

mediation of tracking effects through the operation of conditional properties. This view has the merit of consistency with the known facts about resistance of an aversive CR complex to extinction.

A somewhat less obvious possibility, conjoined with or alternative to the first, assumes that some extinction of the CR complex did in fact occur, but that reconditioning of the cues took place over the span of tracking trials involving supplementary feedback.¹ Support for this view is suggested by Fig. 1, in which Group 1 began RH practice with less proficiency than Group 2, yet gained more rapidly so that the two curves were essentially equal from Block 6 onward. However, if reconditioning occurred, what was the UCS? The reader will recall that Ss were warned not to touch the sides of the pathway. Side contact, an intrinsic cue, was therefore at least mildly aversive. Since its duration was coextensive with the red signal, the requirements of a simultaneous paradigm were satisfied. It was obviously not aversive enough to affect the cues in Groups 3 and 4, but it might have been aversive enough to restore conditional properties in Group 1. This view is consistent with the known facts about the progressive ease with which reconditionings occur.

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NOTE

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Recall of attitudinal and value belief statements in interpersonal judgment tasks*

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The theoretical distinctions between attitude and value statements were investigated, using two interpersonal-judgment situations. Recall of attitude and value beliefs and the effect of similarity of views on attraction were of interest. Predictions from Rokeach's belief centrality theory suggested the saliency of value beliefs over attitude beliefs in judgment settings. In Study I, 102 undergraduates were given booklets, attributed to a bogus stranger, which contained either attitude or value statements. The responses to the statements were manipulated to agree or disagree with the Ss' opinion, using one of three levels of similarity (25%, 50%, or 75% agreement). Ss tended to have better recall of value topics ($p < .10$). Attitude statements, however, were rated as being more useful in making judgments about the bogus stranger ($p < .05$). There was a significant effect for level of similarity on the attraction measures ($p < .005$). In Study II, 114 Ss met an accomplice face to face and exchanged either attitude or value statements. This similarity of the accomplice and S was one of four levels (0%, 33%, 67%, or 100% agreement). Attitude statements were more useful ($p < .05$) than value beliefs, and recall data favored value statements ($p < .05$). There was a significant similarity effect ($p < .05$) for attraction measures.

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Experimental research in social psychology has been remiss in empirically demonstrating the distinction between attitudes and values. The basic task of human-memory recall may provide a paradigm for investigating this substantive distinction.

The following study involved two separate

experiments in which students received specific bits of information, either attitude or value statements, and were later asked to recall these bits. Predictions have been offered from several theories regarding the distinction between attitude and value beliefs. Values generally are hypothesized to be central, potent, enduring, and informative, while attitudes are specific, situational, and peripheral to an individual. In recall tasks, it might then be hypothesized that the more central values would be more easily recalled than attitudes.

Another factor influencing the memory of information is the degree of arousal associated with the information. Hearing beliefs consistent with one's own values or attitudes would be less arousing than hearing beliefs differing from your own (Festinger, 1954; Gormly, 1971). Theories of social comparison and reinforcement also suggest that positive affect is associated with similarity of viewpoints (Byrne, 1961). Similarity of central and peripheral viewpoints (values and attitudes) might also influence the degree of recall for such statements.

The present research attempts to investigate the recallability of attitude and value beliefs in two judgment situations.

STUDY I: FICTITIOUS STRANGER SITUATION

Method

One hundred and two undergraduates from introductory psychology classes at a large state university were tested in groups of 10-15 during two experimental sessions 1 week apart.

In the first session, Ss were told that they were participating in a study on values and attitudes and were asked to respond to an 80-statement value and attitude survey using a 6-point scale of agreement-disagreement. The value and attitude survey was constructed on the basis of data collected in two pilot studies (total $N = 197$). Students in the pilot studies received a booklet containing 102 statements and a listing of the eight chosen terminal values. The 102 statements were chosen to reflect these eight values and were selected from two sources: (1) an attitude scale constructed by Rokeach, and (2) a pool of items written by the author. Ss were instructed to match the statements with one of the eight values. The value associations for each statement were tallied, and for each of the eight values, the nine attitude statements with the highest frequency association with that particular value were selected for the final booklet. In addition to the 72 attitude statements randomly arranged in the booklet, there were eight items directly stating a value preference—e.g., "Equality, the idea of brotherhood and equal opportunity for all, is most important to me." Additionally, Ss were given an alphabetical listing of eight Rokeach values and were asked to rank-order the values in terms of importance to them.

Rokeach's Value Survey (1968), consisting of a scale of 18 terminal value, was used. From the 18 terminal values, the 8 chosen were values most highly ranked by University of Illinois students ($N = 90$). The values used were: a comfortable life, a sense of accomplishment, equality, freedom, national security, salvation, social recognition, and wisdom.

One week later, Ss were given a small number of statements to which another student had responded and were asked to make several judgments about that person. The Ss were given a booklet containing four statements. For half of the Ss, the booklets contained four direct value statements, one concerning each of their four highest ranked values. For the other half, the booklets contained four attitude statements, each of which reflected one of the four highest rank values.

The responses on the four statements (either attitude or value statements) were manipulated to agree or disagree with the S's opinions on the statements. Three levels of agreement were used for the similarity factor: 25%, 50%, and 75% agreement (i.e., Ss in the 25% condition received one agreement and three disagreements).

After studying the stranger's responses, Ss completed the Interpersonal Judgment Scale (IJS) (Byrne, 1961) and the Evaluative-Behavioral Attraction Measure (E-BAM) (Gormly, Gormly, & Johnson, 1971). Then Ss were asked to rate the degree to which they felt they knew the stranger on a 9-point knowing scale and to rate the statements using a 4-point scale for their usefulness in helping in their judgments.

All materials were then collected, and Ss were asked to recall the stranger's responses by topic and to indicate whether the responses were in agreement or disagreement with their own opinions.

Results

Two sets of recall scores were of interest: recall of the topics and recall of agreement and disagreement. The maximum possible number of correctly recalled topics was fixed by design to be four, while the maximum possible number of correctly identified agreements and disagreements varied with the similarity level. To control for the number of agreements and disagreements available for recall, a recall ratio was computed for agreements and disagreements by dividing the number actually recalled by the total possible. Thus, each S had three recall ratio scores: recall of topics, recall of agreements and recall of disagreements.

A $3 \times 2 \times 2$ between-within analysis of variance with factors of similarity, statement, and agreement-disagreement was performed on the recall scores. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for agreement-disagreement; disagreements were recalled more often than agreements ($p < .001$). The main effect for statements approached significance ($p < .10$). There was a tendency for value statements to be recalled more often than attitude statements. The main effect for similarity was not significant. The only interaction term to reach significance was the interaction of similarity and agreement-disagreement ($p < .01$). At high and medium similarity, where number of disagreements were few, disagreements were recalled more often than agreements, while at the low similarity level, there was no difference between the recall of agreements and disagreements.

Analysis of variance on both the IJS and E-BAM attraction scores revealed significant main effects for

similarity ($p < .005$ for both measures); however, no significant statement effects were revealed. For both IJS and E-BAM scores, increased similarity resulted in higher attraction.

A 3 x 2 analysis of variance was performed on the knowing score with levels of similarity and the kind of statement as factors. No significant main effect for similarity was found, there was a significant main effect for the kind of statement. Ss who received attitude statements reported higher knowing scores than Ss who received value statements ($p < .05$).

For each S, two usefulness scores were determined: the rated usefulness of agreement statements and the rated usefulness of disagreement statements. An analysis of variance with similarity, statement, and agreement-disagreement as factors performed on the usefulness ratings revealed a significant effect for statements; Ss who received only attitude statements rated these statements as more useful than did Ss who received only value statements ($p < .05$). Further, there was a significant main effect for agreement-disagreement; disagreements were rated as more useful than agreements ($p < .001$).

STUDY II: FACE TO FACE SITUATION

Method

The Ss, 114 volunteer undergraduate students at Trenton State College, met in two sessions. Session 1 was the same as Session 1 in the first study. During the second session, S was introduced to an accomplice who was posing as another research S. The two people were asked to record their selected viewpoints on several topics. The "real" S responded first, followed by the accomplice who agreed or disagreed with S on a prearranged schedule. The S and accomplice were read instructions which told them essentially that they were to form an opinion of each other. After the S and accomplice had read their opinions on the selected statements, they were separated in two different cubicles and the S was given the IJS and E-BAM scales to complete. The Ss were also asked to rate how well they knew the accomplice as a result of their interaction, how useful the opinions were in judging the accomplice, and to recall the statements and the accomplice's responses during the interaction.

The type of exchange the S and accomplice experienced was determined by design. Half of the Ss and accomplices read six attitude statements to each other, while the other half read six value statements. Within each statement condition, the degree of similarity between the S and accomplice was manipulated so that one of four levels was received: no agreement, one-third agree, two-thirds agree, and all agree.

Results

The recall of topics was significantly greater for value statements as compared to attitude statements ($p < .05$). No similarity effect was found for recall scores. Analysis of recall for agreement and disagreement topics revealed no significant statement or similarity effects. Significant main effects for similarity were found by an analysis of variance of attraction scores. Both IJS and E-BAM scores

increased significantly with increased similarity ($p < .01$ and $p < .05$, respectively). Knowing scores did not differ significantly for statements or degree of similarity. Attitude and value statements were rated significantly different for usefulness ($p < .05$). Attitude statements were rated as more useful than value statements.

DISCUSSION

Rokeach and others interested in values and attitudes make the assumption that value beliefs are more central or important to a person than attitudinal beliefs (Rokeach, 1968). This position is, in part, supported by the current study. Recall data from an earlier study (Gormly, 1970) indicated that value statements were more easily recalled than attitudinal statements, and the recall data for the present study approached significance in the same direction. Value beliefs were more frequently recalled than attitude beliefs in both face to face and fictitious stranger situations.

The results of this research do not provide complete support for theories of belief centrality. Differential influences for attitudinal and value beliefs on interpersonal attraction were not apparent in either Study I or Study II. Rokeach's principle of belief centrality implies such differences. The association between similarity levels and attraction found for the IJS and E-BAM scores is consistent with the principle of belief congruence and numerous attraction studies (Byrne & Griffitt, 1973); we value people in proportion to the degree of belief congruence between us. Increased similarity of beliefs resulted in higher attraction scores but did not influence recall ratios. In the fictitious stranger situation, recall of disagreement topics was significantly higher than recall of agreement topics. The saliency of disagreements is also suggested by the rated usefulness scores for disagreements. Ss in Study I rated disagreements as more useful in judgments than agreements.

The rated usefulness of attitude and value beliefs in the two judgment situations presented in this study appear to further question the concept of belief centrality. Attitude statements were judged more useful than value statements in fictitious stranger and face to face judgment situations. Furthermore, in the fictitious stranger study, Ss reported knowing the stranger better when attitude information was presented rather than value information but did not influence recall ratios. In the stranger situation, recall of disagreement topics was significantly higher than recall of agreement topics.

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