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Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Arthur R. Greenberg
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Extract

In recent years renewed interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy has led to fruitful discussion of Reid's theories of sensation and perception. Although certain aspects of these topics can be discussed without setting out Reid's version of the primary-secondary quality distinction, the ultimate evaluation of Reid's work on both sensation and perception requires discussion of his views on primary and secondary qualities. Current Reid literature virtually ignores this important topic. This paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. In addition to setting out Reid's position on primary and secondary qualities I will discuss Reid's curious relation to the New Science of his day and will explain how Reid thought he could reintroduce the primary-secondary quality distinction despite Berkeley's attacks on the doctrine.

In both of his major works, An Inquiry Into The Human Mind (1764), and Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man (1785), Thomas Reid was intent upon examining the philosophical problems of human knowledge. In the Inquiry perception received his exclusive attention. In the Essays other cognitive operations were examined as well. The impetus for these investigations was provided by Reid's negative assessment of the achievements of his philosophical predecessors.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 4: New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism , 1978 , pp. 207 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1978

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References

1 Reid, Thomas, Philosophical Works, Bracken, H.M. (ed.), 2 volumes, (Hildesheim, Germany: Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), Volume One, p. 96.Google Scholar Hereafter references will be given as follows: Inquiry, PW, 1, p. 96.

2 Inquiry, PW, 1, p. 97 and Essays, PW, 1, pp. 249-251.

3 Essays, PW, 1, p. 220.

4 Essays, PW, 1, p. 222.

5 Essays, PW, 1, pp. 248-252.

6 Reid suggested that Aristotle, Hume, and Locke can be interpreted as having committed this error. Essays, PW, 1, pp. 253-254.

7 Reid claimed that among modern writers Newton and Clarke seem to subscribe to this view, and Descartes and Locke sometimes write as if they did, too. Essays, PW, 1, pp. 254-256. .

8 For Reid's specific injunctions against analogical reasoning with respect to mind and body see Essays, PW, 1, p. 237 and p. 254.

9 Essays, PW, 1, pp. 223, 224.

10 Essays, PW, 1, p. 229.

11 Essays, PW, 1, p. 229.

12 Essays, PW, 1, p. 311. Reid held that many sensation words are ambiguous, referring to properties of physical objects as well as to sensations. This doctrine of sensation term ambiguity will be discussed later in this paper.

13 This reliance on the quantifiable is epitomized by Galileo's famous claim about the character of Natural Philosophy. Galilei, Galileo, “The Assayer,” tr. by Drake, Stillman, The Controversy on the Comets of 1618 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 183-184.Google Scholar

14 Boyle, Robert, Some Specimens of An Attempt to make Chymical Experiments useful to illustrate the notions of the Corpuscular Philosophy, in The Works of Robert Boyle, 6 vols. (London, 1772), 1, pp. 355-356.Google Scholar For a thorough account of the development of the mechanistic view of nature of this period see Boas, Marie, “The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,”; Osiris, 10-11 (1952-54), pp. 412-541CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Galileo Galilei, “The Assayer,” p. 311.

16 Descartes, Rene, The Principles of Philosophy, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Haldane, and Ross, eds. 2 vols. (New York, 1955), 1, p. 296.Google Scholar

17 This distinction between sensible and structural odor can be somewhat misleading when applied to Reid's construal of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. We shall see that he held that secondary qualities (of bodies) are perceived but that terms used for them also designate sensations. Reid claimed that secondary qualities are perceived causal qualities of bodies. They cannot be distinctly and non-relationally conceptualized, unlike primary qualities. Secondary qualities are determined by the structural make-up of the bodies having them. The structural arrangements are not perceived.

18 For the different uses of “secondary quality” on the part of Locke and Berkeley see R. Jackson, “Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities,“ Mind, Vol. 38 (1929). Jackson claims that Berkeley misunderstands Locke. W.H.F. Barnes argues, in response to Jackson, that although Berkeley uses “secondary quality” in a different sense than Locke, he did not misunderstand him. See W.H.F. Barnes, “Did Berkeley Misunderstand Locke?” Mind, Vol. 49 (1940).

19 Essays, PW, 1, p. 313.

20 Essays, PW, 1, p. 313.

21 Essays, PW, 1, p. 314.

22 Essays, PW, 1, p. 314.

23 Essays, PW, 1, p. 314.

24 Essays, PW, 1, p. 310.

25 Essays, PW, 1, p. 310.

26 Essays, PW, 1, p. 310.

27 Essays, PW, 1, p. 319.

28 Essays, PW, 1, p. 315.

29 Essays, PW, 1, p. 313.