Abstract
Utilitarian objections to the consumption of factory-farmed products center primarily on the harms such farms cause to animals. One problem with the utilitarian case against the consumption of factory-farmed products is that the system of production is so vast and complex that no typical, individual consumer can, through her consumer behavior, make any difference to the welfare of animals. I grant for the sake of argument that this causal inefficacy objection is sound and go on to argue that the utilitarian nevertheless has the resources to conclude that at least in some cases it is wrongful on utilitarian grounds for an individual to consume factory-farmed products. When a consumer who believes that factory farming is wrongful consumes the products of factory farms, she endorses wrongful practices, and by doing so she engages in a form of self-harm. Self harm, like harm to others, must be taken into consideration when a utilitarian agent deliberates about the permissibility of her proposed course of action. Therefore, the causal inefficacy objection, while powerful, is not decisive against utilitarian objections to consuming factory-farmed products.
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Notes
I wish to thank Mark Budolfson for pushing me on this point and for the Clinton example (personal correspondence).
Jeremy Bentham provided an early and influential articulation of hedonistic utilitarianism in An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation.
Garrett (2007) has developed a utilitarian response to the causal inefficacy objection. His argument is grounded not in the welfare of animals but rather in the welfare of human beings whose consumption of meat negatively impacts their health. Thus, his argument is similar to mine in focusing attention on the harm meat consumers bring upon themselves. However, Garrett’s argument does not address consumers of factory-farmed products who limit their consumption to levels at which the health risks are minimal or non-existent, nor to animal products that do not negatively impact human health (e.g., textiles produced from factory-farmed animals).
References
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Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to Anne Barnhill, Beth Tropman, and Bernie Rollin for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I have also benefited greatly from discussions with Mark Budolfson.
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Gorin, M. Causal Inefficacy and Utilitarian Arguments Against the Consumption of Factory-Farmed Products. J Agric Environ Ethics 30, 585–594 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9690-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-017-9690-7