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Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism

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Abstract

Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition.

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Notes

  1. As affect is grounded by pleasure and displeasure/pain (Russell 1980)—core capacities of experience—affective states are analogous to experience; conversely, agentic states are inherently non-affective.

  2. Classically, it was thought that all those with moral responsibility possess moral rights, but not all those with moral rights possess responsibility. As an analogy, all doctors can be patients, though not all patients have the requisite knowledge to be doctors.

  3. Moral agency can also be split by valence into blame and praise (Bastian et al. 2011), harm and help (Gray and Wegner 2011a), and proscriptive and prescriptive (Janoff-Bulman et al. 2009)

  4. Dyadic completion is one implication of a dyadic template. Another is moral typecasting, which is the tendency to see others as either moral agents or moral patients (Gray and Wegner 2009). Typecasting is one reason why victims escape blame (Gray and Wegner 2011b), why people are willing to harm the saintly (Gray and Wegner 2009), and why good and evil deeds make people physically stronger (Gray 2010). For a review, see Gray et al. (2012c).

  5. The perceptual nature of victimhood casts doubt on evidence that uses “victimless” scenarios (e.g., Haidt 2001). Just because researchers do not see victims does not mean participants do not.

  6. Additionally arguing for unification, different cultures (i.e., liberals and conservative) are also both equally likely to possess moral conviction (Skitka and Bauman 2008)

  7. Indeed, dyadic completion occurs even for the experience of pain and pleasure (Gray 2012).

  8. There are a variety of deontological accounts (see Alexander and Moore 2008 for an overview). Here we focus on what most accounts share in common—the focus on moral rights and duties over consequences.

  9. There are patient-centered deontological accounts, which focus on moral rights such as treating people not as a means to an end, but as ends in and of themselves. These accounts, however, still fail because violations of moral right are not necessarily linked to consequences—i.e., the experience of suffering.

  10. More explicitly, we suggest that the conclusion typically reached from moral dumbfounding (Haidt et al. 2000) is analogous to the following fear-of-heights logic. <<You are terrified of heights. I tell you that you are completely safe. You begrudgingly acknowledge that this is true, but remain terrified. Given this explicit acknowledgment, I surmise that there must be some additional non-height related reason for your fear.>> In truth, there is no additional fear-inducing factor—you are simply unable to intuitively accept the lack of danger.

  11. For example, Sidgwick (1907) writes, “moralists of all schools … would agree that the moral judgments … relate primarily to intentional actions … on this point I do not think that any dispute need arise.”

  12. Of course, dyadic completion suggests that harm—whether past, present or potential—remains perceived. Indeed, people will connect intention to harm even when capable only through the magic of voodoo (Pronin et al. 2006)

  13. 41/66 is significantly higher than chance, χ 2 = 3.88, p < 0.05. Furthermore, judgments of immorality are significantly different from judgments of whether they would do it, χ 2 = 6.86, p < 0.05, suggesting that participants appreciated the difference between these two questions.

  14. indeed, we used two trolley scenarios in the previous section!

  15. Pessoa (2008) writes “The current view…[is that] many [brain] regions can be conceptualized as either ‘affective’ or ‘cognitive’. Popular examples are the amygdala in the domain of emotion and the lateral prefrontal cortex in the case of cognition. This prevalent view is problematic for a number of reasons. Here, I will argue that complex cognitive–emotional behaviours have their basis in dynamic coalitions of networks of brain areas, none of which should be conceptualized as specifically affective or cognitive.”

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  1. Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill, CB #3270 Davie Hall, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA

    Kurt Gray & Chelsea Schein

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For helpful comments we thank Brendan Ritchie. For Fig. 3, we thank Aaron Scott.

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Gray, K., Schein, C. Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 405–423 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0112-5

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