Lexical-Rule Predicativism about Names[1]

Aidan Gray
University of Illinois at Chicago

Abstract

Predicativists hold that proper names have predicate-type semantic values. They face an obvious challenge: in many languages (English among them) names normally occur as, what appear to be, grammatical arguments (call these bare occurrences). The standard version of predicativism answers this challenge by positing an unpronounced determiner in bare occurrences. I argue that this is a mistake. Predicativists should draw a distinction between two kinds of semantic type - *underived semantic type* and *derived semantic type*. The predicativist thesis concerns the underived semantic type of proper names and underdetermines a view about the semantic type of bare occurrences. I'll argue that predicativists should hold that bare names are derived individual-denoting expressions. I end by considering what this result means for the relationship between predicativism and other metalinguistic theories of names.

Predicativism about names - the view that proper names have predicate-type semantic values - has received a steady stream of attention in recent years. My topic here is not the absolute plausibility of predicativism.[2] Rather, it is the relative plausibly of different versions of predicativism. Both those inclined to accept predicativism and those inclined to reject it have an interest in discovering the best version of the view. I will argue that an assumption at the heart of standard versions of predicativism - that when names appear as stand-alone arguments they are accompanied by an unpronounced determiner - is untenable. I will then show how predicativists can repair their view by holding that argument-occurrences of names are not syntactically complex; they should hold instead that argument-occurrences are the articulation of individual-denoting expressions which are generated via lexical rules. I provide precedent for this views by describing the pattern of interpretation of familial nouns (*e.g.* **mom**, **grandma**). Though the purpose of the paper is not to defend predicativism in relation to non-predicativist approaches to names, I end by showing how the modification suggested here should change our

[2]A non-exhaustive list of work in support of Predicativism: (*Sloat*, 1969), (*Burge*, 1973), (*Hornsby*, 1976) (*Bach*, 1981, 2002), (*Katz*, 1990), (*Segal*, 2001), (*Geurts*, 1997), (*Elbourne*, 2005, Chp 6), (*Matushansky*, 2006, 2008), (*Sawyer*, 2009) (*Fara*, 2011, 2015a). For some recent work critical of predicativism see (*Leckie*, 2013), (*Rami*, 2014a, 2015), (*Jeshion*, 2014, 2015), (*Predelli*, 2015), (*Schoubye*, 2016a,b), and (*Delgado*, 2016-ms).

understanding of the relation between predicativism and other metalinguistic approaches to names (*e.g.* indexicalism and variabilism).

1   PREDICATIVISM AND THE NULL DETERMINER HYPOTHESIS

As just mentioned, my topic here is not the absolute plausibility of predicativism. Accordingly, I'll introduce the standard version of the view without doing much to motivate it, and I won't consider a variety of important objections to it[3]. My goal is to establish a conditional claim: if one is moved by the predicativist arguments, one ought to adopt the sort of predicativism elaborated herein.

Predicativism has its source in Sloat's (1969) and Burge's (1973) claim that proper names interact with the determiner system in a much more systematic way than would be expected given the (dominant) view that names are individual-denoting expressions. As a representative sample: names can combine with quantifiers - as in (1 a) - and with numerals - as in (1 b) - more or less as freely as do common nouns (with some qualifications to be discussed shortly).[4]

(1)   (a) Every Helen at the party wore a rose.

(b) Two Davids have pledged their love to me.

They argued that the simplest overall account of full variety of possible interpretations of names would be to treat these predicative occurrences as revelatory of names' semantic type. This would be to treat names as predicates. The reason that names can appear in predicative positions, according to Sloat and Burge, is simply that their basic meaning is predicative.

The simplicity of this approach with respect to predicative occurrences of names comes at the cost of added complexity with respect to bare occurrences. These are occurrences in which a name appears, at least superficially, to occupy the position of a complete determiner phrase, as in (2 a)-(2 b).

(2)   (a) Socrates is wise.

(b) A man accused Ortcutt of being a spy.

Here Sloat, and many contemporary predicativists - for example (*Matushansky*, 2006, 2008), (*Elbourne*, 2005, Chap. 6), and (*Fara*, 2015a) - posit an unpronounced definite determiner (I'll return to Burge's position below). They hold that the syntactic structure of (2 a), massively simplified, is (4 b).

---

[3]I provide considerations in favour of predicativism in (*Gray*, 2017), but also provide considerations against it in (*Gray*, 2015).

[4]An important issue which I won't discuss here is the status of singular unmodified definite descriptions containing proper names (*e.g.* **the Alfred**). Sloat claims that these are ungrammatical (pg. 27 *Sloat*, 1969). This is too strong. It is not clear, either from the point of view of predicativism or non-predicativism, how to explain the conditions under which such constructions are available. I discuss the issue in (*Gray*, 2017). See also (*Jeshion*, 2015).

(3)

$$\text{[the] Socrates \quad wise}$$

Thus, they hold that the syntax and semantics of bare occurrences of names is the parallel to that of ordinary incomplete descriptions, for example (4 a)-(4 b).

(4)   (a) The dean is wise.

    (b)

$$\text{the \quad dean \quad wise}$$

Apart from substituting the predicate **dean** for the predicate **Socrates**, the difference between (2 a) and (4 a) is merely phonological. In one sentence the definite determiner is pronounced. In the other, it is not. Let's call this feature of standard predicativism the *null determiner hypothesis* ('NDH', for short).

The proposed meaning of names, *qua* predicates, is supposed to explain the referential behaviour of bare names. The predicativist idea, roughly, is that a name N is a predicate true of individuals named N.[5] The effect of combining that predicate with a definite determiner is that the whole determiner phrase denotes a contextually salient individual who is named N. This is, at least roughly, a plausible picture of the interpretation of bare names (we'll come back to the ways in which it's implausible in Section (4)). So predicativism treats the referential variability of bare names - the fact that different bare occurrences of **Alfred** can refer to different Alfreds - as a kind of context-sensitivity rather than lexical ambiguity.

NDH is the target of this paper. I'll suggest the most plausible version of predicativism would abandon it. First, though, I'll describe it in slightly more detail. Sloat, and those following him, noted the conditions under which names can occur bare are somewhat subtle (1969, pg 28). Relevant for our purposes is the interaction between forms of modification and bare occurrences. If a name occurs with an overt definite article, a relative clause following the name can be interpreted restrictively - as in (5 a). If a relative clause follows a bare name, it must be interpreted non-restrictively, as in (5 b).

(5)   (a) That's the Jones who lives next door.

    (b) That's Jones, who lives next door.

Sloat asserts the same thing about prenominal adjectives. Noting that **young** is interpreted restrictively in (6 a) and non-restrictively in (6 b).

---

[5] I use bold font to indicate quotation (or quasi-quotation, where appropriate). I assume, following (*Matushansky*, 2008) and (*Fara*, 2011), that names are used and not mentioned in constructions like **called Alfred**. Nothing of substance here turns on that assumption. There hasn't been a lot of work by predicativists on the nature of name-bearing properties (*i.e*, the properties expressed by predicative occurrences of names). They have agreed that such properties are not *semantic* (thus, they take it, avoiding the charge that the view is viciously circular). Broadly, facts about name-bearing are supposed to be determined by social and cultural practices, independent of considerations about reference. This isn't entirely plausible. See section (6) for more discussion.

(6)   (a) I talked to young Martin about it.

  (b) I talked to the young Martin about it.

These are, at best, rough generalizations (see (*Matushansky*, 2006, pg 292ff) and (*Fara*, 2015a)). It is not clear how to draw the correct generalizations. I will set adjectives to the side for the purposes of this paper (though see notes (16) and (20) for a brief discussion).

The important thing here is to distinguish two aspects of the standard version of predicativism: A) the idea the lexical meaning of a name is predicative, and B) the idea that bare occurrences of a name are syntactically complex (involving an unpronounced definite article). The second thesis is independent of the first. In section (2) I'll show that there are good reasons to reject it. In sections (3)-(5), I'll develop a version of predicativism which accepts (A) but rejects (B).

Before moving on to problems with NDH, we should say a little more about the motivations for predicativism. We should establish precisely what the advantage of predicativism is supposed to be over traditional accounts for names to be sure that abandoning NDH won't deprive predicativism of its alleged virtues. Sloat and Burge don't argue that predicative occurrences of names *refute* the traditional approach to names. They only suggest that predicativism can offer a simpler, more unified account of the full range of possible interpretations of names. Burge faults non-predicativist approaches for failing " to give a unified account of modified and unmodified occurrences of proper names" (1973, pg. 439). Sloat asserts that "considerations of simplicity and generality" favour the predicativist approach (1969, pg. 30).

Predicativism provides a simple, elegant explanation of predicative occurrences of names. With the minimal additional assumption embodied in NDH, it can account for bare occurrences (or so the thought goes). Sloat and Burge seemed to assume that the traditional approach would not be able to offer as plausible an explanation of how names - understood as ambiguous individual constants - could be interpreted in predicative positions. This is probably an unfounded assumption - I discuss the issue in (*Gray*, 2017). But the point, for our purposes, is that the force of the argument for predicativism doesn't depend specifically on NDH.[6] It depends on some plausible story about how names, though predicates in the lexicon, can appear as grammatical arguments. Below I'll offer an alternative story of this kind.

2   Problems with the Null Determiner Hypothesis

NDH holds that bare names and definite descriptions differ phonologically but not syntactically. This predicts that bare names and definite descriptions should be alike with

---

[6]This is actually too strong. Sometimes predicativists will point to the fact that there are languages in which when names are used in normal reference they occur with an overt definite determiner as evidence in favour of the NDH and, by extension, evidence for predicativism. So predicativism without NDH will lose this piece of evidence, and have to account for those languages in another way. I've argued in other places that there are independent reasons for predicativists not to argue in this way - see (*Gray*, 2017). See also note (22).

respect to phenomena which depend on syntactic structure. This appears not to be the case. King (2006, pg. 149) pointed out that if a bare name is the phonological realization of a predicate, that predicate should license 'one'-anaphora. But note the contrast between (7 a) and (7 b).

(7) (a) The dog/ that dog/ my dog$_i$ barks whenever he sees another one$_i$ coming up the street.[7]

(b) ?? Ralph$_i$ is excited whenever he meets another one$_i$.

The attempt to use **Ralph** as an antecedent for **one** is very strained at best. This is unexpected given the hypothesis that it is a predicate. The same thing is observed with respect to the licensing of **also** (*Hawthorne and Manley*, 2012, pg. 235).

(8) (a) The mayor / our mayor / that mayor $_i$ is also$_i$ a criminal.

(b) ?? Ralph$_i$ is also$_i$ a criminal.

This is strong evidence against the NDH.[8] It appears that bare names do not behave as we would expect if they involved the syntactic realization of predicates. A more plausible version of predicativism would not involve the NDH.

3   UNDERIVED VS. DERIVED SEMANTIC TYPE

The NDH resolves the tension between the lexical semantic type of proper names and the apparent grammatical role of bare occurrences by positing a null determiner. There are other ways that the tension might be resolved. I won't develop an alternative in full detail here. Instead I will offer a 'proof of concept' by 1) showing, at a general level, that standard morphosyntactic theories offer alternative strategies, 2) presenting independent evidence for the kind of morphological mechanism which would be required for a form of predicativism that did not involve the NDH, and 3) describing the general form the approach would have to take.

Theorists of language have often appealed to forms of semantic generativity which are distinct from the compositional rules which operate at the syntax/semantics interface. Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between syntax and morphology (for background see (*Matthews*, 1991, Chap. 1), (*Anderson*, Forthcoming)). According to this

---

[7] Note that the subscripts in examples of this kind are not meant as part of a syntactic representation of the sentence. They merely serve to indicate the intended anaphoric relations.

[8] Of course, with the right context one can access the relevant readings of both **one** and **also**. The data are somewhat subtle. For example, forms of parallelism make it easier to hear the relevant reading with **also**. Note that it is relatively easy to access the relevant reading in (9 a).

(9) (a) Ralph$_i$ is also$_i$ a Charles.

But this is consistent with the basic observation. Given the right situation, both **one** and **also** can pick up their antecedent from non-linguistic context. The important data is the *contrast* between (8 a) and (8 b), which is unexpected given NDH.

distinction, certain forms of semantic complexity are not the result of the compositional rules of the syntax/semantics interface. The lexicon itself has a generative structure - consisting in underived lexemes and mechanisms which generate different forms of those lexemes (*inflection*), or which generate derived lexemes (*word-formation*).

Note that the division of labour between morphology and syntax, the variety in morphological structure, and the nature of morphological productivity are all matters of debate (see note (9) for some detail about the division between syntax and morphology; see (*Matthews*, 1991) for the variety in morphological structure; see (*Bauer*, 2001) for difficulties in characterizing morphological productivity). We can only work here with a relatively simplistic understanding of the distinction. The goal is show how structure in the lexicon provides a plausible path forward for predicativists.

Some examples: the lexicon contains the lexemes **horse** and **dog** and a rule which generates the plural forms **horses** and **dogs**; the lexicon contains the lexemes **afraid** and **aware** and a rule which generates the derived lexemes **unafraid** and **unaware**. The application of lexical rules determines the phonological, syntactic, and semantic properties of their outputs. So the outputs of these generative mechanisms have different such properties than the lexemes on which they operate.

The upshot is a structured lexicon, with an internal distinction between derived and underived elements. Underived or derived elements can be inserted in the syntax, at which point the compositional rules associated with the syntax/semantics interface take over. In this context, we can draw a distinction between the semantic properties of an underived lexeme and the semantic properties of a lexeme derived from it. **Aware** and **unaware**, though they are both adjectives, differ in meaning. If a given lexical rule involves a change in semantic type, we can distinguish the semantic type of the underived lexeme from the semantic type of lexeme which is derived from it.

Think of it this way: the lexicon plays two distinct roles in our model of linguistic competence. On one hand, the lexicon represents the basic stock of non-derived expressions - expressions which are either hard-wired into linguistic competence or must be learned individually. On the other hand, the lexicon represents the basic stock of expressions which can be inserted into the terminal nodes of syntactic structures and thereby provide the building blocks for compositional semantics. We can - and many theories do - distinguish those roles and hold that the non-derived items are a proper subset of the items which can be inserted into the terminal nodes of syntactic structures.

My suggestion is simple: predicativists should hold that proper names, qua underived lexemes, have predicate-type semantic values and that there is a lexical rule which generates individual-denoting expressions from them. Bare names are occurrences of these derivative lexemes and therefore have individual-type semantic values. I'll call this *lexical-rule predicativism*.[9] I'll motivate it and flesh it out below. Before that, a few

---

[9]I'll mention a significant complication. Many contemporary approaches to morphosyntax either minimize or completely reject the distinction between syntactic and phonological structure. For example, Distributed Morphology (DM) (*Halle and Marantz*, 1994) is an influential approach to linguistic architecture that denies a division of labour between syntactic and lexical productive rules. The basic idea behind DM is that linguistic structure is "syntactic structure all the way down" (ibid. pg. 276). What

comments:

First, Note that this lexical rule would have to be restricted to apply only to proper names. But this is not surprising. It's already a feature of the NDH that the determiner can only go unpronounced with names. We would need a parallel restriction with the lexical rule. More importantly, we will see below that there is independent evidence of a lexical rule of this kind which is seemingly arbitrarily restricted to apply to a narrow class of nouns.

Second, I will do nothing here to argue that the predicative interpretation of proper names is underived. It is, of course, possible that the predicative interpretation is derived and the individual-denoting interpretation is underived. To choose between the predicativist and the referentialist approach we must develop arguments that one direction of derivation is more plausible than the others. I won't do that here (see (*Gray*, 2017)). My goal is show that the hypothesis that the predicative meaning is basic is consistent with the syntax/semantics of bare occurrences being individual-denoting; or slightly stronger, not just that it is consistent but that there is a plausible precedent for a predicative lexical item having derived individual-denoting occurrences. Section (4) provides this precedent.

Finally, as a historical note, this kind of approach has as much claim to being an elaboration of Burge's own view as the NDH. Burge doesn't embed his proposal in a syntactic framework. He says that bare names have the "semantic structure" of predicate and demonstrative (1973, pg. 432), but says nothing about how they acquire that semantic structure - whether by unarticulated syntax or lexical rule. The lexical rule approach seems a fair elaboration of his claim that bare occurrences "do not abbreviate the roles of predicate and operator" but rather "play the roles of predicate and demonstrative"

---

might look like lexical structure - for example, the structure of adjective plus comparative in **smart-er** - is simply the phonological realization of particular syntactic configuration of features. Those same features might, in other constructions be phonologically realized as distinct words, as in (10)((*Embick and Marantz*, 2008, pg 12)).

(10)   Helen is more smart than she is wise.

Obviously, the proposal I develop here would need to be transformed to fit into a DM framework. The framework posits different layers of syntactic structure related by derivational rules. One such layer, LF represents the level of structure that captures "meaning-related structural relations" (*Harley and Noyer*, 1999, pg. 5). It is unclear to me what layer of structure, in DM, would be relevant to licensing **one** or **also**, but to develop of the kind of approach discussed below in the context of DM would require positing a derivation which moves names out of predicative position at that level of structure, and correspondingly alters a name's semantic type. I cannot speak to how plausible that would be relative to the rest of the DM framework. The example of **grandmother/grandma** below demonstrates, independently of names, that a mechanism of this kind is needed.

It should also be noted that Matushansky's version of NDH-predicativism is framed within the DM framework. She posits a morphological rule, m-merger, which merges the determiner and the proper name in the right syntactic configuration (2006, pg. 296ff). It might be that this process can play the same role that the lexical-rule plays in the approach developed here. To my knowledge Matushansky does not discuss these issues.

(ibid. 438).

4   GRANDMA, *etc*[10]

The previous section demonstrated that the theoretical space exists for a form of predicativism without NDH. In this section, I'll show that there is independent evidence - that is, evidence that is independent of considerations involving proper names - for the kind of lexical rule which predicativists would need to posit. Though most common nouns cannot appear bare (in singular form) in English, there is a small class of exceptions that express family relations (call these familial nouns).[11] For example **mother/father** are lexical predicates, but can appear bare, for example in (12)

(12) Don't tell mother that I ate the whole pie.

In many dialects, their bare occurrence tends to be associated with a phonological change, *e.g.* to **Mom/Dad**. Note that these phonologically reduced versions can also appear with overt determiners so it is implausible to treat them as semantically unrelated expressions (for example as *ad hoc* names)

   I'll focus on **grandmother/grandfather** (**Grandma/Grandpa**). The lexical meaning of **grandmother** is predicative, so it can enter the syntax in predicative positions, as in (13 a)-(13 b).

(13) (a) Every grandmother thinks her grandchild is the cutest.

   (b) Both of my grandmothers were physicists.

But it can also have bare occurrences, as in (14 a)-(14 b).

(14) (a) Grandma is in the kitchen baking pies.

   (b) The dean awarded Grandma a distinguished professorship.

---

[10] (*Hawthorne and Manley*, 2012, Chap. 6) discuss bare familial nouns in the context of a discussion of names, and cover some of the ground I cover in this section. They do not discuss lexical rules.

[11] In some dialects, some non-familial nouns can also appear bare. These often express authority relation. For example **coach** can appear bare in some American dialects. This class of nouns should not be confused with a different class of nouns which can appear bare, but only in *address*. Note the difference between (11 a) in which **doctor** can appear in address, and (11 b), where **lawyer** cannot.

(11)   (a) Doctor, you've got to help me!

   (b) #Lawyer, you've got to help me!

The ability of a noun to bare in address roughly corresponds with its ability to function as a title (note: **Doctor Smith**, **Coach Jones**, # **Lawyer Smith**, #**Teacher Jones**). **Waiter**, is an exception to this rule.

A bare occurrence of **Grandma** refers to some contextually salient grandmother[12] - often it's one of the grandmothers of the speaker, but it needn't be. This might make us consider the hypothesis that bare occurrences of **Grandma** involve an unpronounced determiner. But if we look as the way that bare familial nouns behave with respect to the tests introduced in section (2), we will see that, as with bare occurrences of names, a bare occurrence of **Grandma** doesn't seem to introduce a predicate into the syntax. In (15 a) we see that a bare occurrence of **Grandma** doesn't license 'one'-anaphora, where the determiner phrase **our grandmother** in (15 b) does. In (16 a) and (16 b) we see the same pattern with **also**.

(15) (a) ?? Grandma $_i$ is in the kitchen baking pies, and another one$_i$ is in there baking cakes.

(b) Our grandmother$_i$ is in the kitchen baking pies, and another one$_i$ is in there baking cakes.

(16) (a) ?? Grandma $_i$ is also$_i$ a doctor.[13]

(b) The grandmother$_i$ is also$_i$ a doctor.

These patterns are repeated with **grandfather**, **mother**, and **father**, and perhaps other expressions as well (see note (11)).

So there is strong evidence that bare familial nouns do not involve the syntactic articulation of the relevant predicate. But, plausibly, they are semantically derivative of the basic predicative meaning.[14] There is a systematic semantic connection between predicative and bare occurrences of **grandmother**, one which is mirrored in the behaviour of **mother** and **father**. We should hold that there is a lexical rule which creates a derivative individual-denoting lexeme **grandmother/grandma**. It is this individual-denoting expression which occurs bare. There is no null determiner in the syntax of bare occurrences because there is no predicate.

---

[12]Note that in many languages, English is not among them, familial nouns can be used bare to address individuals on either end of the relevant relation. For example, an occurrence of **Mami** in Puerto Rican Spanish can be used either by a child to address their mother *or* by a mother to address one of her children. This is an interesting phenomena, but it is confined to *address* rather than reference - see note (11) - so is not directly relevant here.

[13]It is possible, given the right context and intonation, to hear this as acceptable. This is not surprising, the same is true with bare names. The important point is the contrast between (15 a) and (15 b), rather than absolute judgment about (15 a).

[14]Would it be problem for the hypothesis that bare familial nouns are semantically derivative of a predicative meaning if it turned out, as seems likely, that children learn to operate with the bare occurrences before they operate with the predicative occurrences? I don't think so. The claim about semantic derivation is claim about mature competence. What precisely to say about the nature of immature competence is an interesting question, but one which would presumably apply in a parallel way to range of nouns. Children presumably learn a variety of predicates - **dog**, **cat**, *etc* - by first only applying them to individual instances. Children presumably also learn to operate with certain syntactic complexes initially as unstructured idioms and only later parse as complex and compositional.

It is certainly possible to resist this move. We might treat bare familial nouns as, effectively, nick-names: merely etymologically derived from the corresponding noun. Any view must acknowledge that nick-names exist, that they can be etymologically derived from other expressions, and that there can be local regularities in how they are assigned to individuals (*e.g.*, calling a large person 'Tiny'). Perhaps bare familial nouns should be assimilated to this practice. The suggestion can't be dismissed out of hand. I suspect that the practice of using bare familial nouns is systematic enough, and cross-linguistically robust enough, to make this suggestion implausible. But I'll just mark this is a choice-point and move on.[15]

I suspect that the proposed analogy with bare names is clear. The important thing here is that there is independent evidence for the kind of lexical rule which would be required to take a predicative lexeme and create an individual-denoting one. Thus evidence that bare names have individual-type semantic values is not substantial evidence that names do not have predicate-type underived semantic values. That evidence is perfectly consistent with names having predicative lexical semantic type but having an individual-denoting derivative form.

Before sketching an account of the relevant lexical rule, we can expand the analogy between bare familial nouns and bare names. Bare occurrences of **grandma**, like bare names, cannot occur with restrictive relative clauses. The relative clause in (19 a) must be interpreted non-restrictively while the one in (19 b) can be interpreted restrictively.[16]

(19) (a) Grandma, who is a well-known doctor, always urged me to go to medical school.

     (b) The grandmother who is a well-known doctor always urged me to go to medical school.

I noted above that the hypothesis that bare names have the semantics of definite descriptions is initially promising as a picture of their semantics. But it is ultimately unsatisfying. Definite descriptions have occurrences where their interpretation is relativized to the contributions of higher operators. In (20 a), **the oldest child** can be

---

[15]Thanks to a reviewer for pressing this issue.

[16]As with bare names, the default with bare familial nouns is to interpret prenominal adjective as non-restrictive, as in (17).

(17) Give my regards to dear Mother.

My sense is that it's roughly as easy to hear prenominal adjectives restrictively with both. Consider (18 a) and (18 b).

(18) (a) I gave young Alfred the cake.

     (b) I gave young Grandma the cake.

With the right intonation, you can hear **young** restrictively in either, though to my ears both are forced. See note (20) for a further discussion.

interpreted as covarying with the situations introduced by the quantifier **at every family reunion**. But even relative to a context in which it is common ground that there is exactly one Alfred at every family reunion, it can be difficult, for some speakers it is impossible, to hear a relativized reading of **Alfred** in (20 b). This is not what we would expect if NDH were true.[17]

(20) (a) At every family reunion, the oldest child misbehaves.

(b) At every family reunion, Alfred misbehaves.

We see the same pattern with bare occurrences of **grandma**. It is difficult to hear a relativized reading of **grandma** in (21 a). It is easy to hear one, given the right common ground, to hear a relativized reading of **the grandmother** in (23 b).

(21) (a) At every family reunion, Grandma misbehaves.[18]

(b) At every family reunion, the grandmother misbehaves.

Similar remarks apply to the rigidity of bare occurrences of names and familial nouns. Famously, Kripke (1980) argued that bare names are rigid designators. This means, among other things, that the interpretation of a bare name cannot be relativized to the possible worlds introduced by a modal operator. Definite descriptions are - or at least can be - non-rigid. One reflex of this difference, Kripke argued, is that there is a reading

---

[17]The issue is contested. Many predicativists claim that bare names have non-rigid readings. I discuss the issue extensively in (*Gray*, 2012). See also (*Geurts*, 1997), (*Bach*, 2002), (*Rothschild*, 2007), (*Elbourne*, 2005), (*Maier*, 2009), and (*Fara*, 2015a,b) (*Schoubye*, 2016b,a). It would be easy to alter the picture of the lexical rule if we wanted to allow for this.

[18]My own intuitions are relatively liberal here. I can easily access a relativized reading of both bare names and familial nouns in constructions like this given the right background. A reviewer suggests that there is a disanalogy between bare names and bare familial nouns: it is possible to access relativized readings of bare familial nouns in other constructions, but relativized readings of names, if available, are marked. Contrast (22a) and (22b).

(22) (a) In every family, Grandma misbehaves.
  (b) In every family, Alfred misbehaves.

Is it not easier to access a relativized reading of **Grandma** in (22a) than to access a relativized reading of **Alfred** in (22b)? The situation is complicated, and intuitions are not uniform here. But I agree with the reviewer that there might be a disanalogy here. Note, though, that in the right conditions, one can access relativized readings of bare names, consider (23).

(23) In every family with children named after the Osmonds, Donnie misbehaves.

It's unclear to me that this is more marked than the relativized reading of **Grandma** in (22a). The data here is messy, and the conditions under which relativization is possible are complex. The availability of relativized readings depends in complex ways on the interaction between the descriptive content of a DP, the range of quantification, common ground in a context, and audience expectations. I won't try to sort it out here (I try to make some sense of it in (*Gray*, 2012)). Even granting the reviewer's point, the main thrust of the analogy between bare names and bare familial nouns - the absence of a predicate in the syntax - would go through. We would simply have to posit different meanings for the derived individual-denoting expressions in the case of familial nouns and names.

on which (24 a) expresses a trivial falsehood. This is the reading on which the definite description **the oldest child** is interpreted relative to the contribution of the modal operator **might**. There is no trivially false reading of (24 b), which we would expect if bare names had the semantics of definite descriptions.

(24) (a) The oldest child might have had an older brother.

(b) Alfred might not have been named 'Alfred'.

We see the same pattern with bare occurrences of **grandma**. There is no reading on which (25 a) asserts a trivial falsehood; there is a reading in which (25 b) does.[19]

(25) (a) Grandma might not have had children.

(b) The grandmother might not have had children.

Again, there is a striking analogy between bare names and bare familial nouns along precisely the dimensions that have been most troubling for the hypothesis that bare names are definite descriptions. The behaviour of bare familial nouns is best explained by thinking of them as derived individual-denoting expressions. predicativists should treat bare names the same way.

I won't develop a detailed picture of the lexical rule which derives individual-denoting expressions from familial nouns here. It will be substantially similar to the to the kind of rule I describe below in relation to names. But I should provide some detail here to see potential divergences between the two rules. First, it might seem that the familial rule would have to involve phonological change (*e.g.* from **Grandmother** to **Grandma**). I've encouraged this thought by generally using reduced forms for bare occurrences. But phonological change is neither necessary nor sufficient for bare occurrence. In (26 a), **grandma** is used predicatively, and **mother** appears bare in (26 b).

(26) (a) Every grandma makes lovely pies.

(b) I'm going to ask mother for some more pie.

So we shouldn't build a phonological component into the lexical rule (and this respect it will be analogous the rule developed for bare names below). We should hold, instead, that both the basic and derived lexical items are associated with the same phonology (which allows for variation between non-reduced and reduced forms) and that the lexical

---

[19]These readings can be a little tricky to access. The overwhelming interpretive tendency is not to assign a sentence a trivially false reading where other interpretations are possible. It's easier to access the narrow-scope reading if we concoct a context in which **the grandmother** is a role-type description (in the sense of (*Rothschild*, 2007)). Imagine, for example, that we are conducting a study and we need input from different demographic groups. Among our requirements is that we need at least one grandmother, and no more than 5 people who have had children. Our colleague organizes the participants, he finds a grandmother but we end up with 6 people who have had children. In attempt to defend his decision-making process, he utters (25 b). He has said something trivially false. The important point here is that even relative to that scenario, a bare occurrence of **grandma** cannot receive the same interpretation.

rule doesn't alter that phonology. If there is a tendency for the reduced forms to be used bare - as there appears to be - we can appeal to Gricean considerations to explain this specialization.

Second, though I'll describe the individual-denoting meaning of bare familial nouns and bare names in the same way - they occurrences of them refer to the salient bearer of the relevant property - this masks important differences. Talk of "salience" is simply a place-holder for a real theory of reference-determination, and it seems likely that bare names and bare familial nouns select their reference from context in different ways. In particular, familial nouns are relational nouns. So it might be that the relational structure is preserved in the individual-denoting meaning and that interpreting them in a context requires anchoring them to an individual or group to whom the referent stands in the relevant relation.

5   OUTLINE OF A PROPOSAL

With all of this in place, it's relatively straightforward to characterize, at least in broad strokes, the sort of lexical rule which we would need to account for bare names. Simplifying substantially, we can think of a lexeme as characterized by a triple consisting of a phonological type, syntactic category, and semantic feature. We can model lexical rules as partial functions which take one of those triples as an input and return one as an output.

The lexical rule which takes names-qua-predicates and returns names-qua-singular-terms has no phonological effect, at least in English (this is not unusual, it is known as *zero-allomorphy*). How, precisely, to characterize the syntactic effect will depend on details of a favoured syntactic theory. On one way of thinking about the matter - modeled after Hankamer and Mikkelson's (2002) account of the lexical rule which generates suffixal definite descriptions in Danish - the rule changes the category of a name from *noun* to *intransitive determiner*. An intransitive determiner is a determiner which needs no arguments to generate a determiner phrase. Intransitive determiners can enter the syntax as complete determiner phrases.

So there are two ways for a name to enter the syntax. As as noun, in structures like (27 a), or as an intransitive determiner, in a structure like (27 b).

(27) (a)

13

(b)

```
              DP      VP
              |       |
              D       V
              |       |
           Alfred   walks
```

In the bare occurrence, (27 b), **Alfred** contributes no predicate to the syntax and thus contributes nothing which would license **one** or **also**. Thus lexical-rule predicativism avoids the unwanted predictions of NDH-predicativism.

Note also that given certain plausible assumptions - that restrictive modification has to occur at the NP level, while non-restrictive modification occurs at the DP - this proposal also explains why restrictive modification is impossible with bare names (see (*Hankamer and Mikkelsen*, 2002, Pg 167) for the same story about restriction with suffixal definite descriptions in Danish). There is no predicate in the syntax to be restricted.[20]

The semantic effect has been determined, in outline, by what we've already said: 1) A bare name refers to a contextually salient individual in the extension of the corresponding lexical predicate; 2) The interpretation of a bare name cannot be shifted by quantifiers or modal (or temporal) operators. So the lexical rule would take a predicate meaning and return a singular-term meaning which is context-sensitive, but insensitive to other parameters.[21] If we characterize basic predicative meaning of a name N as in (28).

(28) $[\![N_{predicative}]\!]^{c,g,w} = \lambda x.\ x$ is an N in w

The lexical rule will return an expression whose meaning can be characterized as in (29).

(29) $[\![N_{individual}]\!]^{c,g,w} =$ the salient individual who is an N in c^w

This is, at best, a rough outline. The important points are these: $N_{individual}$ is an individual-denoting expression; relative to a context c it refers to a salient individual who satisfies the basic lexical predicate, $N_{predicative}$, in the world of c; it is insensitive to the world and variable assignment parameters relative to which it is evaluated, so its interpretation is not effected by quantifiers or modal operators. This hypothesis avoids

---

[20]This raises the question of how to treat restrictive adjectival modification with bare names where it is possible. Given the analysis below, the only way to do this would be to treat those adjective as having monstrous - in the Kaplanian sense - meanings. They would have to shift the context parameter of the bare name. This seems reasonable, given how forced the readings are. It's worth mentioning that it's likely that any principled account here would have to appeal to some metalinguistic mechanism. Certainly any non-predicativist account would.

[21]Another possibility here, at least formally, would be a rule which generated a number of distinct individuals constants. In this way, predicativism could mimic the traditional philosophical account of bare occurrences of names. If we agree that bare names do not have a shiftable meaning - which not all predicativists do, see note (17) - than there is no knock-down reason not to go this route. Considerations of parsimony presumably tell strongly against it. Note that the situation is precisely analogous in the case of bare familial nouns.

the consequence, present in contemporary forms of predicativism, that bare names have shiftable meanings.

This is the basic shape of a proposal. I should stress, though, that it needs to be filled out. More would need to be done to integrate the proposal into a systematic syntactic framework (but see (*Hankamer and Mikkelsen*, 2002) for the basic assumptions that lie behind the proposal above).[22] One note on that front: an option here, which complicates the relationship between predicativism and competing views about names, would be to hold that names *qua* lexemes are neutral with respect to syntactic category but have individual-denoting and predicative forms.[23] This is closer to the approach to lexemes of distributed morphology; likewise *word and paradigm* approaches to inflection posit structure in the lexicon without positing derivation (*Matthews*, 1991, chap. 10).

But holding that names *qua* lexemes do not have a syntactic category wouldn't absolve us from having to characterize their semantic features. We would still need some account of the basic meaning of the lexeme, which is modified in the different forms. It seems, then, that we would still have to pick between a predicative and individual-type basic meaning. Or perhaps it would be possible to posit some other kind of basic meaning. A sort of intermediate option between predicativism and referentialism, which might gain support from comparisons with the interpretation of the pronouns (see (*Heim and Kratzer*, 1998, pg. 244)), would be to think of the basic semantic feature as a partial identity function, defined only for individuals who bear the relevant name (this is basically a referential filter for an individual-denoting expression). This would not straightforwardly be a version of predicativism or referentialism, but rather, a kind of synthesis of the two views.

And the semantic proposal, too, is merely a placeholder. The appeal to a *salient individual named N* in the characterization of the meaning of bare occurrences is certainly

---

[22]A substantial issue here would be how to extend the lexical-rule approach to languages in which names do not appear bare. NDH-predicativists can simply say that these are languages in which the article which goes unpronounced in English (and other bare-name languages) is pronounced (as the definite article or a special preproprial article). What should lexical-rule predicativists say? The answer here depends on the interpretive possibilities for such languages. If the relevant uses of names - ones that would be translated as bare occurrences - license predicate anaphora then the lexical-rule predicativist should simply say that those language do not contain the relevant lexical rule. If normal referential uses of names in those language *do not* license predicate anaphora, then lexical-rule predicativists should hold that these languages *do* contain the relevant lexical rule. At first blush this might seem strange to posit a lexical rule which generates an individual-denoting expression which occurs *with* an overt determiner (but note that NDH predicativists would have no very obvious explanation here either). In fact, though, this would fit with one standard approach to the syntax of such languages, which treats the overt definite article as expletive (that is, as making no semantic or pragmatic contribution - see (*Longobardi*, 1994)). For example, in their analysis of definiteness in modern Greek (one of the languages in which ordinary referential uses of names can occur with the overt determiner), (*Lekakou and Szendrői*, 2012, pg 115) conclude that "all instances of the Greek definite determiner are semantically expletive. What looks like the source of definiteness [that is, the overt determiner] is semantically empty[...]" This proposal, developed independently of considerations involving names, is consistent with the view that overt determiner combines with an expression that is already individual-denoting.

[23]Thanks to a reviewer for pressing this point.

not explanatory. The proposal above comes to nothing more than the claim that bare names are context-sensitive individual-denoting expression which can only refer to individuals who satisfy the corresponding name-predicate in the world of the context. That's enough to establish the basic structure. A more complete picture would require a theory of how bare names select their reference from context. This issue has been explored in various places in the literature on metalinguistic theories of names - see (*Pelczar and Rainsbury*, 1998), (*Rami*, 2014b), (*Gray*, 2017) - I won't go into it here.

The outline provided here is enough to motivate the idea that lexical-rule predicativism is a substantial improvement over NDH-predicativism. It avoids the unwanted predictions associated with holding that bare names are the articulations of predicates. It also provides a simple explanation of the way that the interpretative possibilities for bare names differ from those of definite descriptions.

6   ORDER OF PRIORITY[24]

We should consider whether the lexical rule approach makes life more difficult for predicativism in other ways. In particular, is it inconsistent with a natural picture of the nature of name-bearing?

There is an intuitive difference between the properties expressed by familial predicates and the properties expressed by predicative occurrences of names: the properties expressed by familial nouns are (plausibly) natural/social properties whose extension is determined independently of linguistic practices. The properties expressed by predicative interpretations of names are conventional properties whose extension is determined by linguistic practices. So far so good. But what kind of conventional properties are name-bearing properties? Another natural idea: name-bearing properties are metaphysically (or conceptually, or genealogically, ...) posterior to the use of names-qua-singular-terms: what it is for x be an Alfred is for there to be a practice of using 'Alfred' as a singular term to refer to x.

If this is on the right track there is an obvious disanalogy between the lexical rule approach to bare occurrences of familial nouns and the lexical rule approach to bare occurrences of names. It is plausible that the individual-denoting interpretation of familial nouns is derived from a more basic predicative interpretation. But, the thought goes, the individual-denoting interpretation of names cannot be derived from the predicative interpretation because the predicative interpretation expresses a property which constitutively depends on facts about individual-denoting uses of names.

This is a serious issue for predicativism, and one that cannot be fully addressed here. The typical response to this kind of worry on the part of predicativists is to reject the natural picture of name-bearing described above (in the literature, this worry is discussed in the context of Kripke's (1980, pg. 68) claim that metalinguistic approaches to names are viciously circular). Predicativists claim that there is no constitutive connection between name-bearing and reference. To take a characteristic example, Bach writes:

---

[24]Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this issue.

It is no more essential to the property of bearing a certain name that one be referred to by that name than it is essential to the property of having a certain social security number that one be referred to by that number (2002, pg. 83).

Similar ideas can be found in (*Burge*, 1973, pg. 435), (*Katz*, 1990, pg. 39-41) *(Geurts, 1997, pg. 326)*, (*Elbourne*, 2005, pg. 212), (*Bach*, 2015, pg. 777). These predicativists do not want to deny that it is, in some sense, the typical function of names to be used in reference. They only hold that name-bearing is not constitutively connected to reference. To understand name-bearing, they appeal to social practices, like baptisms or birth-certificates, by which names are assigned to individuals.

If these predicativists are on the right track, there is no order-of-priority problem for predicativism and thus no reason that the metaphysical difference between familial properties and name-bearing properties would be a problem for lexical-rule predicativism. As it happens, I think that this kind of response from the predicativist is implausible. It's difficult to avoid the thought that the nature of name-bearing is connected to reference. To see this, note that an individual can come to bear a name in virtue of the referential practices of a group of speakers (Evans' (1985) famous Madagascar case is an example of this kind). Predicativists, in my view, should face this challenge head-on and accept that name-bearing is constitutively connected to reference and argue that this is not problematic. Essentially, predicativists should hold that name-bearing properties are *response-dependent* referential properties: an individual bears a name in virtue of speakers' dispositions to presuppose that it does for the purposes of referential communication about it. Explicating and defending this approach falls beyond the scope of this paper, but see (*Gray*, 2014) and (*Gray*, ms) (for another predicativist who holds that name-bearing is constitutively related to reference and that this is not problematic, see (*Loar*, 1976, 1980)). The important upshot for our purposes is that if this approach is correct, we can hold that name-bearing is constitutively connected to reference *without* holding that predicative interpretations of names presuppose an independently characterizable individual-denoting use of names.

What we should do in this paper is explore whether the move from NDH-predicativism to lexical-rule predicativism alters the landscape with respect to this issue. And, again, if the traditional predicativist line is correct and name-bearing is not dependent on reference, then there is no issue. But supposing we are worried about an order-of-dependence issue, could moving from NDH-predicativism to lexical-rule predicativism make the matter worse?

On the face of it, it doesn't seem as though there should be any difference. Both the NDH approach and the lexical-rule approach hold that the meaning of names *qua* individual-denoting expressions is semantically derivative of the meaning of names *qua* predicates. They only differ on the nature of that derivation: the NDH approach appeals to syntactic/compositional generativity; the lexical-rule approach appeals to morphological generativity. So if the connection between name-bearing and reference poses a problem for the lexical rule approach, it should pose the same problem for the NDH

approach.

But perhaps this is too quick. If we understand the order-of-priority worry *temporally* rather than merely metaphysically or conceptually, it might interact with the lexical-rule approach in worrying ways. If reflection on the relation between name-bearing and reference establishes that there must have been individual-denoting uses of name *before* there were predicative uses, this might mean trouble for the lexical-rule approach. Suppose it follows from α's being morphologically derivative of β that there must have been occurrences of β *before* there were occurrences of α. Then lexical-rule predicativism would predict that there were predicative occurrences of names *before* there were individual-denoting ones.

I don't know how to assess the idea that the order-of-priority worry should be understood to entail this kind of temporal priority for individual-denoting occurrences of names. I'm not aware of any argument for it. The argument I mentioned briefly above - Madagascar cases, and the like - if they work, only establish a direction of metaphysical dependence of name-bearing on reference (and, recall, on the metaphysical interpretation of the priority issue, the lexical-rule approach is no worse-off than the NDH approach). Even if there is a direction of metaphysical dependence of name-bearing on name-reference, it wouldn't follow that there is a temporal priority of individual-denoting uses.

But the idea of temporal priority has some intuitive appeal, so let's see what follows if we grant that individual-denoting uses of names are temporally prior to predicative occurrences. This is only a special problem for lexical-rule Predicativism if appealing to structure in the lexicon always commits one to a claim about temporal priority. And I'm not aware of any reason to hold this very general claim about lexical generativity.

Suppose we discover a new species, looking at a group of them I say: "Let's call these things 'glunks'; there sure are a lot of glunks over there!". In this case, are we forbidden from holding that **glunks** is lexically derived from the noun **glunk** and the plural marker **-s**? I can't see any reason to think so. The claim about derivation is a claim about the structure of the lexicon, not about the history of the lexemes. But there were occurrences of **glunks** before there were occurrences of **glunk**. So lexical derivation doesn't imply temporal priority. It might be that there are some forms of lexical generativity for which temporal priority is the the norm, but I don't see any reason to hold that lexical derivation always entails temporal priority.

One more point here. As I mentioned at the end of section (5), there are pictures of morphological complexity which don't employ a distinction basic and derivative forms. Instead they posit a family of related forms which are different inflections of a basic meaning. Lexical-rule predicativism could just as easily work with this picture of morphological complexity - they would only need to assume that the core meaning is predicative. On this model - the *word and paradigm* model - there are no underived and derived items, there is just a family of related lexical items. So, even if morphological *derivation* implies temporal priority in some cases, predicativists could deploy a model of morphological complexity which doesn't posit derivation at all.

To sum up this section: there might be an order-of-priority problem for predicativism

with respect to names-qua-predicates and names-qua-individual-denoting. Most predicativists simply deny any form of essential dependence of name-bearing on name-reference. I am not particularly sympathetic to that denial; but acknowledging a sense in which name-bearing is dependent on reference is not a deal-breaker for predicativism. More importantly for us, there is only a particular problem for lexical-rule predicativism if the order of priority is understood as temporal, and if lexical derivation implies temporal priority. I don't know whether there is a plausible temporal version of the order-of-priority worry, but it doesn't seem that morphological structure implies temporal priority.

7 The relation between predicativism and other metalinguistic views

Predicativism is a particular version of a more general approach to proper names: the *metalinguistic* approach. Traditional philosophical approaches treat bare names as context-insensitive individual-denoting expressions. They must therefore treat ordinary names as lexically ambiguous; *e.g.* they must hold that a bare occurrence of **Alfred** which refers to Tarski and one which refers to Hitchcock are articulations of semantically unrelated lexical items. Metalinguistic approaches deny that names are lexically ambiguous in this way. Instead they hold that bare occurrences of a name are context-sensitive. What makes these approaches *metalinguistic* is the fact they posit a semantic role for *name-bearing properties* (the property of being an Alfred, being a Helen, *etc.*).[25] Metalinguistic approaches hold that the reference of an occurrence of a bare name is constrained, but not determined, by the distribution of the corresponding name-bearing property: a bare occurrence of **Alfred** can only refer to someone named 'Alfred', a bare occurrence of **Helen** can only refer to someone named 'Helen', *etc.*

Metalinguistic approaches differ along two dimensions: 1) their conception of the underived meaning of names, and 2) their conception of the syntax and semantics of bare occurrences. Predicativists hold that the basic lexical meaning of a name is predicative, and NDH-predicativists hold that bare names have the syntax and semantics of definite descriptions. Non-predicativist metalinguistic approaches hold that basic lexical meaning of a name is individual-denoting and that bare occurrences are articulations of this basic lexical meaning (that is, bare occurrences don't involve any unpronounced syntax). Different non-predicativist metalinguistic approaches differ with respect to the precise account of the individual-denoting meaning. Indexicalists - for example in (*Recanati*, 1997) and (*Pelczar and Rainsbury*, 1998), and (*Maier*, 2009) - model the meaning of names on the meaning of the so-called automatic indexicals (**I**, **you**, **here**, *etc.*). Each proper name is associated with a parameter in a context of utterance which, in proper contexts, can only be assigned to an individual who bears the relevant name. Variabilists - (*Fiengo and May*, 2006), (*Cumming*, 2008), (*Rami*, 2014b) and (*Schoubye*, 2016a) -

---

[25]In a sense, 'metalinguistic' is not a great term here, insofar as it might be taken to suggest that these views treat names as somehow quotative of other, more basic, expressions. This is clearly not what theorists have in mind. I stick with 'metalinguistic' to mark the fact that these theorists gloss the properties expressed by names in terms of linguistic ideas: *being called, being given a name, being dubbed, etc.*

model the meaning of names on the meaning of pronouns (**he**, **she**, **it**, *etc.*).[26] In Schoubye's recent version, each occurrence of a name is associated with a particular variable. The reference of an occurrence is determined by a variable assignment and a variable assignment counts as proper relative to the occurrence of a name just in case it assigns the associated variable is assigned to an individual who bears the relevant name.

The availability of lexical-rule predicativism complicates the relation between predicativist and non-predicativist approaches to proper names. Lexical-rule predicativists can *agree* with indexicalists/variabilists about the syntax and semantics of bare occurrences. What a non-predicativist treats as the basic lexical meaning of a name, a lexical-rule predicativist can treat as a derived lexical meaning. The rough individual-denoting meaning characterized in (29) is simply a generic version of the kind of meaning posited by non-predicativist metalinguistic accounts of names. We might wonder, then, how to choose between the two approaches.

Where lexical-rule predicativism and indexicalism/variabilism essentially differ is in their conception of the underived meaning of a proper name. Predicativists hold that the underived meaning is predicative; indexicalists/variabilists holds that it is individual-denoting. Lexical-rule predicativists must posit a rule which generates an individual-denoting lexical item. Indexicalists/variabilists must posit a lexical rule which generates the correct predicative meaning to account for predicative interpretations.

The choice between indexicalism/variabilist and predicativism therefore becomes the question of which direction of derivation - from predicate to individual-denoting, or from individual-denoting to predicate - is more plausible. The analogy with familial nouns above offers some significant evidence that a predicate-to-individual direction of the appropriate kind is independently motivated. But there is also relevant precedent for the other direction of derivation ((*Leckie*, 2013), (*Rami*, 2014b), (*Jeshion*, 2015) (*Schoubye*, 2016a), (*Gray*, 2017)). In addition, there is evidence that predicative interpretations of names are not as systematic in some languages as they are in English (see (*Schoubye*, 2016a), (*Delgado*, 2016-ms)). Progress will have to come from more careful attention to these questions. The point here is simply that the choice between predicativist and non-predicativist varieties of metalinguistic approach is unlikely to be settled by facts about the syntax/semantics of bare occurrences.

---

[26]Note that variabilists predict that bare occurrences are shiftable, at least via quantification. And some of them, hold that this is a desirable property. (*Cumming*, 2008) argues that we should treat the bare occurrence of **Earnest** as bound in (30).

(30)   There is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of 'Ernest'. Ernest is engaged to two
          women.

If we accept this, we could fashion a version of the lexical which would deliver the appropriate kind of meaning.

8 Conclusion

Predicativists should clearly distinguish two question: 1) What is the basic semantic type of proper names? 2) What is the semantic type of proper names when they appear bare? Most predicativists answer these questions the same way - holding that names universally have predicative semantic type - by positing a null determiner in the syntax of bare occurrences. That hypothesis faces serious challenges. An alternative picture, which treats bare names as the articulation of derived individual-denoting expressions, avoids those challenges. Lexical-rule predicativism gains independent support from an analogy with bare familial nouns and can be developed in a way that captures the difference in interpretive possibilities between bare names and definite descriptions. It thus promises a significant advantage over standard versions of predicativism.

References

Anderson, S. R. (Forthcoming), A short history of morphological theory, in *The Oxford Handbook of Morphological Theory*, Oxford University Press.

Bach, K. (1981), What's in a name?, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *59*, 371–86.

Bach, K. (2002), Giorgione was so-called because of his name, *Philosophical Perspectives*, *16*, 73–103.

Bach, K. (2015), The predicate view of proper names, *Philosophy Compass*, *10*(11), 772–784.

Bauer, L. (2001), *Morphological productivity*, vol. 95, Cambridge University Press.

Burge, T. (1973), Reference and proper names, *Journal of Philosophy*, *70*, 425–439.

Cumming, S. (2008), Variabilism, *Philosophical Review*, *18*, 525–554.

Delgado, L. (2016-ms), Between singularity and generality: The semantic life of proper names.

Elbourne, P. (2005), *Situations and Individuals*, MIT Press.

Embick, D., and A. Marantz (2008), Architecture and blocking, *Linguistic Inquiry*, *39*(1), 1–53.

Evans, G. (1985), The causal theory of names, in *Collected Papers*, pp. 1–24, Oxford University Press.

Fara, D. G. (2011), You can call me 'stupid', ... just don't call me stupid, *Analysis*, *71*(3), 492–501.

Fara, D. G. (2015a), Names are predicates, *Philosophical Review*, *124(1)*, 59–117.

Fara, D. G. (2015b), A problem for predicativism solved by predicativism, *Analysis*, *75*(3), 362–371.

Fiengo, R., and R. May (2006), *De lingua belief*, The MIT Press.

Geurts, B. (1997), Good news about the descriptions theory of names, *Journal of Semantics*, *14*(4), 319–348.

Gray, A. (2012), Names and name-bearing: An essay on the predicate view of names, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago.

Gray, A. (2014), Name-bearing, reference, and circularity, *Philosophical Studies*, *171*(2), 207–231.

Gray, A. (2015), Lexical individuation and predicativism about names, *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy*, *4*(2), 113–123.

Gray, A. (2017), Names in strange places, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *Online First: DOI: 10.1007/s10988-017-9205-z*, 1–44.

Gray, A. (ms), On the very idea of metalinguistic theories of names.

Halle, M., and A. Marantz (1994), Some key features of distributed morphology, *MIT working papers in linguistics*, *21*(275), 88.

Hankamer, J., and L. Mikkelsen (2002), A morphological analysis definite nouns in Danish, *Journal of Germanic Linguistics*, *14*, 137–175.

Harley, H., and R. Noyer (1999), Distributed morphology, *Glot international*, *4*(4), 3–9.

Hawthorne, J., and D. Manley (2012), *The Reference Book*, Oxford University Press.

Heim, I., and A. Kratzer (1998), *Semantics in Generative Grammar*, Blackwell.

Hornsby, J. (1976), Proper names: A defence of Burge, *Philosophical Studies*, *30*(4), 227–234.

Jeshion, R. (2014), Names not predicates, in *On Reference*, edited by A. Bianchi, pp. 223–248, Oxford University Press.

Jeshion, R. (2015), Referentialism and predicativism about proper names, *Erkenntnis*, *80*(2), 363–404.

Katz, J. J. (1990), Has the description theory of names been refuted?, in *Meaning and Method. Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam.*, edited by G. Boolos, pp. 31–61, Cambridge University Press.

King, J. (2006), Singular terms, reference and methodology in semantics, *Philosophical Issues*, *16*.

Kripke, S. (1980), *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press.

Leckie, G. (2013), The double life of names, *Philosophical Studies*, *165(3)*, 1139–1160.

Lekakou, M., and K. Szendrői (2012), Polydefinites in Greek: Ellipsis, close apposition and expletive determiners, *Journal of Linguistics*, *48*(01), 107–149.

Loar, B. (1976), The semantics of singular terms, *Philosophical Studies*, *30*, 353–377.

Loar, B. (1980), Names and descriptions: A reply to Michael Devitt, *Philosophical Studies*, *38*, 85–89.

Longobardi, G. (1994), Reference and proper names: A theory of N-movement in syntax and logical form, *Linguistic Inquiry*, *25*(4), 609–665.

Maier, E. (2009), Proper names and indexicals trigger rigid presuppositions, *Journal of Semantics*, (26), 253–315.

Matthews, P. H. (1991), Morphology (cambridge textbooks in linguistics), *New York: Cambridge University*.

Matushansky, O. (2006), Why Rose is the Rose: On the use of definite articles in proper names, in *Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 6*, edited by O. B. . P. C. Hofherr, pp. 285–307.

Matushansky, O. (2008), On the linguistic complexity of proper names, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *31*(5), 573–627.

Pelczar, M., and J. Rainsbury (1998), The indexical character of names, *Synthese*, *114*, 293–317.

Predelli, S. (2015), Who's afraid of the predicate theory of names?, *Linguistics and philosophy*, *38*(4), 363–376.

Rami, D. (2014a), On the unification argument for the predicate view on proper names, *Synthese*, *191*(5), 841–862.

Rami, D. (2014b), The use-conditional indexical conception of proper names, *Philosophical Studies*, *168*(1), 119–150.

Rami, D. (2015), The multiple uses of proper nouns, *Erkenntnis*, *80*(2), 405–432.

Recanati, F. (1997), *Direct Reference: From Language to Thought*, Blackwell.

Rothschild, D. (2007), Presupposition and scope, *Journal of Philosophy*, *104*, 71–106.

Sawyer, S. (2009), The modified predicate theory of proper names, in *New Waves in Philosophy*

of Language, edited by S. Sawyer, pp. 206–225, Palgrave MacMillan Press.

Schoubye, A. (2016a), Type ambiguous names, *Mind*, *Online First:* *https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv188*.

Schoubye, A. J. (2016b), The predicative predicament, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Online First. 10.1111/phpr.12336*.

Segal, G. (2001), Two theories of names, *Mind & Language*, *16* (5), 547–563.

Sloat, C. (1969), Proper nouns in English, *Language*, *45* (1), 26–30.