Abstract
Our experiences of heat and cold are usually thought to represent states of things: their hotness and coldness. I propose a novel account according to which their contents are not states of things but processes, more specifically, the opposite processes of thermal energy being transmitted to and from the body, respectively. I call this account the Heat Exchange Model of heat perception. Having set out the evidence in support of the proposal, I conclude by showing how it provides a new perspective on some old problems.
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Notes
Here I remain neutral with regards to views that seek to explain fully the phenomenal content of experience in terms of the properties represented by experience and views that endorse phenomenal modes of presentation of such properties. Indeed, much of what I say here will be consistent with a naïve realist view according to which mind-independent objects of experience constitute the phenomenology of experience.
Vesey (1960, p. 202).
Armstrong (1962, p. 39).
Armstrong (1963, p. 361).
Armstrong (1962, p. 16); the emphasis is Armstrong’s.
Locke (1975), Book 2, Chap. 8, Sect. 21.
It is at this point that it might be suggested that hotness and coldness are non-physical properties of things, albeit dependent on physical properties of things, as a ‘simple’ view of colours would claim. Space prevents a proper discussion of this suggestion here. However, one difficulty that this view would have to address is the way in which the hotness and coldness of things, in contrast to colours, seems to be in some way constitutively related to our perception of them.
This relational physical property view is not the view proposed by Armstrong, which holds that the tactile perception of heat represents a difference, i.e. a relation, although there are close similarities.
Parallel considerations would apply to the claim that heat and cold sensations represent the dispositional properties objects have to heat us up or cool us down. The approach may provide some explanation of our representation of the hotness and coldness of other things but not the hotness and coldness of parts of our own bodies.
Strang (1961).
Akins (1996).
For a recent review of empirical data see Schepers and Ringkamp (2009).
The presence of two different types of receptors that respond in a non-linear way to increases in temperature is used by Akins as evidence that thermoreception does not detect temperature as a thermometer does. She also cites in favour of her narcissistic account of thermoreception that there are far more cold receptors than hot receptors distributed over the body and that each type of receptor is not uniformly distributed over the body. This second feature of the thermoreceptive system, however, only shows that some parts of the body are more sensitive than other parts of the body, not that thermoreception is non-representational.
Kenshalo et al. (1968).
Stevens (1991).
It is somewhat surprising that Akins does not consider the possibility that thermoreception represents heat exchanged for she cites other evidence that also supports the view. For instance, she cites the way that when the hand goes from warm water to hot water it feels much hotter than when going from tepid water to warm water even though the temperature differential in the two cases is the same. She claims that what is important is that in the former case the hand is closer to a temperature that would damage the hand. That is right. But it is also true that in the former case more energy has been transferred to the hand than in the latter case.
See Ratcliffe (2012, p. 418) for the claim and an expression of the apparent variety of contents of heat perception.
Strang (1961, p. 246).
Smith (2002, pp. 143–145) notes how, in the case of radiant heat, we just feel the heat of an object. To perceive that the heat belongs to the object requires other senses. Smith argues that when we move with respect to a heat source, it becomes apparent that the heat sensations have a distal source. He concludes that the integration of self-movement with sensory fields is a condition for perception in such cases. I agree that we are able to determine the location of heat sources only by means of capacities that are distinct from the heat sensations themselves.
Strang (1961, pp. 247).
Aristotle (1931) Book 2, Chap. 11.
Ratcliffe (2012). It is worth pointing out that if the heat exchange model is right then the seemingly novel contents of the wetness and oiliness of things would involve misrepresentation. For if our experiences of heat and cold were not experiences of properties of objects, there would be no such properties of objects represented by experiences of wetness and oiliness.
See Macpherson (2011) for a discussion of types of cross-modal experiences.
For a recent account of the role of bodily sensation in tactile perception, which also discusses other accounts of touch, see Richardson (2011). She is not explicit about whether her account is intended to cover heat perception. The heat exchange model of heat perception and her account of the role of sensations in touch are not obviously inconsistent. Nevertheless, my point here is that the features that the heat exchange model tells us are perceived by means of heat and cold sensations are sufficiently different from the properties of objects perceived by tactile sensations—in particular, they are not properties of things—as to lead one to question the incorporation of heat perception under touch.
Ho and Jones (2006).
Ratcliffe (2012, p. 418).
References
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Acknowledgments
Versions of this paper were presented to audiences in Heraklion, Trnava, Cardiff and Bristol; my thanks to them for their comments. I am grateful to Nicholas Shackel and Matthew Ratcliffe for providing written comments on earlier drafts. Finally, my thanks go to Brian Keeley, with whom I discussed many of the ideas of the paper at an early stage, and to an anonymous referee for a series of very helpful comments at a later stage.
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Gray, R. What do our experiences of heat and cold represent?. Philos Stud 166 (Suppl 1), 131–151 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5