Abstract
Scheler had always emphasized that he had developed his phenomenological method independently from Husserl. Even though references to Husserl in works such as Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik are surprisingly sparse, the critical remarks are balanced with ones that remain largely appreciative of Husserl’s philosophical project. This, however, seems to have changed significantly in Scheler’s later works. The following paper investigates Scheler’s position with respect to Husserl in the posthumously published work Idealismus - Realismus from the year 1928. In critiquing the binary opposing positions of “Bewusstseinsidealismus” on the one hand and “kritischer Realismus” on the other, Scheler explicitly includes Husserl among those who are not able to solve the so-called problem of reality. He argues that Husserl, rather than investigating what we mean by this moment of reality and the acts through which reality is given to us, is content with the vague and erroneous statement that being real means “to have a place in time.” Husserl, according to Scheler, loses reality completely. Reconstructing Scheler’s position on reality not only gives insight into Scheler’s interpretation of Husserl but also sheds light on Scheler’s central philosophical concerns in his later work.
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- 1.
“In dem absoluten Bewußtsein Husserls wäre die Realität ebensowohl verschwunden als im absoluten Schlaraffenland.” Scheler 1995, 279.
- 2.
Cf., e.g., Spiegelberg 1994, 269ff. However, that initial respect may have been one-sided. According to Spiegelberg “Husserl’s opinion of Scheler, never too high from the start, dropped in proportion to Scheler’s rising fame.” Ibid.
- 3.
Mader 1995, 30.
- 4.
Cf., Scheler 1973, 308. As Spiegelberg points out, Husserl’s point of view on this account is not known. Scheler describes in this passage the connection with Husserl as ongoingly highly beneficial (ungemein fruchtbar). It is also in this passage that Scheler stated that he already at this stage had been so dissatisfied by the Kantian philosophy to which he had been close, that he had withdrawn his half printed (sic!) work on logic. According to Mader, Scheler had withdrawn the planned publication with Metzger and Wittig in Leipzig although the publisher had already provided the proofs. Cf., Mader 1995, 30.
- 5.
“[das] fast verloren gegangene Wesen der Philosophie in der Gegenwart erst wieder aufgesucht werden mußte.” Scheler 1973, 267.
- 6.
That Husserl recommended Scheler for his post in Munich is mentioned by a number of scholars. Cf., for example, Henckmann 1998, 20 or Hand 2017, 247. Hand points to an additional recommendation by Husserl from 1910 for an international post. Cf., ibid. Hand refers to the signature Ana 315 E II, 1 in the Scheler Nachlass. The precise nature of the relationship and its development between Scheler and Husserl, including philosophical, scholarly, and personal tensions, growing especially after Scheler moved from Munich to Göttingen is not the topic of this paper. However, both are well documented. See, for example, Mader 1995, 30; Staude 1967, 19–21; 26–28; Spiegelberg 1994, 269ff. For a precise analysis of the philosophical relationship of the early Scheler to Husserl see Willer 1981.
- 7.
- 8.
“Die Phänomenologie ist weniger eine abgegrenzte Wissenschaft als eine neue philosophische Einstellung, mehr eine neue Techne des schauenden Bewußtseins als eine bestimmte Methode des Denkens.” Scheler 1973, 309. It is interesting that Scheler in the same passage, just like Spiegelberg 30 years later, characterized phenomenology as a movement, an interpretation that Spiegelberg defended throughout his career. Cf., Spiegelberg 1994; Spiegelberg 1983. I am not aware if Scheler references to the phenomenological movement earlier than in Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart which was first published in 1922 in Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart, ed. by Ph. Witkop. Rodney Parker makes the interesting observation that Husserl already uses this phrase in 1905 when referring to the so-called “Munich Invasion” in a letter to William E. Hocking (Cf., Hua Dok III.3 (Husserl 1994), 157) and that, to his knowledge, it first appeared in print 1918 in Johannes Volkelt’s essay ‘Die phänomenologische Gewissheit’. Cf., Volkelt 1918, 174. Scheler knew Volkelt’s work and referenced him repeatedly.
- 9.
Husserl 1997, 159. The definition quoted here is from Draft D of Husserl’s Encyclopedia Britannica article, written in 1927.
- 10.
On the latter cf., De Palma 2017. De Palma argues that Husserl’s phenomenology, despite many opposite claims, is actually not idealistic. However, these questions are not the main focus of this paper and will therefore be left unaddressed.
- 11.
Scheler 1973, 280–302.
- 12.
Scheler 1995,185.
- 13.
Ibid., 191 f. When Scheler speaks of the “problem of reality” he seems to mean both, different theories relating to questions regarding reality (Realitätslehren) as well as what he calls the “the actual problem of reality,” namely the givenness of reality and the relationship of this givenness to consciousness. It is here that resistance and how it is experienced emerges as the central tenet for Scheler’s own answer to the actual problem of reality. Cf., ibid., 208ff. In addressing the idealism-realism debate, the problems (plural) of reality are a subset of issues that Scheler further splits into a number of subcategories, such as, e.g., the questions of the givenness of reality, in which acts it is given, what kind of being (Sein) we consider reality to be etc. Cf. for the full set, ibid., 204 f.
- 14.
Scheler 1927/28, 257.
- 15.
Scheler 1995, 185.
- 16.
“Also muß auch alles mögliche Dasein in mente sein, also gibt es kein bewußtseinstranszendentes, kein vom Bewußtsein unabhängiges Dasein (esse = percipi); Bewußtsein (überindividuelles Bewußtsein oder Bewußtsein überhaupt) ist also wesensnotwendig Korrelat auch alles Daseins.” (Scheler 1995, 186) Husserl similarly identifies Bewusstseinsidealismus as the position associated with Berkeley and Kant. See, Hua Mat 3 (Husserl 2001), 238–239. However, Husserl denies that his philosophy is equivalent to this. See, Hua XXXIV (Husserl 2002), 114.
- 17.
Scheler 1973, 297–301.
- 18.
Sepp 2014, 206–207.
- 19.
Cf., Scheler 1995, 185.
- 20.
Which are divided as follows: 1. Order of evidence (Evidenzordnung); 2. Knowledge and consciousness (Wissen und Bewusstsein); 3. The problem of transcendental objects and transcendental consciousness (Problem der transzdentalen Gegenstände und des Transzendenzbewusstseins); 4. The problem of the spheres (das Sphärenproblem), 5. Relativity of being (Seinsrelativität); 6. Cognition and its standards (Erkenntnis und ihre Maßstäbe); 7. The problem of the a priori (das Apriorismusproblem) and 8. The problems of reality (Realitätsprobleme), the main issue of the text. Cf., Scheler 1995, 187–208.
- 21.
Which Scheler distinguishes in zufälliges Sosein and echte Essentia. The translation as essence is thus somewhat unfortunate as this distinction is not kept. Cf., ibid., 185, fn 1.
- 22.
Ibid., 185.
- 23.
“Er ist dadurch besonders gesteigert worden, daß E. Husserl in seinem letzten Werk über «Ideen» usw. sich dem erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus Berkeleys und Kants, sowie der Ichlehre Natorps wieder bedeutend genähert hat und die Phänomenologie nur als Wesenslehre von den Bewußtseinsstrukturen (die durch zufällige Erfahrungen unwandelbar sind) auffaßt, gleichzeitig aber, ähnlich wie Kant, diese Bewußtseinsstrukturen zu Voraussetzungen auch der Gegenstände der Erfahrung selber macht. Auch ihm werden so die Gesetze der Erfahrung der Gegenstände zugleich Gesetze der Gegenstände aller möglichen Erfahrung («kopernikanische Wendung» Kants). Diese eigenartige Wendung Husserls, nach der auch bei Aufhebung aller Dinge ein «absolutes Bewußtsein» erhalten bliebe, ist fast von allen von ihm angeregten Forschern abgelehnt worden und sie ist zugleich ein Haupthindernis für den Aufbau einer Metaphysik auf wesenstheoretischer Basis.” (Scheler 1973, 311).
- 24.
Ibid., 309.
- 25.
Scheler 1995, 206.
- 26.
Ibid., 207.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
It is not actually clear from Scheler’s brief mention of Maine de Biran (1766–1824) if he read the “French Kant” directly, as the only references are to two dissertations on Maine de Biran which were being prepared in Cologne. Cf., ibid., 209.
- 29.
Ibid., 187.
- 30.
Dilthey 1964, 90.
- 31.
“Das Schema meiner Erfahrungen, in welchen mein Selbst von sich das Objekt unterscheidet, liegt in der Beziehung zwischen dem Bewußtsein der willkürlichen Bewegung und dem des Widerstandes, auf welchen diese trifft.” Ibid., 98.
- 32.
Scheler 1995, 210–211.
- 33.
Sepp provides an excellent overview and analysis of Scheler’s position on reality and his critique of Dilthey. Cf., Sepp 2014, 199–236; on Scheler’s critique of Dilthey cf., especially, 199–208.
- 34.
Ecstatic knowledge is that knowledge, according to Scheler, which does not include consciousness (Bewusst-Sein); such as to be found in animals, primitives, children and particular mental states such as awakening out of a general anesthetic. Cf., Scheler 1995, 189.
- 35.
Cf., ibid., 211–14.
- 36.
Scheler emphasizes here the difference between the will that has an element of consciousness and the life of the drives as involuntary (unwillkürliches Triebleben) or pre-conscious. Cf., ibid., 214–15.
- 37.
Ibid., 194ff.
- 38.
The being of each empirical object is pre-given; real and unreal exist in a “peculiar mixture” in each. They exist each in each and have their own causality; e.g., a past memory can be experienced to put pressure on a present experience and once that is experienced it cannot be changed just by an act of will while a fata morgana or a shadow or a rainbow can be experienced as appearances but are not real in the defined sense above.
- 39.
With this judgment Scheler is not alone. A number of philosophers and phenomenologists share this perception, among them Conrad-Martius, Stein, Landgrebe, and Fink. However, as already mentioned earlier, this assessment of Husserl is debatable, as a number of scholars such as De Palma have pointed out.
- 40.
Cf., Scheler 1995, 200.
- 41.
Cf., Scheler 1995, 200–202.
- 42.
Ibid., 236 f.
- 43.
“[…] das so als ‘real’ Gegebene auch zu einem realen ‘Gegenstand’ erheben zu können. Damit ist aber auch die Leistung des Transzendenzbewußtseins für das Realitätsproblem zu Ende.” Scheler 1995, 192.
- 44.
Ibid., 286.
- 45.
Ibid., see also fn 2.
- 46.
Ibid., 282.
- 47.
Ibid.
- 48.
Ibid., 208.
- 49.
Cf., ibid., 189; Sepp 2014, 204–205; Henckmann 1998, 76. Scheler makes the distinction between knowledge and consciousness very clear in the beginning of Idealismus - Realismus where he distinguishes between Wissen (scientia) and reflexives Wissen (Be-wußt-sein as con-scientia). Cf., Scheler 1995, 186.
- 50.
Especially in Erkenntnis und Arbeit (Scheler 1980a).
- 51.
The following points have been excellently summarized by Hans Rainer Sepp. Cf., Sepp 2014, 204–209.
- 52.
“Wir erfassen das Realsein eines unbestimmten Etwas […] bevor wir sein Sosein sinnlich wahrnehmen oder denken.” Scheler 1980b, 372. Cf. also ibid., 373.
- 53.
“In gewisser Art und mit einiger Vorsicht im Wortgebrauche kann man sagen: ‘Alle realen Einheiten sind Einheiten des Sinnes’.” Husserl 1913a, § 55.
- 54.
Cf., Sepp 2014, 205–206.
- 55.
Cf., Sepp 2014, 205.
- 56.
“[...] daß jede originäre gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‘Intuition’ originär (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich gibt, kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen.” Husserl 1913a, § 24.
- 57.
See, for example, Henckmann on the relationship between the genetic understanding of knowledge types and the functionalisation of the spirit (Geist) . Henckmann 1998, 76.
- 58.
Cf., Sepp 2014, 207.
- 59.
Thus, Scheler distinguishes between the ens reale and the ens intentionale. Cf., Scheler 1995, 188.
- 60.
Cf., ibid., 203; Sepp 2014, 206.
- 61.
Cf., Scheler 1995, 205.
- 62.
“Es kann sehr wohl das Sosein des Seienden ‘in mente’ und zugleich ‘exra mentem’ sein; es kann sehr wohl in mente ‘einspringen’ und ‘ausspringen’ ohne daß das reale Dasein diesen Sprüngen folgt, und zwar im strengsten Sinne das Sosein selbst [i.e., the true essentia].” Ibid., 202.
- 63.
“nur das Was des Daseins, nicht das Dasein des Was ist intelligibel.” Ibid., 204. The emphasis is Scheler’s.
- 64.
Ibid., 252.
- 65.
Cf., Sepp 2014, 208.
- 66.
I would like to express my gratitude to Rodney Parker and Zachary Davis for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
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Gottlöber, S. (2021). The Problem of Reality. Scheler’s Critique of Husserl in Idealismus – Realismus . In: Parker, R.K.B. (eds) The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_6
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