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From Physical Time to a Dualistic Model of Human Time

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Abstract

There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time (the flow/passage of time) is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component (e.g. change, motion, and temporality) has both an illusory and non-illusory (‘real’) aspect. With the dualistic model we are able to provide experimental tests for all of the human time assertions of 10 chosen spacetime cosmologies. The illusory aspect of the ‘present,’ i.e. a ‘unique present’ was confirmed. An information gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) was constructed using a virtual reality (VR) apparatus allowing the observer to experientially roam back and forth along the worldline ad lib. The phenomenon of ‘change’ was experimentally found to be illusory at high frequency observation and non-illusory (‘real’) at low frequency observation, the latter phenomenon coinciding with ‘change’ referred to in the ‘Order of Time’ and ‘Relativity Refounded’ views. Additional experiments are presented indicating that both motion and temporality are dualistic. In sum, the dualistic model of human time allows for the existence of both illusory and non-illusory (‘real’) aspects of human time that are not in conflict with one another. It also provides experimental evidence for various spacetime cosmological assertions regarding human time.

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Fig. 1

Figure modified from Hartle (2005)

Fig. 2

Figure is modified from Hartle (2005)

Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Figure modified from Hartle (2005)

Fig. 5

From Gruber (2008)

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Notes

  1. Reduction of the visual field is known to cause a loss of immersion and consequently loss of ‘presence’ in VR systems and therefore an expected failure to experience ‘being there.’ A second test was performed to provide a within-subject control group. All participants were tested again using the same protocol except that the peripheral field (on the cameras) was reduced by 30%. The result in all was the experience of a video replay but no ‘presence’, i.e., no experience of ‘being in the past.’ The results were significant to p < 0.05 using a non-parametric Cochran-Q test and confirmed with an exact McNemar’s test in which there was a statistically significant difference in the proportion of participants who responded yes to both questions, when experiencing VR in 100% visual field and 30% visual field, p = 0.016. This result is in accordance with that of Burdea and Coiffet (2013) who noted that ‘presence’ is a key feature resulting from immersion by VR.

  2. In a separate pilot IGUS experiment we allowed the human IB robot to observe a remote controlled toy dog to roam about as the observer went ‘back and forth in time.’ When the IB robot sees the dog on his left in the ‘past’ and then suddenly sees it on his right (when he/she presses the control button to return to the ‘present’) the only reasonable conclusion is that the dog is not the same one. The dog is not persistent, and we can assume that the same would apply to all objects and even the observer if tested for.

  3. The Hollingworth experiment can be a simple and easy didactic presentation with the aid of a PowerPoint program. Informally, we replicated it a few times and also found (as one might expect) dynamic change at ISI = 0.

  4. Herzog et al (2016) provide a two-stage information processing model to account for discrete perception and also consciousness. They suggest that like other features, temporal features, such as duration, are coded as quantitative labels. When unconscious processing is ‘completed,’ all features are simultaneously rendered conscious at discrete moments in time, sometimes even hundreds of milliseconds after stimuli were presented. Their model challenges prominent theories on the philosophy of mind, which considers that consciousness is a continuous stream. However, they do acknowledge that the phenomenal experience of events has the appearance of continuity. Herzog et al (2016) provide a two-stage information processing model to account for discrete perception and also consciousness. They suggest that like other features, temporal features, such as duration, are coded as quantitative labels. When unconscious processing is ‘completed,’ all features are simultaneously rendered conscious at discrete moments in time, sometimes even hundreds of milliseconds after stimuli were presented. Their model challenges prominent theories on the philosophy of mind, which considers that consciousness is a continuous stream. However, they do acknowledge that the phenomenal experience of events has the appearance of continuity.

  5. We provide an example of a cinematographic spatiotemporal changes of a bird. (seen at Nature of Time conference at Stanford University in 2018. www.natureoftime.com; lecture by R. P. Gruber). Despite the absence of DPC and a continuous smooth movement, there is enough spatiotemporal information for the hunter to take an accurate shot. Thus, having a cognitive add-on of dynamism is clearly desirable but not necessarily critical.

  6. A more physical way of describing the difference between these two neuropsychological properties of motion and change is as follows: motion is an Eulerian specification, in which derivatives are defined with respect to a fixed point in space. Change is a Lagrangian specification, in which derivatives are defined with respect to the path of a particular small element (Rensink 2002).

  7. We were able to replicate Nakashima and Yokosawa’s (2012) experiment. The questions asked of the participant were altered to emphasize that there is an actual experience of completed motion in the form of a cognitive ‘inference’. At about1000 seconds participants would say: “I couldn’t see it actually move” but know it “must have just happened.”

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank James Hartle, Julian Barbour and Ryan P. Smith for helpful discussions of this complex topic. Also many thanks to David Karp and Stephen Waddell for their technical expertise that made the VR experiment possible.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University Medical Center, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

    Ronald P. Gruber

  2. Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, USA

    Carlos Montemayor

  3. Department of Psychology, Montana State University, Bozeman, USA

    Richard A. Block

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  1. Ronald P. Gruber
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  2. Carlos Montemayor
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  3. Richard A. Block
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Correspondence to Ronald P. Gruber.

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Gruber, R.P., Montemayor, C. & Block, R.A. From Physical Time to a Dualistic Model of Human Time. Found Sci 25, 927–954 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09670-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09670-4

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