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The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing

  • Dana Goswick EMAIL logo
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.


Corresponding author: Dana Goswick, University of Melbourne, Arts West, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia, E-mail:

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Received: 2021-08-03
Accepted: 2021-11-08
Published Online: 2022-03-16
Published in Print: 2022-04-27

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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