Abstract
There has been much discussion of late on what exactly the Problem of Universals is and is not. Of course answers to these questions and many more like it depend on what is supposed to be explained by a solution to the Problem of Universals. In this paper, I seek to establish two claims: first, that when the facts (explanada) to be explained and the kind of explanation needed are elucidated, it will be shown that the Problem of Universals is a real metaphysical problem, not a pseudo problem; secondly, the facts whose explanation posed the problem in the Problem of Universals still provide reason to think realism regarding universals is true, even if God exists.
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Notes
Michael Jubien suggests that there is a kind of conceptual bias among philosophers when considering the Problem of Universals, in thinking that “we must look hard at natural language semantics in order to evolve a theory of properties.” But this, according to Jubien, is to put the semantic cart before the metaphysical horse (1989, 164).
Rodriguez-Pereyra is here following Oliver (1996, 50–74).
Typical arguments for anti-reductionism regarding causation involve (1) detailing the repeated failures of reductive analysis; (2) the fact that there is a sparse base of non-causal concepts that can be employed in providing a reductive analysis; and (3) the case of preemption. See John Carroll (2010).
Abstract singular terms name the set of resembling tropes, e.g., ‘Wisdom’ names the set of tropes that agree in being wisdoms; ‘courage’ names the set of tropes that agree in being courages, etc. General terms are then conventionally correlated with the set of tropes named by the corresponding abstract singular term: ‘wise’ is semantically tied to the set of tropes that is the referent of ‘wisdom,’ and so on. See Loux (2006, 76–77).
That is, while (2) and (5) might be mutually (logically) entailing, (2) has different content than (5).
For a nice exposition of this kind of argument, see Rowe (1993, 20–26).
That is, universals might be Aristotelian instead of Platonic—further arguments would need to be supplied to decide if universals are abstract or not—there are a number of arguments one might use, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. See Balaguer (2004).
There is a parallel argument for qualitative facts that can be expressed as follows:
(MOO) Object a is F and G. The realist has a ready explanation for these facts. Object a possesses the universals, Fness and Gness. The nominalist cannot account for these facts as well as the realist; therefore, realism regarding universals is true.
I think that (MOO) is not as strong as (OOM) for the simple reason that it appears that various nominalist accounts of qualitative facts can, prima facie, explain as well as the realist account, such as (TN). Thus, in the remainder of this paper I shall focus on the (OOM) argument and the prima facie support it renders for realism.
“my ontological commitment is not what it might seem…. In saying that God has concepts, the most I commit myself to is that there is in God whatever underlying reality makes it apt to speak of concept-possession….I suggest that in the last analysis, the ontology of divine concepts is in terms of divine mental events and powers” (Leftow 2006, 349).
“If there is a God, Fido is a dog not because of what he resembles but because this is what God made him to be, in accord with His concept dog” (Leftow 2006, 346).
See Gould (2011), where it is argued that the realist (even the Platonist) can endorse an abundant theory of properties and a unified theory of predication without incoherence.
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Acknowledgements
I’d like to thank Richard Brian Davis and Scott Smith for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Gould, P. The Problem of Universals, Realism, and God. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 183–194 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0103-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0103-0