Abstract
I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, Epistemic Luck. The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between safety and intellectual virtue.
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Greco, J. Worries about Pritchard’s safety. Synthese 158, 299–302 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9040-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9040-1