Abstract
According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bickle, J. 2003. Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gottschling, V. The mind reduced to molecules?. Phenom Cogn Sci 4, 279–283 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4071-5
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4071-5