. The modern state cares nothing for this struggle of self-mastery, habituation in which would produce or at least be requisite to the capacity for action. This is, in fact, more than a matter of the state's indifference: "the loss of concrete understanding of the qualitative difference between commanding and obeying and the obfuscation or oblivion of the phenomenon of commanding and thus also of that of obeying result from or prepare the system of the state."[45] The task of the state, in guaranteeing rights, is to insulate the members of society from any commands, to protect them from the actions of others in part by minimizing the scope granted for action. The consequence of such a system will be that "the encephalogram may not be flat-lining, but *thumos* certainly is."[46]

The flattering name given by moderns to this freedom from command is "autonomy." According to Fukuyama, this autonomy is Christianity's great legacy to liberalism, the source of the ideal of universalized recognition:

> Christian equality [...] is based on the fact that all men are equally endowed with one specific faculty, the faculty for moral choice. [...] Christianity's contribution, then, to the historical process was to make clear to the slave this vision of human freedom, and to define for him in what sense all men could be understood to have dignity. The Christian God *recognizes* all human beings universally, recognizes their individual human worth and dignity. [...] The last great slave ideology, Christianity, articulated for the slave a vision of what human freedom should be. Even though it did not provide him with a practical way out of his slavery, it permitted him to see more clearly his objective: the free and autonomous individual who is recognized for his freedom and autonomy, recognized universally and reciprocally by all men.[47]

[44] Manent, *Natural Law*, 61.

[45] Ibid, 67.

[46] Manent, *Seeing Things Politically*, 70

[47] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 196-98. Fukuyama's reduction of the historical meaning of Christianity to the universal dignity of moral choice comes from Kojève and can be traced back through Hegel to Kant, who is also the source of the notion of autonomy. This Kantian conception of moral dignity is in turn indebted to Rousseau's reduction of thumos to amour propre, a form of self-consciousness. As Matthew Rose rightly notes in this regard: "Kojève believed that his lectures brought to an official close an intellectual development begun by Christianity, accelerated by modern political revolutions, and completed in the thought of Hegel. Its story had begun when two human beings fought to the death for pure prestige. It ended when the recognition human beings had once sought in God was finally found in other humans. Kojève had a more positive view of Christianity than did most other Marxists. Philosophers had the job of confirming Christianity's essential truth, he believed, not disproving it. In a revealing remark, he claimed that the work of modern 'Intellectuals' was to preserve the Christian idea

Manent, by contrast, sees the modern ideal of autonomy as a deceptive substitute for the self-mastery involved in the capacity for action:

> The more [the member of society] is shaped by the state and becomes incapable of commanding as well as obeying, and, moreover, of understanding what it means to command and to obey, the more he sees himself as self-commanding and obeying himself, then the more he situates himself and prides himself on this imaginary condition, that of a subject or an autonomous individual, an unrecognized but faithful product of the unperceived tyranny of the state.[48]

The demand for recognition is precisely the sign that we have lost the "human worth and dignity" that belongs to the citizen who deliberates and acts for common ends:

> Once rights have reached the limit of their extension; once they have established their exclusive legitimacy by victoriously opposing all collective rule; once the law, slave to rights, has, as it were, no more "practical matter" to rule, it comes to seek out each person in his or her subjective suffering or enjoyment – *politically* these come to the same thing, for in both cases the individual is convoked in his passivity – and it brings this suffering or enjoying "I" into the public light, commanding all to recognize this suffering or enjoying – to "recognize," that is, to grant it a value that can be opposed to any law or rule whatsoever. [...] Social energy, rather than being spent mainly on "going beyond oneself," on entering into shared activities and participating in common life, is increasingly diverted to the assertion of the feeling, however incommunicable, of the living-individual, the sensate and sensitive "*I*."[49]

In other words, thumos expressed primarily as the desire for recognition is the sign of the state's suffocation of the citizen's capacity for action. Deprived of its most natural political expression in the commitment to deliberated and chosen action, in the "going beyond oneself" of attachment to the good to be accomplished in cooperation with others, thumos instead seeks and demands confirmation by others of one's ungrounded and asserted worth, mobilizing the power of the state to compel recognition that I am I and that I need not be otherwise. Manent implies that it is not Christianity but rather the politics of recognition that is "the last slave ideology." Thumos as seen through the narrative prism of Kojève is thumos as seen through the modern state and precisely not as seen by the citizen or by the political philosopher Plato.

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of equality while 'eliminating the Christian idea of transcendence'" (Matthew Rose, "Masters and Slaves," *First Things* [April 2021]).

[48] Manent, *Natural Law*, 68.

[49] Ibid, 78, 80. Manent's invocation of "the feeling, however incommunicable, of the living-individual" may be meant to echo the concept of "lived experience" (Simone de Beauvoir's "*experience vécue*"), which the identity politics of the left has inherited from feminist thought.

IV. THE SOULS OF CITIZENS

Once thumos has come to light as the source of self-command, Socrates is able to describe each of the cardinal virtues psychologically, as a proper relationship of ruling and being ruled among the three parts of the soul. Wisdom is the rational part ruling for the good of the whole soul; courage is thumos abiding by the rational judgement as to what is or is not to be feared; moderation is thumos and appetite agreeing that reason should rule them both; and justice is each part performing its role within the whole order rather than either lower part usurping reason's rule.[50]

With this well-ordered soul as a standard of comparison, Socrates goes on to consider disordered souls. These take very specific forms, and these forms correspond to the different deficient orders in cities. This correspondence between city and soul is grounded upon thumos because the order of each regime primarily involves giving the first place of honor in the city to a different principle and a different kind of man. The rule of the thumotic types upholding properly thumotic priorities will be devoted to honor and victory, especially in war; oligarchy will honor the wealthy; democracy will honor the equal freedom to live as one pleases; and tyranny will honor and flatter the ruthless and lawless man. As Socrates says, "what happens to be honored is practiced, and what is without honor is neglected."[51] We may say that each regime has a distinct "thumotic economy" and that the soul of the typical citizen conforms to that economy so as to participate in it with some measure of honor. In this sense, the criteria of recognition are paramount, but they also reveal distinct satisfactions of thumos within the order of the soul.

The soul-orderings particularly worthy of attention for those in a liberal regime are the oligarchic and democratic souls. In the oligarchy, wealth and the wealthy are honored and elevated to office. The oligarchic soul is devoted to this form of honor and puts both reason and thumos in the service of accumulating wealth. This, however, means that the oligarchic citizen is self-disciplined, exhibiting what Max Weber called a "worldly asceticism": he pushes himself hard in the work of accumulation and allows only the necessary desires to be gratified. He has a strong "work ethic" and watches his diet, but he buys the house and the car that demonstrate his success. He is Locke's rational and industrious man, liberalism's ambitious careerist meritocrat, or the first-generation immigrant who sacrifices to launch the children into the meritocracy. It is this Lockean liberal *homo economicus* Manent has in mind when he observes that, when we support a universal guaranteed income, "we deprive humanity of its last serious reason, and of the specifically modern reason, for *acting*."[52] This economic action involves planning and commitment and above all ascetical self-command. The oligarchic soul takes a certain pride in its capacity for self-denial and in the achievements this makes possible.

In the 1960s, the American oligarch – Organization Man – was confronted with the rebellion of the democratic soul – the Boomer (and above all, the Hippie). The democratic youth is the disaffected child of the oligarch, "luxurious and without taste for work of body or of soul, too soft to resist pleasures or pains, and too idle."[53] The democracy is a "city

[50] Plato, *Republic*, 428b-435b, 441c-443b
[51] Ibid., 551a [228].
[52] Manent, *Natural Law*, 82.
[53] Plato, *Republic*, 556b-c [234].

full of freedom and free speech" and license "to do whatever one wants"; it celebrates diversity and eliminates "any compulsion to rule [...] or again to be ruled if you don't want to be, or to make war when the others are making war"; it's soft on criminals and "doesn't care at all from what kinds of practices a man goes to political action, but honors him if only he says he's well disposed toward the multitude."[54] The democratic soul, raised in plenty, can't see the point of self-denial; persuaded by "boasting speeches" to disdain the sober moderation and thrifty prudence of his elders and to call anarchy freedom and shamelessness courage, it is driven toward "the liberation and unleashing of unnecessary and useless pleasures [...] dishonoring none but fostering them all on the basis of equality."[55]

The thumos of the democratic man is liberationist, rebellious against moral authority, and driven to resist the power of shame. Augustine nicely captures the paradox of this form of thumotic psychology: "As soon as the words are spoken 'Let us go and do it,' one is ashamed not to be shameless."[56] As he understood well, it is a matter of being "transgressive" to prove that one is free. Ultimately the rebellion is directed against law as such, as that which authorizes and demands the citizen's self-discipline. The democratic soul is, in a sense, a citizen soul resentful of the psychological conditions of citizenship.

In the ancient polis, oligarchs and democrats – the wealthy few and the vulgar many – constituted distinct parts of the city and strove with one another in assemblies and elections to rule and make laws. Their thumos, attached to their conflicting priorities (the accumulation of wealth or the unabashed enjoyment of pleasures) found expression in political action. When the common sphere of deliberative conflict broke down, they split the city into violent factions, sometimes descending into civil war. This civil strife, though it could devolve into frenzied rage, must be distinguished from the indiscriminate mob violence at the center of Girardian theory precisely because the different kinds of citizens remain distinct in their inner soul structure and especially in the kind of honor to which their thumos has attached itself and the role it plays in their psychology. In the city, mimesis attaches itself to types of characters and not simply to acts or objects of desire. Character is a stable formation of deliberative action and not simply the kind of reactive behavior that leads to naïve mimesis. The violence that erupts in the city remains purposeful violence, at least up to a point.

On the basis of this relationship of polis, action, deliberate choice, and character, we can better understand why properly political life forms a lacuna in the Girardian narrative. By the same token, we can understand why Manent, when he wishes to draw attention to this political deficit in Girard, focuses on Shakespeare's Roman plays, depicting attachment to republican virtue.[57] Shakespeare was writing as the modern state was barely beginning to take shape, when the meaning and experience of political action had not

[54] Ibid., 557b-558c.
[55] Ibid., 560c-561b.
[56] Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick, Oxford World's Classics, II.ix.17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 34. Augustine is here discussing his famous adolescent escapade of robbing a pear tree – a brief spell of rebellion when he is on holiday from the severe discipline of his demanding meritocratic education. In Augustine's account, the mimesis and sense of shame involved in the desire for friendship play an important psychological role, whereas they are usually missing in the self-understanding of what Girard calls the romantic desire of the modern individualist.
[57] Pierre Manent, "The Tragedy of the Republic," *First Things* (May 2017).

been lost. It is noteworthy in this regard as well that Girard's first insights into mimetic desire arise from his studies of the great literary genre of bourgeois modernity, the novel.[58] In fact, one of the novelists to whom Girard devotes particular attention, Dostoyevsky, provides a valuable clue as to what happens to these thumotic formations of the soul in the conditions of the modern liberal state.

The main character of Dostoyevsky's *Demons*, Nikolai Stavrogin, is a powerfully thumotic aristocrat who has no goals in life except to demonstrate his superiority to all fear and subordination. He is a supreme example of the negative transcendence aimed at by Kojève's Master. Stavrogin combines the ascetic self-discipline of the oligarchic soul with the pride in transgression of the democratic soul. But he cares neither for wealth nor for pleasures. He has no attachment to action. He is the nihilistic outcome of liberalism's amalgamation of the oligarchic and democratic soul formations set within the state's withering of action.[59] His educator is the endlessly virtue-signaling liberal Stepan Trofimovich Verkhovensky, a demonstrative champion of the rights of conscience who never does anything that would require him to exercise these rights. He only wishes to be recognized as an exemplary liberal. Stavrogin imbibes from his tutor the vacuity of liberalism's unpolitical politics of self-consciousness, and he radicalizes its vacuity as he strives for an extreme autonomy that can only be ultimately suicidal.

This amalgamation of the oligarchic and democratic souls is precisely the alchemy of liberal economic freedom and freedom of expression, the two forms of the self-conscious self-ownership that lies at the core of liberal anthropology. In liberalism, thumos expresses itself in asserting one's rights, either to property and economic freedom or to have one's lifestyle affirmed with equal honor and to be free from shame. This is Locke's corrective to Hobbes's unthumotic conception of rights under the omnipotent state: recasting rights as something we have to stand up for, even to the point of rebellion, provides an outlet for thumos in the modern state.[60] It is part of the American thumotic economy that there must be a rights-protest movement every generation or two: abolition, suffrage, labor, black civil rights, women's liberation, gay rights, trans rights.

Although they are political in the sense that they seek changes in the legal and administrative regimes, these protest movements amount to demanding that the state protect members of society from the consequences of the actions of others. Under the transformation wrought by the state, this thumotic assertion is reduced more and more to the desire for recognition of a self-consciousness desperately seeking satisfaction in

[58] René Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

[59] As far as I am aware, no commentator on this novel has noted that Stavrogin's decisively nihilistic and transgressive turn occurs when he is sent off to seek social and career advancement in Saint Petersburg – the city developed to transform Russia into a modern administrative state and to diminish the political significance of the aristocracy.

[60] Fukuyama consistently fails to recognize this thumotic dimension of Locke because it operates not on the explicit theoretical level, which emphasizes rational self-interest, but rather on the rhetorical level, inspiring rights assertion and resistance. "In the civil society envisioned by Hobbes, Locke, and other early modern liberal thinkers," he writes, "man needs only desire and reason" (*The End of History*, 185; see also 158-61). The transposition of the thumotic from the explicitly theoretical to the rhetorically implicit level is typical of much modern thought, and especially of Marxism.

something other than meaningful action. The Tea Party movement made even the most Lockean kind of patriotic libertarian protest a form of identity politics.

As Manent emphasizes, these soul forms deploy themselves on the level of civil society, which on the one hand is beneath the state but also (because we think of ourselves less as citizens and more as universally identical humanity) transcends the national boundaries of state administrations and laws.

> The modern State signifies, by imposing it, this *plane of equality* on which we have been living for two or three centuries – the plane of equal human rights, the plane of the equal or similar human condition [...]. But oligarchy too has overflowed the limits of the city, or the nation, and inequality triumphs in this competition where there is no limit to the price we are prepared to pay for the people that we prize. [...] The problem then is [...] that this equality and this inequality are deployed in two parallel affirmations that envelop the whole human world but that never meet, so to speak, or do so less and less since they more and more overflow the framework of any possible meaningful dialogue – the properly political framework. [...] The individual is indeed freed from the necessity of being master or servant, from the trying confrontation of the few and the many, but is rent by the agonizing contrast between a boundless equality and an unlimited inequality.[61]

This is Manent's updated description of the fluidity of the modern human world that Tocqueville described as democratic social conditions. The key word is "social": our self-consciousness is anxiously comparative because our social status is always under negotiation, and this fixates us all the more on the social to the extent that we are less habituated to action in the political domain. In this fixation on the social, recognition becomes everything and our thumos is easily and constantly offended.

The centrality of thumos to political action provides further insight into the hopes Tocqueville invested in local self-government for sustaining what he called the spirit of liberty. As we know, the logic of the modern administrative state has increasingly usurped local prerogatives and enervated the citizen spirit. But the intrinsic role of thumos in all free and deliberatively chosen action also manifests itself in the vibrant voluntary associations of civil society Tocqueville saw as an additional bulwark against administrative despotism. This sphere of meaningful action, as we also know, has dwindled precipitously in the past half century.[62] America has increasingly lost an aspect of its exceptionalism that was never adequately recognized, except imperfectly by Tocqueville: while all Europe was taking on the form of the modern state, America was spontaneously developing in polis-like forms

[61] Manent, *Natural Law*, 99-101.

[62] This applies as well to the sphere of meaningful action that is manual labor. The dignity of labor and the thumotic element within it constitutes another dimension of our topic that space limitations preclude unfolding here. For meaningful labor as the center of a nexus of relationships of meaningful action, see Matthew Crawford, *Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); and for some preliminary thoughts on the relevance of thumos to Crawford's insights, see my review, "Dirty Hands, Clean Mind" (https://www.frontporchrepublic.com/, July 17, 2009).

such that it harbored a much greater scope for meaningful action. As we experience ever greater loss of the capacity for action in both the political arena and the domain of free civil society – a loss in many ways accelerated by the COVID response – we increasingly lose the channels for meaningful action in common that attach thumos to community, character, and deliberated choice responsible for common goods.

In such conditions, which Manent helps us to see as deficiently political, thumos serves less and less in its humanizing role of psychically ordering self-mastery in the service of meaningful action. It is more intelligible, then, that it increasingly takes the form of the demand for recognition and that this demand is addressed to others through the medium of administrative compulsion. One is, I think, entitled to doubt whether Fukuyama is right to recommend as an antidote to identity politics simply a more inclusive form of the politics of recognition, "larger and more integrative national identities that take into account the de facto diversity of existing liberal democratic societies."[63] If thumos were reducible to the desire for recognition, this might be sound counsel; but if the reduction to recognition is already a symptom of a psycho-pathology of life in the modern state, shifting the site of its supposed satisfaction seems likely to fail precisely because recognition is insufficient for the satisfaction of thumos.

The same deficiently political conditions also help to clarify the relevance of Girard's insights into our current political or postpolitical existence. If thumos is deprived of its exercise in the personal interiority of deliberative practical reason, which freely commits us to meaningful action responsible to and for others and forms character, one can easily conceive that it will revert to its more inarticulate, inchoate, and "raw" forms and dynamics. As in prepolitical social life, so also in postpolitical, the human animal will be highly susceptible to the contagion of scapegoating violent rage. The difference will be that, rather than "naïve" mimetic violence, the postpolitical animal will indulge in forms of collective rage mediated by technocratic tools and institutions, with a mendacious self-consciousness satisfied that it deserves recognition for its "active" participation in bringing progressive History to its ordained end.

[63] Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), 123.

William Wood

THREE PERSPECTIVES ON PHILOSOPHY IN NIETZSCHE'S *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL* 5-7*

In a letter from January 1888, Nietzsche claimed that even his best readers had failed to grasp the inner structure and coherence of *Beyond Good and Evil*:[1] "That they're dealing here with the long logic of a completely determinate philosophical sensibility and *not* with some mishmash of a hundred varied paradoxes and heterodoxies – of that, I believe, nothing has reached even my most sympathetic readers."[2] In a notebook entry from the summer of 1885, the period when he was just beginning to write *BGE*, Nietzsche remarked, "In aphorism-books like mine, many forbidden, lengthy things and chains of thought stand between and behind short aphorisms."[3] Together these remarks suggest that, in order to uncover the hidden connections between aphorisms that seem to be arbitrarily juxtaposed or only loosely and associatively connected, the reader must make explicit what Nietzsche leaves implicit and even renders "forbidden" insofar as his elusive art of writing "forbids" the hasty reader from grasping his intentions. As Nietzsche says in the 1886 preface to *Daybreak*, "Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also to my taste – a malicious taste, perhaps? – no longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair every sort of man who is 'in a hurry.'"[4]

Despite Nietzsche's indications that his books are not hastily thrown together but very carefully composed and must therefore be approached with a corresponding degree of care, the general tendency among scholars has been to treat his books as collections of insights and observations to be mined at will or reorganized to suit the needs of the interpreter. Even readers who present highly systematic and penetrating interpretations

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1 Henceforth *BGE* references are to Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966).

2 Friedrich Nietzsche to Georg Brandes, January 8, 1888, in Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden. Bd. 8: Januar 1887 – Januar 1889*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 228-29 (translation is my own).

3 Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 7 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 3, 37 [June-July 1885] (translation is my own).

4 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Preface," in *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 5. The preface was written in the autumn of 1886, five years after the initial publication of *Daybreak* in 1881.

of his thought, such as Heidegger and Deleuze or more recently John Richardson, have generally followed this approach – as though Nietzsche were a philosopher who could *think* coherently but who couldn't *write* coherently and who thus requires a posthumous amanuensis to arrange the jigsaw pieces of his recorded thoughts into a coherent whole.[5]

While this continues to be the way in which Nietzsche's books are often approached, a growing number of scholars has begun to emphasize the importance of paying attention to the literary design and argumentative structure of his published writings for achieving a more complete understanding of the philosophical thought they convey. Concerning *BGE*, which is arguably the most philosophically comprehensive of Nietzsche's books, the pioneering articles of Leo Strauss and Alexander Nehamas deserve particular mention, as do the more recent book-length studies of Laurence Lampert and Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick,[6] while in 2019, Robert Pippin published two important articles on *BGE* that address Nietzsche's "figurative" manner of presenting his thought and his artful use of rhetorical "masks."[7]

Valuable as all these studies are, few would deny that we are still learning how to read *BGE*. My aim in this essay is to bring out, through a very close reading, the connections between three aphorisms in *BGE*, numbers 5 to 7, which I argue belong together and form a unity. Taken together, I suggest, these aphorisms are a beautiful illustration of Nietzsche's perspectival method, whereby he approaches the same phenomenon from a variety of angles in order to illuminate it more fully: "The more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity,' be."[8] I argue that these aphorisms concern how the philosopher appears from the outside, to nonphilosophers (5), how he appears to himself (6), and, finally, how he appears to other philosophers on the stage of world history (7). There is an inner logic to this sequence: one always begins from the first perspective, when one first studies the history of philosophy, then (perhaps) one becomes a philosopher oneself and understands philosophy as it were "from the inside," after which one may develop a politics of friendship (or enmity) with other philosophers (past or present), while bearing in mind, like an actor in a play, how this politics will appear to an outside audience and the effect it may have on them. These aphorisms, then, represent three stages in the philosophical life while

[5] See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche I* and *II*, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Harper, 1990); Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1984); and John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). It is no accident that all these interpretations rely heavily on Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, which lends itself to this kind of approach.

[6] Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*," *Interpretation* 3 (Winter 1973): 97-113; Alexander Nehamas, "Who Are 'The Philosophers of the Future'?: A Reading of *Beyond Good and Evil*," in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 46-67: Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of* Beyond Good and Evil (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); and Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, *The Soul of Nietzsche's* Beyond Good and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[7] Robert Pippin, "Figurative Philosophy in Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*," in *The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Thomas Stern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 195-221; and Pippin, "Nietzsche's Masks: Philosophy and Religion in *Beyond Good and Evil*," in *Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy*, ed. Paul Loeb and Matthew Meyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 106-23.

[8] F. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufman, essay 3, sec. 12 (New York: Random House, 1969), 119.

concomitantly addressing the related themes of how the philosopher conducts himself in relation to nonphilosophers (5), the distinctive *self-relation* at the heart of the philosophical way of life (6), and the philosopher's way of relating to kindred spirits (7). The last of these may be overtly friendly, like Aristotle's stance toward Plato, or antagonistic, like Epicurus's "rage" against Plato – or Nietzsche's own apparent rage against Plato – if not against "all philosophers" who came before him.

Before turning to the aphorisms themselves, I must make a preliminary remark about method. One cannot follow the argument of *BGE* on a first reading not only due to the difficulty of the text but also because the book has a structure that is both linear and circular; even though one must try to follow Nietzsche's argument as it develops aphorism by aphorism, earlier aphorisms can often be understood only when they are juxtaposed with much later ones, the connections between them marked by the reappearance of certain themes or *dramatis personae*, or sometimes just by the striking repetition of an unusual word or phrase. Accordingly, in conducting a close reading of a subsection of *BGE*, one must proceed as though one were reading the book for the first time while simultaneously adopting the equally fictitious conceit that one has a synoptic view of the entire text before one's eyes whenever one focuses on a particular aphorism or sentence. Only in this way will a clearer picture of Nietzsche's "chains of thought" gradually become visible.

I

BGE 5 begins:

> What provokes one to look at all philosophers half suspiciously, half mockingly, is not that one discovers again and again how innocent they are – how often and how easily they make mistakes and go astray; in short, their childishness and childlikeness – but that they are not honest enough in how they go about things, although they all make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched upon even remotely.[9]

In this aphorism, Nietzsche inhabits – and rhetorically amplifies – the perspective of a skeptical modern scholar, approaching the history of philosophy and being confronted by what appears to him as the spectacle of "a series of refuted systems," as he puts it in *BGE* 204.[10] As examples, Nietzsche mentions Spinoza and Kant, two of the most notoriously elaborate system builders, and alludes to a third, Hegel:

> They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish – and talk of "inspiration"); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of "inspiration" – most often a desire of the heart that has

[9] *BGE* 5 (translation modified).
[10] *BGE* 204.

> been filtered and made abstract – that they defend with reasons they have sought after the fact.[11]

At first, Nietzsche's point seems to be fairly straightforward. Philosophers take themselves to be engaged in the disinterested pursuit of truth, when in fact they merely construct systems that provide elaborate justifications for how they want or need to view the world. The arguments they make are specious "after the fact" justifications for the moral values unconsciously motivating their inquiries. At bottom, they are not really engaged in open-minded inquiry at all but in advocacy: "They are all advocates who resent that name."[12] Although they are dishonest, they are not "Platonic" liars but self-deceivers.

Nietzsche adopts a fairly common modern, skeptical reaction to the history of philosophy as "a series of refuted systems" and amplifies it to a hyperbolic degree, thereby provoking the reader to ask: With what authority does he claim that "all philosophers" are self-deceived? Furthermore, the careful reader wonders how the message of this aphorism can be reconciled with the idea of a "philosophy" that "recognizes untruth as a condition of life" and for this reason stands "beyond good and evil," an idea that Nietzsche introduced in the concluding sentence of the preceding aphorism.[13] The formula "a philosophy that risks this by that token alone places itself beyond good and evil" is followed *immediately* by mockery of "*all* philosophers" as gripped by moral prejudice, which is very jarring.[14] Still further, one wonders how this aphorism can be reconciled with Nietzsche's fulsome praise of philosophy in many other parts of the book – for example, when he describes "philosophy" itself as "real *power* of intellectuality, real *profundity* of intellectual perception."[15] The self-deceivers of *BGE* 5 appear to lack any such depth of insight.

One might suggest that Nietzsche was carelessly using the word "philosophy" in different senses in *BGE* 4 and 5. However, a close reading of the aphorism suggests that Nietzsche is not being careless at all. The mockery of "all philosophers" is ironic; the last laugh is on the modern scholar. Nietzsche says that the suspicious thing about philosophers is *not* that they are "innocent" and "childish," *not* that they often and easily "make mistakes." Rather, "they are not honest enough," although they all talk virtuously about "truthfulness." But does their dishonesty not consist primarily in self-deception rather than in deception of others? Nietzsche carefully says that "they all pose [*stellen sich*] as if" they have arrived at their "real opinions" through a "cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic." This is very ambiguous. The claim that all philosophers "pose as if" this were true could mean that they know that this isn't really true. Are they adopting a pose, behaving theatrically, as Nietzsche suggests in *BGE* 7, when he mentions "the grandiose manner, the *mise-en-scène* at which Plato and his disciples were expert"?[16] Rather than self-deceivedly erring, Nietzsche intimates that philosophers know exactly what they're up to. Nietzsche *contrasts* the philosophers with "the mystics of every rank," religious figures,

[11] *BGE* 5.
[12] Ibid.
[13] *BGE* 4.
[14] Ibid. (emphasis added).
[15] *BGE* 252 (translation modified).
[16] *BGE* 7.

who are "more honest" than the philosophers; when the mystics claim to be "inspired" by God, they surely believe it themselves. Philosophers are not so "innocent" or "childish" – and, Nietzsche implies, they rarely "make mistakes."

If "all philosophers" tend to be dishonest in their manner of self-presentation, perhaps they are dishonest not just about *how* they arrived at their opinions but also about *what* their "real opinions" really are. Nietzsche's formulation carefully leaves this possibility open. In *BGE* 289, he suggests that a "hermit" will "doubt whether a philosopher could *possibly* have 'ultimate and real' opinions."[17] Even if this doubt might eventually be resolved, Nietzsche's reference in *BGE* 30 to "the difference between the exoteric and the esoteric, formerly known to philosophers" suggests that in many cases it won't be easy to figure out what those "real opinions" are.[18] Philosophers might write in such a way as to "forbid" hasty access to their most private thoughts. That the only other occurrence of the phrase "real opinions" in the entire book occurs in an aphorism about esotericism (*BGE* 289) supports this suggestion.

When Nietzsche then says that philosophers are "mischievous [*verschmizte*] spokesmen" (quite unlike the honest, doltish mystics) for *their* "prejudices," that they make an assumption, a hunch, or "a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract," and defend it "after the fact" with reasons rather than claiming that they are blundering *self-deceivers*, it is possible – and I would suggest more likely – that he means to say that they are mischievous *deceivers*.[19] In the doctrinal presentation of their thought, they flatter a variety of popular prejudices (for example, that what everyone really wants is power), which they artfully make their own without falling prey to these prejudices in their thought. If they are "advocates" who don't want to be recognized as such, it's because they won't be effective advocates unless they give the appearance of sincerity, as when Socrates at his trial claimed to be an inept orator.[20] On the other hand, if they refuse to admit *to themselves*, as Nietzsche also says, that they are mere advocates for "their" prejudices, it's because they are not *mere* advocates – they are privately detached from the prejudices that they present as their own in their books.

Given that a major implicit theme of this aphorism is esotericism, it's fitting that it should be one of the most outwardly misleading aphorisms in the book; there is an unusually strong contrast between the rhetorical pose Nietzsche adopts on the surface and the concealed meaning at which he hints. Rather than suddenly reversing course, this aphorism continues to develop the "antimetaphysical," reflexively questioning, and tentatively naturalistic conception of philosophy itself that he had already started to elaborate in *BGE* 1-4. Real philosophers are unusually self-conscious, not exceptionally self-deceived. They are reflexively aware of the "instinctive" and passionately driven character of all "conscious thinking," including their own,[21] but they conceal this reflexive awareness, posing as "divinely unconcerned" dialecticians. But why do "all philosophers"

[17] *BGE* 289.
[18] *BGE* 30.
[19] *BGE* 5.
[20] Plato, *Apology* 17a-18a.
[21] Cf. *BGE* 3.

engage in deliberately misleading speech? And what about Nietzsche himself, who seems so outspoken?

Nietzsche doesn't fully answer the first question yet or explain the particular motives for *his* peculiar variant of esotericism. The preceding aphorism suggested that Nietzsche's esotericism will somehow be rooted in the recognition that "untruth is a condition of life" in a deep epistemological sense but also in a crudely political sense. Furthermore, if philosophers who recognize this are "beyond good and evil," even if they don't behave like Alcibiades or Cesare Borgia, they will presumably have no compunction about employing deceptive rhetoric to promote their "real interests."[22] But what are a philosopher's real interests? That is the theme of the next aphorism, but I will turn first to the concluding examples of Kant and Spinoza, which offer some hints.

Nietzsche writes:

> The equally stiff and decorous Tartuffery of old Kant as he lures us onto the dialectical bypaths that lead to his "categorical imperative" – really lead astray and seduce – this spectacle makes us smile, as we are fastidious and find it quite amusing to watch closely the subtle tricks of old moralists and preachers of morals. Or consider the hocus-pocus of mathematical form with which Spinoza clad his philosophy – really "the love of *his* wisdom," to render that word fairly and squarely – in mail and mask, to strike terror at the very outset into the heart of any assailant who should dare to glance at that invincible virgin and Pallas Athena: how much personal timidity and vulnerability this masquerade of a sick hermit betrays![23]

The first thing to note is that, although Nietzsche gives Kant and Spinoza as the only two examples mentioned by name in an aphorism meant to convey something about the congenital dishonesty of "all philosophers" in *BGE* 211, on the difference between "genuine philosophers" and "philosophical laborers," who engage in a kind of reflective systematization of inherited values rather than questioning inherited values and "creating" new ones, Nietzsche gives Kant (along with Hegel) as one of his two examples of a "philosophical laborer."[24] According to Nietzsche, then, Kant is emphatically *not* a philosopher in the strictest sense. This suggests that there may be an important difference between the functions of Kant and those of Spinoza in *BGE* 5. A close reading confirms this suspicion.

Nietzsche suggests that Kant's intention as a writer was to "preach morals" by persuading the reader of his argument for the categorical imperative. Nietzsche describes this argument as a "trick" that leads astray the one who is persuaded by it, but there is no hint in Nietzsche's statement that Kant was being insincere with his readers rather than dishonest with himself – at least in his moral philosophy. Nietzsche's likening of "old Kant" to Molière's Tartuffe, a religious hypocrite and old lecher, suggests that Kant may well have

[22] Ibid., 6.
[23] *BGE* 5.
[24] *BGE* 211.

been insincere insofar as he "retained the appearance of religious belief," as Nietzsche put it in 1874.[25] What is more, this comparison suggests that, in trying to "seduce" (*verführen*) his readers down the "dialectical bypaths" that lead to his moral doctrine, "old Kant" is comparable to an elderly lecher who draws innocent young women into his bedchamber in order to gratify his lust. By contrast, Spinoza is a "virgin" (*Jungfrau*) who seeks to *repel* "assailants" who might rob him of his innocence. Nietzsche suggests that the moral impulse, which underlies metaphysical dogmatism, is somehow akin to uncontrolled sexual desire, while there is something chaste about real philosophers.

The example of Kant indicates that those who seem like real philosophers when one first "looks at" them may not be so on closer inspection. We shouldn't be surprised, then, that in Nietzsche's statement about Kant the word "philosophy" doesn't occur. By contrast, Nietzsche states that Spinoza "clad his philosophy" in a "hocus-pocus of mathematical form," the famous geometrical method. Nietzsche describes this presentation as a formidable suit of armor that Spinoza used to "strike terror" into any "assailant" who "dared to glance at him" (cf. "what provokes one to *look at* all philosophers"). Unlike Kant's argument for the categorical imperative, Spinoza's elaborate presentation wasn't designed to convince ("seduce") the reader but to *protect* Spinoza himself and "his philosophy" from "assailants." Nietzsche alludes to the incident when Spinoza was attacked by a religious zealot and barely escaped with his life; famously, Spinoza kept the knife-torn cloak he was wearing as a visceral and intimate reminder of the ever-present danger of popular hostility toward philosophers.[26] Nietzsche intimates that Spinoza's *presentation* of his thought was a suit of armor[27] ("mail and mask") intended to protect Spinoza from religious persecution and his books from censorship, presumably by giving the impression that he was more pious than he really was and making it difficult to figure out his "real opinions." Spinoza's self-presentation was a "masquerade," a deceptive and theatrical pose, like Plato's mise-en-scène.

In short, Nietzsche suggests that Kant is an example of self-deception, while Spinoza is an example of philosophical deceptiveness. Self-deception is unavoidable for the "philosophical laborer," who has an unusually high degree of philosophical self-awareness but still refuses seriously to question inherited values or "popular valuations."[28] By

[25] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 137.

[26] Nietzsche certainly knew this very famous story from Kuno Fischer, his main source of information about Spinoza's philosophy. Cf. Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neurn Philosophie. Erster Band: Descartes und Seine Schule. Zweiter Theil* (Heidelberg: Bassermann, 1865), 112. Fischer's source is Pierre Bayle's article on Spinoza. It is unknown whether Nietzsche read Bayle's article, but he mentions Bayle (in connection with Lessing, notorious as a Spinozist) in the next chapter, in *BGE* 28. Fischer (112) concludes there's no reason to doubt the story ("diese so beglaubigte Tatsache ist nicht zu bezweifeln"); by contrast, Steven Nadler regards it as implausible. Cf. Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 110.

[27] Cf. Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 18: "The exoteric teaching was needed for protecting philosophy. *It was the armor in which philosophy had to appear.* It was needed for political reasons. It was the form in which philosophy became visible to the political community" (emphasis added).

[28] Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Josephine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 193: "Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the whole world, that the whole world was right. [...] He wrote against the scholars in favor of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the people."

contrast, Spinoza illustrates two reasons why "genuine philosophers" practice esotericism – to protect themselves from religious persecution and to ensure that they circumvent the censors and receive a posthumous reception. Spinoza is a good example to illustrate these points because he suffered from persecution and censorship but still managed to write in a way that disguised the extent of his heterodoxy and allowed him to be interpreted by many of his readers, not as a radically irreligious thinker, but as a "God-intoxicated man" with idiosyncratic religious opinions. Nietzsche at any rate presents Spinoza as a canny philosopher, not as a "drunkard of God."[29] But the example of Spinoza also provokes the reader to reflect on the differences between Spinoza's milieu and late modern Europe, where philosophers no longer need fear this kind of persecution. As Nietzsche writes elsewhere, "We more intellectual men of this age, we know our advantage well enough. [...] We will hardly be decapitated, imprisoned or exiled; not even our books will be banned or burned. This age loves the intellect; it loves and needs us."[30]

Why, then, must late modern philosophers such as Nietzsche continue to practice esotericism? This aphorism raises this question pointedly by drawing an implicit parallel between Spinoza and Nietzsche. The phrase "personal timidity and vulnerability of a sick hermit" cannot help but call Nietzsche himself to mind. Nietzsche is notorious for having been a sickly recluse who "struck terror" into his readers and concealed his "personal timidity" not with the imposing geometrical form of his books but with ferocious rhetoric that praises cruelty and war. But Nietzsche was no longer "vulnerable" to persecution at the hands of religious zealots in the manner of Spinoza; he speaks often of "danger" and "risk," but publishing his thought was no longer dangerous or risky as it had been for premodern or early modern philosophers.[31]

Nietzsche raises this question here without answering it. Elsewhere, he suggests in Tocqueville-like fashion that toleration of diversity and freedom of speech do not cultivate freedom of thought; rather, they lead to the tyranny of public opinion, "nook-and-cranny" overspecialization in intellectual life, and profound spiritual complacency: "The dangers for a philosopher's development are indeed so manifold today that one may doubt whether this fruit can still ripen at all."[32] Philosophy faces a new danger in the modern world – extinction through toleration, not through auto-da-fé. By contrast,

> the long unfreedom of the spirit, the mistrustful constraint in the communicability of thoughts, the discipline thinkers imposed on themselves to think within the directions laid down by a court or a church, or under Aristotelian presuppositions [...] all this, however forced, capricious, hard,

[29] *BGE* 205. Nietzsche's formula clearly alludes to the German romantic view of Spinoza as a mystical pantheist and "God-intoxicated man."

[30] Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 379 (translation modified).

[31] The earliest contemporary reviewer of *BGE* observed, "Nietzsche [...] allows one virtue 'from which we free spirits cannot be separated': *candor* [*Redlichkeit*]. Nietzsche demonstrates this candor throughout his book, which two hundred years ago would have landed him on the gallows." Joseph Viktor Widmann, "Nietzsche's Dangerous Book" (1886), trans. Tim Hyde and Lysane Fauvel, *New Nietzsche Studies* 4, nos. 1 and 2 (2000): 199. Such candor notwithstanding, Nietzsche himself claimed that in *BGE*, "refinement in form, in intention, in the art of *silence* is in the foreground." *Ecce Homo*, "Beyond Good and Evil," sec. 2.

[32] *BGE* 205. Note the contemptuous reference to "freedom of the press and newspaper-reading" in the preface.

> gruesome and anti-rational, has shown itself to be the means through which the European intellect has been trained to strength, ruthless curiosity and subtle mobility.[33]

Nietzsche's "gruesome" rhetoric is designed to shock his liberal age out of its complacency, not to protect him from "assailants."

Finally, the example of Spinoza reminds us that the antiphilosophical perspective that Nietzsche inhabits in this aphorism ("what provokes one to look at all philosophers half suspiciously, half mockingly") is not just that of the modern skeptic who sees in philosophy nothing but "a series of refuted systems." This kind of hostility to philosophy is a modern secular variant on the perennial popular suspicion and mockery of philosophy, given voice for example by ancient satirists such as Lucian, which has often taken the form of pious hostility. For example, Leibniz was suspiciously and mockingly nicknamed *Glaubenichts* by his contemporaries: "Leibniz did not attend church often, and his scanty church attendance, along with his refusal to take communion, earned him a reputation in Hanover as a non-believer. Locals playfully referred to him as 'Glaubenichts,' that is, one who believes in nothing. While it seems farfetched to suppose that Leibniz had no religious beliefs at all, it is far from clear what beliefs he did have."[34]

II

While *BGE* 5 begins with the phrase "what provokes one [*was dazu reizt*] to look at all philosophers," *BGE* 6 begins with the phrase "gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been."[35] Nietzsche switches from an outside perspective – concerning how one "looks at" philosophers – to an inside perspective: "It has become clear *to me*." The phrase recalls the introductory locution of *BGE* 3 – "I say to myself." We are about to be presented with one of Nietzsche's most personal insights.

Nietzsche begins, "Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the self-confession [*Selbstbekenntnis*] of its author and a kind of involuntary and unnoted [*ungewollter und unvermerkter*] *mémoires*; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown."[36] At first, Nietzsche's point appears to be similar to the surface teaching of the preceding aphorism – philosophers take themselves to be engaged in the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but really they are in the business of producing after the fact metaphysical justifications for their moral convictions. Philosophy is the unconsciously motivated and un-self-aware expression of the philosopher's unquestioned "values": "Indeed, if one would explain how the most bizarre metaphysical claims of a philosopher came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does it (does *he*) aim?"[37]

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[33] *BGE* 188.

[34] Lloyd Strickland, introduction to *Leibniz on God and Religion*, trans. and ed. Lloyd Strickland (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 10.

[35] *BGE* 6.

[36] Ibid. (translation modified).

[37] Ibid. (translation modified).

However, a close reading suggests that Nietzsche's point is more complex than it appears to be. What does Nietzsche mean by the qualification "every *great* philosophy"? Presumably not every "genuine philosopher" need be a "great philosopher." I suggest that a "great" philosopher is one who has had a profound historical influence through his books – or through being immortalized in the books of others, such as Socrates. A "great philosophy," then, is a literary corpus that inevitably reflects something about the life and personality of "its author." As we saw from the commentary on Spinoza's "hocus-pocus of mathematical form" in the preceding aphorism, *BGE* is not just a book about the nature of philosophy but also a reflection on the history of philosophy and a guide to reading philosophical books. The use of the word *mémoires* (a literal French rendering of the title of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, to which Nietzsche probably alludes)[38] suggests that, in the first sentence of this aphorism, he is once again advising us on how to read such books. But while *BGE* 5 emphasized the protective, deceptive, or otherwise political function of esotericism, *BGE* 6 suggests that under the surface philosophical books are autobiographies (or "recollections") in disguise. But this need not imply that philosophers themselves were unaware of this fact. It also need not imply that such books convey nothing of general significance about the world.

But doesn't Nietzsche describe "every great philosophy" as an "involuntary and unnoted" *mémoires*? This formulation is careful and ambiguous. *Ungewollt* could mean "involuntary" in the sense of "inadvertent," but it could also simply mean "unchosen." Nietzsche could mean that a philosopher has no choice but to philosophize; it belongs to his nature, like a "germ of life" that will grow into a "whole plant" so long as it receives the proper nourishment. In the preface, Nietzsche describes Plato as "the most beautiful growth [*Gewächs*] of antiquity."[39] *Unvermerkt* is a still odder choice of word. It could mean "unnoticed," but it could also mean "un-remarked-upon" or "unnoted" – its contrary, *vermerkt*, most often refers to a note one makes, for example, in a calendar or in the margins of a text. Neither word need imply that the philosopher doesn't know what he's doing – taken together, they could simply mean that he has no choice but to express his "nature" in any books he writes and that (with some exceptions, such as Montaigne, Rousseau, or Nietzsche himself) the philosopher typically doesn't draw attention to the implicitly autobiographical character of his writing. If the purpose of this statement was merely to convey the view that philosophers inevitably fail to understand their own real motivations, he could have made this point more unambiguously, as he

[38] Kaufmann renders *mémoires* in the singular, "memoir," with no justification. Especially given the importance of Socrates in *BGE* and the importance of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* for Nietzsche, I find it difficult to find any other explanation for this unusual choice of word. It is unlikely to be a mere literary flourish. Nietzsche might also be alluding playfully to the Platonic doctrine of *anamnesis* – the doctrine that all our knowledge, unbeknownst to ourselves (*ungewollt und unvermerkt*), consists in "recollections" of what we have already learned (cf. *BGE* 20, where Nietzsche describes philosophical thinking as *ein Wiedererinnern*, a kind of "remembering again"). Surely Nietzsche's unusual choice of word is meant to provoke the careful reader to wonder what significant associations it might have. Concerning Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, see Nietzsche's description of this text as "the most attractive book of Greek literature" in a fragment from July 1879 and his praise of the *Memorabilia* as a guide to living that is superior to the Bible in *Human, All Too Human II* (F. Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878 – Fall 1879)*, trans. Gary Handwerk [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013], 86).

[39] *BGE*, "Preface."

did in the case of the dualistic metaphysicians of *BGE* 2, whom he studiously avoided describing as "philosophers."[40]

Nietzsche then adds, as a further thought ("also"), that "the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy" – no longer just every "great" philosophy – "had constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown." The rhetorical context distracts the reader from the fact that Nietzsche may well be suggesting that, in order to understand a philosopher, one must take care to understand his *deliberate* "intentions" (*Absichten*). In *BGE* 3, he had already suggested that one must read philosophers "between the lines."[41] Perhaps Nietzsche means that one must unearth a philosopher's *unconscious* "intentions," his instinctive valuations, which are of such a kind that the philosopher himself couldn't possibly have been reflectively aware of them, but Nietzsche's formulation leaves both possibilities open, while many of his remarks about the need for the reader to grasp the deliberate care with which his *own* books are written (such as those I cited in the introduction to this paper) lend support to the former interpretation. The contrast "moral (or immoral) intentions" calls to mind the examples of Kant (moral) and Spinoza (immoral) in the preceding aphorism.[42] Could it be that "genuine philosophers" (unlike Kant) have both kinds of literary intention when they write books – they "preach morals" to the people while also looking out for their "real interests"? For all his vaunted "immoralism," Nietzsche himself had no compunction about preaching a new kind of noble, warlike morality through the mouth of his Zarathustra.

Nietzsche suggests, then, that the philosophical life is always the most important theme of a truly philosophical book, whatever other subjects it might discuss – a very Platonic thought. But what about the "bizarre metaphysical claims" one often finds in such books? We must try to discover what "morality" the philosopher is "aiming at" by means of these claims – again, an ambiguous formulation, which might refer to strategic esotericism, not necessarily to self-deception about one's real motives. Leo Strauss points out that, in the later aphorism on philosophical laborers, Nietzsche virtually identifies the "moral" with the "political."[43] Strauss suggests that juxtaposing these aphorisms leads one to infer that when a real philosopher makes "bizarre metaphysical claims," one must first understand his political intentions in doing so.[44] The example of Spinoza has already given us a sense of what this might involve. We are prepared to approach Nietzsche's own bizarre metaphysical doctrines, "the will to power" and "the eternal return," with the proper caution.

Nietzsche continues, "Accordingly, I do not believe that a 'drive to knowledge' is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as elsewhere, employed knowledge (and misknowledge – *Verkenntniss*) as a mere instrument."[45] The oddly cautious,

[40] Cf. *BGE* 2.
[41] *BGE* 3.
[42] Even though Kant is likened to an old lecher and Spinoza to a virtuous maiden anxiously concerned about preserving her innocence.
[43] Leo Strauss, *On Nietzsche's* Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Richard Velkley (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2017), 246. Cf. *BGE* 211.
[44] Strauss, *On Nietzsche's* Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 246–47.
[45] *BGE* 6.

perhaps gently ironic phrase "I do not believe" (contrast "I say to myself" or "it has become clear to me") is striking. So is the fact that "drive to knowledge" appears in scare quotes. What, then, *is* the "father of philosophy" – and what is philosophy itself? Nietzsche now introduces a very bizarre (although not metaphysical) reflection on philosophy as a kind of mastery, while alluding to the famous Socratic "demon," which however still leaves it unclear what "philosophy" itself actually is:

> But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they have been at play just here as *inspiring* spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them have done philosophy [*Philosophie getrieben*] at some time – and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just *itself* as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate *master* of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be master [*herrsüchtig ist*] – and it attempts to philosophize *in that spirit*.[46]

Introducing the phrase "the basic drives of man," Nietzsche proposes that these drives are engaged in a perpetual contest for mastery. For example, when we are overcome by hunger, all our other drives are in a way subdued by our hunger until we have satisfied it. But why describe this struggle for dominance among the drives as the attempt of each drive to "philosophize"? Nietzsche suggests that philosophizing itself consists in the attempt to "represent oneself" as "the ultimate purpose of existence" and therefore as "the legitimate master" of – well, everything else. In the *Philebus*, Socrates remarks, "All the wise agree – whereby they merely exalt themselves – that intellect (*nous*) is king of heaven and earth. And perhaps they are right to do so."[47] Does Nietzsche mean that philosophy is the drive, not to discover the truth about the world, but rather to reshape the world in thought in order to think of *oneself* as its cosmic ruler and final cause, "the most spiritual will to power,"[48] such that one can by analogy describe, say, hunger or the sexual drive as "philosophizing" whenever they seek to overpower our other drives? Nietzsche described Spinoza as a "Pallas Athena," a virginal goddess, the first of many explicit indications that there is something godlike or divine about philosophers, and this would be one way to make sense of these intimations.[49]

However, while Nietzsche's rhetorical pose easily provokes such an interpretation, it is difficult to reconcile with his suggestion two aphorisms earlier, in *BGE* 3, that "philosophical thinking," as a kind of thinking *about* the instinctual basis of thinking *itself* (thus a peculiar kind of *noesis tes noeseos*, the activity that Aristotle ascribes to his God),

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[46] *BGE* 6.

[47] Plato, *Philebus* 28c (translation is my own).

[48] *BGE* 9.

[49] *BGE* 5. This locution associates Spinoza with ancient Greek, pre-Christian culture. Nietzsche implies that Spinoza's chastity or virginity consists partly in somehow remaining pure of Christian influence, presumably thanks to his Jewish background, which may thereby have rendered him, paradoxically, more authentically receptive to Greek thought than were his Christian contemporaries. Cf. F. Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human I: A Book of Free Spirits*, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 475: "If Christianity has done everything to Orientalize the Occident, Judaism has always played an essential part in Occidentalizing it again: which in a certain sense means making of Europe's mission and history a *continuation of the Greek*."

can achieve a kind of knowledge of nature (in particular, knowledge of the "physiological" substructure of "logic")[50] – or with his announcement in *BGE* 23 of a "physio-psychology" that is also the "queen of the sciences," an authentic first philosophy that illuminates the "fundamental problems" (*Grundprobleme*).[51] At the same time, it would only raise the question: What is the status of Nietzsche's thinking *about* philosophy *as* "the most spiritual will to power" if the latter is supposed to be understood as a drive directed toward sheer creation or invention rather than genuine discovery?[52] I suggest that Nietzsche means rather to indicate that the philosophical drive can achieve a kind of authentic mastery over "all the other drives," which the other drives *cannot* achieve (even if they might temporarily overpower their competitors), a mastery that alone makes possible an integrated personality and a truly elevated mode of life, while the philosophical drive *is* a genuine drive for knowledge,[53] albeit for knowledge of the "fundamental problems," and thus very different from the mechanical "drive for knowledge" characteristic of the scholar, which reflects an impoverished way of life. This is why the other drives can be described as "philosophizing" when they seek (but inevitably fail) to achieve such mastery.

Nietzsche concludes by contrasting the philosopher with the scholar:

> To be sure: among scholars who really are scientific men, things may be different – "better," if you like – there you may really find something like a drive for knowledge, some small, independent clockwork that, once well wound, works on vigorously *without* any essential participation from all the other drives of the scholar. The real "interests" of the scholar therefore lie usually somewhere else – for example, in his family, or in making money, or in politics. Indeed, it is almost a matter of total indifference whether his little machine is placed at this or that spot in science, and whether the "promising" young worker turns himself into a good philologist or an expert on fungi or a chemist: it does not *characterize* him that he becomes this or that. In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to *who he is* – that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.[54]

The philosopher's real interest is in philosophizing; the scholar *turns himself into* an expert on a subject in which he has no "real interest," in part because merely empirical inquiries (in contrast to *Grundprobleme*) don't concern man's deepest spiritual needs,

[50] Cf. *BGE* 3.

[51] *BGE* 23.

[52] In *BGE* 11, Nietzsche claims that the German Idealists conflated "invention" (*Erfinden*) and "discovery" (*Finden*), while *BGE* 12 concludes with the suggestion that "the new psychologist" will engage not only in invention but *also* in discovery, implying that Nietzsche himself, unlike Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, knows how to distinguish between them.

[53] Hence the scare quotes in the initial formulation. In this aphorism, Nietzsche chooses to reserve the formula "drive for knowledge" for the scholar's "little machine," but elsewhere he unhesitatingly ascribes a "passion for knowledge" to the philosopher. Cf. *BGE* 210 and Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 429.

[54] *BGE* 6.

even if they satisfy a passing curiosity. The scholar becomes something he is not, while the philosopher becomes "who he is." Nietzsche suggests there is a kind of self-alienation intrinsic to the scholarly life. But in the concluding sentence, Nietzsche contrasts the philosopher, no longer just with the scholar, but with *any* other human type. It is the *distinguishing mark* of the philosopher that in him "there is nothing whatever that is impersonal." Alluding to Aristotle's contest of lives[55] while adding – in modern, post-Christian fashion – the alternative of a life devoted to the family, Nietzsche suggests that anyone whose "real interests" lie in a sphere other than philosophizing, for example in moneymaking, in politics, or in family life, will lead a life that is in some elusive sense "impersonal" or self-alienated, while only philosophy allows a human being to become "who they are" (cf. Exodus 3:14), to achieve the distinctive kind of godlike self-relation according to which their "morality," their way of life, is in harmony with their individual being. Given the importance throughout *BGE* of religion as an alternative to philosophy, its absence in this aphorism is surprising, especially after one has grasped the general import of Nietzsche's suggestion. Religion is absent in part because, as Nietzsche notes elsewhere, modern scholars tend not to have "religious interests" in the conventional sense,[56] so its sudden appearance in this place would be incongruous, but it may also be because Nietzsche regards everyone who is not a philosopher as is in some diffuse sense "religious."[57] Thus it is not the scholar as scholar but the scholar as nonphilosopher whom Nietzsche ultimately contrasts with the philosopher – the scholar as an ordinary person who happens to be a scholar.

In this very important aphorism, Nietzsche intimates – alluding to the contest of lives in Aristotle's *Ethics* – that philosophy is the best way of life because it allows one to achieve a kind of self-mastery that fulfills the deepest desire or need of a human being *as* a human being. It is important that the scholar has an unintegrated plurality of "real interests," while the philosopher, it is implied, has *one* "real" interest – philosophy. But the philosopher is not a "pure mind."[58] The philosopher will also have other interests – in moneymaking, in politics, in the family, in scholarly pursuits – but these, Nietzsche implies, are somehow "mastered" and integrated by the philosophical drive such that "in him there is nothing whatever that is impersonal."

Nietzsche implies that philosophizing has a "higher value for life" than any other human activity, to use the language he introduced in *BGE* 2 when questioning "the value of the will to truth."[59] Nietzsche implies that an analysis of the structure of human desire, "the basic drives of man," will show that the philosophical life is the kind of life that all human beings in a sense *want* to lead but most *cannot* lead (note the scare quotes around the scholar's real "interests"), and can thus only dimly understand. This thought is perfectly compatible with the possibility that some awareness of the most important truths disclosed by philosophical inquiry may be *harmful* to those who are incapable of leading such a life. The will to truth may not be unqualifiedly "valuable" for everyone.

[55] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1095a-1096a.
[56] Cf. *BGE* 58.
[57] Cf. *BGE* 53.
[58] Cf. *BGE*, "Preface" (translation modified).
[59] *BGE* 2.

BGE 6 raises many questions Nietzsche will have to answer as the book proceeds. What exactly is the nature of this self-relation? Why must a life that finds its highest organizing purpose in moneymaking, the pleasures of food or sex, political engagement, romantic or familial love, artistic creativity, specialized scientific research, or religious devotion fail to achieve such mastery and result instead in self-alienation? This aphorism presents an anticipatory sketch of Nietzsche's phenomenology of human desire, the core of which will be an unavoidably somewhat indirectly presented account of *his* way of life, the philosophical life. While *BGE* 5 begins to elaborate the more crudely political reasons why philosophers practice esotericism, *BGE* 6 introduces the deeper, most interesting, and inescapable reason – the philosopher's "highest insights," as Nietzsche calls them, cannot be communicated fully to "those who are not predisposed and predestined for them," even if the philosopher wants earnestly to reach them.[60]

III

Nietzsche concludes this sequence of aphorisms by coming back to the surface at a new angle. Having looked at philosophy itself "from the outside" and "from the inside" in *BGE* 7, Nietzsche now looks at philosophy "from the inside looking out," as one philosopher observing two others – Plato and Epicurus – sparring in public, on the stage of world history. This aphorism is at the same time an implicit commentary on Nietzsche's own sparring with his precursors, including Spinoza as well as Plato and Socrates, which helps the reader understand the playfully agonistic character of much of his polemicizing.

Nietzsche implies that the philosopher's mastery of his drives manifests itself externally as a contest for influence with other philosophers, albeit a playful one that appears simply "venomous" to the untrained eye:

> How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more venomous than the joke Epicurus permitted himself against Plato and the Platonists; he called them *Dionysiokolakes*. That means literally – and this is the foreground meaning – "flatterers of Dionysius," in other words, tyrant's baggage and lickspittles; but in addition to this he also wants to say, "they are all *actors*, there is nothing genuine about them (for *Dionysokolax* was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is really the malice that Epicurus aimed at Plato: he was peeved by the grandiose manner, the mise-en-scène at which Plato and his disciples were expert – at which Epicurus was not an expert – he, that old schoolmaster from Samos, who sat, hidden away, in his little garden at Athens and wrote three hundred books – who knows? Perhaps from rage and ambition against Plato? It took a hundred years until Greece found out who this garden god, Epicurus, had been. – Did they find out?[61]

[60] *BGE* 30; see also *BGE* 40.
[61] *BGE* 7 (translation modified).

Speaking now as a philosopher himself, Nietzsche patiently explains the secret intention ("he also wants to say") of an Epicurean joke. This secret meaning itself concerns esotericism (Plato's theatrics) – and the "venomous" joke turns out to be a kind of flattery, a form of praise for the artistry to which Epicurus aspired but at which Plato excelled. Nietzsche's own apparent "rage" against Plato, then, should not be taken at face value – it may be a "venomous joke" and a concealed form of praise for his artistry. What about Epicurus? Nietzsche carefully avoids attributing "rage" to Epicurus. He merely raises the question: "Who knows?" Otherwise put: Who is competent to decide? Nietzsche himself, one infers – he has just unpacked the secret meaning of an Epicurean joke! Due to his relatively inept theatrics, it took a century for Epicurus to become famous throughout Greece – but did "Greece" ever really discover "who he had been"? The phrase calls to mind the formula applied to the philosopher in the preceding aphorism – "who he is." The description of Epicurus as a "hidden" god calls to mind Spinoza as a goddess concealed in a suit of armor. The preceding aphorism intimated that there is something godlike about the philosophical drive itself. If Epicurus, then, despite his artistic or dramaturgical inferiority to Plato, was a real philosopher, a kind of mortal god, only those akin to him (such as Nietzsche) can comprehend "who" he really was: "What a philosopher is, that is hard to learn because it cannot be taught – one must know it, from experience."[62]

Marx famously claimed that "the philosophers" have "merely" interpreted the world in various different ways, whereas the important thing is to change it.[63] Against Marx's rather myopic view, Nietzsche suggests that philosophers have always tried not only to understand but also to change the world, even if they regard this part of their task as less important. In establishing philosophical traditions, Plato and Epicurus each tried to make the world safe for philosophy – and to contribute in a philanthropic manner to civilization and to the overall "enhancement" of man. Plato was more successful – unlike Epicurus, his books survived many centuries of unpredictable cultural upheaval and censorship of subversive ideas.[64] But even Epicurus, who took shelter in a garden, had ambitions as a "cultural legislator" – he tried to establish a *tradition* of garden-philosophizing! If Epicurus wasn't really "enraged" at Plato, he was surely ambitious, perhaps even "peeved" at his relative lack of success. He was competing with Plato for influence and prestige, much like Nietzsche: "Maybe this old Plato is my real great antagonist? But how proud I am to have such an antagonist!"[65] Nietzsche doesn't yet fully explain why philosophers

[62] *BGE* 213.

[63] Karl Marx, "Thesen über Feuerbach" (1845), in *Philosophische und ökonomische Schriften*, ed. Johannes Rohbeck and Peggy H. Breitenstein (Ditzingen: Reclam, 2018), 49 (translation is my own).

[64] Nietzsche's hyperbolic description of Epicurus's joke as the *most* "venomous" thing of which he knows alludes humorously to the "hemlock" imbibed by Socrates, which he had mentioned in the preface. So Nietzsche surely knew of at least one thing that was literally more venomous than any malicious jest! Nietzsche thereby implicitly contrasts the playful "malice" with which philosophers attack one another in public with the very real malice they have often provoked among their *real* enemies. Note the reference to "danger, slander, expulsion, and still rougher consequences of enmity" in *BGE* 25 (translation modified).

[65] Friedrich Nietzsche to Paul Deussen, November 16, 1887, in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden. Bd. 8: Januar 1887–Januar 1889*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 2nd ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), 6 (translation is my own).

engage in this playful politics of friendship and enmity[66] or why philosophical thinking has this effect on their *thumos* – moderating their political ambition in the conventional sense while heightening it in another.

I conclude with a note on the Epicurean joke itself. Epicurus alludes to Plato's more crudely political ambitions – his ill-fated trip to Syracuse to be court philosopher for the tyrant Dionysius. The "secret meaning" of the joke may have nothing to do with the surface meaning – but it's more likely to be meant (by Nietzsche if not by Epicurus himself) as a further elaboration of the surface meaning. In stepping forth as actors on the stage of history, where they are invariably misunderstood by the greater part of their audience, philosophers are above all trying to win the favor of "tyrants," who might then choose to protect them rather than to persecute them, but who might also in turn be influenced by them as philosophical advisors. Perhaps Nietzsche has in mind "tyrants" not just in a straightforwardly political sense but also in a spiritual or cultural sense, as when Pindar (famously cited by Herodotus) called *nomos* "king of all." Nietzsche's later reference in *BGE* 242 to "*tyrants*, taking that word in every sense, including the most spiritual," supports such an inference.[67] Furthermore, the name of the tyrant Dionysius calls to mind the Greek god Dionysos, whom Nietzsche ostentatiously "flatters" in *BGE* 295.[68] *BGE* 7 draws our attention obliquely to the theological-political problem – the question of the relationship between philosophy, religion, and politics. It also raises the question, Who are the real "gods"? The gods of the people or the philosophers themselves?

IV

The early aphorisms of *BGE* represent a highly condensed, preliminary exploration of the book's central themes, the most important of which is philosophy itself. However, Nietzsche's attitude toward philosophy is rhetorically ambiguous throughout the book. Sometimes he appears, in a surprisingly Platonic fashion, to be concerned above all with distinguishing the *real* philosopher from the rivals and claimants who may be confused with him: "The crowd has for a long time misjudged and mistaken the philosopher, whether for a scientific man and ideal scholar or for a religiously elevated, desensualized, 'desecularized' enthusiast and drunkard of God."[69] Some are easily dismissed as mere pseudophilosophers, such as "the anarchist Eugen Dühring and the amalgamist Eduard von Hartmann," while others are serious thinkers who nonetheless lack something decisive that would make them "genuine philosophers" in the strictest sense, such as Kant and Hegel.[70] But in other places, Nietzsche appears to be concerned rather with drawing a line between the "dogmatic" and "metaphysical" philosophy of the past, which he comprehensively

[66] Note the odd reference in *BGE* 5 to warning "an enemy or friend." Why would one warn an "enemy" unless they were really a kind of friend? Leo Strauss suggests that Aristophanes's lampooning of Socrates in the *Clouds* is a playful warning addressed to a rival who is also a friend: "It is no more plausible to say that the *Clouds* is an accusation of Socrates than to say that it is a friendly warning addressed to Socrates – a warning informed by a mixture of admiration and envy." Leo Strauss, "The Problem of Socrates," in *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 105.

[67] *BGE* 242.

[68] Ibid. 295.

[69] Ibid. 205.

[70] Ibid. 204.

rejects, and the nondogmatic, antimetaphysical "philosophy of the future," which *BGE* itself either exemplifies (as the first instance of such a philosophy) or somehow anticipates and prepares.

I suggest that a close reading of the sequence *BGE* 5-7 indicates that the former, more Platonic concern represents the deeper stratum of Nietzsche's thought. He is concerned above all with distinguishing real philosophers from those who are not. The distinction between the philosopher and all other human types, or between philosophy and all other ways of life, is more important to Nietzsche than any distinction that might obtain between the philosophy of the past and the "philosophy of the future." While Nietzsche claims in the preface that "all philosophers" hitherto, "insofar as they have been dogmatists," have failed to acquire "the truth,"[71] as the book develops, one comes gradually to learn that, "insofar as they have been dogmatists," so-called "philosophers" haven't really been *philosophers* at all but "mystics" or "metaphysicians" who are unworthy of the name "philosopher." For Nietzsche, "dogmatic philosophy" is a contradiction in terms – it is more like religion than philosophy. However, many philosophers of the past who seem to be metaphysical dogmatists when one first "looks at" them, such as Spinoza or Plato, reveal themselves, upon careful inspection, to have been far less dogmatic than a preliminary "glance" would suggest: "What is needed first of all is absolute skepticism against all traditional concepts, as one philosopher *perhaps* already possessed it – Plato. Naturally, he taught the opposite."[72]

Accordingly, when Nietzsche claims very early in the book, in the second aphorism, that one must "wait for the advent of a new species of philosophers" if one hopes to encounter thinkers who concern themselves with "dangerous maybes" that throw into question dogmatic moral and metaphysical certainties, this statement should be approached with caution.[73] At first, Nietzsche appears to mean that there has been no prior tradition of radical questioning comparable to his own. Nietzsche contrasts the philosophers whom "we have known so far" with those "I see coming up."[74] But does he mean philosophers who will be "coming up" in the future or the philosophers who will shortly be "coming up" in the first chapter, such as Spinoza, Epicurus, and Plato? The abrupt switch from "we" to "I" is striking. Perhaps "we moderns" will come to realize that we are less original than we tend to think after we learn to approach not only philosophy itself but also the history of philosophy in the way Nietzsche is about to propose. Perhaps we will discover a "new species of philosophers" when we learn to read old, familiar books in a new way.

But what about Socrates, who *didn't* write books and is the target of so many of Nietzsche's own "venomous jokes"? In the preface to *BGE*, Nietzsche ascribes Plato's invention of metaphysical "Platonism" to the "corrupting" influence of "the evil Socrates" (*der böse Sokrates*).[75] Nietzsche inverts the common scholarly view that the more Plato freed himself from the influence of Socrates, in the later dialogues, the more "Platonic"

[71] *BGE*, "Preface."
[72] This note stems from the summer of 1885.
[73] *BGE* 2.
[74] Ibid.
[75] *BGE*, "Preface."

(and metaphysical) he became. In calling Socrates "evil" and asking if he "deserved his hemlock" after all, Nietzsche suggests that Socrates may well have been guilty of the charges on which he was convicted by the Athenian *demos* – corrupting the morals of the youth ("above all that typical Hellenic youth, Plato")[76] and teaching them to disbelieve in the gods of the city. Socrates may well have been an "evil" philosopher who trafficked in "dangerous maybes" of the kind Nietzsche is about to propose, who in his deepest and most private thoughts was an unsparingly irreverent critic of morality and religion, even as he disguised himself with edifying rhetoric. Socrates, Nietzsche implies, "that great ironist, rich in secrets," taught his student well.[77]

In *BGE* 39, Nietzsche tells us that "the concept 'philosopher' isn't restricted to the philosopher who writes books – or makes books of *his* philosophy."[78] Nietzsche clearly alludes first to Socrates, as the most famous philosopher who didn't write books, but also, somewhat more obliquely, to Plato, as the most famous philosopher who *did* write books without making books of "*his* philosophy" but rather of somebody else's, namely, that of Socrates. As Plato himself writes, "No writing of Plato exists or will exist and those that are now said to be written by him belong rather to a Socrates become beautiful and new."[79] Just before he alludes to Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche mentions, as if in passing, "the evil who are happy [*den Bösen, die glücklich sind*]," describing them as a "species about whom the moralists are silent."[80] I suggest that "the evil Socrates" and the corrupted Plato are the primary examples that Nietzsche has in mind of "the evil who are happy."[81] Like his earlier book *Human, All Too Human II*, *BGE* is meant as a "signpost" toward recovering the Socratic art of living and the "joy" or "happiness" it promises.[82] But while in 1879 Nietzsche presented Socrates as a kind of anti-Christ *avant la lettre*, now he suggests that Platonism, invented by Plato as an exoteric vehicle for the preservation of Socratic philosophy, played a decisive role in the triumph of Christianity, which he describes as a "nightmare" (*Alpdrucke*) from which Europe is still waking up.[83] Nietzsche intimates that the extreme situation created by the fight against Christianity and its aftereffects has somehow necessitated the novel, anti-Socratic pose he adopts. Nietzsche is confident that Socrates would have enjoyed his venomous jokes.

[76] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 13.

[77] *BGE* 191. In the preface, he suggests that Socrates "corrupted" Plato; in *BGE* 191, he calls him Plato's "teacher." What first appears as "corruption" reveals itself upon closer inspection as "education."

[78] *BGE* 39.

[79] Plato, *Second Letter* 314c (translation is my own).

[80] *BGE* 39.

[81] The moralists are silent about them because *they don't know* "the *evil* Socrates" (or the evil Plato), only their exoteric doubles. Nietzsche frequently uses the word "evil" (*böse*) to refer, not to Cesare-Borgia-like behavior, but to the willingness radically to question moral conventions or "law-tablets."

[82] *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments*, trans. Handwerk, 86.

[83] *BGE*, "Preface." This word is difficult to translate; it suggests a sense of heavy pressure, as though one were to wake up panting, unable to breathe.

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

SECULARIZATION AS CULTURAL ANNIHILATION: NOTES ON PIOTR NOWAK'S *AFTER JEWS*[*]

> *The charge commonly made, to the effect that modern civilization overestimates the power of reason, is superficial. It would be true if one meant by reason the mind's capacity to calculate and construct, to which we owe technology and our control over the things around us. But that is one of the mind's lesser faculties and is said to be found in spiders and apes. If on the other hand one means the capacity to grasp the being of things and their meaning, and to adhere to them with the will, then the present world is much more inclined to alogism than to rationalism.*
> [Romano Amerio, *Iota Unum*]

Piotr Nowak's passionate, thoughtful, and elegantly written book is not a systematic treatise but a literary spider's web with many intricately related threads that can be difficult to follow but that return always to the guiding motif of the Jewish "idea of chosenness," the "antinomies" it contains, and its meaning today (x), after secularization and the Holocaust

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– phenomena that Nowak argues are closely linked: "The Shoah could only happen under the conditions of late capitalism rather than in the atmosphere of primitive pogroms, the violent expulsion of Jews from their Anatevkas" (x).[1] The gently hyperbolic title, *After Jews*, refers to the fact that very few Jews remain in Poland today: "There are no more Jews in Poland. They had been murdered by the German Nazis, and those who survived were expelled by the Polish Communists after the war" (xi). But Nowak's concerns are not, or not primarily, historiographical or sociological. This brute fact – the absence of Jews in Poland – serves as a symbol for man's spiritual condition in the aftermath of what Nietzsche called "the death of God." Nowak believes that one must reach for the language of political theology to come to terms with our spiritual condition today: "Ultimately, sociology and political science provide no explanations, so one needs to dig deeper, into theology – political theology" (79). Words such as *anomie* are too weak; we must speak rather of "Antichrist": "The devil, Antichrist is not just a metaphor or a creature with a limp in the left leg and charred wings; it is rather the atmosphere we live in, manifesting itself in turning traditional values inside out, in replacing respect with tolerance, charity with dubious philanthropy, love with sex, family with any social organization, religion with science, freedom with safety, and so on" (xi). However, Nowak is not a theologian, whether Jewish, Christian, Muslim, or natural (see 201). If one wanted to categorize this uncategorizable book, one could do worse than saying that it belongs to the no longer fashionable genre of "the philosophy of history" – although it is certainly not Hegelian.

The book consists of fourteen chapters, perhaps alluding to Paul's "rich epistolography" ("unluckily, he wrote 13 letters, although some argue it was 14" [2]). They address manifold topics – Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, Rene Girard's theory of the scapegoat, Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, D. H. Lawrence's *Apocalypse* (his meditation, cherished by Deleuze, on the last book of the Bible, which Luther wanted to excise from the sacred canon before changing his mind), Jacob Taubes, Joseph Roth, and Primo Levi, Jean Amery, W. G. Sebald, K. K. Baczyński, Czesław Miłosz, Krzysztof Michalski's interpretation of Nietzsche, Jonathan Lear's Heideggerean reflections on cultural obsolescence, Hannah Arendt (as refugee), and, in the final chapter, "the remainder of Christianity." Nowak's way of reading is invariably illuminating, often surprising, and sometimes perplexing. I cannot do justice to every detail of this remarkable book, so I will begin at the beginning, saunter through the middle (pausing to meditate in locations that seem particularly important to me, although given the variety of the scenery, others will find others more worthy of meditation), then stop at the end.

One might expect a book called *After Jews* to begin with a chapter called "Before Jews," in accordance with T. S. Eliot's maxim that "the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time."[2] Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*, which diagnoses the weakness that the Roman church has brought to the present age and predicts a future in which ancient, pre-Christian Roman virtue will be renewed, begins with a chapter called "What Have

[1] Piotr Nowak, *After Jews. Essays on Political Theology, Shoah and the End of Man*, Anthem Press, London–New York 2022. The numbers in parentheses are the pages of this edition.

[2] T. S. Eliot, *Four Quartets*, "Little Gidding," 5.

Been Universally the Beginnings of Any City Whatever, and What Was That of Rome." Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, which seeks to reconcile reactionaries to the present and to encourage revolutionaries not to despise the past if they want the postrevolutionary future to preserve some nobility and grace, begins with a depiction of the "External Configuration of North America." This depiction calls to mind that in the Book of Genesis of the newly created cosmos prior to the arrival on the scene of the first pair of human beings, who were also the first human sinners and who departed on a journey of discovery and conquest out of Eden into the world as we know it, the world of disease, misfortune, and death. Tocqueville's second chapter is called "On the Point of Departure and Its Importance for the Future of the Anglo-Americans." The philosophy of history seeks to understand the present and looks to the future, but typically it begins with the past.

Nowak follows such precedents up to a point, but he doesn't go all the way. Nowak's story begins in the first century, with the apostle Paul ("small, insignificant, low-ranking"), né Saul ("grand" – see page 196). Nowak doesn't begin with Abraham, or with Adam and Eve, still less with the "external configuration" of the world prior to the arrival of interiority itself and the "departure" from innocence that it freely initiated. Rather, Nowak begins with the *Epistle to the Romans*. However, one could argue that Nowak's point of departure is indeed an appropriate beginning for a book called *After Jews*. For although there were "Jews" before Paul, the meaning of "Jew" undergoes a transformation in the New Testament. Today, "Jew" is contrasted with "Christian" (even as they are linked in the conventional formula "Judeo-Christian" by means of an act of hyphenation that Jacques Derrida memorably described as "violent"), and this contrast originates in those texts, written in Greek, that Christians regard as holy and Jews today do not.

Nowak observes, "St. Paul emphasizes [...] that it is not ethnic but spiritual descent from Abraham that is necessary for salvation" (2). This idea can also be found in the Gospels, most strikingly in John, when the Pharisees tell Jesus that they are the "seed" (*sperma*) of Abraham, claiming natural descent from the patriarch. Jesus responds, "I know that you are the children [*tekna*] of Abraham: but you seek to kill me, because my word hath no place in you. [...] If you be the children [*tekna*] of Abraham, do the works of Abraham" (John 8:33-39). For the Pharisees, it is bodily kinship (*sperma*) that is important; Jesus acknowledges that the Pharisees are children (*tekna*) of Abraham in *this* sense ("I know that you are [...]") but adds that it is more important to be children in a spiritual sense. The Pharisees demonstrate that they are not Abraham's spiritual children by rejecting Jesus and resting their confidence in racial pride ("ethnic" is too weak, as the Pharisees emphasize their genealogy in the bodily sense, the fact that they *are* the seed or sperm of the patriarch). But for Jesus, it is those who "do the works of Abraham" who are his children in the most important sense, not those who are descended bodily from his seed. What Jesus says to the Pharisees about Abraham coheres perfectly with what Paul says to the Romans about those who are "a law unto themselves" (Romans 2:14), "the righteous Gentiles who were included in the spiritual order long before the birth of the Son of God" (Nowak, 3-4).

This is not to say that the sense of "Jew" referring to natural descent is not important in the New Testament, as we can infer from the genealogy of Jesus with which Matthew's Gospel begins (Matthew 1:1-17). Earlier in John, when Jesus tells the Samaritan woman

that "salvation is from the Jews" (John 4:22), "Jew" is meant in this sense. The savior is born of a virgin, descended from the line of Abraham. But the racial or genealogical (*sperma*) meaning of "Jew" comes to be replaced by a spiritual meaning, which itself gives rise to a bifurcation. On the one hand, with a decidedly pejorative valence, the Jew comes to mean one who belongs to the synagogue that rejected the claim of Jesus to be the long-awaited messiah: "The Jews had already agreed among themselves, that if anyone should confess him to be Christ, he was to be put out of the synagogue" (John 9:22). On the other hand, one could *also* say that the Jew in *this* sense "isn't really a Jew" but rather the antithesis of a Jew (just as Jesus tells the Pharisees that they both are but, more importantly, are not the children of Abraham). Thus, in a striking and crucially important formulation, the Book of Revelation refers to "those who call themselves Jews" but are not really so, regardless of whether or not they are descended bodily from Abraham's seed, because they belong *spiritually* not to the reconstituted Israel but to "the synagogue of Satan" (Revelation 2:9).

As Nowak emphasizes, such thinking can also be found in Paul, who "*teaches the Jews* which one of them is a good, real Jew and which one is pretending to be a Jew" (8, Nowak's emphasis). "According to Paul, the true Jews are Christians, the orthodox heirs of the Jewish tradition" (10). Thus, the question of *what it means to be a Jew*, much-debated by Jewish writers in modernity but one that also "kindles the imagination of all sorts of anti-Semites" (8), is fraught with theological-political significance. One cannot answer such a question by calling upon a committee of lexicographers. There is no "neutral" or "impartial" criterion to which one can appeal. One's answer is bound to offend somebody.

Nowak has no truck with approaches akin to that of the influential "New Perspective on Paul" established by the American liberal Protestant biblical scholar E. P. Sanders's book *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*.[3] For Sanders, most of the Jewish-Christian theological-political conflict during the past 2,000 years comes down to an unfortunate misunderstanding. Paul in fact believed there were two paths to salvation – one for Jews, who had no need to accept Christ as messiah and savior but were free to reject Him to their heart's content so long as they kept the Law, and another for everyone else, who (whether happily or not) had to confess the name of Christ to make it to heaven. It is difficult to say whether the New Perspective is inspired by misplaced compassion toward a persecuted people or merely by liberal fuzzy-mindedness and sentimentality. However that may be, Nowak demonstrates very clearly, with ample quotations, that Paul (the distinguished rabbi and former zealous persecutor of Christians) was out to tell *everyone* just what it means to be a *real* Jew. From now on, this requires that one accept Jesus as messiah – "those who call themselves Jews" but reject Christ don't get an "alternative option" (Americans love customizable menus, while Europeans expect a chef who knows what he's doing). Of course, Nowak recognizes that the same bifurcation that I noted above appears in Paul, too (see 12). We find it also in 1 Corinthians 1:23, when Paul famously asserts that while "Christ crucified" is "foolishness" to "the Greeks," Christ is a "stumbling block" to "the Jews." But Nowak doesn't emphasize with sufficient clarity what this implies – that the

[3] E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1977).

Jews wanted a powerful warrior, a kind of *Übermensch*, not a suffering servant who freely accepted a humiliating death on the cross.

However, Nowak's own orientation is neither Christian nor Jewish but secular and philosophical, one might say "Greek" (for Nowak, the crucified savior who literally rose from the dead is not a "stumbling block" but rather "foolishness") – even as Nowak believes that the language of political theology remains indispensable for comprehending our spiritual condition today and perhaps in any time. Nowak's fundamentally Greek orientation can be seen in his acceptance of a modified version of Nietzsche's hypothesis that there is a contradiction between Jesus's teaching and that of Paul, such that Paul is the real founder of Christianity (is this why he starts from Paul and not from the Gospels?) and thus the real originator of the Jewish-Christian split as we know it today. For Nowak as for Nietzsche, Jesus didn't teach doctrine or dogma, and (Nowak implies) all the evidence in the Gospels that suggests otherwise are distortions or fabrications. Jesus "trusted" in God *without* "believing" in God, for belief takes the form of doctrinal assent to propositions, whereas trust, Nowak posits, doesn't require any such thing:

> To sum up: There are two types of faith – a "better" one and a "worse" one. The "better" faith is that which *trusts in God* rather than *believes in Him*. At its best, this faith [...] is driven by spontaneity – it is natural, just like some poems and all sunsets are natural. It is born out of the experience of an entire nation, not an individual human being (which is why it attaches importance to law and rituals). The other type of faith (*pistis*) is created outside the history of a nation – on its margins, so to say – and consists in the conversion of an individual human being toward a credo, most often an absurd one. His or her individual choice is thus made outside the community and is ahistorical. Jesus inclined to the first type of faith, whereas the second characterized St. Paul. (14)

Nowak's confident assertion about the fundamental difference between the faith to which Jesus "inclined" and the kind that "characterized" Paul implies that Nowak understands Jesus better than Paul understood Jesus. It is worth noting that Nietzsche himself does not share Nowak's confidence in the very hypothesis that Nowak borrows from *The Antichrist*, with some modifications (e.g., Nowak's suggestion that Jesus "attaches importance to law and rituals," contrary to Nietzsche's claim in *The Antichrist* that "the Redeemer" was utterly indifferent to law and ritual).[4] This can be inferred from the fact that Nietzsche proposes three different, competing hypotheses about the teaching of the historical Jesus: the hypothesis he develops in *The Antichrist* and on which Nowak relies, but also two others in different aphorisms in *Beyond Good and Evil*, 164 and 269, the first of which presents Jesus as an antinomian and egalitarian religious teacher, while the other emphasizes the doctrine of eternal punishment and, in fact, fits rather well with Paul and with later Christian tradition.[5] One may conclude that Nietzsche didn't believe it possible,

[4] See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 32-35.
[5] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 164 and 269.

given the nature of the sources, to reconstruct the teaching of the historical Jesus with anything even distantly approaching certainty; all one can do is to develop and to explore various more or less plausible hypotheses. This distinguishes Nietzsche not only from Nowak (who, however, follows Nietzsche's psychological and literary approach to the sources) but also from biblical scholars, such as those of the so-called "Jesus seminar," who believe that empirical-scientific criteria can be developed by means of which it is possible to break down the Gospels, as if in a laboratory, into those particular elements that are Jesus's own words, translated *verbatim* into Greek, and those that are later fabrications (Nowak shows no sign of such superstitious vulgarity).

From the perspective of traditional Catholic (or Orthodox) theology, Nowak's distinction between trust in God and belief in God, as if the former could exist in the absence of the latter, his valorizing of noncreedal trust at the expense of creedal belief, the opposition he posits between the community and the individual and between exterior ritual and interior assent, his dismissal of the importance of interior assent, and above all the fundamental antithesis he affirms between Paul (as someone whose attitude anticipates that of hard-line theological pedants and heartless inquisitors) and Jesus are all unsustainable. It is important to point this out because, although Nowak is not an antireligious polemicist – on the contrary, he is favorable toward Christians today, whom he describes as "an unpopular minority" comparable in this respect to "gay people and transvestites" (Nowak, 192) – his argument directly implies that later Christian tradition is founded on a lie, and not an altogether noble one.

I noted that Nowak's orientation is neither Christian nor Jewish but "Greek." However, Nowak's take on Paul *is* Jewish in a certain, decisive sense. Nowak writes, "By going out into the wilderness, Moses starts a new People of God, whereas Paul wants to start his people anew. Obedient to the dead law, the 'old Jews' mark time, do not move on, while the 'new Jews,' those who proclaim the divinity of Christ, represent a genuinely new opening" (12). Now, it's true that, for Paul, Jesus inaugurates a new covenant (Thomas Aquinas even speaks of a "New Law"). But for Paul, those who call themselves Jews without accepting Jesus as messiah do not represent *authentic continuity* with the religion of Hebrew scripture, as if non-Christian Jews are simply doing things the old way when it's time to move on. Likewise, those who follow Christ do not practice a new religion. Rather, the Christian religion is the *same* as that of Hebrew scripture (the Old Testament), only manifest in its plenitude now that the prophesied messiah has arrived, while the religion of those who call themselves "Jews" but reject the messiah (this includes the Jews who were living in Poland in the first half of the twentieth century) is an essentially *different* faith from that revealed in Hebrew scripture, indeed a *new* faith, founded on the rejection of the *true* Jewish messiah and thus a misunderstanding of, and decisive *break* with, the older Jewish tradition. For Paul, those who reject Christ as messiah are not true to the faith of the prophets and the patriarchs.

Nowak doesn't appear to notice that, in claiming that Paul did not "[recognize] the continuity of the Jewish tradition" (14), he thereby takes sides in a religious dispute that ought not to concern him as a "Greek." Later, when discussing Jacob Taubes's interpretation of Paul, Nowak writes, "Over two thousand years have passed since the Lord promised man the Second Coming, and he has not kept his promise. Jews, who have already had

many messiahs, such as Jesus or Sabbatai Zevi, have been awaiting salvation even longer" (74). Further on: "For the Jews, revelation has a public dimension – its arena is human history: God is coming from the direction of their history. Revelation is always connected with that which already came to pass. For Christians, however, it is a spiritual event that wholly belongs to their private, apolitical world" (77). Nowak ignores the fact that "public revelation" is a concept integral to Catholic theology (unless he means to imply that Catholics aren't really Christians due to their distortion of the evangelical message?). Aquinas argues for the orthodox position that public revelation came to an end with the Book of Revelation, written by John the Evangelist.[6] In *Dei verbum*, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation of the Second Vatican Council (1965), we read: "The Christian dispensation, [...] as the new and definitive covenant, will never pass away and we now await no further new public revelation before the glorious manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ (see 1 Tim. 6:14 and Tit. 2:13)."[7] More importantly, however, in affirming a fundamental continuity between the Jews of antiquity and those who came later and a radical discontinuity between the Jews of antiquity and the Christians, Nowak unwittingly takes the side of the Jews *against* the Christians with respect to a question recognized as profoundly important by both parties to the dispute. Leo Strauss asked of Spinoza, who was born a Jew, "Why does he take the side of Christianity in the conflict between Christianity and Judaism, in a conflict of no concern to him as a philosopher?"[8] Similarly, one might ask of Nowak, who was born a Catholic, why he takes the side of Judaism "in a conflict of no concern to him as a philosopher." Might it be that philosophers have an irresistible tendency, which may be more or less conscious, toward the inversion of origins?

I return now to the title of the book. Nowak is more correct than he seems to realize in beginning *After Jews* with a chapter on Paul because for Paul there were indeed no "Jews" *in the sense in which Nowak has in mind* before Christ. Why? Because it is not Jews but rather Christians who (in their acceptance of the messiah prophesied by the Jewish prophets) represent authentic continuity with prior Jewish tradition, while those Jews who reject Christ – "Jews" in Nowak's sense, including the Jews of Poland – represent a radical break with Jewish tradition. Christians and Jews, then, both represent novelty, but Christians represent the kind of novelty that fulfills the old law, whereas Jews (in a moment of dramatic irony) represent the kind that abolishes, or at least distorts, it. This idea would later be taken up by Muhammad against both Christians and Jews. The Qur'an teaches that both religious groups received authentic revelations ("the Torah" and "the Gospel") from the One God, which they subsequently distorted to suit their own particular purposes, turning mendaciously against the God who was so merciful as to communicate with them.[9]

It is interesting that Nowak supplies considerable textual detail for his mostly convincing reading of Paul but none at all for his idiosyncratically neo-Nietzschean picture of Jesus. One knows how Nowak reaches his conclusions about Paul; one can only speculate why he speaks with such confidence about who Jesus really was and the

[6] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Question 174.

[7] https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/dogmatic-constitution-on-divine-revelation-1539.

[8] Leo Strauss, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 244.

[9] See Mun'im Sirry, "The Falsification of Jewish and Christian Scriptures," in *Scriptural Polemics: The Qur'an and Other Religions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 100-132.

kind of faith toward which Jesus had a certain "inclination." However, in a way the second chapter of *After Jews*, "The Secret of the Scapegoat (Rene Girard)," is about Jesus – not the historical Jesus as Nowak imagines him but rather the image of Jesus as sacrificial victim whose freely accepted death on the cross atoned for the sins of the human race.

In exile on St. Helena, Napoleon recognized in *this* Jesus a general who conquered the world posthumously through the loyalty and devotion he inspired in his army, a devotion analogous to but far greater than that inspired by glorious military leaders of world-historical importance, such as Alexander the Great (who, in fact, makes an appearance in the Qur'an as a prophet comparable to Moses or Jesus),[10] Caesar, or Napoleon himself:

> You speak of Caesar, of Alexander, of their conquests, and of the enthusiasm which they enkindled in the hearts of their soldiers; but can you conceive of a dead man making conquests, with an army faithful, and entirely devoted to his memory. My armies have forgotten me even while living, as the Carthaginian army forgot Hannibal. Such is our power! A single battle lost crushes us, and adversity scatters our friends. Can you conceive of Caesar as the eternal emperor of the Roman senate, and, from the depth of his mausoleum, governing the empire, watching over the destinies of Rome? Such is the history of the invasion and conquest of the world by Christianity; such is the power of the God of the Christians; and such is the perpetual miracle of the progress of the faith, and of the government of his Church. [...] I have so inspired multitudes, that they would die for me. [...] But, after all, my presence was necessary: the lightning of my eye, my voice, a word from me, then the sacred fire was kindled in their hearts. I do, indeed, possess the secret of this magical power which lifts the soul; but I could never impart it to any one. None of my generals ever learned it from me. Nor have I the means of perpetuating my name and love for me in the hearts of men. [...] Now that I am at St. Helena, now that I am alone, chained upon this rock, who fights and wins empires for me? who are the courtiers of my misfortune? who thinks of me? who makes effort for me in Europe? Where are my friends? [...] Such is the fate of great men! So it was with Caesar and Alexander. And I, too, am forgotten. [...] Behold the destiny, near at hand, of him whom the world called the great Napoleon! What an abyss between my deep misery and the eternal reign of Christ, which is proclaimed, loved, adored, and which is extending over all the earth! Is this to die? is it not rather to live?[11]

In this way, Napoleon tells us, Jesus survives in the hearts of men, whether or not the God-Man of church dogma is a historical or a theological reality. Having presented Paul as the first Christian theologian, it is appropriate that Nowak take up the theme of the Christ of faith, the Christ who conquered European culture, in the second chapter.

[10] Qur'an, Surah 18:89-98.

[11] Cited in John Stevens Cabot Abbott, *The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*, vol. 2 (London: Ward, Lock and Co., 1899), 616-18.

However, Nowak takes this theme up in a rather indirect way, by means of a harsh critique of Rene Girard's theory of the scapegoat, which relies on an "infantile anthropology" (22).

This is the most polemical chapter in the book and one of the most persuasive. Nowak presents Girard as a philosopher for whom religion is of great importance, just as it is for Hegel, Heidegger, and Nowak himself: "There is mystery in a human being, and only religion can reveal this mystery to us. [...] In order to properly understand philosophy and science, one must first understand religion" (17). Religion is the most important dimension of our subphilosophical or transphilosophical spiritual life – for Hegel, the second most adequate form of appearance of the Absolute (philosophy is the most adequate); for Heidegger, the form of human existence (*Daseinsform*) antithetical to philosophy, its "mortal enemy" (*Todesfeind*), but for this very reason an important theme of ontological reflection.[12] Girard likewise recognizes the importance of religion, but for Girard, culture in all its complexity is reducible to imitative desire, the "mimetic" impulse. We want things only because other people want them; if I fall in love with a beautiful woman, it is only because she is desired by others or because I assume that she is so desired. As in Nietzsche, value is created, not discovered, but it is created not by the creative legislation of the superior individual but rather by the cowardly and vain collective, which is understood not on the model of Hegelian *Geist*, progressively developing more and more rational transparency and self-consciousness (albeit through the painful means of "the slaughterbench of history" and "the terrible labour of the negative"), but rather as trapped in a vicious circle of mimetic desires, guided by no authentic teleology. If nothing were done to stabilize this situation, human beings would tear each other to pieces. So the crisis is obviated by fixing on a scapegoat, an innocent and defenseless victim, "thanks to whom the entire community will then unite in the medium of hatred" (18).

For Girard, all culture is rendered comprehensible through this theory, but the Christian religion is unique in bringing the truth of culture to light. Nowak cites Girard: "Christianity, in the figure of Jesus, denounced the scapegoat mechanism for what it actually is: the murder of an innocent victim, killed in order to pacify a riotous community. That's the moment in which the mimetic mechanism is fully revealed" (19). Girard rejects the doctrine that Jesus's death in fact atoned for our sins. As Nowak paraphrases, "Here is the essence of Christian doctrine that is a great betrayal of the Gospel message. Christianity betrayed Christ, saying that He redeemed our sins, that He saved us from the fatal consequences of original sin, while in fact He only released our mutual anger" (20). Christianity teaches that it is precisely because Jesus was innocent that he was able to save us from our sins; Girard claims that it is precisely because Jesus was innocent that he could *not* save us from our sins: "Christ, however, could not be a victim because he was not guilty. *He did not voluntarily burden himself with man's evil in order to later redeem it*" (21, Nowak's emphasis). For Girard, the doctrine of the atonement is a "betrayal of evangelical values" (22).

Nowak argues, convincingly, that Girard's theory of culture is monstrously reductive and crude:

[12] "Phenomenology and Theology," in Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, trans. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 53.

> In his view, all cultural phenomena can be explained by the empirical theory of the scapegoat and the mimetic impasse. The complexities of human nature are questioned, the puzzles of the inner life are solved, and everything is reduced to the "social phenomena," just like in today's theater. Seen through Girard's eyes, human beings are flat and one-dimensional, consisting only of words and behaviors that are easy to fathom. Therefore, they are predictable, cowardly (they act in groups), cruel and dangerous. Is this the truth about man? There is no other, says Girard. (22)

This chapter includes one of the shrewdest observations in the book:

> One might presume that his scapegoat theory was first hardened on personal, psychological, typically *resentful* grounds, only later acquiring the features of a scientific concept. [...] Girard tends to emphasize the fact that he likes puzzles and secrets, or that he studies obliterated traces and explores forlorn paths. I do not think this is true. Girard is not at all interested in the human depths. (22, Nowak's emphasis)

Rather, Nowak demonstrates, Girard reduces human interiority to just so many instantiations of the same crudely external causal mechanism at work everywhere. There is no depth to be found anywhere, at all.

One wonders why Nowak chose to insert a chapter on Girard at just this place. Girard shares with Nowak the opinion that Christianity distorts the original message of Jesus, that the image of Jesus that conquered and ruled over European culture in a more-than-Napoleonic manner is an imaginative construction, not the preservation of an authentic "public revelation." But Girard understands culture itself through a crudely reductive mechanism, which Nowak elegantly dismantles. Perhaps, then, Nowak introduces Girard here because he wants to point us toward the structure of the problem that Girard solves in a grotesquely simplifying fashion – namely, the philosophical comprehension of post-Christian culture in all its glory, but also in its shame. In particular, the Holocaust of European Jews might seem to lend itself to explanation through Girard's theory of the scapegoat; the Nazis and their accomplices freed themselves from the mutual rage engendered by the vicious circle of mimetic desire by fixing on a victim (here a group, not an individual) who had done nothing to harm them. However, Nowak suggests that, just as human history as a whole cannot be understood through this simple mechanism, neither can this most recent catastrophe. The "founding murder" of postmodernity demands an approach more nuanced and more profound.

After Jews itself begins with two founding murders, though of an intellectual kind. The first two chapters, on Paul and Girard, share a certain polemical structure. Although Nowak is far more respectful of Paul than of Girard, both chapters end with a clear critique of their subject, which in each case appeals to Jesus. The first chapter ends by contrasting the faith of Paul with that of Jesus, while the second ends with a harsh criticism of Girard's theory of culture, a theory that Girard himself presents as the true meaning of Jesus's death, in contrast to the distortions of official church doctrine.

Having established his own authority through this double patricide, Nowak's attitude to his various subjects in the remaining chapters becomes, on the whole, more ambiguous. For example, the fourth chapter deals with D. H. Lawrence's interpretation of the Book of Revelation and Christianity itself. Like Nowak and Girard, Lawrence wants to recover the original teaching of Jesus, which he regards as distorted by later Christian tradition and even by much of Christian scripture, although like Nietzsche, and unlike Nowak and Girard, Lawrence goes so far as to criticize Jesus as an individual. Lawrence maintains that "Christ demonstrated a lack of political acumen" and "lied to the common people" (58). Nowak appears to sympathize with aspects of Lawrence's religious thought, such as the contempt with which Lawrence views the doctrine of rewards and punishments after death (see 47-48, 52, 55), and he defends Lawrence from the facile charge of "fascism" on the part of dogmatic egalitarians and partisan cheerleaders for democracy such as Bertrand Russell and Anthony Burgess (see 59-60). However, the conclusion to the chapter reserves judgment about many details of Lawrence's thought, which Nowak has just analyzed with sympathetic neutrality.

As the book develops, it becomes difficult to follow the thread of its argument because it doesn't develop in a linear fashion but rather in the manner of a well-patterned novel, the meaning of which is conveyed less by the plot than by the characters (Jews, Germans, Poles – Shylock, Sebald, Miłosz) and less by the characters than by the patterns that emerge and the themes that gradually crystallize.

Nowak is concerned with the idea of chosenness and with the Christian-Jewish split, which he presents as a historical dialectic that unfolds from the former, not, however, with the necessity of Hegelian teleology, the wound of Spirit that heals and "leaves no scars" – *die Wunden des Geistes heilen, ohne Narben zu hinterlassen* – but rather in a manner closer to that of Walter Benjamin's notion of a "stalled dialectic." Does the idea of chosenness manifest itself properly in the people who remain stubbornly apart, who cannot assimilate without ceasing to be themselves?

> *A Jew needs to be different than everybody else, or he is not a Jew at all.* [...] Under the mask, the Jew can pretend he is like others, that is, he can lie. Also to his God. But in reality, the Jew *has* different eyes, for he sees other things, looks somewhere else; he eats differently than Christians (kosher!), also he takes care of his bodily cleanliness in a decidedly different way (mikvah!). The Jew is different. (35-36, Nowak's emphasis)

Or does it manifest itself properly in Christian universalism focused on the God on the cross, the particularist Everyman, whose Holy Name offers salvation? Neither Christian nor Jewish but Greek, Nowak intentionally leaves these questions hanging.

Nowak is also concerned with the grittier historical dimension of the conflict between Christians and Jews, for example, in the third chapter, on *A Merchant of Venice*. With respect to this dimension, Nowak takes no sides but seems at times more sympathetic to the Christians (see the description of Antonio's Greco-Christian magnanimity [28]), at other times to the Jews:

> Hasidic religiousness created a highly sensual, quasi-erotic bond; faith was supposed to trigger a spontaneous joy in the believers, rather than a concern for what may come after death; it was meant to release and appreciate the sensual side of the human, rather than negating it, coaxing them, to take the first example, into a necessity of months-long fasting. Stripped of sensuality, religion promptly turns into fear (Catholicism) or a barren, intellectual speculation (Protestantism). (84)

But while Nowak recognizes that the Christian-Jewish split was a kind of formal precondition for the Holocaust, he doesn't resort to a facile blaming of Christianity. Rather, with darkly anti-Hegelian irony, Nowak presents the Holocaust as the culmination of the totalitarianism implicit in the modernization process itself. Nowak's argument echoes the famous thesis of Horkheimer and Adorno, while embracing the cultural nostalgia such a thesis implies more straightforwardly and honestly than do those quasi-Marxists.

Quite correctly, Nowak asserts that industrial-scale slaughter of human beings is possible only in modern conditions – and he emphasizes that this applies to the Allied bombings of German civilians, serving no military purpose (see 111), documented by the writer W. G. Sebald, no less than to the Nazi slaughter of defenseless Jews and gypsies. But as a philosopher of history, Nowak is concerned less with historiography than with *Zeitdiagnose*, "comprehending one's age in thought." For Nowak, the elimination of European Jews, *especially* the alien, unassimilable, eastern Jews of the shtetl (who might be contrasted with the cultured, assimilated Jews of western Europe, the doctors, professors, art-collectors, and piano-players, such as the protagonist of Roman Polanski's *The Pianist*, that liberal intellectuals like to portray in their novels, movies, and television shows and instinctively call to mind when they lament the Holocaust, preferring not to sully their imagination with images of dirty Lithuanian peasants or stinking village rabbis with unruly forelocks), is not only a horrifying fact of modern European history but *also* a symbol for the spiritual atmosphere of the secularized present:

> The Shoah was a necessary result of processes of modernization annihilating, one by one, every element of the old world, which came to be regarded as "swamped in gross superstitions," unfit for assimilation, and anachronistic. Eastern Jews, due to their incorruptible attitude to religion and tradition, played no accidental role of the victim in the work of destruction. It turned out that negotiating conditions of renouncing their forefathers' faith with the chosen people was impossible. They valued their religion over the miracles of the latest technology or the newest social solutions prompted by ideologies and lay prophets. [...] The requiem over the world of Eastern Jews is a mourning after the loss of truly human values – God, tradition, remembrance of the dead – after a fierce religiousness unharmed by an aggressive atheism and thoughtless boredom. Without them, without Jews, whose very own tradition transformed them into guardians of human values, we have been diminished in our very essence. (96-97)

No passage in *After Jews* conveys so clearly why Nowak regards the extermination of the Polish Jews – *not* the German Jews of the salons and the universities, Jews such as Rahel Varnhagen (immortalized in Hannah Arendt's famous study) or Hermann Cohen, but the unassimilated Polish Jews of the shtetl – as a symbol of the cultural devastation unleashed on the human spirit by modernity itself. Nowak's sympathy for the Jews *as* Jews (i.e., not "merely" as victims, like the victims of the Rwandan genocide, for example, an event to which Nowak, curiously, alludes several times), which at times seems even stronger than his sympathy for believing Christians *as* Christians, comes from a sense, similar to certain thoughts of Leo Strauss, that Jews of this kind are those denizens of twentieth-century Europe *most* untouched by European modernity (recall that Strauss characterizes the Christian tradition as "the perverse interweaving of a *nomos*-tradition with a philosophical tradition,"[13] something that Strauss would surely never say about Jewish Orthodoxy or the sages of the Talmud).

Nowak's thesis recalls Heidegger's notorious assertion (endorsed by Alexandre Kojève) that democratic America and Soviet Russia are "metaphysically the same" and his even more notorious comparison of the "mass production of corpses" in death camps with mechanized agriculture.[14] Perhaps partly to ward off the misunderstanding that his emphasis on the symbolic dimension of the Holocaust implies neglect of the nonsymbolic, fleshly suffering of the victims, Nowak includes a chapter on Jean Améry, who depicted his torture at the hands of the Nazis in vivid, horrifying detail in *At the Mind's Limits* (1966). Whatever might have to be said of Heidegger, whose "neglect of the body" can arguably already be found in *Being and Time*,[15] Nowak is surely immune to this criticism.

However, Nowak's argument proceeds on both a symbolic and an empirical level, and it is at times difficult to determine how exactly they are meant to be intertwined. Nowak observes, "The racist theory of the superiority of the Aryan race over others was only a screen, a pretext for the Holocaust. Its real cause was the unenlightened religiousness of the chosen people, which presented a challenge to the Enlightenment model of civilization" (186). Surely the survival of such unassimilable relics as the Jews of the shtetls poses a challenge to "the Enlightenment model of civilization," but the Nazi movement itself was in many respects an attack on this very model.

However, the Nazi movement cannot be opposed to the Enlightenment in the simple way that many partisans of secularism would like. Kant and Hegel, for example, found little to justify the continued existence in modernity of the Jews as a distinct people, stubbornly holding onto their traditions. Notoriously, Kant even called for "the euthanasia of Judaism."[16] Kant would surely never have called for, or even remotely sympathized

[13] Cited in Heinrich Meier, *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8.

[14] Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. G. Fried and R. Polt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 48. For Kojève's approbation of this remark, see Waller R. Newell, "Kojève's Hegel, Hegel's Hegel, and Strauss's Hegel: A Middle Range Approach to the Debate about Tyranny and Totalitarianism," in *Philosophy, History, and Tyranny: Reexamining the Debate between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève*, ed. T. Burns and B.-P. Frost (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016), 247-49.

[15] See Kevin Aho, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009).

[16] E. Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Albaris, 1979), 95.

with, the physical extermination of Jews, although it is easy to see that someone with similarly "enlightened" goals but a more brutal and impatient approach to the morality of means might be inspired by such formulae to contemplate the unthinkable. As for the leading Nazis themselves, it is well known that Eichmann appealed, however spuriously, to the categorical imperative to justify his crimes; it is less well known that Hitler praised Kant in an extremely banal way, but quite sincerely, appealing to Enlightenment clichés: "His complete refutation of the teachings which were a heritage from the Middle Ages, and of the dogmatic philosophy of the Church, is the greatest of the services which Kant has rendered to us."[17]

Nowak's proposal, then, even if suggestive and hyperbolic at the same time, is worthy of reflection and further development. John Lukacs, the Hungarian Catholic historian of Jewish descent who survived the Fascist and Communist occupations of Budapest before escaping in 1946 to the United States, argued that Hitler was not a reactionary or even a straightforwardly counter-Enlightenment figure. Rather, Hitler's political orientation, and the policies of the movement he spearheaded, combined traditional and modern, conservative and revolutionary elements in a dynamic synthesis, a point completely missed by neo-Marxist interpretations of Hitler as the archreactionary. Consider the following remarks from *The Hitler of History*: "Already during Hitler's lifetime, the terms 'right' and 'left' did not properly apply to him. Was he to the right or to the left of, say, the Pope? Or Franco? Or even Churchill?" (77); "The prospect he evoked was not that of a *return* to the Middle Ages but that of an enormous leap *forward*, to a new Dark Age" (77-78); "There were many things in National Socialism and in Hitler's ideas that were *modern*" (80); "He himself said on many occasions: reactionaries, as well as Communists or Marxists or Jews, were his main enemies, within Germany as well as abroad. Indeed (he said this often), within Germany the reactionaries were his most dangerous enemies" (82); "Often during the war, he told his circle that the business of taking the churches to task would have to wait until the end of the war. Then they would be properly dealt with, and German youth would be liberated from their influences" (91); "Hitler's interest in and respect for technology were considerable" (98); "Modernization does not necessarily mean a cult of youth; but for Hitler the latter was dominant. [...] The impression he gave of himself was seldom [...] that of a particularly youthful person. But his party and movement *were* youthful: In 1931, in Berlin 70 per cent of the SA were men under thirty, and in the Reichstag in 1930, 60 per cent of the National Socialist deputies were under forty, while only 10 per cent of the Social Democrats were [...]. Hitler seems to have been the creator of a free country of the young. Before them he plays not the role of a severe father but of a mother, a source of many pleasures and of love. He allows them pseudo-revolutionary freedom for their biological and sexual impulses, adding to his appeal" (99-100); "Hitler often used the word 'modern' approvingly" (103).[18]

[17] H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations*, trans. Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (New York: Enigma Books, 2008), 720.

[18] All from John Lukacs, *The Hitler of History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).

The leading Nazis saw themselves as executing the imperatives of a *true* Enlightenment and quite consciously forging a *new* unity of the German nation, even if – like most revolutionaries – they saw their revolutionary agenda as rooted in, and fulfilling, the highest potentialities of the past. Furthermore, it is quite true that the doctrine of biological racial superiority was more an effect than a cause of the Nazi movement and more a means to achieve its goals, a political weapon or instrument, than an end-in-itself, even if Nowak's formulation (the "real cause" of the Holocaust was "the unenlightened religiousness of the chosen people") risks oversimplification. Certainly, however, one cannot dismiss Nowak's thesis by observing that, unlike Kant or Hegel, Hitler didn't allow individuals of Jewish descent to assimilate by renouncing the Jewish religion. For a policy of crude biologism – and horrific physical violence – can *itself* serve idealistic or spiritual goals, including the most demonic ones. Lukacs writes, "Deterministic idealism [...] proved to be more inhumane than the deterministic materialism that had preceded and (lamentably) survived it. [...] And an incarnation of an unstinting belief in a determinist idealism was Adolf Hitler."[19]

But what about the symbolic dimension of Nowak's thesis? Can we say that the Holocaust of European Jews considered *as* Jews (not as anonymous, innocent victims, with no status other than mere suffering, fleshly humanity, although they can *also* be considered in this way, as can all victims of violent persecution), and more particularly the disappearance of Jews from Poland after Nazi murders and Communist expulsions, crystallizes the world-spirit of modernity, the cultural annihilation wrought by secularization, which must also be described (even by a Greek) as the spirit of Antichrist?

In one sense, Nowak's thesis is surely correct and brings to light the intolerance concealed in secular modernity's promise of freedom: "European, post-Enlightenment modernity cannot – it is not able to – incorporate into its own bloodstream those elements that in its eyes are considered pre-Enlightenment, 'barbaric' remnants that deserve 'hospitalization' or rejection" (181). Nowak's account of the present age, dominated by "Canadian policemen," as the world of Antichrist is similar to the Catholic political philosopher James Kalb's characterization of modernity as an "antiworld," "a rebellion against God, nature and history," which has "led to the suppression of many things that have always been fundamental to human society – religion, cultural particularity, even the distinction between the sexes."[20] Kalb observes,

> The contemporary liberal state cannot allow people to take seriously the things they have always taken most seriously. They can say they are Catholics, Muslims, or anything else, but what they mean by that has to be consistent for practical purposes with the liberal view. In effect, they have to accept that their religion – their understanding of the nature of man and the world – has to become a matter of private taste. Those who do not accept the transformation are excluded from public discussion as cranks who oppose freedom, equality, and reason.[21]

[19] Lukacs, *The Hitler of History*, 258.
[20] James Kalb, "Out of the Antiworld," *Modern Age* (Summer 2013).
[21] Ibid.

Insofar as the Jews were exterminated because *as* Jews they were unassimilable, the Holocaust can be taken as a symbol for the intolerance implicit in secularism – a thesis with a certain poignant irony, given that the Holocaust is often taken as *the* justification for a secular, modern, liberal-democratic order insofar as it is assumed that *only* such a political order can prevent history from repeating itself with catastrophic effect.

On the other hand, however, while Nowak argues that Jews *as* Jews were the most characteristic *victims* of the modernization process (even as similar things could be said about, for example, unassimilable Catholics *as* Catholics, Muslims *as* Muslims, and so on), it has often been argued – with some plausibility – that Jews *as* Jews are paradigms of modernity itself. For example, in *The Jewish Century* (2004), historian Yuri Slezkine argues that modernization is the process by which *everyone* becomes Jewish:

> The Modern Age is the Jewish Age, and the twentieth century, in particular, is the Jewish Century. Modernization is about everyone becoming urban, mobile, literate, articulate, intellectually intricate, physically fastidious, and occupationally flexible. It is about learning how to cultivate people and symbols, not fields or herds. It is about pursuing wealth for the sake of learning, learning for the sake of wealth, and both wealth and learning for their own sake. It is about transforming peasants and princes into merchants and priests, replacing inherited privilege with acquired prestige, and dismantling social estates for the benefit of individuals, nuclear families, and book-reading tribes (nations). Modernization, in other words, is about everyone becoming Jewish. [...] But no one is better at being Jewish than the Jews themselves. In the age of capital, they are the most creative entrepreneurs; in the age of alienation, they are the most experienced exiles; and in the age of expertise, they are the most proficient professionals. Some of the oldest Jewish specialties – commerce, law, medicine, textual interpretation, and cultural mediation – have become the most fundamental (and the most Jewish) of all modern pursuits. It is by being exemplary ancients that the Jews have become model moderns.[22]

Perhaps there is something unique about the Jewish people – the chosen people – that allows them to serve equally well as symbols for, or living embodiments of, opposite things?

This difficulty may be related to a well-known ambiguity at the heart of Jewish identity. Does "being Jewish" mean being the adherent of a particular religion (like "being Christian")? Or is it rather a national identity, connoting belonging, not necessarily to a particular *state* (like "being Israeli"), but rather to a particular *people* (like "being Polish" or "being Kurdish")? Or is it somehow *both* and – if so – how do they fit together? Difficulties of this kind are not unique to the Jews, but the Jews somehow instantiate them in an exemplary way. Dramatically, but rather carefully, Leo Strauss wrote, "From every point of view it looks as if the Jewish people were the chosen people, at least in the sense

[22] Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 11.

that the Jewish problem is the most manifest symbol of the human problem insofar as it is a social or political problem."[23] Hannah Arendt's study of Rahel Varnhagen concludes, in effect, that to be Jewish is to be just like everyone else – only even more so. That is to say, irreducibly singular, unable to escape one's origins, even (or especially) if one is willing to betray them, but equally unable to embrace them fully, always somewhat alienated, not only from others but also from oneself, but – if one is sufficiently wise and sufficiently human – ultimately thankful for the difficulties resulting from the identity with which one is thrown into the world.[24] More brutally, Theodor Herzl wrote, "Universal brotherhood isn't even a beautiful dream. The enemy is necessary for the highest exertions of the personality."[25]

Nowak comes down hard on one side of the debate about identity. Twice he says that the formula "religious Jews" is a "pleonasm" because "there are no nonreligious Jews" (2, 186). The Jews in the title *After Jews* are unassimilable orthodox Jews and by extension or analogy every stubbornly religious person, Jewish or not, who refuses to bow the knee to "Antichrist" – that is to say, to the spirit of our age. But it's not clear that Nowak sticks consistently to this principle. Discussing Uriel Acosta, the seventeenth-century freethinker, Nowak writes, "The rebellion Acosta started was Talmudic in its character; certainly, it was a strong rejection, yet it was directed against Jewish orthodoxy and not against Jewishness in its entirety. This is indicated by the last sentence in which he not only renounces the Jewish name he adopted in his youth but also decides to keep it" (31). In the preface, he observes, "Within the borders of the Republic of Poland [...] there was a lack of unanimity on many fundamental issues within the Jewish community. Jews wanted state subsidies for Jewish schools, but could not decide whether the language of instruction should be Hebrew – the language of Zionists and Orthodox Jews – or Yiddish, spoken by the people, workers, laymen and socialists" (viii). Nowak doesn't seem to want to imply that the nonreligious Zionists and socialists "aren't really Jews" or don't belong to "the Jewish community." Nor does he excommunicate from the synagogue such Jews of ambiguous religiosity as Leo Strauss (was he Jewish or Greek? – after all, in a private letter, he said that Maimonides was "absolutely *not* a Jew"!),[26] Jonathan Lear (an adopted member of the Crow tribe, whom one assumes worships the Crow gods or spirits and is thus a polytheist or at least an idolater) or Primo Levi ("from a family of Italian Jews that had for centuries been assimilated" [95]). Nowak denies none of them the status of "Jew."

In different ways, Jews like Strauss (who was born a Jew but became a philosopher who believed that philosophy cannot be united with *any* religion) and Arendt (who wanted to be both a Jew and German but found out the hard way that she was merely a Jew in Germany, living precariously), Herzl (who was a Jewish anti-Semite as a young man[27] but

[23] Leo Strauss, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 230.

[24] See Hannah Arendt, "One Does Not Escape Jewishness (1820-1833)," *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London: Harcourt, 1974), 216-28.

[25] Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat* (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1920), 68 (my translation).

[26] Leo Strauss to Jacob Klein, February 16, 1938, cited in Catherine Zuckert, "Stauss's Return to Premodern Thought," in *The Cambridge Companion to Leo Stauss*, ed. Steven B. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 106n29.

[27] See Jacques Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

later became the founder of modern political Zionism) and Saint Paul (who remained a Jew in one sense by virtue of the very act through which he ceased to be a Jew in another) draw our attention to the question: Is being a Jew a choice, something that requires loyalty and commitment (or else one ceases to be a Jew, through apostasy or assimilation) and, perhaps, something one can therefore *become* (in converting to Judaism, *one chooses to be chosen*) – or is it rather something one can't escape from, even if one would dearly like to?

One can begin by saying, provisionally, that the Jew is defined in part by his relationship to the "seed" (*sperma*) of Abraham, a kinship that can be established also through religious conversion to the religion *of* the people descended from Abraham's seed (as in Judah Halevi's *Kuzari*), not only through actual biological descent. However, the Jew can also be defined negatively, through his not having converted to a different religion, especially Christianity. The conservative rabbi and renowned scholar of Judaism Jacob Neusner distinguishes "Judaists" from "Jews": "The ethnic group does not define the religious system. [...] All Judaists – those who practice the religion, Judaism – are Jews, but not all Jews are Judaists. That is to say, all those who practice the religion, Judaism, by definition fall into the ethnic group, the Jews, but not all members of the ethnic group practice Judaism."[28] However, Neusner also claims that Christianity has a unique *negative* function in determining who counts as a Jew, not only religiously but *also* ethnically: "The ethnic community opens its doors not by reason of outsiders' adopting the markers of ethnicity [...] but by reason of adopting what is not ethnic but religious. [...] While not all Jews practice Judaism, in the iron-clad consensus among contemporary Jews, Jews who practice Christianity cease to be part of the ethnic Jewish community, while those who practice Buddhism remain within."[29]

The negative function of Christianity in determining Jewish identity manifests itself in many ways, both personal and political. The Catholic apologist of Jewish descent Roy Schoeman describes his search for God prior to his conversion: "I remember praying, 'Let me know your name – I don't mind if you are Buddha, and I have to become a Buddhist; I don't mind if you are Apollo, and I have to become a Roman pagan; I don't mind if you are Krishna, and I have to become a Hindu; as long as you are not Christ and I have to become a Christian!'"[30] The example of Oswald Rufeisen, who converted to Catholicism and became a Carmelite monk, is telling. Rufeisen – who had saved hundreds of Jewish lives through a feat of remarkable daring in Belarus in 1941 – applied for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return on the grounds of his Jewish *ethnicity*, which in his view his *religious* conversion to Christianity did not erase: "My ethnic origin is and always will be Jewish. I have no other nationality. If I am not a Jew, what am I? I did not accept Christianity to leave my people."[31] However, his application was rejected on the grounds that he had become a Christian; he appealed the decision, but it was upheld by the Supreme Court of Israel (Rufeisen vs. Minister of the Interior, 1962). Rufeisen later became an

[28] Jacob Neusner, "Defining Judaism," in *The Blackwell Companion to Judaism*, ed. Jacob Neusner and Alan J. Avery-Peck (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 2003), 5.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Roy Schoeman, *Salvation Is from the Jews: The Role of Judaism in Salvation History from Abraham to the Second Coming* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2003), 360.
[31] *Time Magazine*, December 7, 1962, 54.

Israeli citizen through naturalization, but the Supreme Court decided that a Jew who converted to another religion would lose their automatic right to Israeli citizenship *as a Jew*. However, as Neusner suggests, conversion to Christianity is typically regarded as uniquely scandalous; had Rufeisen been a Buddhist monk or a Hindu swami at the time of his application, it is unlikely that it would have been rejected on these grounds, leading to the setting of new precedent. Finally, I mention the example of Gillian Rose, the British Jewish critical theorist, author of *The Melancholy Science*, a pioneering study of Theodor Adorno's thought, and *Hegel contra Sociology*, who converted to Christianity (she was received into the Church of England) just before she died of ovarian cancer at the age of 48 in 1995. The news was greeted by intensely hostile accusations of betrayal despite – or, perhaps, partly owing to – the intimate character of the event.[32] Death underscores the limits of ecumenical tolerance.

Nowak's claim, then, that strictly speaking there is no such thing as a nonreligious Jew is a little too hasty. There is of course a difference between Israeli law and Jewish religious law – and Nowak would correctly insist that the latter is far more important for the question of Jewish identity. The state of Israel is a political construction, a hybrid of the modern nation-state and the colonial settlement; the Jews are a *people*, who preceded this construction and would survive its dissolution. But one must make a further distinction: according to the Halakha, anyone born of a Jewish mother remains a Jew, regardless of his religious divagations, *precisely because the Jews are a people*, but according to the Jewish "man on the street" (that is to say, the overwhelming majority, secular or religious), as Neusner emphasizes, the Jew who converts to Christianity is not only an apostate from his faith but also a traitor to his people. The Jew who converts to Buddhism or even to Islam, by contrast, will merely be the object of curiosity or ridicule. This is one of those rare occasions where the Jewish "street" (no stranger to pork and cheeseburgers) is more stringent than the rabbis.[33]

The distinctively Jewish mix of peoplehood and religious identity, in which neither can be detached from, nor wholly collapsed into, the other, and which involves a peculiar relation to Christianity of negative self-definition (Hegel would call it "determinate negation"), is a conundrum to which Jews have devoted much reflection but which the most thoughtful among modern Jewish thinkers – such as Leo Strauss (who compared Husserl's putatively insincere conversion to Christianity to Heidegger's enthusiastic submission to Nazism, saying that it would be "a task for a casuist of exceptional gifts [...] to weigh their respective demerits and merits"!)[34] – rarely claim to have resolved.[35] Taking the physical annihilation of Jews, especially the unassimilable Jews of the east, in

[32] See Arnold Jacob Wolf, "The Tragedy of Gillian Rose," *Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought* 46, no. 184 (1997).

[33] I'm grateful to Prof. Andrew German (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel) for illuminating discussions on this topic.

[34] Leo Strauss, *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 31. This remark is particularly strange if viewed in the context of Strauss's own thesis of esotericism as an imperative of philosophical prudence.

[35] See the inconclusive discussion of "Why We Remain Jews: Can Jewish Faith and History Still Speak to Us?," in Leo Strauss, *Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought*, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 311-15.

the Nazi Holocaust as a symbol for the cultural devastation wrought by secularization is a suggestive and thought-provoking thesis, and true enough as far as it goes, but it takes us to the doorstep of problems that Nowak doesn't address, perhaps because it is not his intention in *After Jews*.

In support of Nowak's thesis, one can note that the Nazis were neo-pagans of a sort, who persecuted not only Jews but also, albeit to a lesser extent, Christians (especially Catholic Poles), while modernity itself has always contained an integral neo-pagan stratum. The latter can be traced to the very inception of modernity in Machiavelli, who praised the old religion for the terror and ferocity it produced. This is what he says:

> Our religion [...] makes us esteem less the honor of the world, whereas the Gentiles, esteeming it very much and having placed the highest good in it, were more ferocious in their actions. This can be inferred from many of their institutions, beginning from the magnificence of the sacrifices as against the humility of ours. [...] Neither pomp nor magnificence of ceremony was lacking there, but the action of the sacrifice, full of blood and ferocity, was added, with a multitude of animals being killed there. This sight, being terrible, rendered men similar to itself. Besides this, the ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of worldly glory, as were captains of armies.[36]

But the post-Christian ferocity and violence of modernity, directed against both the body and the spirit (unlike the pagan holocaust of animals that Machiavelli depicts), has rendered men alternately terrifying, like Hitler and his "captains," and terrifyingly banal, like Nietzsche's last men, "whose race is as inextinguishable as the flea-beetle."[37]

In the discussion period after a 1959 lecture called "The Meaning of Working through the Past," Theodor Adorno was asked if he thought that Christianity could play a role in combating murderous anti-Semitism. Adorno's response contains two interesting and related remarks. First, Adorno relates that in the camps, Nazi murderers would mock their victims by challenging God to intervene on their behalf, taking His nonintervention as a confirmation of His powerlessness, in a way that recalls Annas and Caiaphas mockingly telling Christ that if He came down from the cross they would accept Him as messiah: "It's in all the Nazi atrocities, for instance, also in that they hauled off eighty- and ninety-year-olds into the camps and killed them, even this is part of it, as it were to challenge the Christian or Jewish God: come on, show us what You can do. And if He allows it and there's no bolt of lightning, then it is a sort of triumph."[38] Second, Adorno emphasizes that religion instrumentalized for political purposes, even noble and compassionate ones, ceases to be religion:

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[36] Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, bk. 2, chap. 2, para. 2 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 131.

[37] Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, bk. 1, prologue 5 (my translation).

[38] Theodor Adorno, *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. Harry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 301.

> One cannot pronounce something like a religious ideal for the sake of the effect it has. There is only one legitimation for pronouncing an ideal, and that is its own truth. I would say that the collective role Christianity plays today in a large measure is that people seek and accept it because they believe they find a bond in it. But not at all for the sake of its own truth, and I think that in this tendency there is something that is extraordinarily dangerous for these very religions. And I think, the theologians would grant me this most heartily, that enlisting so to speak religious motives in order to confirm something else, as long as these religious motives are not entirely transparent and as long as they are not based on the truth, that this is a very double-edged matter.[39]

With the difficulties raised by Adorno in mind, I turn now to the final chapter of *After Jews*, "The Remainder of Christianity," where Nowak addresses the question of theology more sustainedly than anywhere else in the book. In the conclusion to the preceding chapter, Nowak qualifies his praise of Giorgio Agamben's diagnosis of "the degeneration of European reason" with a gentle criticism of his excessively "harsh" relationship with theology: "He himself admits that his relationship with theology is somewhat harsh. It is similar to that between blotting paper and ink" (190). Nowak proposes instead to return political philosophy to "the inexhaustible source of theology" (190). But what precisely does this involve?

I observed that Nowak is neither Christian nor Jewish but "Greek." But Greeks can have rather different attitudes toward religion, from barely disguised contempt (Hobbes), for example, to appreciation of its political usefulness combined with concern with the dangers of superstition (Spinoza). There is also a long and venerable tradition of viewing religion as an imaginative or representational articulation of philosophical truth, inferior to a properly intellectual articulation, but nonetheless valuable insofar as it makes such truth accessible, in a mediated and thus limited and perhaps distorted form, to those who lack the capacity for philosophy proper. One finds different versions of this approach stated very explicitly in Alfarabi and Hegel; arguably, it can be traced all the way back to Plato's *Republic*, even though there is no word in classical Greek that can be translated directly as "religion."

Nowak has a certain affinity with this tradition. For example, he rejects the idea of otherworldly rewards and punishments as an old wives' tale, a crudely literal understanding of "eternal life" or "the Second Coming"; even if the common people believe in such things, Nowak prefers to understand this teaching as an image or symbol for a temporal event "that gathers an entire life in a brief moment, in a chance, a jump, a short flash," illuminating its significance and bringing to light what is essential and what is not (199), somewhat like Nietzsche's thought of eternal return when he first introduces it in *The Gay Science*.[40] While the "second death" that unrepentant "murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers" will suffer is traditionally taken to refer to hell (Revelation 21:8), Nowak claims that the "second death" captures rather the failure *in this world* to arrive at "the meaning of one's own life" (198). Nowak's point isn't about the historical intention of

[39] Ibid., 302.
[40] See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (Leipzig: Fritzsch, 1887).

the New Testament writers but rather about the *philosophical meaning* of their poetic, revelatory speech.

However, Nowak is far less confidently rationalist than a medieval "Averroist," to say nothing of Hegel; for Nowak, the reason we "talk about God" is that "it is impossible to stay silent about God," even as the name "God" signifies "the elementary human relations with what remains hidden, what is obscured by darkness and oblivion" (191). Anticipating the objection that there's no reason to call this "God," Nowak responds that there's no better alternative than the time-tested one: "You can try some other way" (191). Such inchoate theological yearning is rooted in human nature and hallowed by tradition. In his approach to religion, Nowak comes closest, among all the great philosophers, to Heidegger insofar as he sees religion as an inexhaustible source of metaphysical depth, which philosophy ignores at its peril, while adopting a resolutely nondoctrinal approach to religious experience. Seth Benardete observed that "Heidegger may be the first philosopher to think the sacred without a theology."[41] Nowak is in this lineage. He says that "a living faith must break away from theology" (201), a claim utterly alien to every Catholic saint, for example, including those who were not scholars or theologians, including even the illiterate. Calling to mind Heideggerean theologians such as Jean-Luc Marion, Nowak claims that it is "idolatrous" and "ungodly" to ask questions such as, "Does God exist?" or "Do unbaptized babies really go straight to hell?" (201). Nowak thinks that catechisms are for children, Sunday school teachers, country parsons, and the pathologically fearful or credulous, not for those intransigently seeking the truth.

Given that there is a certain Straussian inspiration in *After Jews*, it is important to emphasize that Nowak's approach to religion is far more Heideggerean than Straussian, as I suspect that he is aware. While Strauss saw philosophy and religion as fundamental alternatives (in contrast to Aquinas, whom one could plausibly argue is *the* alternative to Strauss), the kind of religion that Strauss took as representing a serious challenge to philosophy is not the elusive Heideggerean or Nowakian kind but the more traditional kind about which Heidegger and Nowak are respectfully dismissive (the early Heidegger would tell his students that "we honor theology by keeping silent about it,"[42] curiously reminiscent of Walter Benjamin's claim that today "theology [...] is wizened and has to keep out of sight").[43] Strauss by contrast took seriously "that notion of providence according to which God literally governs the world as a just king governs his kingdom"[44] and observes that "traditional theology had a proper regard for the objective evidence concerning the beginnings of revealed religion."[45] In short, Strauss would not dismiss traditional apologetics as impatiently as Heidegger or Nowak.

One's response to the final chapter of *After Jews* will depend on one's personal religious or theological "inclination," to use the language that Nowak applies to Jesus (see

[41] Cited in Richard Velkley, *Being after Rousseau* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 190n50.
[42] Cited in Andrzej Wierciński, *Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World* (Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2019), 249.
[43] Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. and intro. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 253.
[44] Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), 197.
[45] Ibid., 204.

14). I found it to be among the weaker chapters in the book, but the reader who perceives religion to be of profound human importance in a sense that goes beyond the merely political and finds the thoughtless arrogance of modern secularists superficial and repellent, but who *also* finds the notions of life after death, rewards and punishments, miracles and resurrection, to say nothing of the dogmatic teaching authority of the church or the postulate of a God who "literally governs the world as a just king governs his kingdom," to be unworthy of belief, will find a kindred spirit in Nowak, as he would in Heidegger.

Nowak's approach to religion can be illustrated by his claim that faith is the "causative principle in Christianity" – without faith, the communion wine will certainly *not* become the body and blood of Christ (199). Although Nowak leaves it ambiguous to *whose* faith he refers, this claim is in direct opposition to traditional Catholic doctrine, according to which the substance of the consecrated bread and wine is transformed wholly irrespective of whether the communicant receiving, or even the priest consecrating, the bread and wine has a committed, sincere faith. This is not an arbitrarily selected point of disagreement; rather, this example succinctly illustrates Nowak's general approach to religion – for him, it is not an objective system in relation to which the potential or actual believer can position himself, rooted in an act of revelation by which God reaches down to man of His own initiative, but rather a phenomenon internal to the human spirit. The substance of religion is the human spirit reaching out into the darkness for a God who may not exist, not God reaching down into *our* darkness in order to illuminate it supernaturally, enabling us to share in His knowledge of Himself. As Nowak puts it, "Faith does not even need the object of faith; faith is sufficient for itself" (201).

I conclude with the theme of "Antichrist." Summarizing centuries of Catholic tradition and scholarship, from the Church Fathers to John Henry Newman, the entry on "Antichrist" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1907) tells us:

> Koppe, Nitzsch, Storr, and Pelt contended that the Antichrist is an evil principle, not embodied either in a person or a polity; this opinion is in opposition to both St. Paul and St. John. Both Apostles describe the adversary as being distinctly concrete in form. [...]
>
> The individual person of Antichrist will not be a demon, as some of the ancient writers believed; nor will he be the person of the devil incarnated in the human nature of Antichrist. He will be a human person, perhaps of Jewish extraction.[46]

Unsurprisingly, Nowak by contrast emphasizes that the Antichrist is certainly *not* a particular human individual but rather the spiritual atmosphere of the times in which we live (see 186). This is not the place to adjudicate this dispute. I will merely note that Nowak emphasizes that the Antichrist should not be thought of as a cartoonish amalgamation of clichés come to life ("charred wings," etc.), and this is quite right from every point of view. In his autobiography *Confessions of an Original Sinner*, John Lukacs makes this point well: "The Anti-Christ will be well-combed and smiling and popular, not someone with disrespectable

[46] https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01559a.htm.

ideas, crazy hair and a spiky Luciferian goatee."[47] In *The Hitler of History*, Lukacs is less playful but no less serious: "The Antichrist will not be horrid and devilish, incarnating some kind of frightful monster – hence recognizable immediately. He will not seem to be anti-Christian. He will be smiling, generous, popular, an idol, adored by masses of people because of the sunny prosperity he seems to have brought, a false father (or husband) to his people. Save for a small minority, Christians will believe in him and follow him."[48]

Confronted by the alternately gruesome and banal horrors of modernity, one cannot help but sympathize with Nowak's decision to use the language of "Antichrist." For Nowak, the only appropriate response to the devastation unleashed by the modernization process is to reach for the language of "political theology," to draw sustenance from the "inexhaustible source" of faith. But for Nowak, we turn *to* theology and faith not *as* theologians or believers but as philosophers who feel the inadequacy of our own rationalism, the darkness coloring the *lumen naturale* and threatening to extinguish it, without thereby ceasing to be "Greeks" and becoming Christians, Jews, or Muslims because "no reasonable person will believe in God" (201). Is this sufficient? Nowak comes dangerously close to the two difficulties raised by Adorno for those who would wield faith as a weapon, or even just as a shield, against the murderous neo-paganism of late modernity, whether we confront murderers only of the body or also of the soul. "And fear ye not them who kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him that can destroy both body and soul in hell" (Matthew 10:28). On the one hand, we may find ourselves in a despairing conversation with our torturers resembling Winston's conversation with O'Brien in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*:

> "I *know* that you will fail. There is something in the universe, I don't know, some spirit, some principle, that you will never overcome."
> "Do you believe in God, Winston?"
> "No."
> "Then what is it, this principle that will defeat us?"
> "I don't know. The spirit of Man."
> "And do you consider yourself a man?"
> "Yes."
> "If you are a man, Winston, you are the last man. Your kind is extinct; we are the inheritors. Do you understand that you are *alone*? You are outside history, you are non-existent."[49]

On the other hand, as Adorno wisely reminds his interlocutors, the only "legitimation" for advocating religion is sincere belief in its divinely revealed truth, and any other approach will be a very "double-edged" enterprise indeed.

[47] John Lukacs, *Confessions of an Original Sinner* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1990), 196.
[48] Lukacs, *The Hitler of History*, 266.
[49] George Orwell, *Ninteen Eighty-four* (New York: Signet, 1977), 222.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

SETH BENARDETE (1930-2001) was an American classicist and philosopher (New York University, The New School), a student of Leo Strauss's in the 1950s. Although his papers are considered dense, cryptic, and generally unclear, his deep knowledge of Greek culture and philosophy is legendary. His most important works are *Herodotean Inquiries* (The Hague, 1969); *The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's* Theaetetus*,* Sophist*, and* Statesman (Chicago, 1984); *Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's* Republic (Chicago, 1989); *The Rhetoric and Morality of Philosophy: Plato's* Gorgias *and* Phaedrus (Chicago, 2009); *The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato's* Philebus (Chicago, 2009; part of this book was published in the Polish edition of *Kronos* [2, 2008]); *The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the* Odyssey (Lanham, MD, 1997); *Plato's* Laws*: The Discovery of Being* (Chicago, 2000); and a translation of *Plato's* Symposium (with introduction by Allan Bloom, Chicago, 2001).

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CARL A. P. RUCK (1935) is a professor in the Classical Studies Department at Boston University. He received a BA from Yale University, an MA from the University of Michigan, and a PhD from Harvard University. Ruck has written extensively on Greek mythology and the ecstatic rituals of the god Dionysus. With the ethnomycologist R. Gordon Wasson and Swiss chemist Albert Hofmann, he identified the secret psychoactive ingredient in the visionary potion that was drunk by the initiates at the Eleusinian Mystery. In *Persephone's Quest: Entheogens and the Origin of Religion*, he proclaimed the centrality of psychoactive sacraments at the very beginnings of religion and innovated the neologism "entheogen" to free the topic from the pejorative connotations of words such as "drug" or "hallucinogen."

MARK SHIFFMAN (1968) is a scholar of the history of philosophy especially interested in the relationships among the philosophical domains of phenomenology, hermeneutics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. He has devoted particular attention to Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Tocqueville. His current project in political philosophy is a book titled *The Legitimacy Crisis of the Modern Liberal State*.

WILLIAM WOOD (1983) received his PhD from the University of Chicago (Committee on Social Thought). He is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Pardubice and principal investigator of the research grant "Nietzschova první filosofie v nové perspektivě" from the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR). His research focuses on post-Kantian continental philosophy, especially Nietzsche and Leo Strauss; the reception of Greek philosophy in German philosophers; and the philosophy of religion.

SUMMARY

Ian Alexander Moore

TRANSLATING GADAMER AND HEIDEGGER TRANSLATING ARISTOTLE: ÜBER *SETZEN* AND *ÜBER*SETZEN

This article discusses Heidegger's theory of translation and how it applies both to his and to Gadamer's German renderings of *Metaphysics* Λ 6 and to my efforts to translate these translations into English for *Kronos: Philosophical Journal*.

Paolo Di Leo

HEIDEGGER GA 62, TRANSLATING *METAPHYSICS* Λ 6: A CRITIQUE OF NEO-KANTIANISM THROUGH A NEW INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE

The first part of this article provides a contextualization for understanding Heidegger's interpretation of *Metaphysics* Λ 1071b6-20. The theoretical terrain on which Heidegger is operating and to whose conclusions he is reacting is that determined by neo-Kantian readings of Aristotle. In the second part of the article, Heidegger's way of translating Aristotle's text is analyzed. This analysis shows how Heidegger's way of translating already represents a fundamental hermeneutic moment, one that opens up the text for a philosophical investigation. Finally, a question is proposed regarding the notion of the transcendent, which is one that Heidegger considers to be absent in his lecture course of 1922 but which he will later acknowledge as being fundamental in Aristotle's thought and in metaphysically oriented thought in general.

Sylvia Fazzo and Jaka Makuc

HEIDEGGER'S 1922 TEACHING ON *METAPHYSICS* LAMBDA: A CHALLENGE FOR ARISTOTELIZING SCHOLARS

Heidegger's approach to Aristotle is highly unconventional and offers a crucial key to Heidegger's own philosophy. As an example, our paper deals with his deconstructed approach to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Lambda, as in HGA 62, summer semester 1922. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Lambda played an overarching role in the Aristotelian scholarly tradition, whereas the young Heidegger reduces it to bits and pieces for his 1922 Freiburg classes. In this essay, we concentrate on his short but significant quotes from this book, focusing on his most original methodological attitudes. We find that his quotes are fully idiomatic, being filled with new meaning and values: his *Übersetzungen* are in no way meant to be just literal translations. In fact, in Heidegger's own view, the remaining part of his class can be regarded as an investigation and exegesis of his own *Übersetzungen* from Aristotle. This approach offers the chance to contextualize Heidegger's way of treating Aristotle's *Metaphysics* books, particularly Lambda, in German universities in the first decades of the twentieth century. A main role was played by Werner Jaeger's early monograph *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, published in Berlin in1912, which was credited with immediate success within the German academic milieu. Jaeger's hypotheses were promptly amplified and taken as a paradigm in the 1919 revised edition of the Ueberweg-Praechter *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, that is, in Heidegger's favorite reference work for his 1922 classes. We may conclude that Jaeger's negative reconstruction of the aim and scope of Aristotle's first philosophy underlies Heidegger's attitude toward Lambda and Aristotle's other *Metaphysics* books.

H. González-Núñez

THE EMERGENCE OF BEING AND TIME AS ʼENEPΓEIA: HEIDEGGER'S UNFINISHED CONFRONTATION WITH ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*

In this essay, I offer a critical analysis of one of the most provocative aspects of Heidegger's unfinished confrontation with Aristotle's thinking. Over the course of his lifelong engagement with Aristotle's texts, Heidegger rarely failed to notice the constitutive ambiguity of the ancient Greek philosopher's position within the history of being. On the one hand, Aristotle appeared to be the founder of the Western metaphysical tradition of ontotheology, whereby God was understood as the supreme principle and being of all beings. But on the other hand, there were traces or echoes of a more originary thinking in Aristotle's texts that, according to Heidegger, could be developed for the sake of another beginning. In this essay, I draw on this constitutive ambiguity by focusing on Heidegger's partial translation of *Metaphysics* Λ 6, where Aristotle most explicitly discusses the being (οὐσία) of the unmoved being. Using Heidegger's translation as an aid, I argue that Aristotle's account of the unmoved being in *Metaphysics* Λ 6 is perhaps best understood as offering an enigmatic description of the origin of movement and time as an act of pure temporalizing (*reine Zeitigung*), which is how Heidegger translates the notion of ἐνέργεια. In the conclusion of this essay, I suggest that the temporal account of being and time as pure temporalizing offers a possible way to reappropriate Aristotle's thinking in a phenomenological context.

Abraham P. Bos

BASILIDES OF ALEXANDRIA AS AN ARISTOTELIAN GNOSTIC I: ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO *REFUTATION OF ALL HERESIES*

Basilides of Alexandria, an early Christian Gnostic, developed a theology that was described as strongly influenced by the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Hippolytus, in his *Refutation of All Heresies* Book VII, provides an interesting picture of it. Basilides regards πνεῦμα as the "ensouled substance" in all living beings and talks about God as the "begetter" of all things through the Power (Δύναμις) that originates in Him. Aristotle defended a philosophical theology in this line in his polemic with his teacher Plato's *Timaeus*. He rejected the notion that life and living beings were the product of a divine Craftsman or Demiurge. It is my strong conviction that there is something fundamentally wrong with the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy because it has been misunderstood through the fault of Alexander of Aphrodisias and restricted to the surviving works of the Corpus Aristotelicum.
The author of the *Refutation of All Heresies* had good reasons for discovering fundamental Aristotelian features in the system of Basilides the Gnostic. Starting from a corrected interpretation of Aristotle's theory of soul, we need to comb through the Patristic and Gnostic traditions to see where it was not Plato but Aristotle who execised the greatest influence. The present paper is a sequel to "Aristotle's *Eudemus* as the Comprehensive Framework of His *De Anima*," published in *Kronos* (2021), pages 172-89.

Carl A. P. Ruck

WITH PLATO IN THE CAVE OF THEATRICS

Plato had already embarked upon a successful career as a tragic dramatist for the Theater of Dionysus before destroying his play scripts and turning to philosophy. The precipitating event was probably the trial of Socrates, which demonstrated the irrationality of the jurors, whose mentality had been conditioned by the emotional responsivity of the theater experience. There was a tradition of Plato's friendship with Euripides as a fellow playwright, and he would have known of the cave on the island of Salamis where the great tragedian was supposed to have composed his dramas, perhaps even shared in the experience there with its resident Muses. The Cave of Euripides should be considered among the mystical precedents for Plato's famous allegory.

Mark Shiffman

METAMORPHOSES OF POLITICAL *THUMOS*

Francis Fukuyama rightly reintroduces the Platonic psychological principle of thumos into political theory. By equating thumos with Alexandre Kojève's "desire for recognition," however, Fukuyama effectively reduces it to a form of self-consciousness or amour propre. Plato takes us deeper into the thumotic psychology of internal order that belongs especially to the citizen and comes to light within the polis: self-command in the light of a newly free field of deliberative action in dialogue with the commands given by the laws. Pierre Manent's political phenomenology more accurately reflects and elucidates the thumotic psychology of the citizen as understood by Plato and reveals the psychological account offered by Fukuyama and Kojève to be an artifact of the modern state, which diminishes the scope of action and thereby reduces thumos to the desire for recognition.

William Wood

THREE PERSPECTIVES ON PHILOSOPHY IN NIETZSCHE'S *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL* 5-7

This article presents a close reading of aphorisms 5, 6, and 7 as an interconnected sequence in Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*. I argue that taken together these aphorisms are a concise illustration of Nietzsche's perspectival method, whereby he approaches the same phenomenon from a variety of angles in order to illuminate it more fully: "The more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity' be." I argue that these aphorisms concern how the philosopher appears from the outside, to nonphilosophers (5), how he appears to himself (6), and, finally, how he appears to other philosophers on the stage of world history (7). There is an inner logic to this sequence: one always begins from the first perspective, when one first begins to study the history of philosophy, then (perhaps) one becomes a philosopher oneself and understands philosophy "from the inside," after which one may develop a politics of friendship (or enmity) with other philosophers (past or present), while bearing in mind, like an actor in a play, how this politics will appear to an outside audience and the effect it may have on them. These aphorisms, then, represent three stages in the philosophical life, while addressing the related themes of how the philosopher conducts himself in relation to nonphilosophers (5), the distinctive self-relation at the heart of the philosophical way of life (6), and the philosopher's way of relating to kindred spirits (7).

William Wood

SECULARIZATION AS CULTURAL ANNIHILATION: NOTES ON PIOTR NOWAK'S *AFTER JEWS*

In this review article of Piotr Nowak's book *After Jews*, I argue that this text is difficult to categorize but is best understood as an example of the no-longer-fashionable genre of the philosophy of history. In this book, Nowak is concerned with the empirical causes and historical meaning of the Holocaust of European Jews, especially the Jews of Poland, but also with the questions of Jewish identity and the meaning of secularization – all historical questions but implicitly containing broader philosophical dimensions. Nowak argues from what I describe as a "Greek," secular perspective rather than a Christian or Jewish one, while at the same time emphasizing the philosophical importance of religion as a human phenomenon – an approach that, I argue, while having some affinities both with Hegel and with Leo Strauss, comes closest to that of Heidegger. I conclude with some critical remarks about the strengths and limitations of Nowak's Heideggerean approach to religion in general and to Jewish identity in particular.

***Nietzsche in the Twenty-First Century*, 30–31.01.2023**
(Institute of Philosophy, University of Bialystok, Plac NZS 1, room 108A)

Nietzsche in the Twenty-First Century

In a recent essay evaluating Nietzsche's enduring relevance, the philosopher Volker Gerhardt writes, "Despite periodic doubts, Friedrich Nietzsche does indeed belong to the great thinkers. Even though his work remained unfinished in nearly every respect, and though many of his thoughts are exhausted in exalted gestures and there is in his writings not one insight which cannot be found somewhere else – despite all this, he has become a classic figure of philosophy." Gerhardt's claim about Nietzsche's importance is qualified, if not altogether retracted, by the concessions he makes – Nietzsche is a "great thinker," yet his work reaches almost no conclusions, exhausts itself in "exalted gestures," and is wholly unoriginal in substance, albeit not in literary form. This kind of back-handed praise, or reverent ambivalence, is surprisingly common in the reception of Nietzsche. One might ask: With friends like these, does Nietzsche need enemies? If Nietzsche indeed "belongs among the great thinkers," it is important for us to show why he remains of enduring relevance over a century after his death – as an indispensable source of provocation and insight, not just as a skilled rhetorician and repackager of other people's thoughts. This conference addresses the question of the enduring relevance of Nietzsche's thought and the many different but overlapping and interlocking "perspectives" (e.g., psychological, ethical, political, cultural, aesthetic, epistemological, metaphysical) that he brings to bear on his own world and on the world in which we live today.

Organizers

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DAY 1

Opening Address (9.30–9.45)
Prof. Robert Ciborowski, Rector (University of Bialystok)

Keynote Speaker (9.45–11.00)
Laurence Lampert, "Taking Nietzsche at his Word in the Twenty-First Century" (Indiana University–Purdue University, USA)

I – "Politics and Contemporaneity" **(11.00–12.30)**

Arthur Milikh, **CHAIR**

Piotr Nowak, "Fata Morgana or Nietzsche in Twentieth-Century Poland"
Jaanus Soovali, "Nietzsche and Jordan Peterson: A Critique of Contemporaneity" (University of Tartu, Estonia)
Brian Marrin, "'Man Is an End': Nietzsche's Millenarian Politics" (Emory University, USA)
Zbigniew Janowski, "Illiberal Friends: Nietzsche and Mill in Praise of Inequality" (Towson University, USA)

LUNCH BREAK (12.30–13.30)

II – "Problems and Perspectives" **(14.00–15.15)**

Piotr Nowak, **CHAIR**

Rafal Kuczynski, "Perspective of the Abyss, or the Blueprint for Relativism" (University of Bialystok)
Arthur Milikh, "Nietzsche on Women" (The Claremont Institute, USA)
Thomas Meredith, "Nietzsche's Conscience" (Santa Clara University, USA)

III – "Passion and Affirmation" **(15.30–17.00)**

Andrew German, **CHAIR**

Leo Luks, "Between Decadence and Affirmation of Life: Living on the Edge" (Estonian University of Life Sciences, Estonia)
Marta Soniewicka, "Every Passion Possesses Its Quantum of Reason: Nietzsche's Affirmation of Passions" (Jagiellonian University, Poland)
Ondrej Sikora, "Nietzsche on *Berauschung* and Openness to Life" (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)

Official Dinner 19.00

DAY 2

IV – "Historical Variations" **10.30–12.00**

Marta Soniewicka, **CHAIR**

Andrzej Serafin, "Nietzsche's Plato – Plato's Nietzsche" (Pedagogical University of Cracow, Poland)
Pawel Dybel, "Nietzsche's Critique of Christianity" (Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland)
Jakub Jinek, "Nietzsche's Greek State and Plato's Best City" (Charles University, Catholic Theological Faculty, Czech Republic)

LUNCH BREAK (12.30–13.30)

V – "Nature and Being" **14.00–15.00**

Pawel Dybel, **CHAIR**

Beatrix Himmelmann, "Can and Should Human Beings Be Translated 'Back into Nature'? A Nietzschean Project Revisited" (The Arctic University of Norway)
William Wood, "Nietzsche on the Cosmological Problem in *Beyond Good and Evil* 20"
Andrew German, "Nietzsche and Plato on the Judgment That 'Being Is Better Than Not-Being'" (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel)

The philosophical quarterly *Kronos* was established in 2007 by scholars connected with the University of Warsaw and the University of Białystok. Metaphysics, the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of literature and religion, history of psychoanalysis comprise the thematic scope of the journal. The editors of the quarterly strive to familiarize the Polish reader with new translations and commentaries of classic works (Plato, Joachim of Fiore, Nicholas of Cusa, Shakespeare, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, Heidegger, and many others), as well as the work of contemporary philosophers.

The annual *Kronos Philosophical Journal* (in English) was established in 2012 as a companion edition to the quarterly, to supplement it, yet without repeating the content of the Polish edition. The papers presented in the annual might be of interest to the readers from outside Poland, allowing them to familiarize themselves with the dynamic thought of contemporary Polish authors, as well as entirely new topics, rarely discussed by English-speaking authors. One of the issues published so far contained passages from previously unknown lectures by Leo Strauss on Aristotle; another issue was dedicated to the Russian phenomenologist Gustav Shpet.

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